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Krishnappa v. State Of Karnataka .
Factual and Procedural Background
An incident in 1993 resulted in simple injuries and damage to crops. Twelve persons were charged and are presently facing trial before the Magistrate. The appellant had originally been arrayed as an accused, but the High Court quashed the proceedings against him in 1995 under Section 482 CrPC.
After the prosecution examined 17 witnesses and the statements of the existing accused were recorded under Section 313 CrPC, the State filed an application under Section 319 CrPC seeking to summon the appellant for joint trial. The trial Magistrate, by a detailed order dated 5-2-2000, dismissed the application, holding that the possibility of the appellant’s conviction was remote and noting the earlier quashing order.
In revision, the High Court set aside the Magistrate’s refusal and directed that the appellant be tried alongside the other accused. The present appeal challenges that revisional order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in invoking its revisional jurisdiction to set aside the Magistrate’s discretionary order refusing to summon the appellant under Section 319 CrPC.
- Under what circumstances may a person, against whom proceedings were previously quashed, be re-summoned under Section 319 CrPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent State’s Arguments
- Relying on Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983) 1 SCC 1, the State contended that a court may summon a person under Section 319 CrPC even after earlier quashing, and that the Magistrate erred in suggesting otherwise.
- It was urged that prosecution evidence showed the appellant’s presence and instigation during the incident, warranting his inclusion as an accused.
The opinion does not detail the appellant’s specific arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983) 1 SCC 1 | A person whose prosecution was quashed may still be summoned under Section 319 CrPC; power is discretionary and to be used sparingly. | The Court acknowledged this principle but emphasised the cautionary note that the power must be exercised only on compelling reasons. |
| Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2000) 3 SCC 262 | Section 319 CrPC is discretionary; courts should consider the stage of trial, volume of evidence, and overall conspectus before adding an accused. | The Court applied these factors and concluded that the Magistrate’s refusal to summon the appellant was a proper exercise of discretion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reiterated that the authority to summon an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC is extraordinary and discretionary, to be exercised sparingly and only upon compelling reasons.
Applying the standards set out in Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Michael Machado, the Court observed:
- The incident occurred in 1993; by the time of the Section 319 application, seventeen witnesses had been examined and Section 313 statements recorded—indicating the trial was at an advanced stage.
- The role attributed to the appellant was limited to instigation, and the Magistrate had expressly found the likelihood of conviction to be remote.
- The Magistrate’s brief reference to the earlier quashing was not the sole basis of refusal; the core reasoning rested on an assessment of the evidence and prospects of conviction.
- Given these factors, the Magistrate’s exercise of discretion was neither perverse nor illegal, and therefore did not warrant interference in revision.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED – High Court judgment set aside; Magistrate’s order dismissing the Section 319 application restored.
Consequently, the appellant will not face trial alongside the twelve existing accused. The decision reinforces the principle that courts must exercise caution and consider the stage of proceedings, evidentiary sufficiency, and prior orders when invoking Section 319 CrPC. No new legal precedent is created, but the ruling reaffirms existing limitations on revisional interference with a Magistrate’s discretionary powers.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment of the High Court passed in revisional jurisdiction whereby the order dated 5-2-2000 passed by the trial Magistrate dismissing the application of the State filed under Section 319 CrPC has been set aside. By the impugned judgment the appellant has been arrayed as an accused to be tried with twelve other accused.
3. The case before the Magistrate relates to an incident of the year 1993 which led to certain simple injuries and damage to some crops. Twelve accused are facing trial. The appellant was also arrayed as one of the accused but the High Court had quashed the case against him in the year 1995 on a petition filed by him under Section 482 CrPC.
4. The State filed an application under Section 319 CrPC before the Magistrate for summoning the appellant as an accused after the conclusion of prosecution evidence examining 17 prosecution witnesses and recording of the statements of the accused under Section 313 CrPC by the trial Magistrate. The learned Magistrate by a detailed order, after examination of the evidence, dismissed the application, inter alia, on noticing that on evidence, the possibilities of the appellant being convicted were remote. The trial court also noticed the factum of the quashing of the proceedings against the appellant in the year 1995.
5. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has come to the conclusion that some of the prosecution witnesses have deposed about the presence of the appellant on the date of the incident and also about the instigation made by him to the other accused persons to destroy the crops and trees grown by PW 1.
6. It has been repeatedly held that the power to summon an accused is an extraordinary power conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken.
7. In the present case, we need not go into the question whether prima facie the evidence implicates the appellant or not and whether the possibility of his conviction is remote, or his presence and instigation stood established, for in our view the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate, in any event of the matter, did not call for interference by the High Court, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
8. Mr Sanjay Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the respondent State, contends, relying upon the decision of this Court in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983) 1 SCC 1 that the trial court had the power to summon the appellant in exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC even when the proceedings had been earlier quashed qua him and the trial court committed serious illegality in observing to the contrary and thus the High Court rightly reversed the order of the Magistrate. Though an order under Section 319 CrPC summoning a person can be made on fulfilment of the conditions stipulated therein even when the proceedings had earlier been quashed, but in the present case the Magistrate did not dismiss the application merely on the ground of the proceedings having been quashed against the appellant. The Magistrate first on examination of evidence, came to the conclusion that the possibilities of the appellant being convicted were remote and, thereafter, made a passing reference to the factum of the proceedings having been quashed in the year 1995. In Ram Kishan Rohtagi case (1983) 1 SCC 1 while holding that despite proceedings having been quashed, a person can be proceeded with, a note of caution was added that the power under Section 319 CrPC was discretionary and had to be used sparingly only on the existence of compelling reasons.
9. In Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2000) 3 SCC 262 construing the words “the court may proceed against such person” in Section 319 CrPC, this Court held that the power is discretionary and should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice and that the court should not turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. This Court further held that a judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has already proceeded and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the court had spent for collecting such evidence. The court, while examining an application under Section 319 CrPC, has also to bear in mind that there is no compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons. In a nutshell, it means that for exercise of discretion under Section 319 CrPC, all relevant factors, including the one noticed above, have to be kept in view and an order is not required to be made mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence had come on record implicating the person sought to be added as an accused.
10. Applying the test as aforesaid to the facts of the present case, in our view, the trial Magistrate is right in rejecting the application. The incident was of the year 1993. Seventeen witnesses had been examined. The statements of the accused under Section 313 CrPC had been recorded. The role attributed to the appellant, as per the impugned judgment of the High Court, was of instigation. Having regard to these facts coupled with the quashing of proceedings in the year 1995 against the appellant, it could not be held that the discretion was illegally exercised by the trial Magistrate so as to call for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the order of the trial Magistrate.
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