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State Of U.P And Others v. Ram Bachan Tripathi .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, selected by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission for the post of Medical Officer, initially joined duty at a Primary Health Centre in Basti on 29-2-1988 and was subsequently transferred to Gorakhpur. According to the State, he failed to take charge at Mirzapur, Gorakhpur on 16-7-1988, remained absent without leave, and did not respond to a show-cause notice. Consequently, his services were terminated with retrospective effect from 16-7-1988 by order dated 14-10-1992.
The respondent challenged the termination before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, which set aside the order on 28-8-1999, directed reinstatement with consequential benefits, and granted liberty to the State to initiate fresh departmental proceedings. The State’s review application was dismissed on 18-4-2001. The State’s writ petition before the Allahabad High Court was also dismissed, the High Court holding that the termination order was stigmatic and passed without opportunity of hearing. The State of Uttar Pradesh thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the termination order dated 14-10-1992 was vitiated because it cast a stigma on the respondent and was issued without affording him a proper opportunity of hearing.
- Whether the respondent was entitled to salary and other service benefits for the period of his unauthorised absence and the subsequent period during which he did not work.
- Whether the retrospective operation of the termination order (effective from 16-7-1988) was legally sustainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant-State’s Arguments
- Proper opportunity was given through a show-cause notice; the respondent chose not to avail it.
- The respondent did not work during the period of unauthorised absence and, therefore, is not entitled to service benefits for that period.
- The termination order was non-stigmatic; it merely recorded that no reply had been received.
Respondent’s Arguments
- An explanation to the show-cause notice was in fact submitted on 14-9-1991, but was ignored.
- Reference in the termination order to “no response” despite an alleged reply amounts to stigma.
- The joining report dated 11-8-1989 was unjustifiably rejected; hence service benefits should follow reinstatement.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dhananjay v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Jalna (2003) 2 SCC 386 | Mere mention of suspension in an order of termination does not render it stigmatic. | Applied to hold that reference to non-submission of reply in the present termination order does not constitute stigma. |
| Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana (1997) 4 SCC 385 | Indicating suspension in a termination order does not by itself create stigma. | Reinforced the conclusion that the impugned order was non-stigmatic. |
| Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727; (1993) 25 ATC 704 | On reinstatement after a defective inquiry, the authority may hold a fresh inquiry and decide benefits for the interregnum. | Guided the Court in framing directions regarding fresh proceedings and treatment of service benefits. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court first addressed the allegation of stigma, clarifying that a statement of factual background—such as noting no reply to a show-cause notice—does not blemish an employee’s reputation. Relying on Dhananjay and Bihari Lal Sidhana, the Court rejected the Tribunal’s and High Court’s view that the termination order was stigmatic.
However, the Court observed that the record was unclear on whether the respondent had in fact filed a reply. Significantly, the State had not filed any response before the Tribunal and was unrepresented at the hearing, demonstrating a lack of diligence. Given this procedural lapse, the Tribunal’s decision to set aside the termination while granting liberty to proceed afresh was upheld as justified.
The Court directed that, since service of a show-cause notice is admitted, the respondent may file a reply within four weeks, after which the State may initiate appropriate proceedings. The respondent is to be permitted to join duty at a place chosen by the State within one month.
Regarding back wages, the Court ruled that the respondent is not entitled to salary for the period of unauthorised absence nor for the period thereafter when no service was rendered. Nonetheless, the latter period will count for continuity of service, and any further benefits will be determined in the final decision, in line with the principles laid down in ECIL v. Karunakar.
Finally, the Court noted the State’s concession that giving retrospective effect to the termination from 16-7-1988 was unsustainable, and set aside the order to that extent.
Holding and Implications
Appeal allowed in part: the retrospective operation of the termination order from 16-7-1988 is quashed; remaining directions of the Tribunal—permitting reinstatement, fresh proceedings, and conditional denial of back wages—stand affirmed. No order as to costs.
Implications: The respondent will rejoin service and may face fresh departmental inquiry after filing his reply. He receives continuity of service but no salary for the period of non-service unless later determined. The decision reiterates that mere factual recitals in termination orders do not constitute stigma and underscores the necessity for the State to participate diligently in judicial proceedings; it sets no new substantive precedent but clarifies application of existing case law.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— The State of Uttar Pradesh is in appeal against the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court holding that the order of termination dated 14-10-1992 terminating services of the respondent w.e.f 16-7-1988 was illegal, as held by the State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow, U.P (in short “the Tribunal”). The Tribunal's view was that the order of termination was bad in law, the respondent was to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits of pay, allowance, etc., as per the prevailing rules. Liberty, however, was given to the State and its functionaries to initiate departmental proceedings for the alleged misconduct of the respondent employee.
2. Background facts which need to be noted in brief are as under:
The respondent employee who was selected by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (in short “the Commission”) for appointment to the post of Medical Officer was posted in the district of Basti. On 29-2-1988 the Chief Medical Officer, Basti directed the respondent employee to join the Primary Health Centre at Deno Kuiya, District Basti. He submitted the joining report on 29-2-1988. Subsequently, he was transferred to District Gorakhpur and the respondent employee submitted his joining report on 15-7-1988. According to the appellant State the respondent employee was asked to take over charge on 15-7-1988 (FN) and he was to join at Mirzapur, Gorakhpur. The respondent employee did not take over the charge at the said place and remained absent unauthorisedly. He did not even make any application for leave and also did not take over charge. He was absent from government service from 16-7-1988. A show-cause notice was issued which was served on the respondent employee and publication was also made in the newspaper of Gorakhpur. But there was no response to the show-cause notice. Therefore, his services were terminated w.e.f 16-7-1988 i.e the date from which he remained absent unauthorisedly. The respondent employee took the stand that there was reply submitted to the show-cause notice as is evident from the communication dated 14-9-1991 addressed to the Deputy Secretary, Government of U.P, Medical Section 4. His further stand was that though he submitted the joining report on 11-8-1989, the same was not accepted. It was his further stand that the show-cause notice dated 11-1-1991 was responded to, but in the termination order it has been stated that no response was received. This is nothing else than stigma.
3. Questioning the order of termination the respondent employee filed a claim petition before the Tribunal which by order dated 28-8-1999 allowed the petition. The State's application for review of the same was rejected by order dated 18-4-2001. The writ petition filed before the High Court was dismissed on the ground that the order of termination contained a stigma, no opportunity of hearing was given and the order of termination was, therefore, rightly set aside.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant State and its functionaries submitted that the Tribunal and the High Court had erred in holding that no opportunity was given. In fact, opportunity was granted which was not availed. In any event, the respondent employee did not work during the period he had remained unauthorisedly absent. That being so, he was not entitled to any service benefits. Further the order of termination did not contain any stigma and the Tribunal and the High Court were not right in their view.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent employee submitted that the materials on record clearly show that the respondent had responded to the show-cause notice and erroneously, without consideration thereof, the impugned order of termination was passed. When the respondent employee had responded to the show-cause notice, the mention that he had not submitted any reply constitutes stigma. Further without any justifiable reason the joining report was not accepted. Obviously, the service benefits cannot be denied to the respondent employee.
6. We shall first examine the plea relating to the stigma. Usually a stigma is understood to be something that is detraction from the character or reputation of a person. It is a blemish, imputation, a mark or label indicating a deviation from a norm.
7. Mere description of a background fact cannot be called a stigma. In the termination order it was merely stated that the show-cause notices were issued and there was no response. This can by no stretch of imagination be treated as a stigma as observed by the Tribunal and the High Court.
8. In Dhananjay v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Jalna (2003) 2 SCC 386 it was held that mere mention about the suspension of the employee in the order of termination did not make the order stigmatic. In Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana (1997) 4 SCC 385 also it was held that merely because the termination order indicated the factum that by then the employee was under suspension did not constitute any stigma. To that extent the Tribunal and the High Court were not justified in holding that the order of termination cast a stigma.
9. The record is not very clear whether the respondent employee had submitted his explanation as claimed. Unfortunately, no reply was filed when the claim petition was filed by the respondent employee before the Tribunal. As a matter of fact, on the date of hearing before the Tribunal there was no appearance on behalf of the State. This illustrates lack of seriousness by the State and its functionaries in appearance before the courts and the Tribunal. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order of termination while granting liberty to the State to proceed afresh. As it is accepted by the learned counsel for the respondent employee that a show-cause notice has been served on the respondent employee, let him file a reply before the authorities concerned within four weeks. We find that because of the orders passed by this Court the respondent employee has not been allowed to join. Without prejudice to the claims of the parties, let him be permitted to join at such place as the State Government may direct. Necessary orders in this regard shall be passed within a month. The respondent employee shall not be entitled to any service benefit for the period he remained unauthorisedly absent and for the subsequent period during which he had not rendered any service. But the latter period shall be counted for the purpose of continuity of service. While taking a final decision in the matter, the entitlement of the respondent to any service benefit, shall be dealt with, except to the extent dealt with by us, keeping in view the following observations of this Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727, (1993) 25 ATC 704:
“If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any, and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.”
10. It is fairly accepted by learned counsel for the appellant State that the order dated 14-10-1992 giving retrospective effect from 16-7-1988 is not sustainable. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There will be no order as to costs.
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