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Supriyo Basu And Others v. W.B Housing Board And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Aug 5, 2005
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants, owners of “B type” flats in a housing complex developed by the West Bengal Housing Board, contested the proposed allotment of 156 covered car-parking spaces. They asserted that only B-type allottees, and not “A type” flat owners, were entitled to purchase these spaces. The trigger for litigation was a letter dated 6-6-1995 issued by the Housing Commissioner which, according to the appellants, authorised A-type owners to acquire parking spaces. The appellants filed a writ petition before a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court seeking a declaration that the letter and any consequent actions of the West Bengal Housing Board and Samdrita Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (“the Society”) were invalid.

The Single Judge entertained the petition, rejected objections to its maintainability and issued directions affecting, inter alia, the validity of executed sale deeds. On a letters-patent appeal, a Division Bench set aside the Single Judge’s order, holding the writ petition not maintainable because the dispute was private in nature and the Society did not owe a public duty. The present civil appeal before the Supreme Court challenged that Division Bench decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a registered co-operative society in respect of allotment of car-parking spaces when the society is not a statutory body but merely governed by statute.
  2. Consequent to the above, whether the High Court could adjudicate on private title disputes and the validity of sale deeds regarding car-parking spaces through writ jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The rights they sought to enforce flowed from a statutory housing scheme framed by the West Bengal Housing Board; non-observance of that scheme constituted breach of a public duty.
  • The Division Bench took an unduly technical view and ignored the public element inherent in the Board’s scheme.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Society is a private body created by agreement among its members; no statutory or public duty was implicated.
  • The writ petition therefore did not lie, and the Division Bench correctly dismissed it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey, (1999) 1 SCC 741; AIR 1999 SC 753 A writ lies against a co-operative society only if a statutory public duty is shown; mere governance by statute is insufficient. The Court relied on this principle to conclude that, absent breach of a mandatory statutory provision imposing a public duty, the writ petition was not maintainable against the Society.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court confined itself to the “core issue” of maintainability. It observed that the Society was:

  • a voluntary association constituted under the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983;
  • not a department or instrumentality of the State; and
  • merely governed by, but not created under, the statute.

Applying Chandra Bhan Dubey, the Court held that writ jurisdiction can be invoked against a co-operative society only to enforce a statutory public duty. The appellants had not demonstrated violation of any mandatory statutory provision; rather, the dispute was “essentially” between two rival private groups over property rights. Determination of title and validity of sale deeds required fact-finding unsuited to writ proceedings. Therefore, the Single Judge erred in granting relief, and the Division Bench correctly dismissed the petition.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench’s conclusion that the writ petition was not maintainable. The Society remains free to convene its general body meeting to decide parking-space entitlement, and the Court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits of those rival claims. The ruling reiterates that private disputes within co-operative societies, lacking a demonstrable statutory public duty, cannot be resolved through writ jurisdiction; no new legal precedent was set beyond reinforcing existing doctrine.

Show all summary ...

Arijit Pasayat, J.— The appellants call in question correctness of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court holding that the writ petition filed by them is not maintainable. Accordingly, it set aside judgment of learned Single Judge who had entertained the writ petition and given some directions.

2. The dispute related to the allotment of 156 car parking spaces. The appellants who are occupying B type flats took the stand that the car parking spaces were to be allotted only to them and not to A type flat owners. Questioning the legality of a letter purportedly issued by the Housing Commissioner dated 6-6-1995 giving certain clarifications about entitlement of A type flat owners a writ petition was filed with a prayer that the letter was without any authority and even if any action has been taken by the respondent West Bengal Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) and/or Samdrita Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. (in short “the Society”) in selling the parking spaces or any issue connected thereto, it was inoperative and invalid. The learned Single Judge accepted the plea overruling the contention raised by the Board/Society and A type flat owners who were parties in the proceedings about maintainability of the writ petition and gave certain directions.

3. The order of the learned Single Judge was questioned in the letters patent appeal before the Division Bench which by the impugned order held that the writ petition would not lie against a society and the writ petition was therefore clearly not maintainable as no statutory action had been assailed.

4. The only question which arose for consideration was whether the covered car parking spaces could be sold to both the allottees of A and B type units or to B type units only. A notice dated 21-5-1995 was issued by the Society proposing to consider and discuss the matter at its annual general body meeting. Members of the Society in question comprised both types of allottees i.e A and B type units. The prayer in the writ petition was to declare that the proposed meeting was convened without any authority.

5. The High Court by the impugned judgment held that a mandamus would lie only if the duty imposed on the respondent Society is of public nature and the writ of mandamus could be issued for enforcing compliance with such public duty. Two exceptions as noted by the High Court were: (i) if the rights are purely of a private character, and (ii) if the body against which a mandamus is to be issued is purely a private body with no public duty. It was noted by the High Court that the rights claimed by the writ petitioners are purely of a private character and the Society is a private body with no public duty, and a writ court would not embark upon enquiry into disputed questions of title. Accordingly, the writ petition was held to be not maintainable. It was noted that the question whether the letter of the Housing Commissioner was an administrative decision or not was not required to be adjudicated as the writ petition was not maintainable and since he had not adjudicated any dispute before him.

6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court has taken a very technical view without realising that the rights which the writ petitioners wanted to enforce are relatable to a scheme framed by the Board and, therefore, non-observance of the provisions of the scheme amounted to breach of public duty.

7. According to learned counsel for the respondents the High Court has rightly held that the writ petition was not maintainable and that there was not even semblance of public duty.

8. The rival stands need consideration on the core issue of maintainability of the writ petition, though several other issues were raised by learned counsel for the appellants. It is undisputed that the respondent Society is a cooperative society constituted on agreement between members thereof who had agreed to abide by the provisions of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1983, the Rules framed thereunder or the bye-laws framed by the Society. The Society is undisputedly not a department of the State and is also not a creature of a statute but merely governed by a statute. Only if it is established that a mandatory provision of a statute has been violated, could a writ petition be maintainable. Before a party can complain of an infringement of his fundamental right to hold property, he must establish that he has title to that property and if his title itself is in dispute and is the subject-matter of adjudication in proceedings legally constituted, he cannot put forward any claim based on the title until as a result of that enquiry he is able to establish his title. It is only thereafter that the question whether the rights in or to that property have been improperly or illegally infringed could arise. The dispute as noted by the High Court essentially related to the claims of two rival groups of private individuals in relation to common car parking spaces. The learned Single Judge gave certain directions, which even touched upon the legality of the sale deeds. It was not open to be dealt with in a writ petition. As observed by this Court in U.P State Coop. Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey (1999) 1 SCC 741, AIR 1999 SC 753 in relation to the question whether a writ petition would lie against a cooperative society the question to be considered is what is the nature of the statutory duty placed on it and the Court is to enforce such statutory public duty. The question as to entitlement of the members was to be discussed in the annual general body meeting. The writ petitioners could not have questioned the decision of the Society to discuss the matter in the annual general body meeting. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal. The Society is free to convene a general body meeting and to discuss the rival claims regarding entitlement. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on that aspect of the matter. The appeal fails, but without any order as to costs.