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State Of U.P v. Pappu Alias Yunus And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The prosecutrix, while alone at her home on 21-5-1987, was allegedly raped at gunpoint by the two respondents, Mannoo and Pappu, who gained entry through the roof. Her mother and a neighbour witnessed the respondents fleeing. A written report was lodged the same afternoon; medical examinations of the prosecutrix and the accused followed, and a charge-sheet under Section 376 IPC was filed. The Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sitapur, relied chiefly on the testimonies of the prosecutrix (PW 1) and her mother (PW 2) to convict both accused, sentencing each to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 2000. On appeal, a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) acquitted the accused, prompting the State of Uttar Pradesh to file the present appeal before the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondents by relying principally on the prosecutrix’s alleged “loose morals” and the absence of external injuries, without analysing the trial evidence.
- Whether an appellate court must provide a reasoned judgment when reversing a conviction, especially in a rape case where the prosecutrix’s prior sexual conduct is invoked.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant State of Uttar Pradesh
- The High Court disposed of the appeal in a “laconic and casual” manner, offering virtually no discussion of the evidence.
- Acquittal was granted almost solely on the ground that the prosecutrix was allegedly of “easy virtue,” a consideration irrelevant to the offence charged.
Respondents (Accused)
- The prosecutrix was of questionable character and “habitual to sexual intercourse,” making the prosecution version doubtful.
- Medical evidence disclosed no injuries, undermining the allegation of forcible rape; hence the High Court’s acquittal was justified and should stand.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court found the High Court’s judgment “practically unreasoned,” evidencing a non-application of mind. It observed that:
- The High Court misread PW 2’s testimony; although the mother made a stray admission regarding her daughter’s character, she also categorically denied any bad character.
- Even if the prosecutrix were accustomed to sexual intercourse, that fact is legally immaterial; prior promiscuity does not license rape, nor does it absolve the accused.
- A prosecutrix in a rape case is not an accomplice; her testimony can, if credible, stand on its own without requiring corroboration.
- Appellate courts reversing a conviction must engage with the evidence, record reasons, and articulate their own findings—none of which the High Court did.
Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s reliance on the victim’s character as the decisive factor was “indefensible.”
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s acquittal and remitted the matter to the Allahabad High Court for fresh hearing. The appeal was thus disposed of.
Implications: The decision reiterates that an appellate court must provide a reasoned judgment when overturning a conviction, and that a victim’s prior sexual history is irrelevant to the guilt of the accused in a rape prosecution. While the case is remanded rather than finally decided, the ruling reinforces the principle that courts should focus on the conduct of the accused, not the character of the victim, and underscores the necessity of detailed judicial reasoning.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. The State of U.P has questioned in this appeal correctness of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow directing acquittal of the respondents (hereafter referred to as “the accused”). The respondents were charged for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). The Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sitapur found them guilty and sentenced each to undergo RI for five years and to pay a fine of Rs 2000.
3. The factual position in a nutshell is that while the prosecutrix was alone in her house, at about 11.00 a.m on 21-5-1987 since her mother had gone out to market for purchasing vegetables, the respondents who belonged to her locality came to her house and knocked the door. The prosecutrix asked them as to who they were and they disclosed their identity. The prosecutrix refused to open the door as her mother was not at home. But both the accused persons went to the neighbouring house and came to the roof of her house and jumped into the courtyard and showed her a tamancha. She was first raped by accused-respondent Mannoo and thereafter by accused-respondent Pappu. After some time her mother came home and knocked the door and hearing the sound of knocking, the accused persons ran away and climbed over the roof. While they were climbing, the mother had seen them and she started shouting and hearing it one Vimalesh Kumar Verma of the locality came there and he also saw both the accused persons running away. Written report of the incident was lodged at the police station at 3.10 p.m Investigation was undertaken. The prosecutrix was sent to the district hospital for medical check-up. The accused persons were also sent for medical examination and their clothings were sent for chemical examination. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed and the accused persons were sent up for trial. The accused persons pleaded innocence. In the additional statements submitted during examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) respondent Pappu stated that the prosecutrix was not having a good character and since her house was in front of his house, he and his family members asked them to leave that place and hence the false case was foisted. To similar effect was the plea of accused Mannoo.
4. Placing reliance on the evidence of the prosecutrix and her mother, who were examined as PWs 1 and 2 respectively, learned trial Judge found the accused persons guilty, convicted and sentenced them as aforenoted.
5. The plea that she was a girl of easy morals was found to be of no consequence. There was some dispute as regards the age of the victim. The trial court on consideration of the evidence came to hold that she was a minor at the time of commission of the offence and the question of any consent being there was really of no consequence.
6. The conviction and the sentence were questioned by the accused persons by filing an appeal before the High Court and as noted above the High Court directed their acquittal.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that the High Court has disposed of the appeal in the most laconic and casual manner. There is not even any discussion on the evidence adduced, and practically on the sole ground that the mother of the prosecutrix accepted that the victim was of easy virtue, the acquittal has been directed.
8. Learned counsel for the accused-respondent on the other hand submitted that the High Court noticed that the prosecutrix was not having a good character and she was a girl of easy virtue. The medical evidence showed that she was habitual to sexual intercourse and there was no injury on her body. Accordingly, prosecution case was wholly doubtful. That being so, the order of acquittal does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.
9. We find that the High Court's judgment is practically unreasoned and its approach in dealing with the appeal is rather casual, disclosing non-application of mind.
10. There appears to be some misreading of the evidence of PW 2, the mother of the prosecutrix. The trial court had noticed as to how even in the absence of any external injury an offence could have been committed after analysing the doctor's evidence. The evidence of PW 2 has been read out of context by the High Court. As noticed by the trial court, she had categorically denied that the character of her daughter was not good and had also denied suggestion that her character being not good, they have been forcibly extricated from the mohalla. But at another place, she has accepted that character of her daughter was not good. Even if that be so, that does not dilute the offence.
11. Even assuming that the victim was previously accustomed to sexual intercourse, that is not a determinative question. On the contrary, the question which was required to be adjudicated was did the accused commit rape on the victim on the occasion complained of. Even if it is hypothetically accepted that the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it did not and cannot in law give licence to any person to rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not the victim. Even if the victim in a given case has been promiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone.
12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.
13. Above being the position, the High Court's view that the girl being of loose morals and easy virtue the accused were entitled to acquittal is indefensible. Without indicating reasons or basis the appellate court should not interfere with the findings recorded by the trial court. It is incumbent upon the appellate court, if it takes a contrary view, to analyse the evidence and to record its own conclusions. That has not been done in the instant case. This is a fit case where the matter needs to be reheard by the High Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh hearing. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case except indicating as to how the character of the victim is really of no consequence while adjudicating the question as to whether any rape was committed on her or not. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that since the respondents were acquitted by the High Court, the bail which was originally granted to them should be continued. It shall be open to the respondents to move the High Court for bail which shall be considered on its own perspective.
14. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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