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Delhi Transport Corporation v. Sardar Singh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents, all conductors employed by Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), were subjected to departmental proceedings for alleged misconduct consisting of prolonged unauthorised absence, negligence of duties, and lack of interest in work. Their service conditions were governed by the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952 and the Standing Orders framed thereunder.
After separate enquiries, the disciplinary authority imposed punishment of dismissal/removal and, because an industrial dispute was pending, sought approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Industrial Tribunal concluded that the enquiries were defective but allowed the employer to adduce additional evidence. Ultimately, it refused approval, reasoning that DTC had itself treated the absences as “leave without pay,” which it considered sanctioned leave, thereby negating misconduct.
DTC’s writ petitions succeeded before a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, who held that the Tribunal erred. On letters patent appeals, a Division Bench reversed the Single Judge and restored the Tribunal’s refusal of approval. DTC appealed to the Supreme Court, which consolidated the matters because they raised identical questions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether recording an employee’s prolonged absence as “leave without pay” amounts to sanction of leave so as to negate the charge of unauthorised absence/misconduct.
- Whether habitual unauthorised absence, under paragraphs 4(ii) and 19(h) of the Standing Orders, constitutes misconduct evidencing negligence and lack of interest in the employer’s work.
- Whether the Industrial Tribunal was justified in refusing approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act to the dismissal/removal orders passed by DTC.
- (In CA 9604/2003 and CA 9606/2003) Whether the Tribunal had denied the employer adequate opportunity to lead evidence, warranting remand.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant — Delhi Transport Corporation
- “Leave without pay” is merely an accounting entry to maintain service records; it does not amount to sanctioned leave.
- Paragraphs 4(ii) and 19(h) of the Standing Orders require prior permission; absence exceeding ten days without such permission renders an employee an absconder liable for termination.
- The Tribunal and Division Bench erred by equating “leave without pay” with sanctioned leave and ignoring the mandatory requirement of advance approval.
Respondent Employees
- Notation of absence as “leave without pay” signifies that the employer treated the period as approved leave.
- Long absence per se does not establish negligence or lack of interest; additional proof is necessary.
- The Tribunal therefore correctly refused approval of the dismissal/removal orders.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of M.P. v. Harihar Gopal, (1969) 3 SLR 274 (SC) | Treating absence as “leave without pay” after termination serves only to keep service records accurate; it does not convert unauthorised absence into sanctioned leave. | The Court relied on this decision to reject the employees’ argument that “leave without pay” amounted to granted leave, reinforcing that unauthorised absence remains misconduct. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined the duration of unauthorised absences (ranging from 92 to 294 days in most appeals) and held that habitual absence without prior sanctioned leave is a clear indication of negligence and lack of interest, squarely attracting paragraph 19(h) of the Standing Orders.
It clarified that entries of “leave without pay” are made only to maintain accurate service records and cannot be equated with sanctioned or approved leave. Relying on Harihar Gopal, the Court found the Tribunal’s core premise legally flawed.
The burden to rebut the inference of negligence lies on the employee; none produced evidence to show sanctioned leave or justify the prolonged absence. Consequently, the Tribunal erred in treating absence as authorised and in refusing approval under Section 33(2)(b). The learned Single Judge’s view upholding the dismissals was correct, whereas the Division Bench failed to address the true import of the Standing Orders.
For CA 9604/2003 and CA 9606/2003, the Court noted procedural deficiencies: the Tribunal had curtailed DTC’s opportunity to lead evidence and had not evaluated an alleged admission of misconduct. These matters were remitted for fresh consideration with directions to grant adequate opportunity.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Allowed / Partly Allowed. The Supreme Court restored the learned Single Judge’s decision endorsing the dismissals/removals and set aside the Division Bench’s judgment. CA 9604/2003 and CA 9606/2003 were remitted to the Industrial Tribunal for de novo consideration after giving both parties full opportunity to adduce evidence.
Implications: The ruling confirms that recording absence as “leave without pay” does not sanitise unauthorised absence; habitual absence without prior sanction is misconduct justifying dismissal. While the decision reinforces existing principles rather than creating new precedent, it underscores employers’ entitlement to treat prolonged unauthorised absence as evidence of negligence and lack of interest, provided Standing Orders are adhered to.
Arijit Pasayat, J. As the controversies in these appeals are based on identical premises, they are taken up together for disposal by this common judgment.
2. Background facts leading to these appeals are as follows:
The respondent in each case was working as a conductor in the appellant Delhi Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “the employer”). Departmental proceedings were initiated against each one of them on the ground of misconduct due to unauthorised long absence from duty; negligence of duties and lack of interest in the employer's work. The terms and conditions of appointment and service were governed by the applicable service regulations i.e the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952 (in short “the Regulations”). According to the employer the unauthorised absence was indicative of negligence, and lack of interest in employer's work amounted to misconduct. Reference was made to paras 4(ii) and 19(h) of the Standing Orders issued under para 15(1) of the Regulations. After finding the employees concerned guilty and being of the view that removal from service was the proper punishment, the disciplinary authority imposed punishment of dismissal/removal from service. Since an industrial dispute was already pending, approval was sought for in terms of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short “the Act”). According to the Tribunal, proper enquiry was not held. It, however, granted opportunity to the employer to lead further evidence to justify its action. The employer led further evidence. On consideration of materials brought on record, the Tribunal came to hold that availing leave without pay did not amount to misconduct. It noted that since the employer had treated absence from duty as leave without pay, it indicated sanction of leave and, therefore, also there was no misconduct. According to the employer long absence without sanctioned leave clearly disclosed lack of interest in service and the employee concerned was guilty of misconduct. The approval sought for was refused by the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not accord approval primarily on the ground that in most cases the leave was treated as leave without pay and that being the position it cannot be said that the absence was unauthorised.
3. The employer approached the Delhi High Court and learned Single Judge of the Court held that the disapproval by the Tribunal was not in order. The employees concerned preferred letters patent appeals before the Delhi High Court. A Division Bench of the Court by the impugned judgment disposed of several LPAs being of the view that the Tribunal's conclusions were in orderand the learned Single Judge was not correct in his conclusions.
4. In support of the appeals learned counsel for the appellant employer Corporation submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court has missed to notice the true effect of paras 4(ii) and 19(h) of the Standing Orders. Erroneously, it was concluded that leave without pay meant grant of leave. It is nothing but keeping the record straight and for the purpose of maintaining correct record of service. It did not amount to sanction of leave. The Standing Orders clearly stipulate that the leave was to be obtained in advance. Above being the position, the Division Bench was not justified in interfering with the orders of the learned Single Judge.
5. In response, learned counsel for the employees concerned submitted that where the record shows that the absence was treated as leave without pay, it meant that leave was granted and mere long absence does not per se show lack of interest in work, something more was necessary for the purpose and the Tribunal, therefore, was justified in its view.
6. We have examined the factual position in each case. In CA No. 9600 of 2003 the absence was 171 days between 1-11-1987 to 31-10-1988. In CA No. 9601 of 2003 the absence was 92 days between January 1991 to October 1991. In CA No. 9608 of 2003 there was 105 days' absence between 1-1-1991 to 30-11-1991. In CA No. 9607 of 2003 the absence was 294 days between 13-3-1991 and 1-1-1992. In CA No. 9611 of 2003 the absence was 95 days between January 1987 to August 1987. In CA No. 9602 of 2003 the absence was 137 days between 1-1-1993 to 30-11-1993. In CA No. 9605 of 2003 the absence was 188 days between 1-1-1992 to 15-7-1992. Additionally, a similar absence was there in 1990, 1991 and 1998 for 81 days, 129 days and 45 days respectively. In CA No. 9613 of 2003 the absence was 166 days between January 1991 to December 1991. In CA No. 137 of 2004 the absence was 272 days between 1983 up to August 1985.
7. In all these cases almost the whole period of absence was without sanctioned leave. Mere making of an application after or even before absence from work does not in any way assist the employee concerned. The requirement is obtaining leave in advance. In all these cases the absence was without obtaining leave in advance. The relevant paras of the Standing Orders read as follows:
“4. Absence without permission.—(i) An employee shall not absent himself from his duties without having first obtained the permission from the authority or the competent officer except in the case of sudden illness. In the case of sudden illness he shall send intimation to the office immediately. If the illness lasts or is expected to last for more than 3 days at a time, applications for leave should be duly accompanied by a medical certificate, from a registered medical practitioner or the Medical Officer of DTS. In no case shall an employee leave station without prior permission.
(ii) Habitual absence without permission or sanction of leave and any continuous absence without such leave for more than 10 days shall render the employee liable to be treated as an absconder resulting in the termination of his service with the organisation.
19. General provisions.—Without prejudice to the provisions of the foregoing Standing Orders, the following acts of commission and omission shall be treated as misconduct:
(a)-(g) ***
(h) Habitual negligence of duties and lack of interest in the authority's work.”
8. Clause 15 of the Regulations so far as relevant reads as follows:
“(2) Discipline.—The following penalties may, for misconduct or for a good and sufficient reason be imposed upon an employee of the Delhi Road Transport Authority:
(i)-(v) ***
(vi) Removal from the service of the Delhi Road Transport Authority.
(vii) Dismissal from the service of the Delhi Road Transport Authority.
***”
9. When an employee absents himself from duty, even without sanctioned leave for a very long period, it prima facie shows lack of interest in work. Para 19(h) of the Standing Orders as quoted above, relates to habitual negligence of duties and lack of interest in the authority's work. When an employee absents himself from duty without sanctioned leave, the authority can, on the basis of the record, come to a conclusion about the employee being habitually negligent in duties and an exhibited lack of interest in the employer's work. Ample material was produced before the Tribunal in each case to show as to how the employees concerned were remaining absent for long periods which affects the work of the employer and the employee concerned was required at least to bring some material on record to show as to how his absence was on the basis of sanctioned leave and as to how there was no negligence. Habitual absence is a factor which establishes lack of interest in work. There cannot be any sweeping generalisation. But at the same time some telltale features can be noticed and pressed into service to arrive at conclusions in the departmental proceedings.
10. Great emphasis was laid by learned counsel for the respondent employee on the absence being treated as leave without pay. As was observed by this Court in State of M.P v. Harihar Gopal (1969) 3 SLR 274 (SC) by a three-Judge Bench of this Court, even when an orderis passed for treating absence as leave without pay after passing an orderof termination, that is, for the purpose of maintaining correct record of service. The charge in that case was, as in the present case, absence without obtaining leave in advance. The conduct of the employees in this case is nothing but irresponsible in the extreme and can hardly be justified. The charge in this case was misconduct by absence. In view of the governing Standing Orders unauthorised leave can be treated as misconduct.
11. Conclusions regarding negligence and lack of interest can be arrived at by looking into the period of absence, more particularly, when same is unauthorised. Burden is on the employee who claims that there was no negligence and/or lack of interest to establish it by placing relevant materials. Clause (ii) of para 4 of the Standing Orders shows the seriousness attached to habitual absence. In clause (i) thereof, there is requirement of prior permission. Only exception made is in case of sudden illness. There also conditions are stipulated, non-observance of which renders the absence unauthorised.
12. The Tribunal proceeded in all these cases on the basis as if the leave was sanctioned because of the noted leave without pay. Treating as leave without pay is not same as sanctioned or approved leave.
13. That being the factual position, the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to accord approval to the orderof dismissal/removal as passed by the employer. The learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the employer was justified in passing the orderof termination/removal. The Division Bench unfortunately did not keep these aspects in view and reversed the view of the learned Single Judge.
14. We, therefore, allow these appeals and affirm the view taken by the learned Single Judge while reversing that of the Division Bench.
15. The appeals are allowed to the extent as indicated above.
CA No. 9604 of 2003
16. In this appeal there was 190 days of unauthorised absence between 1-1-1989 to 31-12-1989. It is noticed that the Tribunal did not give any opportunity to the management to lead evidence being of the view that adequate opportunity had been granted earlier. We find that the factual aspects were not examined and it is a fit case where the Tribunal ought to have granted a further opportunity to the management (employer) to place material in support of its case. That having not been done, we think it would be appropriate to remit the matter back to the Tribunal to consider the matter afresh after granting due opportunity to the parties before it.
17. Civil appeal is disposed of accordingly.
CA No. 9606 of 2003
18. In this appeal the absence was 132 days between 1-1-1989 to 31-12-1989. According to the appellant there was an admission regarding the alleged misconduct. The Tribunal does not appear to have considered the entire matter in its proper perspective, in particular, the effect of admission as claimed. We, therefore, think it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Tribunal with a direction to the Tribunal to permit the parties before it to place materials in support of their respective stands, we make it clear we have not expressed any opinion on merits.
19. Civil appeal is accordingly disposed of.
CA No. 9612 of 2003
20. In this appeal the absence was 170 days in 1991. The Tribunal in this case held that the enquiry was proper. But following its earlier view that unauthorised absence was not misconduct, it did not accord approval. If the Tribunal holds that the enquiry is proper then no further evidence was necessary to be produced. In view of what has been observed supra, the view of the Tribunal, that there was no misconduct, does not appear to be justified. The appeal is allowed, judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is restored.
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