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Commissioner Of Central Excise v. Eswaran & Sons Engineers Ltd. .

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 5, 2005
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Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee, M/s Eswaran & Sons Engineers Ltd., manufactures minimum oil circuit breakers. From inception the product had been assessed under Tariff Sub-Heading 8535.00 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The Department took the view that the goods were more appropriately classifiable under Sub-Heading 8537.00 and, by four show-cause notices dated 17-12-1993, 4-4-1994, 31-5-1994 and August 1994, demanded differential duty of Rs. 9,69,638 for the period 30-6-1993 to 31-8-1994.

The Assistant Collector confirmed the reclassification and demand on 19-12-1994. The Collector (Appeals) dismissed the assessee’s appeal on 31-5-1995. The Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, by order dated 26-4-1999, upheld the classification under 8537.00 but held that a Board circular dated 14-7-1994 (issued under Section 37-B of the Central Excise Act, 1944) had only prospective effect; it therefore restricted the demand to the period on and after 14-7-1994 and remitted the matter for recalculation.

The Department filed the present appeals under Section 35-L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 challenging the Tribunal’s restriction of the demand.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Board’s circular dated 14-7-1994 issued under Section 37-B could restrict the Department’s demand for differential duty to the period after that date when the reclassification proceedings had been initiated earlier.
  2. Whether the Tribunal erred in relying on the Supreme Court decision in H.M. Bags Manufacturer v. Collector of Central Excise to give the circular prospective effect in the present circumstances.

Arguments of the Parties

Department’s Arguments

  • The first show-cause notice (17-12-1993) preceded the Board’s circular; the reclassification was based on the Assistant Collector’s own interpretation, not on the circular.
  • Consequently, the Tribunal improperly limited the demand to the period after 14-7-1994.

No counsel appeared for the assessee before the Supreme Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. CCE, (1996) 87 ELT 414 (CEGAT) Circuit-breaker panels equipped with apparatus of Heading 85.35/85.36 fall under Sub-Heading 8537. Referenced as the authority followed by the Tribunal while accepting classification under 8537; no dispute before the Supreme Court.
H.M. Bags Manufacturer v. Collector of Central Excise, (1997) 11 SCC 696 : (1997) 94 ELT 3 Circulars under Section 37-B operate prospectively. Held inapplicable because, unlike the present case, no show-cause notice had been issued prior to the circular in that matter.
Birla Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (1992) 57 ELT 674 (Cal.) Articulated the scope of Section 37-B: instructions ensure uniformity but cannot dictate disposal of individual cases or bind appellate discretion. Relied on to emphasise that the 14-7-1994 circular could not control a quasi-judicial decision already initiated before its issuance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court noted that both the initial show-cause notice (17-12-1993) and the Assistant Collector’s order (19-12-1994) were founded on the officer’s independent interpretation of the tariff headings, not on the Board’s circular issued later. Examining Section 37-B, the Court reiterated that while the Board may issue instructions for uniformity, proviso (a) expressly prevents such directions from compelling disposal of individual cases in a particular manner, and proviso (b) safeguards the discretion of appellate authorities.

Applying the Calcutta High Court’s analysis in Birla Jute, the Court held that the circular could not retrospectively affect proceedings already in motion. The Supreme Court distinguished H.M. Bags Manufacturer, observing that in that case no prior show-cause notice existed and therefore the issue of retrospective application did not arise. Consequently, the Tribunal erred in treating the 14-7-1994 circular as a temporal cut-off for the demand.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Allowed – Tribunal’s order dated 26-4-1999 set aside.

The Department’s demand for differential duty is no longer confined to the period after 14-7-1994; duty may be recovered for the full period covered by the show-cause notices. The decision clarifies that Board circulars under Section 37-B cannot interfere with reclassification proceedings already initiated and underscores the limited, non-binding effect of such circulars on quasi-judicial determinations. No broader precedent was set on tariff classification itself, as that issue stood concluded.

Show all summary ...

S.H Kapadia, J.— These appeals under Section 35-L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as “the said 1944 Act”) are filed by the Department seeking to challenge the order dated 26-4-1999 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”) in Appeals Nos. E/689-92 of 1995.

2. The facts giving rise to these civil appeals, briefly stated, are as follows:

On 17-12-1993 M/s Eswaran & Sons Engineers Limited (hereafter referred to as “the assessee”) was engaged in the manufacture of minimum oil circuit breakers. The assessee paid duty by classifying the same under Tariff Sub-Heading 8535 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. According to the Department the item was classifiable under Sub-Heading 8537. Accordingly, four show-cause notices were issued on 17-12-1993 for the period 30-6-1993 to 31-8-1993; show-cause notice dated 4-4-1994 for the period 13-9-1993 to 30-9-1993; show-cause notice dated 31-5-1994 for the period 1-11-1993 to 28-2-1994 and show-cause notice dated August (sic) 1994 for the period March 1994 to August 1994. By the aforestated four show-cause notices, the Department called upon the assessee to pay differential duty of Rs 9,69,638 covering a period from 30-6-1993 to 31-8-1994. By the said four show-cause notices, the Department proposed to revise the classification from Sub-Heading 8535 to Sub-Heading 8537.

3. By reply dated 4-2-1994 the assessee submitted that they were manufacturers of electrical goods falling under Chapter 85. They were manufacturing switchgear products coming under Sub-Headings 8535.00, 8536.90, 8537.00 and 8538.00 They submitted that minimum oil circuit breaker was classified, right from inception, under Tariff Sub-Heading 8535.00 as it is an apparatus used for switching and protecting the electrical circuit in cases where the voltage exceeded 1000 V. The assessee contended that the demand for duty was not maintainable because the said minimum oil circuit breaker was one single apparatus having function of breaking the current under abnormal conditions such as short circuit.

4. On the other hand, it was the case of the Department that the components of minimum oil circuit breaker performed individual functions within the said circuit breaker and, therefore, cannot be termed as a separate apparatus. According to the Department minimum oil circuit breaker (outdoor) was put on a control panel for controlling the electricity current. Therefore, according to the Department the item in question came within Sub-Heading 8537.

5. By order dated 19-12-1994, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise came to the conclusion that minimum oil circuit breakers were classifiable under Sub-Heading 8537.00 and not under Sub-Heading 8535.00 Reliance was placed on the explanatory note to Chapter 85 as well as HSN for coming to the conclusion that circuit breakers were classifiable under Sub-Heading 8537.00

6. Being aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Collector, the assessee went in appeal to the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals). Before the Appellate Authority the assessee placed reliance on a circular dated 14-7-1994 issued under Section 37-B clarifying that the item in question would fall under Tariff Sub-Heading 8537.00 prospectively. It was urged by the assessee before the Appellate Authority that in view of the said circular dated 14-7-1994 the reclassification ordered should be given prospective effect and to that extent alone demand should be made from the assessee. On merits, the assessee contended that there were two types of minimum oil circuit breakers, namely, indoor and outdoor, which consists of electrical components such as fuse, terminals, socket outlet, etc. The assessee, therefore, contended that the product came under Sub-Heading 8535.00 By order dated 31-5-1995 the appeal was dismissed.

7. Being aggrieved by the aforestated two orders, the assessee preferred appeal to the Tribunal. By the impugned judgment, the Tribunal held that minimum oil circuit breaker was classifiable under Sub-Heading 8537 and not under Sub-Heading 8535. However, by the impugned judgment, the Tribunal held that in view of the circular dated 14-7-1994 issued by the Board under Section 37-B the quantum of duty leviable needed recalculation as the said circular dated 14-7-1994 operated prospectively. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had predeposited Rs 4,00,000 whereas the amount payable on the basis of the circular dated 14-7-1994 fell within the amount of Rs 4,00,000. Accordingly, the Tribunal remitted the matter to the Assistant Commissioner concerned to recalculate the duty payable by the assessee and refund the balance. Hence, these civil appeals by the Department.

8. Shri A. Subbarao, learned advocate for the Department, submitted that in the present case the first show-cause notice was issued on 17-12-1993, much prior to the Board's circular dated 14-7-1994. It was submitted that the said show-cause notice was not based on the circular dated 14-7-1994, but, it was on the basis of the interpretation placed on the aforestated two entries by the Assistant Collector. Therefore, it was urged that the Tribunal had erred in restricting the demand raised by the Department to the period on and after 14-7-1994.

9. Despite notice none appeared for the assessee.

10. Before dealing with the above arguments, for the sake of convenience, we reproduce hereinbelow the relevant heading, sub-heading and description of the goods, along with the rate of duty under Chapter 85 which dealt with electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof:

CHAPTER 85

Electrical Machinery and Equipment and Parts Thereof;
“Heading No. Sub-Heading No. Description of goods Rate of duty (1) (2) (3) (4) 85.35 8535.00 Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits, or for making connections to or in electrical circuits (for example, switches, fuses, lightning arresters, voltage limiters, surge suppressors, plugs, junction boxes), for a voltage exceeding 1000 volts 20% 85.37 8537.00 Boards, panels (including numerical control panels), consoles, desks, cabinets and other bases, equipped with two or more apparatus of Heading 85.35 or 85.36, for electric control or the distribution of electricity, including those incorporating instruments or apparatus of Chapter 90, other than switching apparatus of Heading 85.17 20%”

11. On merits, the Tribunal in the present case following its judgment in the case of Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. CCE (1996) 87 ELT 414 (cegat) has held that circuit breakers are panels equipped with circuit breakers classifiable under Sub-Heading 8535 and are also equipped with one or more apparatus under Sub-Heading 8535.00 or under Sub-Heading 8536.00 and consequently such panels were classifiable under Sub-Heading 8537.00 of the Central Excise Tariff Act. Against the said decision, the assessee has not filed any appeal to this Court.

12. Now coming to the question of interpretation of Section 37-B of the Act, as stated above, the Tribunal has held that circular dated 14-7-1994 issued by the Board was prospective and consequently the Department was not entitled to demand duty on the basis of reclassification for the period prior to that date. In this connection, reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of H.M Bags Manufacturer v. CCE (1997) 11 SCC 696, (1997) 94 ELT 3. In our view, the judgment of this Court in the case of H.M Bags Manufacturer (1997) 11 SCC 696, (1997) 94 ELT 3 has no application to the facts of the present case. As can be seen from the facts enumerated hereinabove, much prior to 14-7-1994 a show-cause notice was issued by the Assistant Collector on 17-12-1993 on the basis of his interpretation of the above two entries. The order passed by the Assistant Collector dated 19-12-1994 is also on the basis of his interpretation of the above two entries. The said order is not based on the circular dated 14-7-1994. Therefore, the circular had no application to the facts of this case.

13. Under Section 37-B of the Act, the Board is empowered to issue instructions to Central Excise Officers, for the purpose of uniformity in the classification of excisable goods, which instructions are required to be followed by such officers. However, under proviso (a) to Section 37-B an exception is made. The said proviso states that the said instructions, orders or directions cannot make any Central Excise Officer to dispose of a particular case in a particular manner. Similarly, under proviso (b) such instructions shall not bind the discretion of the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), discharging appellate functions. In view of the proviso to Section 37-B, the said circular dated 14-7-1994 issued by the Board was not applicable to the facts of the present case. As stated above, in the present case, the Assistant Collector had taken a prima facie view for purposes of reclassification as far back as 17-12-1993. Therefore, the circular dated 14-7-1994 had no application to the facts of the present case. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of H.M Bags Manufacturer (1997) 11 SCC 696, (1997) 94 ELT 3 did not deal with the case where the Department had issued show-cause notice purporting to reclassify the product prior to the issuance of instructions by the Board. Therefore, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case.

14. The extent and scope of Section 37-B came up for consideration before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Birla Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CCE (1992) 57 ELT 674 (Cal). Ruma Pal, J. (as she then was) has succinctly analysed the provisions of Section 37-B by laying down the following principles: (ELT p. 682, para 18)

“18. (1) There is a distinction between a decision in a particular assessment by a quasi-judicial authority and a decision on principle by the Board. While an instruction issued under Section 37-B cannot be binding upon a quasi-judicial authority under the Act, the departmental officers conducting the lis before such quasi-judicial authority cannot take a stand contrary to the directive/instruction issued.
(2) The instructions which may be binding on the Central Excise Officers are not binding on the assessee who may question the correctness of the same before a quasi-judicial authority and before a court. Both the quasi-judicial authority and a fortiori, the court, can question the correctness of the instructions.
(3) An assessee has on the other hand the right to claim and the court may compel compliance with such instructions as are for the benefit of the assessee by the Central Excise Officers.”

15. Applying the tests enunciated hereinabove, to the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that circular dated 14-7-1994 had no application.

16. For the reasons stated above, these civil appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal dated 26-4-1999 in Appeals Nos. E/689-92 of 1995 is set aside with no order as to costs.