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Baldev Singh v. Union Of India And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 28, 2005
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant enlisted in the Indian Army on 13-9-1978. On 30-3-1987 he was arrested in connection with offences under Sections 302/34 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code. A trial court convicted him, leading to his dismissal from service with effect from 18-7-1990. On 26-3-1992, the Punjab and Haryana High Court acquitted him, and he was released from custody on 4-4-1992.

The appellant contends that he reported back to his unit on 5-4-1992 and was reinstated, yet did not receive pay and allowances. The respondents deny that he ever re-joined duty, citing nine letters dated 6-9-1993, 9-9-1993 and other communications—including a courier visit—asking him to resume work. When he failed to do so, he was discharged from service on 30-9-1993.

Claiming to have completed 15 years and 18 days of service, the appellant sought arrears of salary for 30-3-1987 to 30-9-1993 and pension thereafter. A writ petition filed on 22-12-1997 was dismissed by the High Court, which found that he neither worked nor offered to work during the disputed period and had not completed the qualifying 15 years of active service.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant is entitled to arrears of salary for the period 30-3-1987 to 30-9-1993 despite not having actually served during that time.
  2. Whether the appellant’s service qualifies for pension in light of his dismissal, subsequent acquittal, and alleged non-reporting for duty.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The acquittal nullifies the earlier conviction; therefore, the dismissal based on that conviction is non est.
  • Under para 423 of the Army Regulations, the period spent in custody should be treated as duty once the conviction is set aside.
  • A service certificate shows 15 years and 18 days of service, entitling him to pension.
  • The authorities awaited Government sanction to release his dues, implicitly admitting his entitlement.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The appellant was dismissed on 18-7-1990 and never re-joined duty despite repeated reminders.
  • Audit objections questioned any payment for a period when the appellant neither worked nor was available for duty.
  • Because the appellant did not complete 15 years of actual service, he is ineligible for pension.
  • The High Court’s judgment is correct and should be upheld.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Supdt. Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board (1996) 11 SCC 603 Acquittal does not automatically entitle an employee to back wages; “no work, no pay” applies. Used to affirm that the appellant cannot claim salary for periods during which he did not actually serve.
Union of India v. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121 Reiterated the “no work, no pay” principle even after acquittal. Cited to reinforce that subsequent acquittal does not count the custody period as qualifying service for salary or pension.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that the appellant was not in active service during the period in question. Relying on the principle of “no work, no pay,” it held that an acquittal does not retrospectively convert time spent in custody or absence into duty for salary purposes. The dismissal that followed conviction, although later set aside, does not by itself oblige the employer to pay wages for the intervening period.

The Court observed that the appellant failed to respond to multiple communications asking him to re-join duty after orders for reinstatement were issued. Consequently, he did not render the minimum 15 years of active service required for pension eligibility. Documentary references cited by the appellant merely indicated that claims would be processed after Government sanction and contained no admission of liability.

Consistent with Ranchhodji and Jaipal Singh, the Court concluded that the appellant’s claim for arrears and pension lacked legal foundation.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The appeal is dismissed with costs made easy. The appellant is not entitled to arrears of salary for 30-3-1987 to 30-9-1993 or to pension, as he neither worked nor offered to work during the relevant period and did not complete the qualifying length of service. The decision reiterates, without extending, the established “no work, no pay” doctrine and sets no new precedent.

Show all summary ...

Arijit Pasayat, J.— The appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by him under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for grant of arrears of pay and pension.

2. The factual background is as follows:

The appellant was enrolled in the Indian Army on 13-9-1978. On 30-3-1987 he was arrested in a criminal case for offence punishable under Sections 302/34 and 452 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). The appellant was convicted by the trial court. However, his appeal was accepted by the High Court and he was acquitted vide order dated 26-3-1992. The appellant alleges that he was released from the jail on 4-4-1992 and that he had reported to his unit along with a copy of the judgment on the next day. He further stated that he was reinstated on the strength of such acquittal and continued in service, but his pay and allowances were not fixed or released. On 30-9-1993 he was discharged from the service. He claimed to have completed the requisite period of service from the date of enrolment to the date of discharge and claimed entitlement to the release of arrears of salary for the period from 30-3-1987 to 30-9-1993 as also pension for the subsequent periods.

3. The respondents contested the appellant's claim. It was averred that after his conviction in the criminal case the appellant was dismissed from service with effect from 18-7-1990. The averment that the appellant had reported for duty in the unit on 5-4-1992 has also been denied. It was specifically averred that he did not report on duty despite several reminders to him for the purpose. It was also pointed out that after the appellant's acquittal by the Court, the Army Headquarters had directed vide letter dated 18-8-1993 that he be reinstated in service. Orders for the appellant's reinstatement with effect from 18-7-1998 were passed. On receipt of this order the appellant was repeatedly advised by his parent unit to rejoin forthwith. The respondents placed on record letters dated 6-9-1993 and 9-9-1993 to substantiate this stand. When the appellant did not respond to these letters a courier was sent to his place to pursue him to rejoin the duty. Despite all this the appellant never rejoined the duty. He was accordingly, discharged from service with effect from 30-9-1993 (afternoon). Still further, it was pointed out that due to the appellant's failure to resume duty despite repeated requests, the auditors raised objections regarding the admissibility of the pay, etc. for the period from 30-3-1987 to 30-9-1993. The matter was referred to the Government of India. The audit authorities returned the documents with various observations and asked the reasons for non-joining of duty by the appellant. It was further observed that when the appellant has not reported for duty despite issue of as many as nine letters and also after sending a person to his home, it is felt that the case does not warrant consideration for regularisation by obtaining government sanction. On this basis, the respondents prayed that the appellant's claim for the release of pay, etc. be dismissed.

4. The High Court held that from the materials on record it was clear that in spite of several attempts the writ petitioner avoided to join duty and his conduct established a clear motive for only getting arrears of salary and pension. It was held that he was to be entitled to salary for the period for which the writ petitioner actually rendered service and not for earlier periods. He is entitled to receive salary for the period he had actually worked or offered to work. The admitted position was that the appellant had neither worked nor offered to work during the period from 30-3-1987 to 30-9-1993. In fact, he was in custody while facing trial up to March 1992. He had rendered service for the period from September 1978 to the end of March 1987. He had not completed actual fifteen years of service and, therefore, was not entitled to pension. Additionally, it was submitted that the date of discharge was 30-9-1993 and the writ petition was filed on 22-12-1997 and there was considerable delay. Even the suit for payment of arrears of salary may be barred by limitation. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the certificate issued to the appellant clearly shows his period of service to be 15 years and 18 days and the effect of acquittal in a criminal case cannot be wiped out and because of the proceedings which ended in acquittal the appellant was unable to attend duty. When the conviction which was originally recorded was set aside, the effect is that there was no proceeding in the eye of the law. The dismissal was as a consequence of the conviction by order dated 18-7-1990. He was under custody from 9-4-1987 to 16-8-1988. Against the conviction by the trial court, he filed an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which was allowed. But in the meantime because of his conviction, he had been dismissed in terms of para 423 of the Regulation for the Army, 1987 (in short “the Regulation”). According to the appellant, the natural consequence of an order of acquittal is that the period in custody has to be treated as if he was on duty and the order of dismissal is non est.

6. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment of the High Court.

7. As the factual position noted clearly indicates, the appellant was not in actual service for the period he was in custody. Merely because there has been an acquittal does not automatically entitle him to get salary for the period concerned. This is more so, on the logic of no work no pay. It is to be noted that the appellant was terminated from service because of the conviction. Effect of the same does not get diluted because of subsequent acquittal for the purpose of counting service. The aforesaid position was clearly stated in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Supdt. Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board (1996) 11 SCC 603.

8. The position was reiterated in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant further pointed out that the authorities were awaiting government sanction to grant the consequential relief. Reference is made in this connection to some documents, more particularly, letter of the officiating Chief Record Officer for Commanding Officer dated 4-12-1996. A bare perusal of the letter shows that nowhere was it indicated that the appellant was to be paid for the period he was absent from duty. It merely stated that the claims and dues admissible will be settled after the government sanction is received. This was an indication that only after the government sanction for regularisation is received the claim will be settled. Nowhere was there admission of the entitlement of the appellant. In any event the appellant having not rendered service, the question of inclusion of the period does not arise and if the said period is excluded then the inevitable conclusion is that the appellant has not rendered the requisite period i.e service of 15 years in order to be entitled to pension.

10. Looked at from any angle the High Court's order does not suffer from any infirmity.

11. The appeal deserves to be dismissed which we direct. Costs made easy.