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N.K Rajgarhia v. Mahavir Plantation Ltd. And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents had taken an advance from the appellant. When they defaulted, the appellant filed a suit in the Delhi High Court for recovery of Rs 75 lakhs with interest and damages. The parties compromised: the appellant agreed to accept Rs 41,69,110, payable by nine post-dated cheques. The compromise was incorporated into a consent decree, which included a clause allowing immediate execution for the “entire remaining balance amount” plus 15% interest if any cheque was dishonoured.
Three cheques were dishonoured. The appellant filed Execution Application No. 58 of 2001. On 13-9-2001 the parties again settled; the Single Judge recorded undertakings and disposed of the execution petition. Default recurred, leading to Execution Application No. 45 of 2002. The respondent sought extension of time; on 5-2-2002 a Single Judge granted it, relying on Periyakkal v. Dakshyani.
The appellant appealed; on 20-3-2002 a Division Bench directed presentation of cheques the same day, warning of consequences if dishonoured. On 1-4-2002 the appeal was declared infructuous, leaving the appellant free to pursue execution or contempt. A further extension was granted by another Single Judge on 28-8-2002; the appellant did not challenge that order.
Ultimately the respondents paid the entire decretal amount with interest. A contempt petition by the appellant was dismissed. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges the High Court’s interpretation of the consent order and the extensions granted.
Legal Issues Presented
- How should the words “balance decree” in the order dated 13-9-2001 be interpreted?
- Did the High Court have jurisdiction to extend time for payment of decretal dues without the appellant’s consent?
- Does the respondents’ default revive the appellant’s original claim of Rs 75 lakhs that had been waived in the earlier compromise?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The High Court lacked jurisdiction to enlarge time for payment without the decree-holder’s consent.
- Because the respondents breached their undertaking, the original claim of Rs 75 lakhs (or approximately Rs 41 lakhs that had been waived) revived and became executable.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Order 23 Rule 4 CPC does not bar compromises at the execution stage; parties may validly settle even after decree.
- Given full payment of the decretal amount with interest, the Supreme Court should decline to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Moti Lal Banker v. Mahraj Kumar Mahmood Hasan Khan, (1968) 3 SCR 158 | Executing court may record and enforce compromises under Order 21 Rule 2 and Section 47 CPC, independent of Order 23 Rule 3. | Used to affirm that the compromise reached during execution proceedings was legally permissible. |
| Periyakkal v. Dakshyani, (1983) 2 SCC 127 | Court may extend time fixed in a compromise decree in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice. | Cited to justify the Single Judge’s orders enlarging time for payment of the decretal amount. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Supreme Court observed that compromises in execution proceedings are valid; the appellant had accepted the benefit of such compromises and the resulting payments.
2. The Single Judge’s order dated 28-8-2002 granting further extension was never challenged by the appellant and therefore attained finality. Once that order was complied with, the decree stood satisfied.
3. The order of the Division Bench dated 1-4-2002 merely declared the earlier appeal infructuous and granted liberty to pursue execution or contempt; it created no executable direction.
4. Interpreting the phrase “balance decree” in the 13-9-2001 order, the Court held that the word “decree” was used loosely: it referred to the outstanding amount under the compromise in execution (Rs 42,04,222), not to the larger original claim of Rs 75 lakhs. The sum waived by the appellant never became part of any decree and could not be revived.
5. Because the respondents ultimately paid Rs 42,04,222 with agreed interest, the decree was fully satisfied; the appellant could not claim amounts that had never been decreed.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Consequences: The decree is treated as fully satisfied; no further sums are recoverable by the appellant under the waived portion of his original claim. The decision affirms courts’ authority to record compromises and, in exceptional circumstances, extend time for compliance during execution without creating new liabilities. No costs were awarded.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. Interpretation of a consent order falls for determination by this Court in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 17-5-2005 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in EFA (OS) No. 22 of 2004.
3. The respondents herein took an advance of certain sum of money from the appellant herein. A suit for recovery of Rs 75 lakhs towards refund of the said amount with interest and damages was filed by the appellant. The parties, however, entered into a compromise in terms whereof the appellant was to receive a sum of Rs 41,69,110, the relevant clause whereof reads as under:
“… It is specifically made clear that on dishonour of the said cheques or any one of them on any ground whatsoever then and in that event the entire remaining balance amount shall become payable at one time and the plaintiff shall be entitled to execute the decree for realisation of the entire remaining balance amount which shall remain payable plus interest to be calculated @ 15% p.a and shall also be entitled to take all legal steps as may be permissible under the law to the plaintiff.”
4. It is not in dispute that the respondents herein paid a sum of Rs 5 lakhs to the appellant and as they failed and/or neglected to abide by their undertaking as regards payment of the balance sum, an execution application came to be filed which was marked as Execution Application No. 58 of 2001. In the said execution proceedings again, the parties entered into a settlement and a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court by an order dated 13-9-2001 recorded the same which reads as under:
“… These undertakings are accepted. He further agrees that in case any of the cheques is dishonoured he will be liable for not only contempt for violating these undertakings. The decree-holder shall be entitled to execute the balance decree immediately. It is also agreed between the parties that the decree-holder shall withdraw all civil/criminal cases after the entire payment is made by the judgment-debtor in the manner stated above. However, the decree-holder shall not pursue these cases and get these cases adjourned after 20-3-2002 by which time the judgment-debtor is supposed to clear the entire decretal amount.
The execution petition accordingly is disposed of.”
5. Allegedly, the respondent became a defaulter again. As three cheques out of six post-dated cheques were dishonoured, another execution application was filed by the appellant herein which was marked as Execution Application No. 45 of 2002. The respondent, however, filed an application for extension of time and a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, relying on or on the basis of the decision of this Court in Periyakkal v. Dakshyani (1983) 2 SCC 127, AIR 1983 SC 428 granted such extension stating:
“… It is on account of the illness of the Managing Director of the judgment-debtor company and on account of the fact that the company is facing financial problems, extension/enlargement of time for the payment of balance decretal amount is made. The judgment-debtor is also agreeable to pay interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the reduced balance amount. Though ordinarily time for payment should not be extended on the mere asking of the judgment-debtor, but in the present case disallowing the judgment-debtor's request would cause great injustice to the judgment-debtor. Accordingly, in order to meet the ends of justice, the application for extension of time is allowed. The decree-holder would present the cheque dated 20-1-2002 and 20-2-2002 for Rs 6 lakhs each on 20-3-2002 along with the third cheque dated 20-3-2002 for Rs 2,04,222. The judgment-debtor would also pay Rs 22,500 towards interest calculated at the rate of 15% per annum on that date. The judgment-debtor would, thus, clear the entire decretal amount on 20-3-2002. The application is accordingly disposed of.”
6. The appellant preferred an appeal thereagainst and by an order dated 20-3-2002, a direction was issued by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The Division Bench directed the respondent to present three cheques on that day itself and in case those cheques were not encashed, it was threatened that appropriate proceedings would be initiated. It does not appear that any notice was issued to the respondent in the said appeal. By an order dated 1-4-2002, the said appeal was disposed of stating:
“We have perused the record and also the application filed today indicating that two of the cheques given by the judgment-debtor have been dishonoured and the fate of the third cheque is not known. The respondent primarily filed an application before the learned Single Judge for grant of extension of time for making payment. The learned Single Judge granted the extension for making payment until 20-3-2002. Since the extended time has already come to an end the appeal to our mind has become infructuous. The appellant will be, however, within his rights to approach the learned Single Judge for execution as well as for contempt. The filing of the appeal will not come in the way of the appellant in pursuing his remedy before the learned Single Judge.”
7. The said order of the Division Bench is said to be still in force. The respondents, however, obtained another extension from another learned Single Judge of the High Court in terms of an order dated 28-8-2002. The appellant herein did not question the said order. The said order, thus, attained finality.
8. It is, however, not in dispute that the judgment-debtor has paid the entire amount together with interest in terms of the consent order dated 5-2-2002 passed in the aforementioned execution petition. It is, furthermore, not in dispute that the contempt application filed against the respondents herein by the appellant for violating the undertaking by them has ultimately been dismissed.
9. The short question which, thus, arises for consideration is the interpretation of the words “balance decree” occurring in the order dated 13-9-2001, as extracted supra.
10. The contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is twofold. Firstly, the High Court of Delhi had no jurisdiction to grant extension of time for payment of the decretal dues without his consent and, secondly, having regard to the fact that the respondents failed to abide by their undertaking, the original claim of the appellant revived.
11. The contention of Mr C.N Sreekumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, was that despite Rule 4 Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there does not exist any bar to enter into a compromise at the execution stage and, in any event, with regard to the fact that the entire amount has now been paid, this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution in favour of the appellant.
12. The suit was filed for recovery of a sum of Rs 75 lakhs. The consent decree passed by the court shows that a decree for a sum of Rs 41,69,110 became payable wherefor nine cheques were issued. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff waived his remaining claim on the premise that the respondent had agreed to settle the disputes.
13. Clause (b) of the compromise petition filed by the parties merely shows that in the event any of the cheques is dishonoured or returned unpaid, the entire remaining balance amount shall become payable at one time in which event, the decree-holder would be entitled to execute the decree for realisation of the entire remaining balance amount plus interest calculated at the rate of 15% per annum. Order 23 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that other provisions thereof are not applicable to execution proceedings. But, despite the same, it is now well settled that the parties may enter into a settlement even in execution proceedings.
14. In Moti Lal Banker v. Mahraj Kumar Mahmood Hasan Khan (1968) 3 SCR 158, AIR 1968 SC 1087 this Court held such compromise to be permissible in law stating: (SCR p. 161 D-F)
“Independently of Order 23 Rule 3, the provisions of Order 21 Rule 2 and Section 47 enable the executing court to record and enforce such a compromise in execution proceedings. Nor does Order 20 Rule 11(2) affect this power of the executing court. Order 20 Rule 11 enables the court passing the decree to order postponement of the payment of the decretal amount on such terms as to the payment of interest as it thinks fit on the application of the judgment-debtor and with the consent of the decree-holder. It does not affect the power of the executing court under Section 47 and Order 21 Rule 2.”
15. Yet again in Periyakkal (1983) 2 SCC 127, AIR 1983 SC 428 this Court held that, in certain situations, the court has also jurisdiction to extend the time stating:
“The parties, however, entered into a compromise and invited the court to make an order in terms of the compromise, which the court did. The time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the court and this gave the court the jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases. Of course, time would not be extended ordinarily, nor for the mere asking. It would be granted in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice. True the court would not rewrite a contract between the parties but the court would relieve against a forfeiture clause; and, where the contract of the parties has merged in the order of the court, the court's freedom to act to further the ends of justice would surely not stand curtailed.”
16. There cannot, thus, be any doubt that the compromise entered into by and between the parties hereto in the execution proceedings was valid in law. The appellant moreover does not say that the same was not acted upon. Admittedly, he received the entire amount thereunder, albeit belatedly; but even therefor the respondent applied for and obtained extension of time to pay the same.
17. Rightly or wrongly, the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court by an order dated 28-8-2002 extended the time to the respondent herein for paying the decretal amount with interest up to 23-7-2002. The appellant herein had accepted such amount and that order was not questioned and, thus, the same had attained finality. What was questioned was the liability incurred by the respondent not being able to adhere to the terms thereof.
18. If the orders of extension have validly been passed, the order of the court stood complied with. It may be true that the order dated 1-4-2002 was not questioned by the respondent before this Court but then no direction was issued therein. No judgment was passed. The said order was passed without issuing any notice to the respondents. The appeal was disposed of as having become infructuous. It was, thus, not final. Thereby, merely a liberty had been granted to the appellant to agitate his grievances before the learned Single Judge for execution as well as for contempt. By reason of the said order alone the appellant could not put forth his claim. The appellant, thus, cannot take any benefit thereof.
19. An order of a court of law and, in particular, a consent order, must be read in its entirety for the purpose of ascertaining its true intent and purport.
20. The learned Single Judge in his order dated 13-9-2001 recorded as to how much amount was paid by the respondents to the appellant before the execution case was filed. The execution case admittedly was filed for recovery of the balance sum of Rs 36,59,110 together with interest at the rate of 15% per annum. The settlement between the parties was arrived at at this juncture in terms whereof it was agreed:
“1. The judgment-debtor shall pay the balance amount of Rs 36,59,110 in instalments.
2. For the past period i.e from the date of decree till date the judgment-debtor shall pay the lump sum interest of Rs 6,35,082.
3. The judgment-debtor shall pay 15% interest on the principal amount of the further period.”
21. Not only the respondents agreed to pay a lump sum interest of Rs 6,35,082 but also became agreeable to pay 15% interest on the principal amount of the further payment. On calculation, a sum of Rs 42,04,222 was found to be payable out of which the judgment-debtor had paid a sum of Rs 10,00,000 by way of three demand drafts. Appropriating the said amount, the outstanding principal sum came to Rs 26,69,110. However, the balance amount outstanding as on that day came to Rs 32,04,222. It was that amount which was to be liquidated by paying instalments of Rs 6 lakhs each per month. It is in the aforementioned backdrop, the undertaking given before the learned Single Judge of the High Court by the respondents herein is to be construed.
22. The contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is that once a default is committed by the respondents, the appellant in terms thereof would be entitled to execute the balance decree immediately, which would mean he would be entitled to a further sum of about Rs 41 lakhs, which was waived by him. We do not agree. The word “decree” after the word “balance”, in our opinion, has been used loosely. The matter might have been different if the amount payable under the compromise entered into by the parties in the execution case would have been less than the amount paid by the respondents to the appellant in terms of the consent decree passed originally. It is not so. Whereas under the original decree, a sum of Rs 41,69,110 was payable, in terms of the consent order passed in the execution case, a sum of Rs 42,04,222 became payable. The sum which was waived by the appellant did not form part of the consent decree. It was merely a claim. Such a claim never fructified into any decree and in that view of the matter the plea of the respondents being liable to pay the said amount to the appellant despite the fact that no decree in relation thereto was passed cannot be countenanced.
23. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order cannot be faulted. This appeal is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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