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State Of Punjab And Others v. Savinderjit Kaur .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent was appointed on 6-8-1981 as a Sewing Teacher (also referred to as a “tailoring mistress”) in the pay scale of Rs 480-880 by the District Education Officer, Ferozepur. She sought parity of pay with Classical and Vernacular (C&V) teachers, but her representation was rejected. Aggrieved, she filed a writ petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court. The High Court, relying on its earlier decisions in Amarjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Prabhjot Kaur v. State of Punjab, allowed the petition and directed grant of the higher C&V pay scale. The State of Punjab and its authorities appealed to the Supreme Court; both appeals, involving identical facts and law, were heard together.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Sewing Teachers (tailoring mistresses) are legally entitled to the same pay scale as Classical & Vernacular teachers in light of the Punjab State Education Class III (School Cadre) Service Rules, 1978 and the State’s pay-revision notification dated 17-2-1989.
- Whether the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” can be invoked when the two categories differ in educational qualifications, recruitment methods and duties.
- Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to interfere with the High Court’s judgment in the circumstances of the case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The 1978 Service Rules place Sewing Teachers and C&V teachers in distinct categories; the latter require a university degree with B.Ed., whereas Sewing Teachers need only matriculation/middle with a three-year training diploma.
- Recruitment methods for the two categories are different, underscoring the validity of separate pay scales.
- The State’s notification dated 17-2-1989 revised pay scales and expressly maintained different scales for the two categories; the High Court ignored this statutory pay-revision.
Respondent’s Arguments
- Several similarly-situated teachers have already been granted the C&V scale, demonstrating discriminatory treatment if the respondent is denied parity.
- The respondent is a handicapped person, a circumstance that should weigh in favour of upholding the High Court’s relief.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Amarjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (1988) 4 SLR 199 (P&H) | High Court treated Tailoring Mistresses and C&V teachers as the same class and extended revised pay scales. | Supreme Court held the earlier case overlooked statutory rules and thus should not have guided the High Court’s decision in the present matter. |
| Prabhjot Kaur v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCT 262; (1994) 4 SLR 63 (P&H) | Followed Amarjit Kaur without independent analysis. | Supreme Court noted factual differences and that statutory provisions were again not considered. |
| Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347 | Non-filing of appeal against an earlier decision does not validate an erroneous legal position. | Cited to emphasise that failure to challenge earlier High Court rulings does not bind the State where those rulings are legally unsound. |
| Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545 | Even if a party is correct on law, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion under Article 136, refuse relief. | Formed the basis for declining interference despite finding the High Court judgment erroneous. |
| Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad (1999) 2 SCC 635 | Court’s discretion to withhold relief though declaring law in appellant’s favour. | Quoted within Chandra Singh passage to reinforce discretionary nature of certiorari. |
| Champalal Binani v. CIT (1971) 3 SCC 20; AIR 1970 SC 645 | Issuance of a writ of certiorari is discretionary. | Relied on to underline that extraordinary jurisdiction need not always be exercised. |
| S.D.S. Shipping (P) Ltd. v. Jay Container Services Co. (P) Ltd. (2003) 9 SCC 439 | Relief can be denied where quashing an order would revive another illegality or oppose public policy. | Cited to justify the refusal to disturb the respondent’s existing benefit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Court first scrutinised the statutory framework—the Punjab State Education Class III (School Cadre) Service Rules, 1978—and the State’s pay-revision notification dated 17-2-1989. These instruments distinctly classify C&V teachers, Tailoring Mistresses and Sewing Teachers, prescribing different pay scales based on qualifications and duties.
2. It observed that the High Court’s reliance on Amarjit Kaur and Prabhjot Kaur was misplaced because those decisions failed to consider the binding statutory rules and the later pay-revision notification.
3. The doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” was found inapplicable: parity cannot be claimed where educational qualifications, recruitment processes and functional responsibilities are demonstrably different. Such classification is constitutionally permissible.
4. Although these findings rendered the High Court’s judgment legally unsustainable, the Supreme Court examined whether to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136. Referring to Chandra Singh and related precedents, it reiterated that certiorari is a discretionary remedy and relief may be denied even where the impugned order is erroneous.
5. Two equitable considerations guided the Court: (i) the respondent had already been enjoying the higher pay scale pursuant to the High Court’s order; and (ii) she is a handicapped teacher. Interference at this stage would cause hardship and undo a benefit already extended.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, leaving the High Court’s direction—and consequently the respondent’s higher pay scale—undisturbed. No order as to costs.
Implications: The decision affirms the Court’s willingness to refrain from exercising Article 136 powers where equitable considerations outweigh strict legal correctness. It does not establish a new entitlement for Sewing Teachers; rather, it underscores the discretionary nature of the Supreme Court’s corrective jurisdiction.
S.B Sinha, J.— These two appeals involving identical questions of law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The factual matrix is, however, being noticed from Civil Appeal No. 1382 of 1999.
3. On or about 6-8-1981, the respondent was appointed as sewing teacher on regular basis in the pay scale of Rs. 480-880 by the District Education Officer, Ferozepur. She claimed same scale of pay payable to classical and vernacular teachers. The said representation of the respondent was, however, rejected.
4. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, a writ petition was filed by her before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which by reason of the impugned judgment was allowed relying on or on the basis of the earlier decisions of the said Court in Amarjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (1988) 4 SLR 199 (P&H) and Prabhjot Kaur v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCT 262, (1994) 4 SLR 63 (P&H).
5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would submit that the High Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the Education Department of the Government of Punjab had made rules in terms of the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India known as “the Punjab State Education Class III (School Cadre) Service Rules, 1978”, in terms whereof the sewing teachers and master(s) or mistress(es) were placed in different categories. In terms of the said Rules, the learned counsel would urge, whereas a master or mistress must possess a degree of a recognised university with BEd; the requisite educational qualification of a tailoring mistress is only matric or middle (sic) or equivalent with three years' Teachers' Training Diploma from the Industries Department of State or Industrial Training.
6. It was urged that the method of recruitment in the category of master or mistress and tailoring mistress is also different. It was pointed out that on or about 17-2-1989 the scales of pay of the teaching staff of the Education Department had been revised; in terms whereof different scales of pay had been granted to different categories of teachers and in that view of the matter, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would contend that various other similarly situated teachers had been granted scales of pay applicable to classical and vernacular teachers. It was further pointed out that the respondent is a handicapped person.
8. Having considered the rival submissions, we are of the opinion that the High Court proceeded on a wrong premise in passing the impugned judgment.
9. In Amarjit Kaur (1988) 4 SLR 199 (P&H) the writ petitioner therein had been granted a revised scale of pay and the same was wrongly withdrawn on the ground that she was confirmed with effect from 22-5-1974 by mistake. The High Court rejected the said contention of the respondent but proceeded further to hold that the Education Department had classified and recognized tailoring mistress and classical and vernacular teachers in the same category and, thus, when the scale of pay of the classical and vernacular teachers had been revised, there was no reason as to why the pay scale of tailoring mistress should not be accordingly revised.
10. In Prabhjot Kaur (1994) 3 SCT 262, (1994) 4 SLR 63 (P&H) the High Court followed Amarjit Kaur (1988) 4 SLR 199 (P&H) although the fact of the matter was quite different.
11. The High Court, in the above-referred decisions, had no occasion to consider the effect of the statutory rules or the notification revising scales of pay of different categories of the teachers.
12. In a case of this nature, even the doctrine of equal pay for equal work would not apply when it has not been established that duties and functions of two categories of employees are at par. Furthermore, a classification based on different educational qualifications is permissible. Yet again it may not matter as to whether the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amarjit Kaur (1988) 4 SLR 199 (P&H) and Prabhjot Kaur (1994) 3 SCT 262, (1994) 4 SLR 63 (P&H) had been appealed against or not. (See Govt. of W.B v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347, (2003) 9 Scale 671.)
13. The High Court while passing the impugned judgment did not address itself as regards applicability of the 1978 Rules as also the scales of pay granted to different categories of teachers by the Government of Punjab in terms of its notification dated 17-2-1989. By reason of the said notification, the Government of Punjab adopted the notification issued by the President of India in relation to the revised scales of pay to the teaching staff of the Education Department, the relevant portion whereof is to the following effect:
“Sl. No. Category Present scale Revised scale Remarks 5. C & V teacher i.e Pbi/Hindi/Urdu/ Sanskrit teachers 570-1080 (with 3 adv. increments) Fi/Urdu teachers and 5 increments to Sanskrit teachers 1640-2925 Sr. scale after 8 years' serv-ice 1800-3200 SI scale after 18 years' serv-ice 2000-3500 7. Domestic Sc. teachers, Music teachers, tabla players, tailoring mistress 480-800 1200-2100 Sr. scale after 8 years' ser-vice 1410-2640 SI scale after 18 years' service 1640-2925 14. Work experience teacher, vocation teacher, sewing teacher 480-880 1800-2100 Sr. scale after 8 years' serv-ice 1410-2460 Sr. scale after 18 years' service 1640-2925.”
14. From a perusal of the said notification dated 17-2-1989, it is evident that the classical and vernacular teachers had been placed on a higher scale of pay, namely, Rs. 570-1080; whereas the tailoring mistress had been placed in the scale of pay of Rs. 480-800. Similar scale of pay had been granted to the trained sewing teachers. However, different scales of pay in the categories of tailoring mistress and sewing teacher had been made in senior scale after eight years and eighteen years of service, respectively.
15. The validity of notification dated 17-2-1989 has not been questioned. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.
16. However, having regard to the fact that the respondents herein had been granted the same scale of pay and keeping in view the fact that she is a handicapped teacher, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
17. In Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545 this Court held:
“42. In any event, even assuming that there is some force in the contention of the appellants, this Court will be justified in following Taherakhatoon v. Salambin Mohd. (1999) 2 SCC 635 wherein this Court declared that even if the appellants' contention is right in law having regard to the overall circumstances of the case, this Court would be justified in declining to grant relief under Article 136 while declaring the law in favour of the appellants.
43. Issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. (See Champalal Binani v. CIT (1971) 3 SCC 20, AIR 1970 SC 645.) The High Court and consequently this Court while exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India may not strike down an illegal order although it would be lawful to do so. In a given case, the High Court or this Court may refuse to extend the benefit of a discretionary relief to the applicant. Furthermore, this Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India which need not be exercised in a case where the impugned judgment is found to be erroneous if by reason thereof substantial justice is being done. [See S.D.S Shipping (P) Ltd. v. Jay Container Services Co. (P) Ltd. (2003) 9 SCC 439, (2003) 4 Supreme 44] Such a relief can be denied, inter alia, when it would be opposed to public policy or in a case where quashing of an illegal order would revive another illegal one. This Court also in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is entitled to pass such order which will be complete justice to the parties.”
18. These appeals are dismissed with the aforementioned observations; but in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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