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Madan Lal And Another v. Bal Krishan And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal was filed against a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court rendered in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code”). The High Court had set aside the concurrent findings of the trial court and the first appellate court and decreed the plaintiffs’ suit for declaration of title and injunction. The defendants—now appellants before the Supreme Court—contended that the High Court had done so without first formulating any substantial question of law, as mandatorily required by Section 100(4)–(5) of the Code.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a High Court can reverse concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal without first formulating a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- What is the consequence of non-compliance with the procedural mandate of Section 100(3)–(5) CPC on the validity of the High Court’s judgment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The High Court set aside findings of fact recorded by the two courts below without formulating, much less answering, any substantial question of law as required by Section 100 CPC.
- Such omission renders the impugned judgment unsustainable in law.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Even though specific questions were not formally framed, the High Court correctly applied the relevant legal principles to the facts and its decision should therefore be upheld.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 | High Court must formulate a substantial question of law before reversing findings in a second appeal. | Cited to show that the impugned judgment violated a settled procedural mandate. |
| Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 | Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is confined to substantial questions of law; interference with pure questions of fact is impermissible. | Relied upon to emphasise the limited scope of second appeals and the need for strict compliance with Section 100. |
| Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar (2003) 1 SCC 430 | Reinforces the requirement that substantial questions of law must be framed. | Used as additional authority underscoring mandatory compliance. |
| Premabai v. Jnaneshwar Ramakrishna Patange (2000) 9 SCC 418 | Same principle—necessity of substantial questions of law in second appeals. | Cited in support of setting aside the High Court’s judgment. |
| Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram (2004) 6 SCC 359 | Further reiteration of the Section 100 CPC requirements. | Bolstered the Court’s conclusion on procedural non-compliance. |
| Mathakala Krishnaiah v. V. Rajagopal (2004) 10 SCC 676 | Continues the line of authority demanding formulation of substantial questions of law. | Provided cumulative support for remitting the case. |
| Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591 | Explains that long-term permissive possession does not automatically become adverse possession. | Referenced within the quotation from Roop Singh to illustrate limits on factual interference. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined Section 100 CPC, reproducing its relevant sub-sections, and noted that:
- Sub-section (3) requires the memorandum of second appeal to precisely state the substantial question of law involved.
- Sub-section (4) mandates the High Court to formulate such question(s) once satisfied that they arise.
- Under sub-section (5), the appeal “shall be heard” only on the questions so formulated.
A review of the High Court’s judgment revealed that no substantial question of law had been formulated, nor was the appeal heard on any such question. Relying on the authorities cited, the Supreme Court held that failure to comply with these procedural requirements vitiates the judgment. Consequently, the impugned decision could not stand.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The impugned judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal after properly formulating substantial question(s) of law, if any, in accordance with Section 100 CPC. The appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs.
Implications: The decision reinforces the mandatory nature of Section 100 CPC’s procedural safeguards in second appeals. Although no new legal principle is created, the ruling underscores that non-compliance with the statutory requirement to frame substantial questions of law renders a High Court judgment vulnerable to being set aside.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in a second appeal preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “the Code”). By the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge set aside the judgments and decrees of the courts below and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for declaration of title and injunction as prayed for. Though several points were urged in support of the appeal it was basically contended that findings of fact recorded by the two courts were set aside even without formulating a question of law much less a substantial question of law.
2. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that though specifically the questions of law were not formulated, the High Court has rightly taken note of the legal position as applicable to the factual background and has allowed the appeal.
3. In view of Section 100 of the Code the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions of law involved in the appeal as required under sub-section (3) of Section 100. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question of law is involved it shall formulate that question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100.
4. Section 100 of the Code deals with “Second Appeal”. The provision reads as follows:
“100. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”
5. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained.
6. In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 this Court in para 10, has stated thus:
“10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so.”
7. Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
“7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact-finding courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession. (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591) Hence, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below.”
8. The position has been reiterated in Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar (2003) 1 SCC 430, JT (2002) 10 SC 98, Premabai v. Jnaneshwar Ramakrishna Patange (2000) 9 SCC 418, 2003 AIR SCW 2922, Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram (2004) 6 SCC 359, JT (2004) 6 SC 296 and Mathakala Krishnaiah v. V. Rajagopal (2004) 10 SCC 676, JT (2004) 9 SC 205.
9. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set aside. We remit the matter to the High Court for disposal after formulating the substantial question of law, if any, and in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.
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