- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
J.H Jadhav v. Forbes Gokak Ltd. .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, an employee of the respondent, sought promotion to the post of clerk. When employees junior to him were promoted and he was not, he raised an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The dispute was referred by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the General Secretary of the Gokak Mills Staff Union testified that the appellant was a union member and that the Union had espoused his cause. Documentary evidence, including letters to the Deputy Labour Commissioner and objections filed before the Conciliation Officer, was adduced.
The Tribunal found that the Union had indeed espoused the appellant’s cause and that juniors had been promoted without any documented assessment of the appellant’s performance, amounting to an unfair labour practice. It directed the respondent to promote the appellant from the date his juniors were promoted and grant all consequential benefits.
The respondent challenged the award by writ petition. A Single Judge dismissed the petition, but on appeal a Division Bench of the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s award, holding that the dispute was not an “industrial dispute” under Section 2(k) because it was neither espoused by a representative union nor affected other workmen directly and substantially.
The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the individual grievance of the appellant became an “industrial dispute” under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 when espoused by the Gokak Mills Staff Union.
- Whether the High Court, in exercise of judicial review under Article 226, erred in overturning the Industrial Tribunal’s factual finding of union espousal.
- What relief, if any, should be granted in light of the appellant’s subsequent dismissal from service pending a separate industrial dispute.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Gokak Mills Staff Union, of which the appellant was a member, formally and substantively espoused his cause, satisfying Section 2(k).
- The Industrial Tribunal’s finding on espousal was based on oral and documentary evidence and could not be disturbed in writ jurisdiction absent perversity.
- Promotion should relate back to the dates on which juniors were promoted, with consequential monetary benefits.
Respondent's Arguments
- An individual dispute becomes an industrial dispute only when taken up by a representative union or a substantial number of workmen; this threshold was not met.
- No resolution or formal act of espousal by the Union was proved.
- The appellant’s grievance was raised belatedly (though this ground had not been urged before the Tribunal).
- Because the appellant had since been dismissed, actual promotion could not now be granted.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Workmen v. Dharampal Premchand (Saughandhi) (1965) 3 SCR 394; AIR 1966 SC 182 | Criteria under Section 2(k): an individual dispute becomes an industrial dispute if espoused by a union, even if the union is a minority union. | The Court held that the Tribunal correctly applied this principle and that the High Court erred in insisting on majority-union support. |
| Workmen v. Indian Express (P) Ltd. (1969) 1 SCC 228; AIR 1970 SC 737 | An “outside” union can be sufficiently representative to espouse a dispute. | Cited illustratively to reinforce that representativeness, not exclusivity, determines valid espousal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Analyzing Section 2(k), the Supreme Court reiterated the Dharampal principles: (1) the dispute must concern employment; (2) espousal by a union—regardless of majority status—is sufficient; and (3) even an outside but representative union may espouse the claim. It observed that the respondent never disputed the appellant’s union membership and that the Tribunal had relied on both oral testimony and documentary evidence to find valid espousal.
The Court emphasised that no rigid form, such as a formal resolution, is mandated for espousal; evidence aliunde can suffice. The High Court therefore misapplied judicial review by re-appreciating evidence rather than examining whether the Tribunal’s finding was perverse or unsupported.
Regarding relief, the Court accepted that the appellant’s later dismissal precluded present promotion, but held he remained entitled to notional promotion and monetary benefits from the date his juniors were promoted until the date of dismissal. Any further benefits would hinge on the outcome of the separate dispute challenging the dismissal.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s judgment is set aside; the Industrial Tribunal’s award is restored with the modification that promotion is to be treated as notional, conferring monetary benefits only up to the appellant’s dismissal.
Implications: The appellant receives back-pay and other financial benefits for the relevant period, while future relief depends on the pending litigation over his dismissal. The decision reinforces existing precedent that espousal by even a minority or outside union satisfies Section 2(k), but does not establish a new legal doctrine.
Ruma Pal, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellant was employed by the respondent. He claimed promotion as a clerk. When this was not granted, the appellant raised an industrial dispute. The question whether the appellant was justified in his prayer for promotion with effect from the date that his juniors were promoted was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the State Government. In their written statement before the Tribunal the respondent denied the appellant's claim for promotion on merits. In addition, it was contended by the respondent that the individual dispute raised by the appellant was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as the workman was neither supported by a substantial number of workmen nor by a majority union. The appellant claims that his cause was espoused by the Gokak Mills Staff Union.
3. Before the Tribunal, apart from examining himself, the General Secretary of the Union was examined as a witness in support of the appellant's claim. The General Secretary affirmed that the appellant was a member of the Union and that his cause has been espoused by the Union. Documents including letters written by the Union to the Deputy Labour Commissioner as well as the objection filed by the Union before the Conciliation Officer were adduced in evidence. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that in view of the evidence given by the General Secretary and the documents produced, it was clear that the appellant's cause had been espoused by the Union which was one of the unions of the respondent employer. On the merits, the Tribunal accepted the appellant's contentions that employees who were junior to him had been promoted as clerks. It noted that no record had been produced by the respondent to show that the management had taken into account the appellant's production records, efficiency, attendance or behaviour while denying him promotion. The Tribunal concluded that the act of the respondent in denying promotion to the appellant amounted to unfair labour practice. An award was passed in favour of the appellant and the respondent was directed to promote the appellant as a clerk from the date his juniors were promoted and to give him all consequential benefits.
4. The award of the Industrial Tribunal was challenged by the respondent by way of a writ petition. A Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. The respondent being aggrieved filed a writ appeal before the appellate court. The appellate court construed Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and came to the conclusion that an individual dispute is not an industrial dispute unless it directly and substantially affects the interest of other workmen. Secondly, it was held that an individual dispute should be taken up by a union which had representative character or by a substantial number of employees, before it would be converted into an industrial dispute neither of which according to the appellate court, had happened in the present case. It was held that there was nothing on record to show that the appellant was a member of the Union or that the dispute had been espoused by the Union by passing any resolution in that regard.
5. The definition of “industrial dispute” in Section 2(k) of the Act shows that an industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of the employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. The definition has been the subject-matter of several decisions of this Court and the law is well settled. The locus classicus is the decision in Workmen v. Dharampal Premchand (Saughandhi) (1965) 3 SCR 394, AIR 1966 SC 182 where it was held that for the purposes of Section 2(k) it must be shown that: (1) The dispute is connected with the employment or non-employment of a workman. (2) The dispute between a single workman and his employer was sponsored or espoused by the union of workmen or by a number of workmen. The phrase “the union” merely indicates the union to which the employee belongs even though it may be a union of a minority of the workmen. (3) The establishment had no union of its own and some of the employees had joined the union of another establishment belonging to the same industry. In such a case it would be open to that union to take up the cause of the workmen if it is sufficiently representative of those workmen, despite the fact that such union was not exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned. An illustration of what had been anticipated in Dharampal case (1965) 3 SCR 394, AIR 1966 SC 182 is to be found in Workmen v. Indian Express (P) Ltd. (1969) 1 SCC 228, AIR 1970 SC 737 where an “outside” union was held to be sufficiently representative to espouse the cause.
6. In the present case, it was not questioned that the appellant was a member of the Gokak Mills Staff Union. Nor was any issue raised that the Union was not of the respondent establishment. The objection as noted in the issues framed by the Industrial Tribunal was that the Union was not the majority union. Given the decision in Dharampal case (1965) 3 SCR 394, AIR 1966 SC 182 the objection was rightly rejected by the Tribunal and wrongly accepted by the High Court.
7. As far as espousal is concerned there is no particular form prescribed to effect such espousal. Doubtless, the union must normally express itself in the form of a resolution which should be proved if it is in issue. However, proof of support by the union may also be available aliunde. It would depend upon the facts of each case. The Tribunal had addressed its mind to the question, appreciated the evidence both oral and documentary and found that the Union had espoused the appellant's cause.
8. The Division Bench misapplied the principles of judicial review under Article 226 in interfering with the decision. It was not a question of there being no evidence of espousal before the Industrial Tribunal. There was evidence which was considered by the Tribunal in coming to the conclusion that the appellant's cause had been espoused by the Union. The High Court should not have upset this finding without holding that the conclusion was irrational or perverse. The conclusion reached by the High Court is therefore unsustainable.
9. For all these reasons the decision of the High Court cannot stand and must be set aside.
10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent then submitted that the matter may be remanded back to the Division Bench of the High Court as the Court had not considered the other arguments raised by the respondent while impugning the award of the Industrial Tribunal. It appears from the impugned decision that the only other ground raised by the respondent in the writ appeal was that the grievance of the appellant had been belatedly raised. We have found from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal that no such contention had been raised by the respondent before the Tribunal at all. We are not prepared to allow the respondent to raise the issue before the High Court.
11. The respondent finally submitted that pursuant to disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant in the meanwhile, the appellant had been dismissed from service and that the order of dismissal was the subject-matter of a separate industrial dispute. We are not concerned with the propriety of the order of dismissal except to the extent that the appellant cannot obviously be granted actual promotion today. Nevertheless, he would be entitled to the monetary benefits of promotion pursuant to the award of the Industrial Tribunal which is the subject-matter of these proceedings up to the date of his dismissal. Any further relief that the appellant may be entitled to must of necessity abide by the final disposal of the industrial dispute relating to the order of dismissal which is said to be pending.
12. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court. The award of the Industrial Tribunal is confirmed subject to the modification that the promotion granted by the award will be given effect to notionally for the period as indicated by the award up to the date of the appellant's dismissal from service. Reliefs in respect of the period subsequent to the order of dismissal shall be subject to the outcome of the pending industrial dispute relating to the termination of the appellant's services. If the termination is ultimately upheld, the appellant will be entitled only to the reliefs granted by us today. If on the other hand the termination is set aside, the appellant will be entitled to promotion as granted by the award.
Alert