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Phool Pata And Another v. Vishwanath Singh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent–plaintiffs entered into an agreement dated 30-7-1977 to purchase land for a total consideration of Rs 10,000, paying Rs 2,500 in advance and leaving Rs 7,500 to be paid upon execution of the sale deed. After obtaining permission from the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in 1980, the vendor (Defendant 1) sold the land on 14-5-1980 to the present appellant (Defendant 3) and another, prompting the plaintiffs to file a suit for specific performance of the 1977 agreement and cancellation of the 1980 sale deed.
The trial court decreed the suit, finding the plaintiffs ready and willing to perform their contractual obligations. The first appellate court (Additional District Judge, Gonda) reversed this decision, holding (i) that consolidation proceedings had materially changed the land’s description and (ii) that the plaintiffs had not proved readiness and willingness.
The plaintiffs filed a second appeal under Section 100 CPC before the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench). The High Court formulated a single substantial question regarding the effect of minor variation in land area post-consolidation, answered it in the plaintiffs’ favour, and decreed specific performance. The present appeal challenges that High Court judgment before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a minor increase or decrease in land area owing to consolidation proceedings constitutes such a “change in property” as to bar specific performance of the original contract.
- Whether, under Section 100(5) CPC, the High Court may overturn a first appellate court’s findings on the plaintiffs’ readiness and willingness without first formulating a substantial question of law on that specific issue or recording reasons for considering an un-formulated question.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The first appellate court made a clear factual finding that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing; the High Court formulated no substantial question on this point and therefore lacked jurisdiction to disturb that finding.
- The High Court discussed only the issue of minor variation in area; without framing or recording reasons for an additional substantial question, it could not lawfully set aside the entire appellate judgment.
Respondents' Arguments
- The High Court was empowered under the proviso to Section 100(5) CPC to consider an un-formulated substantial question of law if the record so warranted.
- The High Court’s discussion of the appellate court’s failure to consider relevant evidence inherently addressed the readiness-and-willingness finding, and the appellant had not objected to this in the High Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Piarey Lal v. Hori Lal (1977) 2 SCC 221 | Specific performance cannot be ordered if consolidation proceedings materially change the identity/description of the property under contract. | Relied on by the first appellate court; the Supreme Court held it was distinguishable on facts and not applicable here. |
| Baikunthi Devi v. Mahendra Nath (1977) 2 SCC 496; AIR 1977 SC 1514 | Minor variations in area caused by consolidation do not bar enforcement of a contract for sale. | Accepted by the High Court to justify granting specific performance; the Supreme Court did not dispute its applicability to the limited variation issue. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined Section 100(5) CPC, noting that while the proviso permits the High Court to consider substantial questions of law not previously formulated, it must record reasons for doing so. In this case:
- The High Court formulated only one question—whether minor variation in land area barred specific performance—and answered it for the plaintiffs.
- No substantial question was framed on the separate issue of the plaintiffs’ readiness and willingness, yet the High Court set aside the first appellate court’s adverse factual finding on that point.
- The High Court recorded no reasons for considering an additional, un-formulated substantial question as mandated by Section 100(5).
- Because the readiness-and-willingness finding was factual and dispositive, the High Court could not reverse it without adhering to the statutory requirements. Its failure to specify which portions of evidence were ignored or wrongly considered by the first appellate court further vitiated its decision.
While acknowledging that Baikunthi Devi (supra) correctly governed the variation-in-area issue, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in overturning the entire appellate judgment without proper formulation and reasoning on the readiness-and-willingness aspect.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; High Court judgment in the second appeal set aside.
Direct Effect: The first appellate court’s decree dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit for specific performance stands restored. Each party is left to bear its own costs.
Broader Implications: The decision reinforces strict compliance with Section 100 CPC, particularly the requirement that High Courts formulate and record reasons for any additional substantial questions of law considered in second appeals. No new substantive precedent on specific performance was set; the ruling primarily clarifies appellate procedure.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”). The respondent-plaintiffs herein had filed a suit for specific performance of contract dated 30-7-1977 as well as for cancellation of sale deed dated 14-5-1980. According to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs 2500 had been paid as advance money and the consideration for sale was fixed at Rs 10,000. Thus the balance amount of Rs 7500 was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. The suit was contested by the present appellant-Defendant 3. The present appellant along with Defendant 1 (Respondent 4) contended that the permission to sell the land had been obtained from the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) during the year 1980. When the plaintiffs were requested to purchase the land, they did not agree to get the sale deed executed. Thereafter Defendant 1 Jogendra Singh executed the sale deed in favour of the present appellant and Respondent 5.
3. The trial court decreed the suit and directed for specific compliance with the agreement to sale, in dispute, dated 30-7-1977 and cancellation of the sale deed dated 14-5-1980 along with other reliefs. The matter was carried in appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Gonda who allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court and directed dismissal of the relevant suit. It is to be noted that the trial court had held that the plaintiffs had proved that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. Before the first appellate court, two stands were taken by the defendants. Firstly, it was submitted that there was change in the area and description of the land in question and though the agreement was purportedly for 1 acre 99 decimals, after completion of the consolidation proceedings the area had become 2 acres and 2 decimals. The area of some chaks had decreased and some had increased. It was further submitted that materials on record did not justify the stand of the plaintiffs that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. After analysing the evidence the first appellate court recorded two findings. Firstly, it was observed that the description of the properties had completely changed and therefore the suit for specific performance was liable to be dismissed. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Piarey Lal v. Hori Lal (1977) 2 SCC 221 for adopting such view. It was also concluded that the materials on record did not justify the conclusion that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. As noted above, the appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs carried the matter in second appeal before the High Court. The following question was formulated for adjudication:
“Whether in respect of land regarding which the agreement to sell had taken place, was a bit increased or decreased in consolidation proceedings, amounts to change in property and hence the said agreement can be enforced by a suit for specific performance of contract?”
4. The High Court held that there was a minor variation in the area. Referring to a decision of this Court in Baikunthi Devi v. Mahendra Nath (1977) 2 SCC 496, AIR 1977 SC 1514 it was held that the variation was minor and that too on account of allotment of a new chak. There was no bar to a decree being granted. It appears that the High Court recorded the findings on the appreciation of evidence as done by the first appellate court. It observed that the first appellate court is under a duty to examine the evidence on record and when it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of magnitude, it gives rise to a substantial question of law. With reference to various judgments of this Court, it was noted that where the findings of lower courts are vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings. Therefore, the erroneous findings if recorded by the court below can be set aside by the High Court in second appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the first appellate court had recorded positive findings to the effect that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. No question of law was formulated in this regard. On the contrary the only question which was formulated related to the effect of minor variation in the area or description of the property. Entire discussions made by the High Court appear to be in relation to that question. Therefore, without formulating the question regarding the readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs to perform their part of the contract, the High Court could not have allowed the second appeal.
6. In response, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the High Court had considered the question as regards the effect of court of facts not considering relevant evidence or adopting an essentially erroneous approach of the matter. The conclusions were actually in relation to the findings recorded by the first appellate court regarding the readiness and willingness aspect. Merely because the question has not been formulated, that should not stand in the way of affirming the decision of the High Court. It was submitted that the present appellant did not take any plea in this regard before the High Court and therefore should not be permitted to make any grievance.
7. After the amendment of CPC, Section 100(5) reads as follows:
“100. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”
8. As a bare perusal of the provision shows, nothing in sub-section (5) takes away or abridges the power of the High Court to hear for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question, not formulated earlier, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.
9. In the instant case, the only question that was formulated has been quoted above. Undisputedly, there was no other question formulated regarding the findings of the appellate court on the readiness and willingness aspect. In terms of sub-section (5), the High Court could have heard the appeal on a question not formulated if for reasons to be recorded (emphasis supplied) if it was of the view that the case involves such question. In the instant case no such reason has been recorded. The memorandum of appeal filed before the High Court also does not indicate that any specific question was formulated in that regard.
10. Piarey Lal case (1977) 2 SCC 221 relied upon by the first appellate court was clearly distinguishable on the facts and the High Court has rightly observed that the decision in Baikunthi Devi case (1977) 2 SCC 496, AIR 1977 SC 1514 was applicable on the facts of the case. We, therefore, find no substance in the plea raised by learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court was not justified in answering the question formulated in favour of the respondents. But in view of the fact that no question was formulated regarding the findings recorded by the first appellate court on the other aspect, the High Court could not have set aside the judgment of the first appellate court in its entirety. On that ground alone, the present appeal succeeds and the judgment of the High Court in second appeal is set aside. This piquant situation has arisen because the appellant before the High Court was not vigilant. It was not for the defendants who were the respondents before the High Court to invite any finding against them by agitating an issue which was decided in their favour by the first appellate court. As the findings recorded by the first appellate court were essentially factual, the High Court was required even otherwise to show as to how those were erroneous and which relevant material had been left out of consideration and/or which irrelevant material was taken into consideration. It has not been done. The High Court only referred to the principles of law, about which there is no dispute, without specifically pointing out which conclusions of the first appellate court suffered from deficiencies and in what way. That being so, the High Court's judgment, even if we accept that appropriate question could have been formulated would not have altered the situation. The appeal is allowed, with no order as to costs.
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