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Gouni Satya Reddi v. Govt. Of A.P And Others

Supreme Court Of India
May 6, 2004
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant purchased the disputed land through a registered sale deed dated 5-2-1994 executed by S. Prabhakara Rao, who represented himself as the general-power-of-attorney (GPA) holder of Respondent 3, Dr. Guru Bhagavathula Rama Krishna Rao. After obtaining construction permission in March 1994, the appellant began building on the plot. Objections arose from P. Tirupathiah, claiming to be the true GPA holder of Respondent 3, which led the appellant to file a suit for injunction on 28-3-1994. The civil court granted interim injunction to the appellant and, on 20-10-1994, confirmed that injunction while dismissing Respondent 3’s suit for possession.

Subsequently, Respondent 3, acting through Tirupathiah, initiated LGC No. 157 of 1994 before the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (“the Act”). The Special Court held that Prabhakara Rao was not a valid GPA holder, declared the appellant a “land grabber,” and ordered him to hand over possession to Respondent 3. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh affirmed that decision. The present appeal challenges both orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant, who entered possession under a sale deed executed by S. Prabhakara Rao, is a “land grabber” within the meaning of Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.
  2. Whether the findings of the Special Court and the High Court—rejecting the validity of the GPA in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao and directing delivery of possession—are sustainable on the evidence recorded.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • He purchased the land for Rs 1,90,000 through a registered sale deed executed by S. Prabhakara Rao, whose GPA was itself a registered document.
  • Prior to execution, he published a notice on 2-9-1993 inviting objections; none were received, suggesting bona fide conduct.
  • He obtained lawful building permission and remained in open possession, thus lacking the requisite intention to “grab” land illegally.
  • Efforts were made to locate Prabhakara Rao for evidence, but he was untraceable; non-production of the original GPA or identifying witnesses should not be held against him.
  • The Special Court and High Court failed to find that he fabricated documents or knowingly acted without entitlement, elements essential for declaring someone a land grabber.

Respondent 3's Arguments

  • Respondent 3 purchased the plot in 1977 and constructed a room with a watchman; the appellant forcibly demolished it and occupied the land.
  • He never executed a GPA in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao; the alleged GPA and consequent sale deed are false and fabricated.
  • Respondent 3, residing in the USA, granted GPA to P. Tirupathiah to protect his property; therefore, only Tirupathiah could act on his behalf.
  • Because the appellant lacked lawful entitlement, his possession amounted to land grabbing under the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Act, emphasizing that “land grabbing” requires both absence of lawful entitlement and an intention to take possession illegally, with awareness of such illegality. It observed:

  • The Special Court found Respondent 3 to be the owner but did not record any finding that the appellant fabricated documents or knowingly acted illegally.
  • The appellant’s newspaper notice inviting objections before purchase was viewed as inconsistent with an intent to grab land covertly.
  • Discrepancies in the name on the GPA extract (“B. Rama Krishna Rao” instead of the full name) were deemed insufficient to infer fabrication, as abbreviations in signatures are common.
  • Failure to produce Prabhakara Rao or the attesting witnesses was not, by itself, proof of falsity; the appellant had made genuine attempts to trace Prabhakara Rao.
  • No specific finding existed that the appellant knew the GPA was invalid or that he acted with the requisite intent contemplated by the Act.
  • Therefore, mere lack of legal title could not, without the mens rea of illegal grabbing, attract the statutory definition of “land grabber.”

Concluding that the Special Court and the High Court overlooked these pivotal aspects, the Supreme Court held their orders unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed. The judgments of the Special Court and the High Court are set aside; LGC No. 157 of 1994 stands dismissed. Possession of the property is to be restored to the appellant forthwith.

Implications: The decision relieves the appellant from the stigma and consequences of being declared a “land grabber” and reaffirms that, under the Act, absence of lawful title must be accompanied by clear evidence of intentional illegal possession. No broader precedent is expressly articulated beyond the case-specific interpretation of the statutory definitions.

Show all summary ...

Brijesh Kumar, J. The judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh upholding the judgment and order passed by the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short “the Act”) directing the appellant to hand over the possession of the land to Respondent 3 herein, Dr. Guru Bhagavathula Rama Krishna Rao, has been impugned.

2. The relevant facts leading to the dispute between the parties are that according to the appellant he had purchased the land in dispute by means of a registered sale deed dated 5-2-1994 executed on behalf of Respondent 3 by his general-power-of-attorney holder S. Prabhakara Rao. He was granted permit by the appropriate authorities for construction over the land in the month of March 1994 whereafter the appellant started construction and had already raised pillars, etc. when an objection was raised by Tirupathiah who claimed to be the general-power-of-attorney holder of Respondent 3. The case of Tirupathiah was that no one else including S. Prabhakara Rao had any right to transfer the property. However, since obstruction was being created to the construction undertaken by the appellant over the land in dispute, he filed a suit for injunction on 28-3-1994. An interim injunction was granted in favour of the appellant. Later, however, Tirupathiah also filed a suit on 29-6-1994 for Respondent 3 claiming possession over the land. On 29-6-1994 an order to maintain status quo was passed and ultimately by judgment and order dated 20-10-1994 both suits were decided confirming the injunction granted in favour of the appellant and dismissing the suit of Respondent 3.

3. In respect to the question of possession, on consideration of all the evidence adduced before the civil court, it recorded a finding that the appellant was in possession and a case for grant of interim injunction was made out. However, insofar as the question as to the title and ownership of the land was concerned, it was observed that it was for the parties to approach the competent court for determination of their dispute since no other relief was prayed for except for an interim injunction. While disposing of the suit OS No. 3226 of 1994 filed by G. Rama Krishna Rao, the trial court found that there was no reason to grant any status quo order as prayed for and so far as the question of title is concerned, it was observed that it was open to the parties to take appropriate steps and approach the competent court to determine their dispute in respect of the title.

4. After the first round of litigation, as indicated above, was over, Respondent 3 filed a suit being LGC No. 157 of 1994 before the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act through P. Tirupathiah, the alleged general-power-of-attorney holder. The main dispute between the parties was as to whether S. Prabhakara Rao was the general power-of-attorney holder of Respondent 3 or it is P. Tirupathiah as claimed by the respondent. The case of the appellant has been that since he was interested in purchasing a property, on the suggestion of his brother-in-law, he entered into a deal with S. Prabhakara Rao who held out himself to be the general-power-of-attorney holder of Respondent 3. The general power of attorney in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao was a registered document and the sale deed executed by S. Prabhakara Rao was also duly registered. It was denied by the appellant that Tirupathiah was the general-power-of-attorney holder of Respondent 3.

5. The case of Respondent 3 in the petition filed before the Special Court was that he had purchased the plot in question from the cooperative housing society on 13-6-1977. He had constructed a room over the said plot and had kept a watchman in that room to protect the property but the appellant had forcibly occupied the property in dispute and had also demolished the room of the watchman standing thereon. The allegation in regard to the general power of attorney in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao, has been averred as follows:

“The respondent created the false documents by creating the false power of attorney in favour of Shri S. Prabhakara Rao and got registered the sale deed in favour of the respondent and subsequently obtained the permission for the construction of the house by purchasing the false registered sale deed vide Document No. 641 of 1994 dated 5-2-1994.”

With the above allegations it was averred that the appellant had grabbed the property. It was further averred that Respondent 3 was residing in USA and had given general power of attorney to Tirupathiah to safeguard his property.

6. The allegations of creating false documents and general power of attorney have been denied in reply preferred by the appellant before the Special Court. Further, the case of the appellant was that since he wanted to purchase some property in Hyderabad on the suggestion of his brother-in-law he contacted S. Prabhakara Rao who had given out himself as a holder of power of attorney of Respondent 3 and he executed the sale deed in favour of the appellant. Before the sale deed was executed on 5-2-1994 the appellant had got it published in the newspapers on 2-9-1993 that he intended to purchase the property in question and objections, if any, by anyone could be indicated to him. He received no objections from anyone whereafter the sale deed was executed in his favour on payment of a consideration of Rs 1,90,000. He obtained permission for construction from the appropriate authorities. The appellant had also informed Respondent 3 through counsel about the purchase of the property on 6-9-1994. It was further averred that while the construction was in progress one Shankariah who had his plot in the neighbourhood came with antisocial elements and tried to interfere with the possession and the construction which led the appellant to file a civil suit for injunction.

7. There has not been any dispute on the fact that Respondent 3 was the owner of the property. The dispute was as to whether Prabhakara Rao was the holder of the general power of attorney entitled to execute the sale deed on behalf of Respondent 3 or not or that Tirupathiah was the holder of the general power of attorney. The Special Court did not believe the case of the appellant that S. Prabhakara Rao was the holder of the general power of attorney and thus issued directions for handing over possession of the property to Respondent 3.

8. Before entering into further discussion on the merits of the case it would be appropriate to peruse certain relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2(d) of the Act defines “land grabber” as follows:

“2. (d) ‘land grabber’ means a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of the abovementioned acts; and also includes the successors-in-interest;”

9. Section 2(e) defines the expression “land grabbing”, which reads as under:

“2. (e) ‘land grabbing’ means every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation, of unauthorised structures; and the term ‘to grab land’ shall be construed accordingly;”
(emphasis supplied)

10. From a reading of the definitions of the phrases “land grabber” and “land grabbing” it is clear that the grabbing of any land must be without any lawful entitlement and with a view to take possession of such lands illegally. That is to say, the land grabber must be aware of the fact that he is entering into the possession illegally and without any lawful entitlement. If such elements as indicated above are missing in our view, it would not be a case of land grabbing.

11. We may now examine the judgment of the Special Court dealing with the respective cases of the parties after coming to a conclusion that there is no dispute between the parties about the ownership of the land. That is to say, that it belonged to Respondent 3. The Special Court discussed the oral evidence produced by both parties. It found that the appellant failed to produce Prabhakara Rao, who executed the sale deed as holder of power of attorney of Respondent 3. It has also discussed about the effort said to be made by the appellant to trace out Prabhakara Rao since according to the appellant he tried his best to contact Prabhakara Rao and also went to the address as provided to him but it was found that Prabhakara Rao was not available even at that address. Since he was untraceable he could not be produced by the appellant. The Special Court then took into consideration the fact that power of attorney said to be executed in favour of Prabhakara Rao was not filed but a registration extract of the deed of power of attorney was produced through PW 5 from the Sub-Registrar's office. The Special Court found that the name of Respondent 3 is “Guru Bhagavathula Rama Krishna Rao” but the extract of the registration summoned from the Office of the Sub-Registrar showed that the document was signed as B. Rama Krishna Rao. The word “Guru” was not there; nor the full name. Instead of the word “Bhagavathula” only the letter “B” was indicated before Rama Krishna Rao. It is also noticed that the names of identifying witnesses were mentioned on the deed but they have not been examined. As against the above, the court found that Respondent 3 examined himself (which fact seems to be incorrect) to deny execution of any general power of attorney in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao. The court also took into consideration the circumstance that on 5-1-1994 Respondent 3 was not in Hyderabad but the appellant adduced documentary evidence to indicate that Respondent 3 had come to India from America and was here during the relevant period. Though according to Respondent 3 he was in Bombay, Delhi and Haridwar, etc. but not in Hyderabad. The court then takes note of the letter sent by Respondent 3 to the counsel for the appellant in reply to the letter dated 6-9-1994 saying that Respondent 3 had not executed any power of attorney in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao. On the basis of the above facts and circumstances the Special Court recorded a finding as follows:

“Thus from the material available on record, though the applicant is not examined, we are of the clear opinion that the original of Ext. X-1 was not executed by the applicant and consequently the title to the schedule property does not flow to the respondent under Ext. B-1.”

Ultimately, the finding as recorded by the Special Court is to be found in para 21 of the judgment, which reads as under:

“Thus, in view of our above observations, we find under Issue 1 that the applicant is the owner of the schedule property. As we have already observed, the applicant has not authorised S. Prabhakara Rao who is said to have executed Ext. B-1 and consequently no title to the schedule property flows under Ext. B-1 to RW 1 and consequently it is a case where the respondent is in possession of the schedule property without ‘legal entitlement’. As such we find under Issue 2 that the respondent is a land grabber within the meaning of Section 2(d) read with Section 2(e) of the Act.”

12. Thus, the findings are that Respondent 3 is the owner of the property who had not authorised S. Prabhakara Rao to execute the sale deed. Thus no title is passed on to the appellant who is in possession of the property without legal entitlement. Therefore, the appellant is “land grabber” within the meaning of Section 2(d) read with Section 2(e) of the Act.

13. The first thing to be noted is that the case of Respondent 3 as sought to be made out in the petition as quoted in the earlier part of this judgment was that the appellant had created false documents by creating the false power of attorney in favour of Prabhakara Rao and got the sale deed registered in his favour and that the sale deed was also false. But we don't find any such finding having been recorded by the Special Court saying that the appellant had created the false document by creating the false power of attorney. In absence of any such finding it may be examined as to what extent taking over of possession by the appellant without lawful entitlement was “with a view to take possession illegally”. Mere fact of not being lawfully entitled to enter into possession by itself would not lead to the inference of land grabbing unless possession is illegally taken with that view in mind. It is a necessary ingredient of land grabbing i.e the person taking possession must know it that he is acting illegally while taking possession.

14. The appellant's case is that before the sale deed was executed he had published a notice in the newspapers inviting objections against the proposed transaction on 2-9-1993. No objections had been received; it would, however, be immaterial since the material fact is that if the appellant intended to obtain possession illegally and had obtained or created a false power of attorney in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao he would have been the last person to have published any such notice. This vital and important fact, we find, has been totally missed to be taken note of, though, only a mention of it has been made in the judgment. We again find that the criticism that original power of attorney was not filed is also not justified. The appellant is not supposed to have in his possession the general power of attorney executed in favour of another person. Yet another factor which has been overemphasised by the Special Court as well as the High Court is that instead of Guru Bhagavathula Rama Krishna Rao the extract from the Sub-Registrar's register shows that the document was signed as “B. Rama Krishna Rao”. While signing, it is quite often seen that instead of writing full name alphabets are used to shorten the names. In place of “Bhagavathula” if only “B” is written it will hardly give rise to any suspicion, similarly, if “Dr. Guru” is not prefixed before the signature. One could sign one's name “Dr. Guru Bhagavathula Rama Krishna Rao” as “B. Rama Krishna Rao”. It would not necessarily raise any suspicion about the genuineness of the signature. Yet another criticism is about the non-production of S. Prabhakara Rao. It may be seen that evidence was produced by the appellant to indicate that he tried to trace out and find out the correct whereabouts of S. Prabhakara Rao and actually he went to those places but it was found that S. Prabhakara Rao was not residing there. He may have either shifted or may have provided a wrong address. Yet another factor which deserves to be noted is that no finding has been recorded against the case of the appellant that he had purchased the land on the basis of the power of attorney on payment of a consideration of Rs 1,90,000. The case as taken by the appellant is though mentioned in the judgment yet no finding rejecting this part of the case has been recorded. Again so far as the case of Respondent 3 that he was not in Hyderabad on 5-1-1994 is concerned, admittedly, Respondent 3 was in India during that period including on 5-1-1994 and according to his case he has been in Delhi, Bombay and Haridwar during the said period. Respondent 3 has not examined himself in support of his case. In the above circumstances it could not be categorically inferred that he was not in Hyderabad on the relevant date. The only other circumstance is in regard to non-examination of attesting and identifying witnesses of the registration of the deed of general power of attorney in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao. Certainly they could be examined, omission to do so would, however, not be a circumstance strong enough to hold that a false document was created by the appellant in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao with an intention to get the sale deed executed in his favour. Maybe, that the appellant himself has been duped and S. Prabhakara Rao who later disappeared may have wrongly represented to the appellant to be holder of general power of attorney of Respondent 3 and executed the sale deed on that basis. But it would not mean that the appellant when entered into the possession over the land was aware that the power of attorney actually existed or not in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao and that the sale deed executed on that basis did not entitle him to take possession. As observed earlier, merely not being entitled to get the possession itself was not enough to hold that a person would be land grabber unless the possession was taken with an intention to enter into possession illegally. Further, such an intention stands dispelled by the fact that the appellant had invited objections by publishing notice in the newspapers to the intended transaction. The Special Court except for mentioning this fact has not attached due weight to it. If the appellant was responsible for creation of a false document of general power of attorney in favour of S. Prabhakara Rao with an intention to get the sale deed executed in his favour as observed earlier also, he would be the last person to invite objection through publication in the newspapers. The Special Court has not recorded any finding that no such publication was made. S. Prabhakara Rao may have been an impostor, or not a genuine person or a genuine power-of-attorney holder of Respondent 3, but neither is there any such finding nor facts or circumstances on the record to impute any such knowledge to the appellant at the time of execution of sale deed in his favour. The provisions of the Act would not cover such cases, unless coupled with the fact of not being entitled to possession the person enters into possession with a view to obtain illegal possession. Where such view of taking illegal possession is missing or lacking, a person would not be covered under the definition of the phrase or expression “land grabber”. The facts, to indicate such intention, though have been pleaded, as indicated earlier, but no such finding has been recorded. The mere fact of legally not entitled to the possession would not fulfil the ingredients of the definitions of “land grabber” and “land grabbing”. The High Court, we find, has only repeated briefly whatever has been discussed by the Special Court without adverting to the other facts and circumstances and the question involved as discussed above. The orders, therefore, passed by the Special Court and the High Court are not sustainable.

15. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgments and orders passed by the High Court and the Special Court are set aside and the suit filed by Respondent 3 through his alleged general-power-of-attorney holder. Tirupathiah in the Special Court under the A.P Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act shall stand dismissed. Possession of the suit property be restored to the appellant herein forthwith.

16. Costs easy.