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Jaswant Raj Soni v. Prakash Mal .
Factual and Procedural Background
The Supreme Court of India reviewed two connected civil appeals arising from a single judgment of the Rajasthan High Court that had decided two civil revision petitions. In each matter the appellant-landlords sought eviction of the respondent-tenants:
- Jaswant Raj Soni case – eviction sought for alleged misuse of the premises producing material damage.
- Jabar Lal case – eviction sought on the landlord’s bona fide requirement for his son’s business.
In both tenancies the landlords’ rent receipts carried a printed clause stating that the tenant must vacate on one month’s oral or written notice. The tenants contended that, because no valid one-month notice had preceded the eviction petitions, the suits were not maintainable.
Specific chronology:
- Jaswant Raj Soni – a written notice dated 9-10-1991 purportedly terminated the tenancy on 31-10-1991; the eviction petition was filed on 20-2-1992. The tenant argued the notice did not afford thirty clear days.
- Jabar Lal – the landlord claimed to have orally requested vacation pursuant to a rent note clause reading “… on being asked to vacate I will vacate on being told to do so after prior intimation of the month.” The tenant denied receiving such notice.
The High Court upheld the tenants’ objections and dismissed the eviction suits. The landlords appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, notwithstanding Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an eviction petition under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 is maintainable without serving a one-month notice to quit.
- Whether the printed clause on the reverse of the landlords’ rent receipts (or the rent note in the Jabar Lal case) constitutes a binding contractual term obliging the landlords to give one month’s prior notice before instituting eviction proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent-Tenants' Arguments
- The printed clause on rent receipts created a contractual obligation requiring the landlords to give one month’s notice before filing eviction suits.
- Section 28 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act attracts Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, making a statutory notice to quit mandatory.
Appellant-Landlords' Arguments
- After the seven-judge decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar, service of a Section 106 notice is not a legal prerequisite to an eviction petition under rent-control legislation.
- The printed wording on the back of rent receipts is not a mutually agreed lease term; hence no contractual notice is required. In any event, adequate notice (written or oral) had been given.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, (1979) 4 SCC 214 (Seven-Judge Bench) | An eviction petition under rent-control statutes does not require prior notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. | Relied on to reject the tenants’ contention that statutory notice was mandatory, thereby narrowing the dispute to any contractual notice requirement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Justice Arun Kumar, writing for the Court, proceeded as follows:
- Reaffirmed Dhanapal Chettiar as conclusive authority that Section 106 notice is not statutorily required before filing an eviction petition under the Rajasthan rent-control statute.
- Examined whether a contractual notice requirement existed. The Court held that printed conditions on the reverse of rent receipts, unilaterally generated by landlords, do not evidence a “conscious decision of the parties” and therefore do not form part of the lease agreement.
- In Jaswant Raj Soni, even assuming a contractual requirement, the written notice of 9-10-1991 and the four-month interval before the petition (20-2-1992) satisfied any obligation for thirty days’ advance intimation.
- In Jabar Lal, the rent note wording (“on being asked to vacate…”) did not mandate a written notice. Whether the landlord had orally complied is a factual dispute yet to be tried; accordingly, that suit must proceed to evidence.
- Rejected the tenants’ reliance on Section 28 of the Rajasthan Act, reiterating that no statutory notice requirement survives Dhanapal Chettiar.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS ALLOWED; HIGH COURT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE.
Consequences:
- The eviction suit against Jaswant Raj Soni is to proceed; the Supreme Court has already found any notice requirement satisfied.
- The eviction suit against Jabar Lal is remitted for trial, where the trial court will determine, on evidence, whether adequate prior intimation was given.
- No costs were awarded. The decision re-affirms the precedent of Dhanapal Chettiar but does not create new legal principles; its main practical impact is to clarify that printed rent-receipt clauses, without mutual assent, do not impose contractual notice obligations.
Arun Kumar, J.— By the impugned judgment the High Court of Rajasthan decided two civil revision petitions. Facts in both the cases are quite similar. The only question involved is about the maintainability of the eviction suits filed by the appellant landlord herein against the respondent tenants in the absence of one month's notice to vacate the suit premises. The landlords instituted eviction petitions against their tenants on the ground of misuse of tenancy premises which had materially affected the premises and in the second case on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for the business of his son. The rent receipts issued by the landlords in both the cases have a printed condition as per which one month's notice either oral or written is required to be given by the landlord to the tenant and the tenant is obliged to vacate the premises on such notice being given. Relying on the said condition the respondents in both the cases took objection that since the required one month's notice was not given by the landlord, the eviction petition was not maintainable. As a matter of fact, in Jaswant Raj Soni case a notice dated 9-10-1991 was admittedly served by the landlord on the tenant terminating the tenancy with effect from 31-10-1991. The eviction petition was filed on 20-2-1992. The objection is that the notice does not allow thirty clear days before the date of termination of tenancy. In the second case relating to Jabar Lal, the case of the landlord is that he had orally intimated to the tenant to vacate the premises in terms of the condition printed on the rent receipt. An additional fact has to be noticed at this stage with respect to Jabar Lal case, that is, there is a rent note executed by the tenant which contains a condition to the following effect:
“… on being asked to vacate I will vacate on being told to do so after prior intimation of the month”
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. So far as the requirement of issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act before institution of an eviction petition is concerned, the issue stands concluded as per a seven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (1979) 4 SCC 214. It has been held that there is no legal requirement for issuance of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act before institution of an eviction petition. Therefore, requirement of notice under Section 106 is not necessary. The only point left for decision in this case is whether there was agreement between parties requiring service of one month's notice prior to the institution of an eviction petition. For agreement between the parties, reliance is placed only on a condition printed at the back of the rent receipt issued by the landlords. In our view, it cannot be said on the basis of what is printed on the back side of the rent receipt that the parties had accepted it as a condition of the lease. The rent receipt is a document issued by the landlord acknowledging the receipt of payment of rent by him. Conditions printed at the back of the rent receipt cannot be said to be a conscious decision taken by the parties governing the lease of premises. The terms and conditions of a lease result from conscious decision of parties. Therefore, we are unable to accept that the parties have entered into an agreement about service of one month's notice in advance to vacate the premises before institution of eviction petition.
3. In Jaswant Raj Soni case, in fact, a notice dated 9-10-1991 was admittedly received by the tenant. The notice terminates the tenancy with effect from 31-10-1991 and calls upon the tenant to vacate the premises after the said date and also calls upon the tenant to pay double the rent for the period after termination of tenancy till vacation of the premises. This notice shows that though the tenancy was terminated by the end of the month, which did not allow a period of one month, yet the landlord informed the tenant that if he takes time in vacating the premises after the said date he would have to pay double the rent for the extra period. This means that the tenant was being allowed to stay beyond 31-10-1991. The eviction petition was, in fact, instituted on 20-2-1992 which is more than a month after service of notice on the tenant. The requirement of service of notice, even if it is to be read in the facts of the present case, can only mean that a thirty days' advance notice was required to be served on the tenant before he is asked to vacate the premises in his occupation.
4. The alleged condition regarding notice is very loosely worded. It does not have the technicalities of a notice under Section 106 of the Act. At best it being a requirement as per the agreement of the parties, can be seen in substance, which we find to have been in Jaswant Raj Soni case. A notice was served on the tenant before institution of the eviction petition. The eviction petition was instituted more than a month after service of the notice.
5. In the second case the requirement as per the rent notice is: “on being asked to vacate and … on being told to do so” thus, there is no requirement of a written notice before institution of an eviction petition. The case of the landlord in the plaint is that he had intimated to the tenant to vacate the premises before institution of the eviction petition. Of course, the tenant denied the same in the written statement. Whether this condition was actually fulfilled or not is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court. The counsel for the parties informed that the case has not gone for trial. Therefore, so far as the second case is concerned, the trial court will decide the issue after allowing the parties to lead evidence with respect thereto. Therefore, the eviction suit must proceed to trial and final decision.
6. The learned counsel for the respondent tenants tried to argue that in view of Section 28 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply to the facts of the present case and a notice to quit in terms of the said provision was required to be given. In view of V. Dhanapal case (1979) 4 SCC 214 we are unable to accept this argument. There is no legal or statutory requirement for a notice being given in the facts of the present case. The only requirement regarding notice, if at all, arises from the condition printed on the back of the rent receipt which in our view cannot be said to be an agreement between the parties laying down requirement for issuance of a notice for institution of an eviction petition. In any case as noticed above, the landlords have tried to meet that requirement. In Jaswant Raj Soni case the requirement of notice has been met, as observed by us above, while in Jabar Lal case the trial court will consider whether the requirement has been met on the basis of evidence led by the parties. Both the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan is set aside. The eviction suits are directed to be expeditiously tried and disposed of by the court(s) concerned. Both the appeals stand disposed of.
7. No order as to costs.
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