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State Of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The State of Rajasthan filed an appeal in the Supreme Court challenging an order dated 31-5-2001 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in SB Criminal Appeal No. 88 of 2001. In that order the High Court, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and perusing the trial court record, refused to grant leave to appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) against an acquittal, stating only that it found no error in the judgment impugned. The State contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court’s cryptic refusal, devoid of reasons, unlawfully foreclosed its statutory right to an appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a High Court, when refusing leave to appeal under Section 378 CrPC against an order of acquittal, is legally obliged to record reasons for such refusal.
- Whether the High Court can equate its power to grant leave under Section 378 CrPC with the Supreme Court’s discretionary power to grant special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution and thereby dispense with giving reasons.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Arguments
- The phrase “I do not find any error in the judgment” itself amounts to a sufficient reason; hence the High Court’s discretion should not be faulted for brevity.
- An analogy was drawn to the Supreme Court’s practice of summarily dismissing special-leave petitions under Article 136 without assigning reasons, suggesting that a similar approach is permissible under Section 378 CrPC.
Appellant State's Arguments
- Failure to record reasons is, per se, a vitiating factor that invalidates the High Court’s order, as established by numerous prior decisions of the Supreme Court.
- The statutory right to appeal provided in Section 378 CrPC cannot be curtailed by a perfunctory, unreasoned order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar (2004) 5 SCC 568 | High Courts have a duty to record reasons when disposing of applications for leave to appeal under Section 378 CrPC. | The Court relied on this precedent to reaffirm that giving reasons is an essential judicial obligation and that perfunctory dismissals are impermissible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasised that the “hallmark” of judicial decision-making is the disclosure of reasons. It noted:
- Section 378 CrPC provides a statutory, though regulated, right of appeal; refusal of leave effectively forecloses appellate scrutiny of an acquittal and therefore demands a reasoned order.
- Judicial discretion must be exercised judiciously; arbitrary or cryptic refusals undermine the justice-delivery system and violate principles of natural justice.
- The analogy to Article 136 is “illogical”: the High Court is not the final court, and its orders remain subject to further appellate review. In contrast, dismissal of an SLP by the Supreme Court is final and non-appealable, justifying different standards.
- Past Supreme Court jurisprudence over “the past two decades,” including Dhaniram Luhar, consistently mandates the recording of reasons when leave is refused.
Applying these principles, the Court found the High Court’s single-sentence order inadequate and arbitrary, warranting interference.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is ALLOWED; the High Court’s order refusing leave is set aside. Leave to appeal under Section 378 CrPC is granted, and the High Court is directed to hear and dispose of the State’s appeal on merits after issuing notice to the respondents.
Implications: The judgment reiterates that High Courts must provide cogent reasons when refusing leave to appeal against acquittal, reinforcing transparency and accountability in criminal appellate procedure. It clarifies that the Section 378 leave requirement does not dilute the appellate court’s duty to give a reasoned order, and it draws a clear distinction from the Supreme Court’s discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136.
Order
1. The above appeal has been filed by the State of Rajasthan against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court dated 31-5-2001 in SB Crl. A. No. 88 of 2001 whereunder the learned Judge in the High Court has passed the following order while refusing to grant leave and consequently rejected the appeal:
“Heard learned Public Prosecutor.
Perused the judgment impugned and the record available with learned Public Prosecutor. I do not find any error in the judgment impugned. No case for grant of leave is made out. Accordingly, this leave to appeal is hereby rejected.”
2. Mr Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondents strenuously contended, despite the earlier judgments of this Court which have unmistakably indicated that in cases where leave to appeal is refused, reasons have to be assigned in support of the order; and that there is considerable difference between the appeal provided for against convictions under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”) and an appeal provided for under Section 378 CrPC against orders of acquittal — and the inherent differences in the manner of availing of such avenue of appeals provided, one automatically without any condition precedent for entertaining and the other regulating the right to appeal subject to the seeking of and obtaining leave of the High Court — has not been noticed in the earlier decisions of this Court and, therefore, this calls for a consideration. Pursuing such line of submissions it has been contended that when a court has said that it does not find any error in the judgment it should be considered to be itself a sufficient reason and the discretion so exercised to refuse leave cannot be found fault with on the ground that no further or other details/reasons have been assigned therefor. Learned counsel for the respondents also attempted to draw an analogy on the basis of the special leave to appeals filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and the practice adopted by this Court in rejecting summarily, without assigning any reason, such petitions for special leave to appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant State contended that the omission to give reasons is per se a vitiating factor and that vitiates the order of the High Court, as held in a catena of cases.
3. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. This Court in State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar (2004) 5 SCC 568, JT (2004) 2 SC 172 has while reiterating the view expressed in the earlier cases for the past two decades emphasised the necessity, duty and obligation of the High Court to record reasons in disposing of such cases. The hallmark of a judgment/order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is to disclose the reasons for its decision and giving of reasons has been always insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration justice-delivery system, to make known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of principles of natural justice. The fact that the entertaining of an appeal at the instance of the State against an order of acquittal for an effective consideration of the same on merits is made subject to the preliminary exercise of obtaining of leave to appeal from the High Court, is no reason to consider it as an appeal of any inferior quality or grade, when it has been specifically and statutorily provided for, or sufficient to obviate and dispense with the obvious necessity to record reasons. Any judicial power has to be judiciously exercised and the mere fact that discretion is vested with the court/forum to exercise the same either way does not constitute any licence to exercise it at whims or fancies and arbitrarily as used to be conveyed by the well-known saying: “varying according to the Chancellor's foot”. Arbitrariness has been always held to be the anathema of judicial exercise of any power, all the more so when such orders are amenable to challenge further before higher forums. The State does not in pursuing or conducting a criminal case or an appeal espouse any right of its own but really vindicates the cause of society at large, to prevent recurrence as well as punish offences and offenders respectively, in order to preserve orderliness in society and avert anarchy, by upholding the rule of law. The provision for seeking leave to appeal is in order to ensure that no frivolous appeals are filed against orders of acquittal, as a matter of course, but that does not enable the High Court to mechanically refuse to grant leave by mere cryptic or readymade observations, as in this case (“the court does not find any error”), with no further, on the face of it, indication of any application of mind whatsoever. All the more so, when the orders of the High Court are amenable to further challenge before this Court. Such ritualistic observations and summary disposal which has the effect of, at times, and as in this case, foreclosing statutory right of appeal, though a regulated one, cannot be said to be a proper and judicial manner of disposing of judiciously the claim before courts. The giving of reasons for a decision is an essential attribute of judicial and judicious disposal of a matter before courts, and which is the only indication to know about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken, as also the fact that the court concerned had really applied its mind. All the more so, when refusal of leave to appeal has the effect of foreclosing once and for all a scope for scrutiny of the judgment of the trial court even at the instance and hands of the first appellate court. The need for recording reasons for the conclusion arrived at by the High Court, to refuse to grant leave to appeal, in our view, has nothing to do with the fact that the appeal envisaged under Section 378 CrPC is conditioned upon the seeking for and obtaining of the leave from the court. This Court has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be reappreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal.
4. The attempt to draw an analogy on the power of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and the practice of rejecting appeals at the SLP stage invariably without assigning reasons with the one to be exercised while dealing with an application for leave to appeal under Section 378 CrPC has no meaning and is illogical. First of all, the High Court is not the final court in the hierarchy and its orders are amenable to challenge before this Court, unlike the obvious position that there is no scope for any further appeal from the order made declining to grant special leave to appeal. It has been on more than one occasion reiterated that Article 136 of the Constitution does not confer any right of appeal in favour of any party as such and it is not that any and every error is envisaged to be corrected in exercising powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are special and extraordinary and the main object is to ensure that there has been no miscarriage of justice. That cannot be said to be the same with an appeal envisaged under Section 378 CrPC despite the fact that it is made subject to the obtaining of leave to file the appeal. The requirement to obtain leave does not render the nature, extent or the scope of the appeal under the Code a precarious one as sought to be assumed, on behalf of the appellant. Consequently, this appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside.
5. Considering the nature of the appeal before it and the time lag already involved, in our view, interest of justice would be better served by granting the leave, without expressing any view on the merits of the claims in the appeal before the High Court, to enable the same to be disposed of on its own merits without any further delay. Leave is granted. The High Court will do well to entertain the appeal and after issuing notice to the respondents, will consider and dispose of the same in accordance with law.
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