Sangeeta Singh v. Union Of India And Others

Arijit Pasayat, J.— Civil Appeals Nos. 8739-40 of 2003 relate to Civil Writ Petition No. 24966 of 2001 disposed of by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, while, Civil Appeals Nos. 8741-42 of 2003 and 8737 of 2003 relate to Civil Writ Petition No. 18104 of 2002, which was disposed of following the view expressed in the other writ petition. The dispute relates to the eligibility of the appellants to be selected for dealership in petroleum products.

2. Factual controversy lies in a narrow compass and is as follows:

In both the writ petitions challenge was to the selection of the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 8737 and 8739 of 2003 for retail dealership of Indian Oil Corporation Limited (in short “IOC”) at different places. The appellants and writ petitioners in the writ petitions before the High Court were applicants for dealership and distributorship of various petroleum products. Challenge to the selection was on the ground that the selected persons were not eligible for selection on several grounds. One of the grounds highlighted was that their relatives already hold letters of intent for dealership or distributorship of MS/HSD/Kerosene/LDO/LPG of another or same public sector oil company. So far as the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 8739 of 2003 is concerned, it was pointed out that the selected person's father-in-law was already holding dealership. In the case of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 8737 of 2003 similar plea was raised. Successful persons took the stand that the person who was already holding dealership did not come within the enumerated prohibited category and, therefore, there was no illegality in the selection. The High Court, however, held that no doubt the terms and conditions of grant of dealership mention that if the daughter-in-law holds dealership then the father-in-law is disqualified. A literal or narrow meaning should not be given and if the father-in-law holds a dealership, the daughter-in-law is also disqualified. A literal interpretation need not be given to the requirement, but the intention has to be seen. It was observed that the intention of the prohibition criteria for awarding of dealership was that if a close relative is already holding a dealership, relatives of such persons should not be granted a dealership. If the father-in-law is a close relation to the daughter-in-law, the reverse is also true and, therefore, the daughter-in-law is ineligible if the father-in-law already has a dealership. IOC and the selected persons have challenged the correctness of the judgments rendered by the High Court. The writ petitioner in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 24966 of 2001 has questioned the correctness of the High Court's order in Civil Appeal No. 8742 of 2003 on the ground that it had raised several other points to contend that the selected person was ineligible but the High Court did not refer to them. Originally, selected persons and IOC are the appellants in other civil appeals.

3. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the view of the High Court is clearly untenable. In clear and unambiguous terms the advertisement indicated persons who are covered. It was not permissible for the High Court to add persons to the list of the relatives. The writ petitioners before the High Court, the respondents herein supported the judgment of the High Court. Their stand is that intentions have to be seen, monopoly has to be discouraged and while dealing with the State or public sector undertaking largesse, a narrow meaning should not be given. It is a clear case of casus omissus, an unintentional omission, which is to be ignored as the intention is clear. IOC's stand is similar to that of the originally selected candidates. It does not subscribe to the stand that it is a case of casus omissus. It is to be noted at this juncture that the eligibility criteria so far as relatives are concerned are different from 1997 onwards. Pre-1997 the relatives enumerated are as follows:

I. Spouse

II. Father/mother

III. Brother/sister

IV. Son/daughter

V. Daughter-in-law/son-in-law

VI. Parent-in-law.

4. After 1997, the list reads as follows:

I. Spouse

II. Father/mother (not applicable to daughter)

III. Brother/brother's wife (not applicable for women applicants)

IV. Son/daughter-in-law.

5. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or a stipulated condition which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Similar is the position for conditions stipulated in advertisements.

6. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse (1997) 6 SCC 312, AIR 1998 SC 74.) The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moo PC 1 the courts cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, they cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel (1998) 3 SCC 234, JT (1998) 2 SC 253.) It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. (1978) 1 All ER 948, (1978) 1 WLR 231 (HL)] Rules of interpretation do not permit the courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. The courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn, L.C in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans 1910 AC 444, quoted in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah 1962 Supp (2) SCR 554, AIR 1962 SC 847).

7. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them”. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage.) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277, AIR 1990 SC 981.

8. In D.R Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. (1977) 2 SCC 273, AIR 1977 SC 842 it was observed that the courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

9. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See CST v. Popular Trading Co. (2000) 5 SCC 511) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.

10. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole, appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. “An intention to produce an unreasonable result”, said Danckwerts, L.J in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966) 1 QB 878, (1965) 3 All ER 539, (1965) 3 WLR 1011 (CA) (All ER p. 544 I) “is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available”. Where to apply words literally would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result”, we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC 1963 AC 557, (1963) 1 All ER 655, (1963) 2 WLR 559 (HL) where at AC p. 577 he also observed: (All ER p. 664 I) “This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges.”]

11. It is then true that:

“When the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt.”

“But”, on the other hand,

“it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom”.

(See Fenton v. Hampton (1858) 11 Moo PC 347.) A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod enim semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute — casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; “a casus omissus”, observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1785) 1 TR 44 (ER p. 967) “can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws”. The principles were examined in detail in Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004) 6 SCC 672, JT (2004) 6 SC 227.

12. The golden rule for construing all written instruments has been thus stated:

“The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.” (See Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61.)

The latter part of this “golden rule” must, however, be applied with much caution. “If”, remarked Jervis, C.J,

“the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it do lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied, where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely, because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning”. (See Abley v. Dale (1851) 11 CB 378, ER p. 525.)

13. In the aforesaid background the High Court's judgment cannot be maintained and is set aside. However, the writ petitioner in Writ Petition No. 24966 of 2001 has taken the plea that other grounds were highlighted in the writ petition to show as to how the selected person was ineligible. The High Court has not dealt with any other issue and has disposed of only on the ground that the father-in-law was holding dealership, thereby rendering the daughter-in-law ineligible.

14. We, therefore, remit the matter to the High Court for consideration of other issues raised. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on any other issue than those indicated above. So far as Writ Petition No. 18104 of 2002 is concerned, it is not the case that any other point was raised. Therefore, only Writ Petition No. 24966 of 2001 is remitted to the High Court to consider if the other pleas raised are tenable. The parties shall be permitted to place material in support of their respective stand, and not on the issue of relationship.

15. The appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.