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Mohinder Prasad Jain v. Manohar Lal Jain .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was inducted as a tenant in a shop on 1 April 1972 at a monthly rent of Rs 700. After the original landlord died on 5 March 1979, ownership devolved upon the respondent and his four sisters. Upon retiring from Hero Honda Motors Ltd., the respondent filed an application under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 seeking eviction of the appellant on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement to start a wholesale business in Ayurvedic medicines.
The Rent Controller dismissed the application, finding no bona fide requirement and observing that the respondent lacked consent from his co-owner sisters. The Appellate Authority reversed this decision and ordered eviction. In revision before the Punjab & Haryana High Court, the appellant argued that, in light of constitutional challenges, eviction on the ground of personal requirement was unavailable for non-residential premises. The High Court, relying on existing Division Bench authority, rejected that contention and upheld the eviction order. The tenant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after prior constitutional adjudication, a landlord can seek eviction from a non-residential building on the ground of bona fide personal requirement under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973.
- Whether a single co-owner landlord may maintain an eviction petition without the express consent of the other co-owners and, consequently, whether the respondent’s bona fide requirement was proved.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The statutory ground of personal requirement is unavailable for non-residential premises because the relevant provision had been declared unconstitutional.
- The respondent, being only one of several co-owners, could not maintain the eviction petition without first obtaining the consent of his sisters.
- The Rent Controller’s finding that bona fide need was not proved had not been properly examined by the Appellate Authority.
- Absence of prior experience in Ayurvedic wholesale trade undermined the respondent’s claim of genuine need.
Respondent's Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India (2003) 1 Ren LR 91 (Del) (FB) | Held that eviction on personal requirement is not available for certain non-residential premises. | Relied on by the appellant before the High Court; ultimately not followed because the High Court was bound by contrary Supreme Court and Division Bench authority. |
| State of Haryana v. Ved Parkash Gupta (1999) 1 Ren LR 689 | Declared the restricting provision in the Haryana Act unconstitutional, thereby permitting eviction from non-residential premises on personal need. | Formed the basis of the High Court’s decision that the respondent could seek eviction. |
| Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab (1996) 1 SCC 1 | Struck down the statutory bar on seeking eviction from non-residential premises on the ground of personal requirement. | Affirmed by the Supreme Court; the present Bench stated that, in view of this ruling, it need not re-examine the constitutional issue. |
| Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar (1985) 2 SCC 683 | Earlier case noted for adopting a different approach to similar questions. | Mentioned to illustrate that earlier jurisprudence was not uniformly consistent. |
| Rakesh Vij v. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi (2005) 8 SCC 504 | Three-Judge Bench reaffirmed Harbilas Rai Bansal and restored landlords’ right to evict from non-residential premises on personal need. | Cited as binding authority settling the constitutional validity question. |
| India Umbrella Mfg. Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (2004) 3 SCC 178 | One co-owner may sue to evict a tenant; consent of other co-owners is presumed unless dissent is shown. | Applied to reject the appellant’s plea that the respondent needed explicit consent from his sisters. |
| Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath (1976) 4 SCC 184 | Recognised the doctrine that a co-owner can act as agent for others in eviction suits. | Referred to within India Umbrella Mfg. Co. and thereby accepted implicitly in the present case. |
| Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai (2002) 6 SCC 16 | Further affirmed the right of a co-owner to maintain eviction proceedings. | Also relied upon in India Umbrella Mfg. Co. and hence relevant to the Court’s reasoning. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court first noted that the larger constitutional issue concerning the maintainability of eviction petitions for non-residential premises had been conclusively settled by Harbilas Rai Bansal and reaffirmed in Rakesh Vij. Accordingly, the Bench declined to revisit that question.
Turning to the appellant’s primary contention—lack of consent from co-owner sisters—the Court invoked the principle articulated in India Umbrella Mfg. Co. and earlier authorities, holding that any one co-owner is competent to seek a tenant’s eviction unless another co-owner explicitly objects. No such objection was demonstrated on the record.
The Court observed that the Appellate Authority had considered all relevant factors and correctly treated non-joinder of the sisters as non-fatal. It rejected the argument that the landlord must possess prior experience in Ayurvedic medicine, stating that no statute imposes such a precondition for establishing bona fide requirement.
Finding no error of law or perversity in the concurrent findings of the Appellate Authority and the High Court regarding bona fide need, the Supreme Court concluded that interference under Article 136 was unwarranted.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The eviction order in favour of the respondent stands affirmed. The judgment reiterates that (i) the statutory ground of personal requirement is available to landlords for non-residential premises under the Haryana Act, and (ii) a single co-owner may validly pursue eviction without proving prior consent of other co-owners unless dissent is shown. No new precedent is created, but existing principles are reinforced. No order as to costs was made.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. The father of the respondent herein was the owner of a shop in which the appellant was inducted as a tenant on 1-4-1972. The monthly rent payable in relation to the said tenanted premises was Rs 700. The original landlord, the father of the respondent having died on 5-3-1979, the respondent along with his four sisters, became the owner of the said tenanted premises. He was an employee of Hero Honda Motors Limited. He retired from service having attained the age of superannuation. One year after his retirement, he filed an application under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (“the Act”) for eviction of the appellant from the shop in question on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement i.e for the purpose of running wholesale business in Ayurvedic medicines. The said application was dismissed by the Rent Controller holding that the bona fide requirement of the respondent in respect of the non-residential premises had not been proved and moreover he had not been able to show consent of his sisters in his favour in that behalf. An appeal preferred thereagainst was allowed by the Appellate Authority on a finding that he had proved his bona fide requirement. In the revision petition filed before the High Court the appellant raised a contention that an application for eviction on bona fide requirement of a non-residential premises was not maintainable.
3. It is not in dispute that this Court as also the Punjab and Haryana High Court declared such a provision to be unconstitutional.
4. The High Court opined:
“Still further the learned counsel further argued that eviction on the basis of personal requirement is not available in respect of non-residential building. He has placed reliance upon the Full Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India (2003) 1 Ren LR 91 (Del) (FB).
However, I am bound by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ved Parkash Gupta (1999) 1 Ren LR 689 wherein the provision of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 has been struck down and consequently, the landlord is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant from the non-residential building. In view of the above judgment the reliance on Full Bench's judgment of the Delhi High Court is not tenable.”
5. We may notice that this Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab (1996) 1 SCC 1 held such a provision to be unconstitutional, whereas in Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar (1985) 2 SCC 683 somewhat different note was struck. The question recently fell for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rakesh Vij v. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi (2005) 8 SCC 504 wherein this Court upheld the ratio laid down in Harbilas Rai Bansal (1996) 1 SCC 1 stating: (Rakesh Vij case (2005) 8 SCC 504)
“18. We allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, declare the abovesaid provisions of the amendment as constitutionally invalid and as a consequence restore the original provisions of the Act which were operating before coming into force of the amendment. The net result is that a landlord—under the Act—can seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground that he requires it for his own use.” (Harbilas Rai Bansal case (1996) 1 SCC 1)
6. In view of the aforementioned decision of this Court, we are not called upon to answer the said question.
7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant faced with the said decision, however, submitted that whereas a clear finding of fact was arrived at by the Rent Controller that the respondent had failed to prove his bona fide requirement in relation to the said premises in view of the fact that his sisters did not give any consent for starting a business in the said shop, the Appellate Authority did not delve deep into the matter. Our attention in this behalf has been drawn to the following findings of the Rent Controller:
“The third ground which has been raised by the counsel for the respondent for nailing the petitioner's case by itself has a force to upset the petitioner's case because firstly in the case in hand the petitioner has nowhere pleaded that he is the sole owner of the shop in dispute and secondly from the perusal of Ext. D-6 the petition under Section 4 of the Act for the determination of fair rent which was filed by the petitioner along with his four sisters, this Court is satisfied that the shop in dispute is jointly owned by the petitioner along with his four sisters. In para 1 of the aforesaid petition Ext. D-6 this has been categorically pleaded that the petitioners (i.e Manohar Lal Jain, the petitioner and his four sisters) are owners of the shop. Consequently the testimony of the petitioner that he is owner of the shop in dispute is not only beyond pleading but is also devoid of truth. Since the petitioner is not the sole owner of the shop in dispute, therefore, the petitioner's version that the shop in dispute is required solely by him for his personal use and occupation for running a wholesale business of Ayurvedic business appears to be a concocted version because the petitioner has nowhere stated that his other four sisters who are also the owners of the shop in dispute have consented to him to use the shop in dispute for his own use and occupation.”
8. The Appellate Authority although should have dealt with the said question, had otherwise considered the matter from all aspects.
9. He had taken note of the fact that the landlord was one of the co-owners and non-joinder of other co-owners in the eviction petition is not fatal.
10. This question now stands concluded by a decision of this Court in India Umbrella Mfg. Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (2004) 3 SCC 178 wherein this Court opined:
“6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are satisfied that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. It is well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. (See Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath (1976) 4 SCC 184 and Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai (2002) 6 SCC 16, SCC para 25.) This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement. In the present case, the suit was filed by both the co-owners. One of the co-owners cannot withdraw his consent midway the suit so as to prejudice the other co-owner. The suit once filed, the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the suit and the entitlement of the co-owners to seek ejectment must be adjudged by reference to the date of institution of the suit; the only exception being when by virtue of a subsequent event the entitlement of the body of co-owners to eject the tenant comes to an end by act of parties or by operation of law.”
11. A suit filed by a co-owner, thus, is maintainable in law. It is not necessary for the co-owner to show before initiating the eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller that he had taken option or consent of the other co-owners. However, in the event a co-owner objects thereto, the same may be a relevant fact. In the instant case, nothing has been brought on record to show that the co-owners of the respondent had objected to eviction proceedings initiated by the respondent herein. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that before initiating the proceedings, the respondent was required to show that he had experience in running the business in Ayurvedic medicines, has to be stated to be rejected. There is no law which provides for such a precondition. It may be so where a licence is required for running a business, a statute may prescribe certain qualifications or preconditions without fulfilment whereof the landlord may not be able to start a business, but for running a wholesale business in Ayurvedic medicines, no qualification is prescribed. Experience in the business is not a precondition under any statute. Even no experience therefor may be necessary. If the respondent has proved his bona fide requirement to evict the appellant herein for his own purpose, this Court may not, unless an appropriate case is made out, disturb the finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority and affirmed by the High Court.
12. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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