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State Of T.N And Another v. Kethiyan Perumal .
Factual and Procedural Background
The District Magistrate & Collector, Vellore, acting as the detaining authority, issued an order dated 29-3-1988 detaining Kethiyan Perumal under Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (“the Act”). The detenu’s wife filed a habeas corpus petition in the Madras High Court, contending that the detention relied on extraneous matters and failed to demonstrate that his activities were prejudicial to public order. A Division Bench of the High Court accepted this contention and quashed the detention order.
The State of Tamil Nadu and the detaining authority appealed to the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 701 of 1999; Criminal Appeal No. 702 of 1999 involved an identical fact pattern and depended on the outcome of the first appeal. No appearance was entered for the respondent before the Supreme Court despite service of notice.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Forest Officer’s report, which formed the basis of detention, contained no allegation that the detenu’s acts were highly dangerous to public order.
- Whether, by virtue of Section 5-A of the Act, the detention order could survive even if any one of the stated grounds were found extraneous or irrelevant.
- Whether the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in U. Vijayalakshmi v. State of T.N. (1995 SCC (Cri) 176) was distinguishable on the facts of the present case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (State of Tamil Nadu and Detaining Authority)
- The High Court committed a factual error; the Forest Officer’s report explicitly stated that indiscriminate felling of sandalwood trees threatened the ecological system and was prejudicial to public order.
- The detenu had confessed to engaging in unlawful activities, further justifying preventive detention.
- Section 5-A of the Act makes the grounds of detention severable; therefore, even if any one ground were defective, the remaining valid grounds sustained the order.
- The scenario is on all fours with U. Vijayalakshmi, wherein this Court upheld detention based on the same Forest Officer’s report.
Respondent (Detenu)
- The Forest Officer’s report did not assert that the detenu’s conduct endangered public order, rendering reliance on it extraneous.
- The detaining authority therefore took into account irrelevant considerations, vitiating the detention order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| U. Vijayalakshmi v. State of T.N., 1995 SCC (Cri) 176; AIR 1994 SC 165 | (a) Illicit felling of sandalwood affecting ecological balance constitutes a threat to “public order” under the Act. (b) Section 5-A renders detention grounds severable; an irrelevant ground does not invalidate the order. |
The Supreme Court held that the present case is indistinguishable; the same principles apply, thereby validating the detention order despite the High Court’s contrary view. |
| Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 409 | Court may leave it to the State to decide whether, after lapse of time, the detenu should serve the unexpired portion of detention. | Relied upon when directing the State to reconsider the necessity of making the detenu serve the remaining period of detention within two months. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Justice Arijit Pasayat, writing for the Court, found that the High Court’s conclusion rested on a demonstrable factual mistake: the Forest Officer’s report did expressly state that large-scale sandalwood felling “prejudicially affected public order” by destroying the ecological system essential for human life. The Supreme Court reproduced portions of the report to show the explicit reference to ecological harm and threat to public life.
The Court further observed that, even assuming arguendo that an extraneous consideration had crept in, Section 5-A of the Act makes the grounds severable, a position already affirmed in U. Vijayalakshmi. Hence, a single defective ground could not vitiate the detention order when other valid grounds remained.
The High Court’s attempt to distinguish U. Vijayalakshmi was rejected: both cases relied on the identical Forest Officer’s report and addressed the same statutory question. Consequently, the High Court failed to appreciate binding precedent and misapplied the factual record.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Allowed; High Court judgments set aside. The detention orders stand restored.
Implications: The decision re-affirms the severability doctrine embodied in Section 5-A of the Act and clarifies that environmental offences threatening ecological balance can constitute disturbances to “public order.” Although the detention order is revived, the Court directed the State to decide within two months whether, in light of elapsed time, a proximate nexus still exists warranting the detenu’s return to custody. No new legal test is created, but the ruling reinforces strict adherence to precedent and statutory severability in preventive-detention jurisprudence.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— These two appeals involve identical issues. The impugned judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 702 of 1999 has its foundation on the judgment impugned in Criminal Appeal No. 701 of 1999. Therefore, the factual position involved in Criminal Appeal No. 701 of 1999 is described.
2. The State of Tamil Nadu and the District Magistrate and Collector, Vellore District (hereinafter referred to as “the detaining authority”) call in question the legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court quashing the order of detention dated 29-3-1988 passed by the detaining authority.
3. A habeas corpus petition was filed by the wife of Kethiyan Perumal (hereinafter described as “the detenu”) who was detained under Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (in short “the Act”). The High Court allowed the habeas corpus petition primarily on the ground that the detaining authority took into consideration extraneous matters while recording the finding about unlawful activities of the detenu or that it was highly dangerous to the public order. The High Court distinguished the decision of this Court in U. Vijayalakshmi v. State of T.N 1995 SCC (Cri) 176, AIR 1994 SC 165 which was relied upon by the detaining authority. Primary stand of the writ petitioner (present respondent) before the High Court was that though reference was made to the Forest Officer's report and the same virtually provided the foundation of the detention, yet there was no mention therein that activities of the detenu had been highly dangerous to public order. The State resisted the petition on the stand that in an identical matter reference was made to the said Forest Officer's report. This Court in U. Vijayalakshmi case 1995 SCC (Cri) 176, AIR 1994 SC 165 dealt with the matter in detail and upheld the detention. Reliance was placed on Section 5-A of the Act to contend that the grounds are separable and even if one ground indicated in the order of detention fails, on the residual grounds also a detention can be maintained.
4. The High Court found that though the decision in U. Vijayalakshmi case 1995 SCC (Cri) 176, AIR 1994 SC 165 was with reference to the same report of the Forest Officer, yet points which were presently urged were not taken before the High Court in the earlier case.
5. The stand of the appellants is that the High Court accepted the prayer of the detenu on the ground that the Forest Officer's report did not specifically refer to the alleged unlawful activities aspect or that the impugned acts were highly dangerous to public order. It is submitted that the conclusion is factually incorrect. It was pointed out that there was a confession of Respondent 1 where there was clear admission about the unlawful activities. In any event the effect of Section 5-A of the Act has not been kept in view by the High Court.
6. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent in spite of service of notice.
7. The High Court did not take note of the fact that the factual distinction sought to be brought about by the detenu is not supportable. In both U. Vijayalakshmi case 1995 SCC (Cri) 176, AIR 1994 SC 165 and the present case the Forest Officer's report was common. Effect of the confessional statement and the background facts have not been taken note of.
8. Before we go into the legal aspects involved it would be necessary to sort out confusion entertained by the High Court. Interference was done with the order of detention primarily on the ground that the Forest Officer's report did not anywhere indicate about the effect on public order aspect. In fact, it clearly mentions that activities of the detenu prejudicially affected public order. It was specifically stated as follows:
“Human life is dependent on water, clean air and healthy agriculture for providing food. Destruction of sandalwood trees in Vellore district will seriously affect the availability of these essential things and cause threat to public life at large due to destruction of natural forest ecosystem.
Hence I feel that we should stop by all means the indiscriminate felling of trees in Vellore district in the interest of public because the ecological system is affected in a manner prejudicial to the public order.”
9. The factual mistake, committed by the High Court by observing that there was no mention regarding activities being highly dangerous to public order, is not sustainable, in view of the details indicated and clear mention. It was categorically stated that the destruction of ecological system would be highly dangerous to public order. In any event the effect of Section 5-A of the Act cannot be lost sight of. The High Court was clearly in error in holding that decision in U. Vijayalakshmi case 1995 SCC (Cri) 176, AIR 1994 SC 165 was distinguishable. The decision in U. Vijayalakshmi case 1995 SCC (Cri) 176, AIR 1994 SC 165 clearly applies to the facts of the case. It is to be noted that in U. Vijayalakshmi case 1995 SCC (Cri) 176, AIR 1994 SC 165 this Court categorically held that in view of Section 5-A of the Act an extraneous and irrelevant ground does not affect validity of the detention order as Section 5-A was introduced precisely to take care of such a situation. This Court, inter alia, held as follows: [SCC (Cri) pp. 177-78, paras 4-5]
“4. The second contention is based on the facts stated in paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention. It is manifest from the facts stated in paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention that the emphasis is twofold: (1) that to profit from the high price fetched by sandalwood in the open market, illicit felling of sandalwood trees is on the increase, thereby causing widespread danger to the ecological system and loss of revenue to Government, and (2) that the huge money falling into the hands of tribals makes them susceptible to drinking and gambling, thereby converting the poor and innocent tribals into antisocials. So far as the first aspect is concerned we find from the grounds of detention that the detenu was involved in two similar cases in the past and the impugned order of detention was passed after he was found to have indulged in similar activity on 1-5-1992. As is clear from the explanation to Section 2(a) extracted earlier, widespread danger to the ecological system must be deemed to affect public order adversely within the meaning of that expression in Section 2(a) of the Act. Counsel submitted that although it is asserted in paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention that the illicit cutting and removal of sandalwood trees from the reserved forest area causes widespread danger to the ecological system and disturbs the delicate equilibrium thereof, there is nothing on record to show that this assertion is well founded. We are afraid we cannot accept this submission made by the learned counsel for the detenu. It is manifest from paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention that this view was founded on the opinion of the District Forest Officer, Vellore. Once it is found that the ground of detention is one recognised by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, it is not for this Court to probe into the correctness of the alleged facts since this Court has a limited role in the matter of examining the validity of the detention order.
5. Counsel for the detenu next contended that the second aspect of paragraph 4 shows that extraneous consideration weighed with the detaining authority in passing the impugned detention order. He submitted that it is too remote to think that tribals resort to drinking, gambling and turn antisocials merely because some extra money falls into their hands. Assuming without deciding that this contention is well founded, we are of the opinion that Section 5-A of the Act takes care of it. Even if we were to hold that this ground is extraneous or irrelevant, that would not affect the validity of the detention order as Section 5-A was introduced precisely to take care of such a situation. We, therefore, do not see any merit in the second contention also.”
10. The order of the High Court is accordingly set aside.
11. The impugned judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 702 of 1999 involves identical issues.
12. On both aspects factual as well as legal, in both the appeals, the High Court's judgments are not sustainable and are, therefore, set aside.
13. The residual question is whether it would be appropriate to direct the respondent in each case to surrender for serving remaining period of detention in view of passage of time. As was noticed in Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India (2000) 3 SCC 409 it is for the appropriate State to consider whether the impact of the acts, which led to the order of detention, still survives and whether it would be desirable to send back the detenu for serving the remainder period of detention. Necessary order in this regard shall be passed within two months by the appellant State. Passage of time in all cases cannot be a ground not to send the detenu to serve the remainder of the period of detention. It all depends on the facts of the act and the continuance or otherwise of the effect of the objectionable acts. The State shall consider whether there still exists a proximate temporal nexus between the period of detention indicated in the order by which the detenu was required to be detained and the date when the detenu is required to be detained pursuant to the appellate order.
14. Appeals are allowed.
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