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Mahadeva And Others v. Tanabai .
Factual and Procedural Background
Late Nivriti Vithoba Laad owned agricultural Land Survey No. 48/1 (14 acres 15 guntas) in Village Ravatagaon. By an agreement dated 4-4-1967 he agreed to sell the land to the present defendants and put them in possession. After Nivriti’s death, his daughter Tanabai became the sole legal heir.
On 22-11-1978 Tanabai filed a suit seeking (i) a declaration that the 1967 agreement was null and void and (ii) recovery of possession. The defendants asserted that the agreement was valid, that they were entitled to protect their possession under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and that they had perfected title by adverse possession.
The trial court and the first appellate court rejected the plea of adverse possession but accepted the defence under Section 53-A, dismissing the suit. Tanabai then filed a second appeal in the High Court. Although the appeal was admitted on two specific questions of law, the High Court reframed a single question, held the defendants’ possession illegal, allowed the appeal, and decreed the suit in Tanabai’s favour.
The defendants sought special leave, leading to the present Supreme Court proceedings. During the hearing, the Court unsuccessfully encouraged a settlement, after which it considered the merits of the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the second appeal by reframing the substantial question of law and reversing concurrent findings without adequate legal reasoning.
- Whether the defendants could be denied the protection of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act solely because their claim of adverse possession failed and they had not instituted a suit for specific performance.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff-Respondent (Tanabai)
- The 1967 agreement is void; consequently, the defendants’ possession is unlawful.
- The defendants neither perfected title by adverse possession nor paid the full consideration, hence cannot claim equitable protection.
Defendant-Appellants
- The agreement is valid and binding; they are entitled to retain possession under Section 53-A, having been put in possession and having paid part consideration.
- Alternatively claimed to have perfected title by adverse possession (a plea earlier rejected by all courts).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi, (2002) 3 SCC 676 | Bar of limitation against a suit for specific performance does not, by itself, disentitle a vendee from invoking the defence of part-performance under Section 53-A TPA. | The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s single reason for denying Section 53-A protection was unsustainable in light of this precedent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court found the High Court’s judgment unsatisfactory for three principal reasons:
- Departure from Admitted Questions: The High Court decided the appeal on a self-framed question, ignoring the two substantial questions of law on which the appeal had been admitted.
- Absence of Reasoned Analysis: No discussion of governing legal principles or rationale was provided to justify reversal of the concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court.
- Error in Applying Section 53-A: The singular ground relied upon by the High Court—that failure to establish adverse possession negates a Section 53-A defence—contradicts the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shrimant Shamrao, which affirms that limitation against a suit for specific performance does not eliminate the statutory protection of part-performance.
Given these deficiencies, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s judgment of reversal was legally unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; second appeal remanded for fresh consideration.
The matter is remitted to the High Court to decide afresh on the original questions of law, with liberty to facilitate an amicable settlement between the parties. No costs were awarded. The decision underscores the necessity for appellate courts to confine themselves to the formulated substantial questions of law and to provide cogent reasons when overturning concurrent findings. No new precedent is set; the impact is confined to the parties and the proper adjudication of the pending second appeal.
R.C Lahoti, J.— Tanabai, the respondent herein, is the daughter of late Nivriti Vithoba Laad. Nivriti Vithoba Laad owned and possessed Land Survey No. 48/1 measuring 14 acres 15 guntas in Village Ravatagaon. It appears that Nivriti Vithoba Laad executed an agreement to sell the said agricultural land in favour of the defendants and also delivered possession thereof to the prospective vendees. Nivriti Vithoba Laad died. The plaintiff Tanabai is the sole legal heir of Nivriti Vithoba Laad. On 22-11-1978 Tanabai filed a suit for declaring the agreement dated 4-4-1967 as null and void and seeking recovery of possession over the land from the defendants. The suit was contested by the defendants submitting that the agreement was valid and binding on the plaintiff; that the defendants were in possession of the property under the agreement and entitled to protect their possession under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act; and that they had also perfected the title by adverse possession over the land.
2. The plea of the defendants claiming acquisition of title by adverse possession has been negatived by all the three courts up to the High Court. However, the plea under Section 53-A of the TP Act found favour with the trial court and the first appellate court resulting in dismissal of the suit. The agreement was held to be valid and binding on the plaintiff.
3. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal which was admitted for hearing on the following two questions of law framed by the High Court:
“1. Whether the courts below are justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant in spite of clear evidence of the defendant-respondent that he is not ready to pay the remaining consideration amount?
2. Whether it is open to the respondent to plead in his defence under Section 53-A of the TP Act despite finding by the courts below that the plaintiff's title is established?”
4. However, at the time of hearing the High Court formed an opinion that only one question really arose for consideration in the second appeal and that was as under:
“Whether the defendants can continue to be in possession notwithstanding the fact that they have not chosen to enforce the agreement of sale till now?”
5. By a brief reasoning that the defendants who were claiming title by adverse possession also, could not succeed by claiming protection under Section 53-A of the TP Act and inasmuch as the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession was negatived, their possession must be held to be illegal, the High Court has allowed the second appeal and directed the suit filed by the plaintiff to be decreed. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the defendants have filed this appeal by special leave.
6. During the course of hearing, at one stage, taking notice of the fact that the defendant-appellants, agriculturists by vocation, have remained in possession of land ever since 1967 i.e for about 37 years by this time, this Court suggested to the learned counsel for the parties to explore the possibility of mutual settlement. The learned counsel for the defendant-appellants made an offer under instructions that the appellants were prepared to pay an amount of Rs 50,000 over and above what was already paid to the late father of the plaintiff-respondent under the agreement and the plaintiff-respondent should not insist on claiming possession but rather should execute a deed of sale at the cost and expense of the defendant-appellants and thus bring the whole dispute to an end. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent took time for having instructions and after adjournments told us that the plaintiff-respondent was not responding to the communications made by the learned counsel to her. In fact, a demand draft drawn in the name of the plaintiff-respondent for a sum of Rs 50,000 on Vijaya Bank, Miraj, bearing No. 337791 dated 21-3-2004 was produced by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants with readiness to tender the same to the plaintiff-respondent which tender the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent rightly regretted to accept as he was not having any instructions in that regard from the plaintiff-respondent. In such circumstances, the DD has been returned to the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants after being perused by the Court.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the merits of the appeal. We are of the opinion that the second appeal has not been satisfactorily disposed of by the High Court.
8. The judgment of the High Court is based on a question framed during the course of writing of the judgment which is in departure from the two questions of law on which the appeal was admitted for hearing. The whole emphasis shifted from the core issues. Then, the High Court has not discussed any law and has also not assigned any reason, much less a satisfactory one, for taking a view different from the one concurrently taken by the two courts below. The singular reason assigned by the High Court for denying the benefit of Section 53-A of the TP Act is not a sound reason by itself in view of the decision of this Court in Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (2002) 3 SCC 676. This Court has held that merely because the suit for specific performance at the instance of the vendee has become barred by limitation that by itself is not enough to deny the benefit of the plea of part-performance of agreement of sale to the person in possession.
9. As the judgment of the High Court is one of reversal and that too bereft of any reason, the same cannot be sustained. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Instead, the second appeal is remanded to the High Court for hearing and decision afresh in accordance with law. Before deciding the appeal on merits, the High Court would do well to explore the possibility of settlement between the parties in view of the proceedings which took place in this Court. No order as to the costs.
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