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Ram Sakhi Devi (Smt) v. Chhatra Devi And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The original plaintiff, Ishraj Narayan Singh, filed a suit seeking (i) a declaration of his title over certain lands and (ii) a declaration that Defendant 3, Smt. Ram Sakhi Devi (now the appellant before the Supreme Court), had no title to the property. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. On the defendant’s appeal, the first appellate court reversed that decree. The legal heirs of the original plaintiff (now respondents) then filed a second appeal before the Patna High Court. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, in second-appeal jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), restored the trial-court decree and set aside the first-appellate-court decree. The present Supreme Court proceeding arises out of the defendant’s challenge to that High Court judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Patna High Court, while exercising second-appeal jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, could interfere with the findings of the first appellate court without first formulating a substantial question of law as mandated by sub-sections (3)–(5) of Section 100.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The High Court’s judgment is vitiated because no substantial question of law was framed at the time of admission or decided at the time of final hearing, contrary to the mandatory procedure under Section 100 CPC.
- Consequently, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to overturn the well-reasoned judgment of the first appellate court.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The substantial question of law was self-evident on the face of the record; therefore, the absence of a formally framed question should not invalidate an otherwise well-reasoned judgment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 | High Court must formulate a substantial question of law before reversing an appellate decree under Section 100 CPC. | Quoted (para 10) to affirm that reversal without such formulation is impermissible. |
| Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 | Second-appeal jurisdiction is confined to substantial questions of law; factual findings cannot ordinarily be disturbed. | Cited (para 7) to underline the jurisdictional limits of a High Court in second appeal. |
| Kanhaiyalal v. Anup Kumar (2003) 1 SCC 430 | Reiteration of the mandatory nature of framing substantial questions of law under Section 100. | Referenced as further authority supporting the appellant’s stand. |
| R. Lakshmi Narayan v. Santhi (2001) 4 SCC 688 | Mandatory compliance with Section 100 CPC procedure. | Relied upon as part of the line of decisions emphasizing strict adherence. |
| M.S.V. Raja v. Seeni Theyar (2001) 6 SCC 652 | Scope and limits of second-appeal jurisdiction. | Cited illustratively to reinforce the settled position. |
| R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple (2003) 8 SCC 752 | Importance of formulating substantial questions of law. | Referenced in the chain of authorities. |
| Mohd. Mohammad Ali v. Jagadish Kalita (2004) 1 SCC 271 | Same principle regarding Section 100. | Relied upon to strengthen the conclusion. |
| Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram (2004) 6 SCC 359 | Reaffirmation of mandatory procedural requirements under Section 100. | Cited for consistency with earlier rulings. |
| Kishori Lal v. Madan Gopal (2005) 9 SCC 243 | Further reiteration of Section 100 constraints. | Used to show the continuing authority of the principle. |
| Mathakala Krishnaiah v. V. Rajagopal (2004) 10 SCC 676 | Same rule on substantial questions of law. | Cited as additional precedent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court conducted a textual analysis of Section 100 CPC, particularly sub-sections (3), (4) and (5), noting that:
- The memorandum of second appeal must precisely state the substantial question(s) of law involved (sub-section 3).
- Upon being satisfied that such a question exists, the High Court shall formulate it (sub-section 4).
- The appeal shall be heard only on the question(s) so formulated (sub-section 5), subject to the proviso allowing additional questions for recorded reasons.
A perusal of the impugned High Court judgment revealed no formulation of any substantial question of law, nor any indication that the second appeal was heard on such a question. This procedural defect, viewed as jurisdictional, rendered the High Court’s interference with the first-appellate-court’s findings unsustainable. The Court buttressed this conclusion by citing a consistent line of authorities—beginning with Ishwar Dass Jain and Roop Singh—all of which insist on strict adherence to Section 100 CPC.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the Patna High Court’s judgment in second appeal and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with Section 100 CPC. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.
Implications: The decision reinforces the mandatory procedural safeguard that a High Court must frame and decide a substantial question of law before exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. It does not create new substantive law but underscores the jurisdictional limits of second-appeal proceedings, ensuring that factual findings are not disturbed unless a properly formulated legal question justifies such interference.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court in second appeal in terms of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “the Code”). The respondents are the legal heirs of the original plaintiff Ishraj Narayan Singh. The original plaintiff filed a suit seeking declaration of his title over the suit land and declaration of want of title of Smt Ram Sakhi Devi, the appellant herein, Defendant 3 in the suit. The trial court had decreed the suit but in appeal the first appellate court reversed it. The respondents filed the second appeal before the Patna High Court. By the impugned judgment the High Court restored the judgment and decree of the trial court and set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court.
3. Though many points were urged in support of the appeal, the pivotal plea was that the High Court could not have interfered with the judgment and decree of the first appellate court without framing a substantial question of law as enjoined by Section 100 of the Code. The High Court can only exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code in second appeal on the basis of substantial question of law framed at the time of admitting appeal. A second appeal can be heard and decided only on the basis of substantial question of law, if any. The judgment rendered by the High Court in second appeal without following the aforesaid procedure is not sustainable in law.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the question of law is self-evident and on a technical plea that a question of law has not been framed, the well-reasoned judgment should not be set aside.
5. As mandated by sub-section (3) of Section 100 of the Code, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions of law involved in the appeal. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question of law is involved it shall formulate that question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100.
6. Section 100 of the Code deals with “Second Appeal”. The provision reads as follows:
“100. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”
7. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained.
8. In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 this Court in para 10, has stated thus:
“10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so.”
9. Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
“7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact-findings courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession. (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591.) Hence, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below.”
The position has been reiterated in Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar (2003) 1 SCC 430, JT (2002) 10 SC 98.
10. Reference may also be made to R. Lakshmi Narayan v. Santhi (2001) 4 SCC 688, M.S.V Raja v. Seeni Theyar (2001) 6 SCC 652, R.V.E Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P Temple (2003) 8 SCC 752, Mohd. Mohammad Ali v. Jagadish Kalita (2004) 1 SCC 271, Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram (2004) 6 SCC 359, JT (2004) 6 SC 296, Kishori Lal v. Madan Gopal (2005) 9 SCC 243, JT (2004) 8 SC 422 and Mathakala Krishnaiah v. V. Rajagopal (2004) 10 SCC 676.
11. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set aside. We remit the matter to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.
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