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Sumitra Devi Anand (Dead) By Lrs. v. Shanti Devi (Dead) By Lrs. .

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 15, 2004
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns property No. XVI/442, Sethi Building (formerly Hafiz Building), Faiz Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. After the 1947 partition, both Wazir Chand Anand (“Anand”) and B. S. Sethi (“Sethi”) were tenants of the Custodian for the property. The Custodian auctioned the property on 9 November 1955 and, after completion of formalities, a sale certificate dated 20 July 1961 vested title solely in Sethi. Tenants, including Anand, were asked to attorn to him.

On 10 February 1986 Sethi filed an eviction petition against Anand on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. Before the return date of 20 March 1986, Anand purportedly appeared, sought leave to defend, and simultaneously filed a compromise petition. Based on the compromise, the Rent Controller passed a consent decree on 19 February 1986 granting Anand time until 1 March 1988 to vacate.

Sethi died in April 1988; Anand died on 21 December 1999. Their respective legal representatives are the present respondents and appellants. On 28 February 2000, the respondents initiated execution of the 1986 decree—just before limitation expired. The appellants’ objections failed before the Additional Rent Controller and in appeal. A writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution resulted in liberty being granted to the appellants to file a civil suit alleging that the decree had been procured by fraud.

The appellants thereafter instituted Suit No. 1833/2002 (re-numbered 138/2003) seeking (a) a declaration that the 1986 eviction decree is a nullity because of fraud, (b) recognition of their asserted co-ownership, and (c) a permanent injunction against dispossession. Their application for interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC was dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 22 November 2003 and that dismissal was affirmed by the Delhi High Court on 26 March 2004. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges those two orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the courts below erred in refusing interim injunctive relief to the appellants, thereby permitting execution of the 1986 eviction decree, when the appellants’ suit alleges that the decree was obtained by fraud and that they are co-owners of the property.
  2. Consequently, whether the appellants’ possession should be protected pending final adjudication of their suit, and the suit directed to be decided expeditiously.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • At the 1955 auction, Anand’s compensation claim of Rs 4,991.44 was used toward the purchase price, making him a co-owner with Sethi.
  • Anand never appeared before the Rent Controller; Sethi allegedly produced an impostor, thereby procuring the consent decree by fraud.
  • Given his alleged co-ownership, Anand would not logically have agreed to vacate; the very fact that execution was delayed until the verge of limitation (2000) indicates the decree was fraudulently obtained.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Anand’s compensation claim was rejected on 24 April 1959; the sale certificate issued on 20 July 1961 vested title exclusively in Sethi.
  • The eviction decree was not executed earlier because the parties were closely related; cordial relations explained the delay, not fraud.
  • Affidavits from Advocates M. S. Sethi and M. L. Sharma attest that Anand personally engaged them, filed vakalatnamas, and made an on-oath statement supporting the compromise; extensive documentary evidence shows Anand was always treated merely as a tenant.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court acknowledged that notice in the eviction proceedings was returnable on 20 March 1986, yet Anand purportedly appeared a month earlier, filed an application for leave to defend, and almost simultaneously entered into a compromise resulting in a consent decree. The Court found this sequence “a little strange,” especially when coupled with the fact that the decree lay unexecuted for the full twelve-year limitation period, suggesting the eviction petition may have been filed primarily to preserve limitation rather than genuine need.

Given the appellants’ specific allegation that an impostor had appeared on Anand’s behalf and that the decree was procured by fraud, the Court held it “appropriate in the interest of justice” to: (a) protect the appellants’ possession during pendency of their fraud suit, and (b) ensure that the suit itself be decided expeditiously. The Court emphasised that its observations were confined to the interlocutory context and should not prejudice the trial on merits.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDERS OF 22-11-2003 (ADJ) AND 26-03-2004 (DELHI HIGH COURT) SET ASIDE.

Consequent directions:

  • The Additional District Judge must try Suit No. 138/2003 on a priority basis and endeavour to dispose of it within one year of receiving the Supreme Court’s order.
  • The appellants are protected from dispossession from the premises during the suit’s pendency; misuse or delay by the appellants may permit the respondents to seek vacatur of the injunction from the Supreme Court.

Implications are confined to the parties: the appellants retain possession pending trial, and the lower court must expedite adjudication. The judgment sets no new precedent on substantive law; its principal significance lies in reinforcing the judiciary’s readiness to protect possession where allegations of fraud surrounding a consent decree are yet to be adjudicated.

Show all summary ...

G.P Mathur, J.— Leave granted.

2. This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the order dated 26-3-2004 of the Delhi High Court, by which the appeal filed by the appellants against the order dated 22-11-2003 of the Additional District Judge, was dismissed and the order refusing to grant an injunction in their favour under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC was affirmed.

3. The dispute relates to property bearing No. XVI/442, Sethi Building (originally known as Hafiz Building), Faiz Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. After partition of the country, Wazir Chand Anand (for short “Anand”) and B.S Sethi (for short “Sethi”) were tenants of the custodian in the said building. The property was put up for auction on 9-11-1955 and a sale certificate was finally issued in favour of Sethi on 20-7-1961 certifying that he had given the highest bid for Rs 70,250 in a public auction and had been declared as purchaser of the property in full. Thereafter, a letter dated 1-9-1961 was issued by the custodian asking the tenants including Anand to attorn in favour of the auction-purchaser, namely, Sethi. Sethi filed eviction petition against Anand on 10-2-1986 on the ground of his bona fide requirement for his residence, in which notice was issued returnable on 20-3-1986. However, much before the said date, Anand appeared before the Rent Controller and filed an application for leave to defend in the eviction petition. He also filed an application for recording a compromise. The Rent Controller recorded statement of the parties and passed a consent order for eviction of Anand and he was given time up to 1-3-1988 to vacate the premises. An undertaking of Anand was also recorded to the same effect and the case was disposed of.

4. Sethi and Anand were co-brothers as their wives were real sisters. Sethi was an advocate of some standing in Delhi and he passed away in April 1988. Anand also passed away on 21-12-1999. The appellants are the legal representatives of Anand, while the respondents are the legal representatives of Sethi.

5. On 28-2-2000, when the period of limitation for executing the eviction decree was about to expire, the respondents filed an execution petition against the appellants. The appellants filed objections against the same taking various pleas including the plea that the decree had been obtained by fraud but the same was dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller on 18-3-2002 and the appeal against the said order was also dismissed on 3-4-2002. The appellants then preferred a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the Delhi High Court. During the course of hearing, the parties agreed that the petition be disposed of with liberty to the petitioners (appellants) to file a suit for challenging the eviction decree on the ground of fraud. The writ petition was accordingly disposed of on 9-1-2002 and the operative portion of the order reads as under:

“I am also of the view that since the petitioner has objected to the execution of the decree on the ground of fraud, he may have a right to file a suit to challenge the decree on such ground. Without, therefore, going into the question as to whether the decree could be challenged on the ground of fraud before the executing court itself, I dispose of this petition with liberty to the petitioner to challenge the decree on the ground of fraud by filing a regular civil suit. For a period of six weeks from today, the impugned order shall not be executed.”

6. The appellants then filed Suit No. 1833 of 2002 in the Delhi High Court for declaration that the decree of eviction passed on 19-2-1986 in Eviction Case No. 36 of 1986 by Shri R.K Sharma, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi titled as “B.S Sethi v. Wazir Chand Anand” is a nullity having been obtained by playing fraud upon the said court and is not binding upon the plaintiffs and further that they are co-owners of the property in dispute. They also sought a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing them from the said property. In view of increase in the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court, the suit was transferred and registered as Suit No. 138 of 2003 in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Delhi. The plaintiffs also moved an application for injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for restraining the defendants from dispossessing them from the property in dispute. The Additional District Judge dismissed the injunction application by his order dated 22-11-2003 and the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs against the said order was also dismissed by the High Court on 26-3-2004.

7. We have heard Shri Rajiv Dutta, Senior Advocate for the plaintiff-appellants and Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Senior Advocate for the defendant-respondents. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that when the property was put up for auction on 9-11-1955, the highest bid made was that of Sethi and Anand, as his associate, and an amount of Rs 4991.44 which was due to Anand as compensation for assets left by him in Pakistan, was utilised to make up the sale consideration and thus he was a co-owner of the property. Learned counsel has further submitted that Anand had never appeared before the Rent Controller as the notice was not served upon him nor had he filed any application for recording a compromise. According to the appellants, Anand never appeared before the court and he neither filed any application for recording a compromise nor gave any undertaking to vacate the premises by 1-3-1988. Sethi had set up an impostor and by playing fraud upon the court obtained an order of eviction against Anand. Learned counsel has further submitted that Anand being a co-owner of the property, there was no occasion for him to enter into a compromise whereunder he became liable to vacate the building. It is also submitted that the fact that an eviction decree passed in 1986 was sought to be executed in the year 2000, itself shows that the whole thing was fraudulent.

8. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that Anand had not paid any amount as his claim for compensation was rejected by the Settlement Officer (Judicial) on 24-4-1959 and finally the sale certificate was issued in favour of Sethi alone on 20-7-1961 and the tenants were asked to attorn in his favour. The eviction decree was not executed as the parties were closely related being co-brothers and they were having very cordial relations. Learned counsel has further submitted that Shri M.S Sethi, Advocate, had filed an affidavit dated 18-11-2002 stating that Anand had engaged him as his lawyer and he had filed his vakalatnama on his behalf. Anand had appeared in court and had made a statement on oath supporting the compromise petition. Shri M.L Sharma, Advocate, has also filed an affidavit dated 18-11-2002 on similar lines stating that he had been engaged by Anand and on his instructions a compromise petition was drafted by him which had been signed by Anand. Learned counsel has submitted that apart from the aforesaid affidavits, there is other voluminous documentary evidence to show that Anand was always treated as tenant of the building and not as co-owner.

9. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute that in the eviction petition filed by Sethi against Anand, notice was issued returnable on 20-3-1986, but even before the said date Anand appeared on 19-2-1986 and an application for leave to defend was filed by him and thereafter a compromise petition was filed on the basis of which the eviction petition was allowed and time was given to Anand to vacate the premises on or before 1-3-1988. The defendant-respondents did not put the decree into execution, but waited for full 12 years and filed the execution petition only on the last date i.e on 28-2-2000. This shows that the eviction petition was filed only for the purpose of saving limitation and at least till February 2000, they had no pressing need of the building in question. It certainly looks a little strange that though Anand filed an application for leave to defend the eviction petition, but almost simultaneously he filed a compromise petition wherein a consent order was passed giving him time to vacate the premises on or before 1-3-1988. The specific case of the plaintiffs is that Anand never appeared before the Rent Controller and the whole thing was managed by Sethi by setting up an impostor. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider it appropriate in the interest of justice that the suit filed by the appellants itself may be decided at a very early date and their possession may be protected during the pendency of the suit.

10. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the orders dated 22-11-2003 passed by the learned Additional District Judge and also the order dated 26-3-2004 passed by the High Court are set aside. The learned Additional District Judge shall take up the suit on priority basis and decide the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one year from the date of communication of this order to him. The appellants shall not be dispossessed from the premises in their occupation during the pendency of the suit. It is further directed that the parties shall make all endeavours for an early decision of the suit and shall not take adjournments unless absolutely necessary. If the plaintiffs cause obstruction in the progress of the suit or adopt delaying tactics, it will be open to the respondents to apply to this Court for vacating the injunction order.

11. It is made clear that any observation made in this order is only for the purpose of deciding the appeal and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion regarding the merits of the claim of the parties.