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State Of Haryana And Others v. Devi Dutt And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents were engaged by the State of Haryana as daily-wage, muster-roll employees. Following the High Court’s decision in Kulbhushan v. State of Haryana (1996) 1 RSJ 775, the State issued instructions dated 9-1-1996 prohibiting the continued engagement of daily wagers and providing that work would thereafter be performed by employees whose services could be regularised in accordance with a new policy. Pursuant to this policy, the respondents’ services were terminated.
The respondents raised industrial disputes alleging violations of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After both sides adduced evidence, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, by three separate awards held that:
- the respondents had not completed 240 days of continuous service in the twelve months preceding termination, and therefore Section 25-F was not violated; and
- Section 25-G was also not infringed.
Aggrieved, the respondents filed writ petitions. The High Court, relying on additional affidavits filed before it, reversed the Labour Court’s findings and remitted the matters for fresh consideration. The State of Haryana appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Labour Court’s factual findings that the respondents had not completed 240 days of continuous service within the relevant period.
- Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by entertaining additional affidavits and interfering with the Labour Court’s awards absent perversity or misapplication of legal principles.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (State of Haryana)
- The High Court committed a manifest error in setting aside well-reasoned factual findings of the Labour Court.
Respondents (Workmen)
- The Labour Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence; when muster-roll entries for February, March and June 1995 and work done in January 1996 are counted, the respondents worked more than 240 days.
- Therefore, the High Court correctly intervened and remitted the matter.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kulbhushan v. State of Haryana (1996) 1 RSJ 775 | Decision leading to State policy banning engagement of daily-wage employees. | Referenced solely to explain why the State terminated the respondents; it played no role in the Supreme Court’s legal analysis. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that findings of fact by a Labour Court are ordinarily not to be disturbed in writ jurisdiction unless:
- they are perverse;
- incorrect legal principles have been applied;
- irrelevant considerations have been relied upon; or
- relevant materials have been ignored.
Applying these standards, the Court held that:
- The Labour Court had reached a “definite conclusion” on the 240-day requirement after evaluating evidence adduced by both parties.
- The High Court offered no cogent reason for accepting additional affidavits that contained material not produced before the Labour Court, nor did it explain why such evidence could not have been presented earlier.
- The High Court therefore exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to adhere to settled principles governing judicial review under Article 226.
- The State had acted bona fide in terminating services pursuant to a policy decision; the Labour Court had also found that no junior employees were retained.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgments set aside.
Consequently, the Labour Court’s awards—holding that the respondents were not entitled to relief under Sections 25-F and 25-G—stand restored. The decision affects only the parties to the case and does not articulate any new legal precedent beyond reaffirming limits on High Court interference with concurrent factual findings. No order as to costs.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. The respondents herein were recruited on daily wages. They were muster roll employees. Pursuant to a decision of the High Court in Kulbhushan v. State of Haryana (1996) 1 RSJ 775 engagement of daily wagers was purported to have been banned in terms whereof the State issued instructions on 9-1-1996 to all the heads of departments, forbidding continuance of daily wagers on muster roll. The work was directed to be carried out by workmen, whose services were to be regularised on fulfilment of terms and conditions of the policy laid down therefor. In terms of the said policy decision, the services of the respondents were terminated. Industrial disputes were raised alleging violation of different provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“the Act”). Before the Labour Court, both the parties adduced their respective evidence. By reason of three different awards, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court arrived at a definite finding that the workmen having not been in continuous service for a period of 240 days during a period of 12 months preceding the order of termination, the retrenchment of the workmen was not violative of Section 25-F of the Act. It was further held that the provisions of Section 25-G thereof had also not been infringed.
3. Writ petitions were filed by the respondents aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith. In the said proceedings, additional affidavits were filed. The High Court reversed the findings of fact arrived at by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court holding that as the appellants had not denied or disputed that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers from February 1993 to January 1996, the impugned awards could not be sustained. The matters were directed to be remitted to the Labour Court.
4. The State is, thus, before us.
5. Mr Ajay Siwach, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would submit that the High Court committed a manifest error in setting aside the findings of fact arrived at by the Labour Court.
6. Mr Harish Chandra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the Labour Court having not considered the materials on record in their proper perspective, the High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in reversing the said findings. Our attention was also drawn to the following statements made in the counter-affidavit in this behalf:
“If the muster roll for the months of February 1995, March 1995 and June 1995 are taken into consideration, the working days as reflected by the workman as 21½, 30 and 24 are taken into consideration, a period of 75½ days is required to be added and after adding 75½ days, the total number of days comes to 264½ days which is more than 240 days. The respondent had also worked in January 1996 for 21 days, thus total number of days comes to 285½ days.”
7. Before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, evidence was adduced by the parties. The Labour Court, on the basis of the materials placed before it, arrived at a definite conclusion that the respondents herein had not been in continuous service for a period of 240 days within 12 months preceding the date of termination.
8. The High Court ordinarily should not have interfered with the said finding of fact. We, although, do not mean to suggest that the findings of fact cannot be interfered with by the superior courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the same should be done upon application of the well-known legal principles such as: (1) when it is perverse; (2) when wrong legal principles have been applied; (3) when wrong questions were posed; (4) when relevant facts have not been taken into consideration; or (5) the findings have been arrived at on the basis of the irrelevant facts or on extraneous consideration.
9. The High Court ordinarily also ought not to have entertained an additional affidavit without assigning any sufficient or cogent reason therefor. The parties adduced their evidence before the Industrial Court. Why could they not bring on record any other evidence before the Labour Court, was not explained. The contentions raised before the High Court for the first time in the additional affidavits filed before it, were also not admitted by the appellants herein.
10. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court erred in passing the impugned judgments. Submission of Mr Harish Chandra that this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, cannot be accepted. The High Court, in our opinion, has exceeded its jurisdiction. It failed to apply the well-known legal principles of judicial review. Furthermore, the appellants acted bona fide. The orders of termination were passed in terms of its policy decision. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court categorically opined that the workmen had been disengaged keeping in view the exigency of work, which had been mentioned in the muster roll itself. It was found as of fact that no junior had been retained. The State also acted in terms of the directions issued by the High Court. Whether such directions were legal or illegal, is not a matter which fell for consideration before the Labour Court, but, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the appellants acted bona fide.
11. For the reasons mentioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained, which are set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
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