- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. v. State Of M.P And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a public limited company owning a paper manufacturing plant at Amlai in the District of Shahdol, Madhya Pradesh, uses bamboo and other materials as raw inputs. Although it routinely paid market fee when it bought or sold notified agricultural produce within a market area, it refused to pay such fee on bamboo brought from outside the State directly to its factory because, in its view, the bamboo was neither bought nor sold, nor brought into the market area for the purpose of sale.
The Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Budhar, nonetheless issued a notice demanding market fee on the ground that the appellant’s premises lay within its market area and that the bamboo was “used for processing” within the meaning of the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (“the Act”). The appellant challenged the demand by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which upheld the levy and dismissed the petition.
Against that decision the appellant filed the present civil appeal before the Supreme Court of India. A connected transfer petition involving the same controversy was heard together with the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether bamboo, a notified agricultural produce, brought into a market area solely for use as a raw material in manufacturing paper attracts market fee under Section 19(1)(ii) of the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972.
- Whether the term “processing” in Section 2(1)(mmm) of the Act includes manufacturing activities so that notified produce used in manufacture can be subjected to market fee.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- Section 19(1)(ii) authorises levy only when notified produce brought into a market area is “used for processing.” The bamboo is used for manufacture, not for processing, and therefore falls outside the charging provision.
- The High Court erred by overlooking the cumulative requirement of both “bringing in” and “use for processing.”
- Where statutory language is clear, courts must apply its plain meaning irrespective of policy considerations.
Respondents’ (State and Market Committee) Arguments
- Manufacture necessarily involves processing; hence bamboo used in manufacture is “used for processing,” attracting the levy.
- Section 19(1)(ii) contemplates two situations—sale transactions and mere entry of produce into the market area; the present case fits the latter category.
- Adopting the appellant’s interpretation would defeat the object of the statute and erode the market fee regime.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Orient Paper & Industries Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 655 | Previous dispute involving similar parties under the Act | Court noted the citation but found it irrelevant to the present controversy. |
| CCE v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works, (1991) 4 SCC 473 | Explained the breadth of “processing” and its relationship to manufacture | Relied upon for analytical distinction between processing and manufacturing stages. |
| CST v. Coco Fibres, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 290 | Defined “manufacture” as bringing into existence a commercially distinct article | Used to emphasise that manufacture is a distinct concept from processing. |
| Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Haryana State Board, (1992) 1 SCC 418 | Clarified that manufacture produces a new commercial product whereas processing may not | Cited to underline that manufacture is not automatically “processing.” |
| Ujagar Prints (II) v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488 | Test for determining when processing becomes manufacture | Supported the Court’s reasoning that a sharp line is difficult but necessary in context of the statute. |
| Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 314 | Doctrine that manufacture requires emergence of goods with distinct name, use and character | Cited while holding that bamboo converted into pulp creates a new product only at manufacturing stage. |
| Kores India Ltd. v. CCE, (2005) 1 SCC 385 | Restated principles distinguishing manufacture and processing | Referenced as contemporary affirmation of earlier jurisprudence. |
| State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 437 | Plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation | Applied to reject purposive construction urged by respondents. |
| Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271 | When statutory words are clear, courts cannot adopt alternative interpretation | Used to bolster adoption of literal reading of Section 19(1)(ii). |
| Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85, 8 ER 1034 | Classical articulation of the plain meaning rule | Quoted to reinforce that legislative intent is best found in the words themselves. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by examining Section 2(1)(mmm), which defines “processing” as powdering, crushing, polishing, and other preparatory treatments prior to final consumption. It juxtaposed this definition with Section 19(1)(ii), which imposes market fee on notified produce “brought … into the market areas and used for processing.” The Court stressed that both elements—entry into the market area and actual use for processing—must co-exist to trigger liability.
To resolve whether manufacturing equates to processing, the Court surveyed precedent distinguishing the two concepts. It noted that “manufacture” involves transformation into a new, commercially distinct product, whereas “processing” may involve intermediary or subordinate operations that do not necessarily yield a new commercial article. Bamboo converted to pulp is part of a manufacturing sequence culminating in paper, and the end-use here is manufacturing, not processing within the statutory sense.
Consequently, the levy cannot be justified merely because some processing occurs during manufacture; the statutory focus remains on whether the purpose of bringing the produce into the area was processing. The respondents’ argument that statutory objectives warranted a broader reading was rejected in view of the plain meaning rule reaffirmed in Govind Singh, Nathi Devi, and the Sussex Peerage case.
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that bamboo brought in solely as raw material for paper manufacture does not satisfy Section 19(1)(ii). Therefore, the Market Committee lacked authority to levy the market fee on the appellant.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed. The impugned judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was set aside, and the connected transfer petition was disposed of without separate orders.
Direct Effect: The appellant is relieved from liability to pay market fee on bamboo brought into the market area for manufacturing paper. Broader Implication: The decision clarifies that under the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972, market fee is leviable only when notified agricultural produce is actually used for “processing” as statutorily defined, not merely when it undergoes incidental processing within a manufacturing activity.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— The civil appeal and the transfer petition are interlinked and are taken together for disposal.
2. Background facts involved are essentially as follows:
A writ petition was filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The basic stand of the appellant was that it is not eligible to pay any market fee under the M.P Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Before the High Court it was projected that the appellant is a public limited company having its registered head office at Brajrajnagar (Orissa) and has a paper manufacturing plant at Amlai in the district of Shahdol in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The appellant Company uses bamboo, wood, dyes, starch rosin, talcum and several chemicals as raw material for production of paper. The manufacturing process consists of crushing bamboos and wood pieces into pulp to which chemicals are added at a subsequent stage. Elaborate description was given as to how the manufacturing process takes place. It was paying without any demur the market fee to the Mandi Samiti whenever the appellant bought or sold any agricultural produce either within the market area or the market yard. It had never disputed the liability to pay such fee for purchase made in the area in question. No market fee is payable on the agricultural produce when they are neither bought or sold or brought into the market area for the purpose of sale. The appellant has been getting the agricultural produce from outside the State to its manufacturing unit at Amlai for being used as one of the raw materials and hence, the same would not be covered under the provisions of the Act. It is not disputed that bamboo as well as wood are specified (sic notified) agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act.
3. Stand of the appellant was that when it brought the agricultural produce a demand was raised in exercise of power under the Act that it has been brought inside the market area for the purpose of process on the ground that Amlai Paper Mills is included within the area of the respondent Mandi Samiti, Budhar. A notice was issued by the Director, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Budhar to which the appellant has filed his show-cause. It was also averred that the Director, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti issued a general circular fixing the liability of persons who are liable to pay the market fee. At that juncture, the appellant moved the High Court by filing a writ petition challenging the view taken by the authorities in the matter.
4. The writ petition was resisted by the State and the Market Committee, inter alia, taking the stand that the levy of market fee is in order. The High Court upheld the stand of the State and the Committee and dismissed the writ petition.
5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the levy can be made only in respect of the notified agricultural produce which is brought into market areas for processing. In the instant case, the notified agricultural produce brought inside the market area is not used for the purpose of processing, and the end-user is manufacturer. Therefore, the High Court has clearly erred in holding that the Market Committee was authorised to levy market fee.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the Market Committee and the State submitted that the end-user may be manufacturer, but in the process of manufacture processing is involved and, therefore, the levy is in order.
7. Though reference was made to a decision of this Court in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. (1995) 1 SCC 655 by learned counsel for the respondents, the issue really has no relevance so far as the present dispute is concerned.
8. The stand of the respondent further is that in the process of manufacture bamboo is processed to pulp which is primary raw material for the purpose of manufacture of paper.
9. In order to appreciate the rival submissions, it is necessary to take note of few provisions of the Act. “Processing” is defined in Section 2(1)(mmm). The same reads as follows:
“2. (1)(mmm) ‘processing’ means powdering, crushing, decorticating, husking, parboiling, polishing, ginning, pressing, curing or any other treatment to which an agricultural produce or its product is subjected to before final consumption;”
10. Section 19 deals with the power to levy market fee. The provision reads as follows:
“19. Power to levy market fee.—(1) Every Market Committee shall levy market fee,—
(i) on the sale of notified agricultural produce whether brought from within the State or from outside the State into the market area; and
(ii) on the notified agricultural produce whether brought from within the State or from outside the State into the market areas and used for processing;
at such rates as may be fixed by the State Government from time to time subject to a minimum rate of fifty paise and a maximum of two rupees for every one hundred rupees of the price in the manner prescribed:
Provided that no Market Committee other than the one in whose market area the notified agricultural produce is brought for sale or processing by an agriculturist or trader, as the case may be, for the first time shall levy such market fee.
(2) The market fees shall be payable by the buyer of the notified agricultural produce and shall not be deducted from the price payable to the seller:
Provided that where the buyer of a notified agricultural produce cannot be identified, all the fees shall be payable by the person who may have sold or brought the produce for sale in the market area:
Provided further that in case of commercial transaction between traders in the market area, the market fees shall be collected and paid by the seller:
Provided also that no fees shall be levied up to 31-3-1990 on such agricultural produce as may be specified by the State Government by notification in this behalf if such produce has been sold outside the market yard or sub-market yard by an agriculturist to a cooperative society of which he is a member:
Provided also that for the agricultural produce brought in the market area for commercial transaction or for processing the market fee shall be deposited by the buyer or processor as the case may be, in the Market Committee office within fourteen days if the buyer or processor has not submitted the permit issued under sub-section (6) of Section 19.”
(underlined for emphasis)
11. Undisputedly, the notified agricultural produce in the instant case is “bamboo”. During the pendency of the appeal, it was brought to the notice of this Court that in the judgment impugned in the appeal certain directions were given more particularly in para 18 thereof. The directions read as follows:
18. Submission of Mr Gupta is that the bamboos are brought into the market area and used in manufacturing as one of the raw materials and, therefore, concept of processing as has been defined under the statute would not be attracted. Learned counsel submitted that if the agricultural produce is brought inside the market area and is not used for processing, market fee cannot be levied. The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has substantial force. We are inclined to hold that if Section 19(1)(ii) is read in proper perspective it becomes plain as noon day that the market fee is leviable on the notified agricultural produce when it is brought into the market area and used for processing. If the goods are brought only into the market area and are not used for processing certainly it cannot be liable to the levy of market fee. Both the aspects are to be read in a composite manner. To put it differently it has to be given the cumulative effect of bringing in and used for processing which would give/create the factum of liability. In absence of the produce being used for processing the liability cannot be saddled or fastened. While we are accepting the submission of Mr Gupta we are not inclined to adjudicate the fact whether the petitioner is engaged in processing or not as in our considered view that lies in the realm of factual aspect and would be adjudicated by the competent authority. Needless to emphasise it would be open to the competent authority to delve upon the fact whether the produce which is brought inside the market area is used for processing and is brought for some other purpose, and take a decision. If the petitioner seeks a personal hearing the same shall be afforded to it. Mr Saxena, learned Senior Counsel, has no objection to the aforesaid hearing being given to the petitioner.
12. Pursuant to the directions, the Additional Director, Madhya Pradesh State Agriculture Marketing Board, Bhopal considered the matter. By order dated 7-2-2006 he held that the appellant is liable to pay market fee as process of agricultural produce.
13. The distinction between “manufacturing” and “processing” has been examined by this Court in several cases.
14. According to Oxford Dictionary one of the meanings of the word “process” is “a continuous and regular action or succession of actions taking place or carried on in a definite manner and leading to the accomplishment of some result”. The activity contemplated by the definition is perfectly general requiring only the continuous or quick succession. It is not one of the requisites that the activity should involve some operation on some material in order to effect its conversion to some particular stage. There is nothing in the natural meaning of the word “process” to exclude its application to handling. There may be a process, which consists only in handling and there may be a process, which involves no handling or not merely handling but use or also use. It may be a process involving the handling of the material and it need not be a process involving the use of material. The activity may be subordinate but one in relation to the further process of manufacture. Any activity or operation, which is the essential requirement and is so related to the further operations for the end result, would also be a process in or in relation to manufacture. (See CCE v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works (1991) 4 SCC 473.)
15. In Black's Law Dictionary, (5th Edn.), the word “manufacture” has been defined as,
“The process or operation of making goods or any material produced by hand, by machinery or by other agency; anything made from raw materials by the hand, by machinery, or by art. The production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving such materials new forms, qualities, properties or combinations, whether by hand labour or machine.”
Thus by manufacture something is produced and brought into existence which is different from that out of which it is made in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercial commodity capable of being sold or supplied. The material from which the thing or product is manufactured may necessarily lose its identity or may become transformed into the basic or essential properties. (See CST v. Coco Fibres 1992 Supp (1) SCC 290.)
16. Manufacture implies a change but every change is not manufacture, yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. Naturally, manufacture is the end result of one or more processes through which the original commodities are made to pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one class to another. There may be several stages of processing, a different kind of processing at each stage. With each process suffered the original commodity experiences a change. Whenever a commodity undergoes a change as a result of some operation performed on it or in regard to it, such operation would amount to processing of the commodity; but it is only when the change or a series of changes take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place. Process in manufacture or in relation to manufacture implies not only the production but also various stages through which the raw material is subjected to change by different operations. It is the cumulative effect of the various processes to which the raw material is subjected to that the manufactured product emerges. Therefore, each step towards such production would be a process in relation to the manufacture. Where any particular process is so integrally connected with the ultimate production of goods that but for that process processing of goods would be impossible or commercially inexpedient, that process is one in relation to the manufacture. (See CCE v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works (1991) 4 SCC 473.)
17. “Manufacture” is a transformation of an article, which is commercially different from the one, which is converted. The essence of manufacture is the change of one object to another for the purpose of making it marketable. The essential point thus is that in manufacture something is brought into existence, which is different from that, which originally existed in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercially different commodity whereas in the case of processing it is not necessary to produce a commercially different article. (See Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Haryana State Board (1992) 1 SCC 418.)
18. The prevalent and generally accepted test to ascertain that there is “manufacture” is whether the change or the series of changes brought about by the application of processes take the commodity to the point where, commercially, it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but is, instead, recognised as a distinct and new article that has emerged as a result of the process. There might be borderline cases where either conclusion with equal justification can be reached. Insistence on any sharp or intrinsic distinction between “processing and manufacture”, results in an oversimplification of both and tends to blur their interdependence. [See Ujagar Prints (II) v. Union of India (1989) 3 SCC 488.]
19. To put it differently, the test to determine whether a particular activity amounts to “manufacture” or not is: Do new and different goods emerge having distinctive name, use and character? The moment there is transformation into a new commodity commercially known as a distinct and separate commodity having its own character, use and name, whether it be the result of one process or several processes “manufacture” takes place and liability to duty is attracted. Etymologically the word “manufacture” properly construed would doubtless cover the transformation. It is the transformation of a matter into something else and that something else is a question of degree, whether that something else is a different commercial commodity having its distinct character, use and name and commercially known as such from that point of view is a question depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. (See Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 3 SCC 314.)
20. These aspects were highlighted in Kores India Ltd. v. CCE (2005) 1 SCC 385.
21. The stand of learned counsel for the respondents that the levy is under two circumstances i.e (i) on the buying and selling of notified agricultural produce when brought within the State into the market area (ii) on the notified agriculture produce when brought from within the State or from outside the State into the market areas. The case at hand, it is submitted, relates to the second category.
22. Had it been only that the goods notified brought into the market area are to be covered by the second category then the stand of the respondents would have been acceptable. But the further condition that it must be “used for processing” shows that the emphasis is on end-user. In this case that makes the difference. Therefore, the appellant is correct in its stand that levy on the notified agriculture produce being brought within market area where the end-user is manufacture does not attract levy of market fee.
23. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that by accepting the interpretation suggested by them, the object of the statute shall be achieved.
24. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. (See State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh (2005) 10 SCC 437, AIR 2005 SC 294, Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005) 2 SCC 271.)
25. In Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85, 8 ER 1034 at p. 143 Tindal, C.J observed as follows: (ER p. 1057)
“If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.”
26. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.
27. As observed in Nathi Devi case (2005) 2 SCC 271 if the words used are capable of one construction only, then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly be not given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.
28. The appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct. In view of the order in the appeal no further order is necessary to be passed in the transfer petition. Same is disposed of. No costs.
Alert