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Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P v. National Cereal Product .

Supreme Court Of India
Mar 7, 2005
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Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns the correct tax classification of germinated barley (malt) under three separate notifications issued between 1975 and 1977 pursuant to the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. These notifications fixed sales-tax rates for “foodgrains including cereals and pulses,” with differing treatment from the definition contained in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Initially, the respondent–assessee contended that malted barley was a “cereal” under Section 14 of the 1956 Act. By judgment dated 16-9-1993 the Allahabad High Court rejected that contention. The respondent then filed five rectification applications, advancing alternative arguments that malt nevertheless qualified as a cereal or foodgrain under the three notifications. On 21-9-1994 the High Court remanded the matter to the Sales Tax Tribunal to decide that limited question, while treating its earlier finding—that malt is not a cereal for purposes of Section 14—as final.

On remand, the Tribunal examined multiple dictionary and encyclopaedia definitions and concluded that malt is covered by the term “cereal” in the notifications. The High Court, on revision by the Department, independently affirmed the Tribunal’s conclusion.

The Department then filed special leave petitions before the Supreme Court, resulting in the present appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether germinated barley (malt) qualifies as a “cereal” or “foodgrain” within the meaning of the three U.P. Sales Tax notifications dated 30-5-1975, 11-9-1976 and 30-4-1977.
  2. Whether the Tribunal and High Court exceeded the scope of the High Court’s remand order of 21-9-1994, which had already held that malt is not a cereal for purposes of Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (State/Department)

  • Contended that the remand order conclusively determined that malt is not a cereal, thereby barring the Tribunal and High Court from holding otherwise.
  • Submitted dictionary definitions to argue that “grain” means seed that has not yet germinated and, therefore, malt (a germinated seed) cannot be a cereal or foodgrain.

Respondent (Assessee)

  • Maintained that even if malt is not a cereal under Section 14 of the 1956 Act, it remains a cereal or foodgrain under the broader language of the three notifications.
  • Emphasised that, after its primary contention was rejected, the taxing authorities were obliged to classify the product under the correct entry in the notifications.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first clarified that the High Court’s remand order of 21-9-1994 was limited to Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. That determination did not preclude a finding that malt could still be a cereal or foodgrain for the purposes of the three notifications, which employ broader language.

On the merits, the Court:

  • Reviewed the dictionary meanings offered by the appellant and found no support for limiting “grain” to ungerminated seed. In contrast, several definitions described malt as a foodgrain.
  • Observed that the notifications are charging provisions, not exemption provisions; hence the burden lay on the Revenue to show that malt did not fall within “foodgrains” or “cereals.” The Revenue failed to discharge this onus.
  • Noted that both the Tribunal and the High Court had concurrently found, on the basis of authoritative sources, that malted barley is a foodgrain or cereal for the notifications. These findings were not perverse and warranted no interference.
  • Remarked that the question of law framed in the special leave petition was misconceived because it referred to Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, an aspect that was no longer at issue.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Dismissed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the Tribunal and the High Court that malted barley is a cereal/foodgrain for purposes of the three U.P. Sales Tax notifications. Consequently, sales of malted barley remain taxable at the rates specified for cereals under those notifications. The judgment settles the classification dispute for the parties but does not establish a new precedent beyond interpreting the specific notifications in question.

Show all summary ...

Ruma Pal, J.— Leave granted in special leave petitions.

2. The dispute in this case is whether germinated barley or malt is a cereal for the purposes of three notifications. Malted barley is barley which is soaked in water and upon germination, dried. The first notification is issued under Section 3-D of the U.P Sales Tax Act, 1948 read with Section 21 of the U.P General Clauses Act, 1904 and is dated 30-5-1975. It provided that with effect from 18-6-1975 the turnover of first purchases of inter alia foodgrains including cereals and pulses but excluding sawan, kodon, mandua, kakun, manjhri (or ankri), kutu, ramkana and paddy would be liable to tax under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 3-D at the rates mentioned against it.

3. The second notification is dated 11-9-1976. This notification was issued under sub-section (2-A) of Section 3-A of the U.P Sales Tax Act, 1948. It provided that with effect from 11-9-1976 the turnover in respect of foodgrains (including cereals and pulses) other than cereals and pulses as defined in Section 14 in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 shall be liable to tax at the reduced rate of 4% at the point of sale to the consumer.

4. The third notification is dated 30-4-1977 issued under Section 3-D(1) of the U.P Sales Tax Act, 1948. It provided that with effect from 1-5-1977, the turnover of first purchases of inter alia foodgrains including cereals and pulses other than cereals and pulses as defined in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 would be liable to tax at 4%.

5. Earlier the respondent assessee had claimed that the malted barley sold by it was covered by the word “cereal” in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The High Court had rejected this claim by its judgment dated 16-9-1993 and held that malted barley was not a cereal within the meaning of Section 14 of the 1956 Act.

6. The respondent assessee then moved five rectification applications before the High Court alleging that the alternative cases that had been argued by the respondent had not been noted or dealt with by the High Court in the order dated 16-9-1993. The alternative case of the respondent assessee was that even if the malted barley was not a cereal within the meaning of Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 nevertheless it continued to be a foodgrain or cereal for the purposes of the three notifications. In the further alternative it was urged by the respondent assessee that in any case it was the duty of the taxing authority to tax the assessee under the proper entry if the contention of the assessee had been negatived by the authorities. The five rectification applications were disposed of by judgment and order dated 21-9-1994. The High Court held that the determination of the alternative cases might require evidence and therefore it was appropriate to send the case back to the Sales Tax Tribunal. Accordingly, it was ordered that the Sales Tax Tribunal would decide the question whether the malt prepared from barley is foodgrain including cereal within the meaning of the three notifications. It was, however, made clear that the Tribunal would take the finding of the Court that malt and barley were two different commodities and that malt did not fall within the definition of the word “cereal” for the purposes of Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, as final.

7. On remand, the Tribunal re-examined the meaning of the definitions of “malt” and “cereal” in several dictionaries and encyclopaedias and came to the conclusion that the word “malt” was covered by the word “cereal” in the three notifications.

8. The High Court dismissed the revision application of the Department by independently considering the definitions given in various dictionaries and other authoritative works and came to the conclusion that malt is merely another form of barley and was a foodgrain within the meaning of the three notifications.

9. Impugning the decision of the High Court, learned counsel for the Department submitted that the Tribunal and the High Court had erred in holding that malt was either a cereal or a foodgrain when the order of remand, which had not been challenged by the respondent assessee, had already held that malt was not a cereal.

10. The submission is misconceived. By the order dated 21-9-1994, the High Court had merely held that barley malt was not a cereal for the purposes of Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. It was clearly envisaged by the order of remand that despite such finding, barley malt could still be a cereal or a foodgrain for the purposes of the three notifications.

11. Counsel for the appellant then referred to various other dictionaries to contend that malt is neither cereal nor a foodgrain. Grain, according to the appellant, is seed which is yet to be germinated. We have considered the various dictionary meanings referred to by the appellant. In none of them has the word “grain” been limited to ungerminated seed. On the contrary, malt has been described as a foodgrain.

12. The notifications by which the rate of tax has been fixed in respect of foodgrains makes it clear that the definition of foodgrains in the notifications is wider than that in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. It must be remembered that the notifications are not exception notifications but contain charging provisions. As such the onus to prove that the malted barley does not fall within foodgrains or cereals was on the Revenue. They have failed to discharge the onus. Both the Tribunal and the High Court have concurrently found that malted barley is a foodgrain or cereal for the purposes of the three notifications for reasons that cannot be discarded as perverse. We therefore see no reason to interfere with their conclusion.

13. Additionally we find that the question of law formulated in the special leave petition was wholly incorrect. The question of law as framed was whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that barley malt falls under the category of cereals and pulses contained in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. That was not the subject-matter of remand nor decided by the Tribunal nor affirmed by the High Court.

14. The appeals are accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.