Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

M.P Rural Agriculture Extension Officers Association v. State Of M.P And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 5, 2004
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants are an Association of Rural Agriculture Extension Officers (“Extension Officers”) who were originally appointed as matriculate Village-Level Workers. Their services were later transferred to the State Agriculture Department. With effect from 9 April 1981 the designation was changed to “Rural Agriculture Extension Officer”.

The State framed the Madhya Pradesh Revision of Pay Rules, 1983, prescribing two scales of pay for the same post: Rs 575-880 (a “dying” scale) for non-graduates and Rs 635-950 for graduates. An executive instruction dated 2/5 March 1984 directed that the graduate scale be paid not only to fresh recruits but also to existing graduate Extension Officers. A consequential amendment of 5 September 1984 replaced the words “B.Sc./B.Sc.(Agri.) pass” with “graduates holding the degree”.

The Association filed a writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court seeking parity of pay with graduates on the strength of the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work”. The petition was transferred to the Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal in 1988. Despite holding that a prima facie case of hostile discrimination was made out, the Tribunal refused relief, observing that pay matters should be dealt with by the Pay Commission. The High Court dismissed the ensuing writ petition, relying on Union of India v. P.V. Hariharan. The present appeal challenges those orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether fixing two different pay scales for Rural Agriculture Extension Officers on the sole basis of educational qualification (graduate vs. non-graduate) violates the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” read with Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the State’s policy decision, reflected in the 1983 Pay Rules and subsequent executive instructions/amendments, constitutes hostile discrimination against non-graduate Extension Officers.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • No new post or cadre was created; therefore, employees in the same cadre performing identical duties cannot be placed in different pay scales merely because of educational qualification.
  • All Extension Officers, irrespective of qualification, perform the same work, have interchangeable posts and undergo identical training; classification on education alone is impermissible.
  • Failure of the State to file a return before the Tribunal amounts to admission of the Association’s averments.
  • Both the 1982 and 1999 Pay Revision Commissions recommended a uniform scale for all Extension Officers; the State arbitrarily ignored these expert recommendations.
  • Over-reliance on educational qualification stretches the doctrine of reasonable classification beyond permissible limits (citing Col. A.S. Iyer v. V. Balasubramanyam).

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Possession of a higher educational qualification is a constitutionally valid basis for differential pay and has been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
  • Article 14 is attracted only where discrimination is between persons who are truly similarly situated; graduates and non-graduates are not similarly situated.
  • Precedents such as P. Narasinga Rao, Mewa Ram Kanojia, V. Markendeya and Tarun K. Roy confirm that educational qualification provides an intelligible differentia rationally connected with enhanced pay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Delhi Veterinary Assn. v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 1 Basis for claim to higher pay under “equal pay for equal work”. Relied upon by appellants in their prayer; not discussed in Court’s analysis.
Union of India v. P.V. Hariharan (1997) 3 SCC 568 Classification on educational qualification upheld. Earlier relied on by the Tribunal and High Court to reject appellants’ claim; Supreme Court maintained the same view.
State of Mysore v. B. Basavalingappa 1986 Supp SCC 661 Equal pay despite different qualifications. Distinguished; Court noted it ignored earlier binding precedents.
State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhartiya (1993) 1 SCC 539 Burden on employee to prove discrimination. Cited to show petitioners must establish invidious discrimination; burden not discharged here.
Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India (1994) 2 SCC 521 Equal pay principle must not be applied mechanically; qualification can justify differential pay. Quoted approvingly to support validity of educational-based classification.
Col. A.S. Iyer v. V. Balasubramanyam (1980) 1 SCC 634 Limits on stretching classification doctrine. Mentioned but held inapposite to the facts.
State of Mysore v. P. Narasinga Rao AIR 1968 SC 349 Educational qualification as intelligible differentia satisfying Article 14. Relied upon as Constitution Bench authority validating the impugned classification.
Mewa Ram Kanojia v. AIIMS (1989) 2 SCC 235 Reasonable nexus required; qualification-based pay upheld. Extensively quoted; forms core of Court’s reasoning.
V. Markendeya v. State of A.P. (1989) 3 SCC 191 Equal pay applies only among equals; court must examine rationale. Cited to reinforce that academic qualification provides rational basis.
Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347 Reiteration of validity of educational qualification classification. Relied upon; two of the present Bench were parties to that judgment.
Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146 Restatement of tests for reasonable classification under Article 14. Quoted for the twin tests of intelligible differentia and rational nexus.
Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 222 Single person/group can constitute a class. Majority view discussed to explain flexibility of classification.
Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41 Legislation directed at a single company/person can be valid. Referred to while analysing Article 14 precedents.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538 Scope of Article 14; reasonable classification. Cited in support of proposition that even one person may form a valid class.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the “primal question” as whether granting a higher pay scale to graduate Extension Officers, while placing non-graduates in a “dying” scale, is discriminatory. The analytical steps were:

  1. Role of Pay Commissions: Although the 1982 and 1999 Pay Commissions recommended uniform pay, the State is not bound to accept such recommendations; it may formulate service conditions under the proviso to Article 309.
  2. State Policy: The State adopted a policy to recruit only graduates for the post and, to avoid disparity between new recruits and existing graduate employees, extended the higher scale to all graduates. This policy was neither arbitrary nor irrational.
  3. Doctrine of Reasonable Classification: Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification based on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Educational qualification satisfies both limbs (citing P. Narasinga Rao, Mewa Ram Kanojia, V. Markendeya, Tarun K. Roy, Saurabh Chaudri).
  4. Burden of Proof: Following Pramod Bhartiya, the onus lay on the appellants to prove invidious discrimination; they failed to do so.
  5. Distinction from Relied-on Precedents: Decisions like B. Basavalingappa were distinguished for overlooking earlier Constitution Bench rulings, and Balasubramanyam was found factually irrelevant.
  6. Conclusion: As educational qualification provides a valid basis for differential pay and the State’s policy had a rational nexus with maintaining higher standards for future recruitment, the challenged rules and executive instructions withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of maintaining separate pay scales for graduate and non-graduate Rural Agriculture Extension Officers, reaffirming that educational qualification is a constitutionally permissible ground for classification in matters of pay. The decision leaves the differential scales intact, offers no monetary relief to the appellants, and reiterates an existing line of precedent without creating a new legal principle.

Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, J.— Applicability of the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” is involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 13-4-1998 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 1550 of 1998.

Background facts

2. The appellant herein is an Association of Rural Agriculture Extension Officers (hereinafter referred to as “the Extension Officers”). They were originally appointed as village-level workers. They are matriculates. The services of the village-level workers were transferred to the Agriculture Department of the State. It framed rules in the year 1972. On or about 9-4-1981, the designation of village-level worker was changed to Rural Agriculture Extension Officer by the State Government. The State of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the power conferred upon it under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India made rules known as “the Madhya Pradesh Revision of Pay Rules, 1983”. Rule 3 of the said Rules reads as under:

“3. Revised scale of pay.—The revised scale of pay applicable to any post carrying existing scale shown in columns 2 and 3 of Annexures I and II respectively shall be the corresponding pay scale shown in column 4 thereof in respect of that post.”

3. By reason of the provisions of the said Rules, two different scales of pay were prescribed, namely, Rs. 575-880 for non-graduates (dying scale) and Rs. 635-950 for fresh recruitment and for existing BSc/BSc (Agriculture). By reason of an executive instruction dated 2-3-1984/5-3-1984, the decision of the State Government was communicated to the Director, Agriculture, the relevant portion whereof is to the following effect:

“Essential educational qualification for the post of Rural Agriculture Extension Officer being graduation (for all departments) be fixed and all the graduates so employed be paid by the pay scale of Rs. 635-950. All those graduate employees who were working in the posts in all departments prior to 1-4-1981 should be paid and given a salary at the rate of Rs. 635-950.
2.-3. ***
This sanction endorsement vide Notification No. 5/385/84.Dept.1.Four dated 3-3-1984 had been endorsed in the records of the Accountant General's Office.”

4. Yet again by an amendment to the Rule by a notification dated 5-9-1984 in sub-clause (2) in Part B of the said Rules the words “for new recruitments and for the qualification BSc/BSc (Agri.) pass” were replaced by the words “for new recruitments and for graduates holding the degree”. The appellant herein filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs:

“(b) That the pay scale of Rural Agriculture Extension Officers be given in accordance with the ratio given in Delhi Veterinary Assn. v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 1, AIR 1984 SC 1221 and it should be enhanced with the cadres stated in the above paras by giving them maximum pay scale, as has been given to any one of those cadres.”

5. On constitution of the Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal in the year 1988, however, the said writ petition was transferred thereto. The Tribunal gave several opportunities to the respondents herein to file a return but despite its failure to do so and despite holding that a clear case of hostile discrimination has been made out in view of the decision of this Court in Union of India v. P.V Hariharan (1997) 3 SCC 568, JT (1997) 3 SC 569 held that the grievances of the applicant regarding pay scale had to be dealt with by the Pay Commission. A writ petition filed thereagainst before the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court by the appellant was also dismissed in view of the judgment of this Court in Hariharan (1997) 3 SCC 568, JT (1997) 3 SC 569 observing:

“… More so, there can always be a classification on the basis of graduation and non-graduation in the pay scale. Thus, we are satisfied that there is no ground to interfere with the order. Hence, this petition is dismissed.”

Submissions

6. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that the Tribunal as also the High Court went wrong in passing the impugned judgments and orders insofar as they failed to take into consideration that as by reason of the impugned Rule no new post or cadre was created, sanction of different pay scale to the employees belonging to the same cadre was impermissible. The purported classification between the two sets of employees whose posts are interchangeable and who are carrying out the same work and have undergone the same training could not have been placed in two different classes only on the basis of educational qualification, the learned counsel submitted. Dr. Dhavan would contend that as despite having been given several opportunities, the respondents herein failed to file return, they must be deemed to have admitted the contentions raised by the appellant herein before the Tribunal as correct and, thus, the Tribunal misdirected itself in refusing to grant any relief to the appellant despite arriving at a finding that the State has committed a hostile discrimination against the appellant. Educational qualification, Dr. Dhavan would urge, can be a valid criterion only where a new cadre is created and where no minimum qualification was fixed at the time of initial appointment, but in a situation where the employees irrespective of their qualification had been performing the same functions in the same grade, the doctrine of equal pay for equal work would be applicable.

7. Drawing our attention to the report of the Pay Revision Commissions made on or about 13-10-1982 as also in the year 1999, the learned counsel would submit that the State should have accepted the recommendations contained therein for grant of scale of pay to all Extension Officers irrespective of their educational qualification. The learned counsel in support of his aforementioned contention has placed strong reliance on State of Mysore v. B. Basavalingappa 1986 Supp SCC 661, (1987) 2 ATC 915, State of M.P v. Pramod Bhartiya (1993) 1 SCC 539, (1993) 23 ATC 657 and Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India (1994) 2 SCC 521, (1994) 27 ATC 121.

8. The learned counsel would contend that the doctrine of classification should not be stretched too far and the same cannot be a basis for justifying an arbitrary action on the part of the State. In support of the said contention, reliance has been placed on Col. A.S Iyer v. V. Balasubramanyam (1980) 1 SCC 634.

9. Ms Geetanjali Mohan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh, on the other hand, would urge that the possession of a higher educational qualification has all along been held by this Court to be a valid classification for the purpose of fixing the scale of pay. Although the employees concerned had been performing similar duties and functions, the same would not mean, it was urged, that the employees cannot be granted different scales of pay on the basis of their educational qualification. Article 14 of the Constitution of India, Ms Mohan would argue, will have application only when a discrimination is made between persons who are absolutely similarly situated and not otherwise. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on State of Mysore v. P. Narasinga Rao AIR 1968 SC 349, (1968) 1 SCR 407, Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences (1989) 2 SCC 235, (1989) 10 ATC 51, V. Markendeya v. State of A.P (1989) 3 SCC 191, (1989) 11 ATC 3 and a recent decision of this Court in Govt. of W.B v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347, JT (2003) 9 SC 130.

Analysis

10. Applicability of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work on the touchstone of Article 39(d) read with Article 14 of the Constitution of India will have to be considered for the purpose of the present case on the premise that save and except disparity in educational qualification, the nature of work performed by Extension Officers is identical and they had undergone a similar training. It is trite that the Pay Commission on or about 13-10-1982 and in the year 1999 desired and recommended that the same scale of pay be given to the Extension Officers irrespective of their educational qualification, but it is not in dispute that the recommendations of the Pay Commission were not accepted by the State. The relevant portion of the recommendations of the Pay Commission and the order of the State Government thereupon respectively are as under:

“Sl. No. Report of Pay Commission chapter/para Recommendations of Pay Commission Order of the State Government 5. Twelve 17 & 18 (One) The present pay scale of Gram Sewak is Rs. 169-300, the said pay scale was recommended to be revised at Sl. No. five and this suggestion was proposed that all the Gram Sewaks who passed the six months' training course should be upgraded to pay scale of Rs. 195-330 as being revised grade. According to the amendment in the Recruitment Rules of this Department the minimum qualification being graduation with Science or Agriculture and Gram Sewak be placed on pay scale of Rs. 635-950. This pay scale will be given to Gram Sewaks who were only Agriculture Graduates or Science Graduates but other Gram Sewaks will be given the revised pay scale of Rs. 575-880 as accepted pay scale.”

11. We have noticed hereinbefore that the State issued an executive instruction directing that not only the fresh recruits shall be entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 635-950, but also the graduate officers working even prior to 1-4-1981 would be eligible therefor. We have furthermore noticed that by reason of an amendment in the Rules made in terms of the notification dated 5-9-1984, the employees holding a degree as also the new recruits were to be placed in the said scale of pay.

12. The primal question which arises for consideration is whether the aforementioned order of the State Government is discriminatory in nature.

Findings

13. Pay Commissions are constituted for evaluating the duties and functions of the employees and the nature thereof vis-à-vis the educational qualifications required therefor. Although the Pay Commission is considered to be an expert body, the State in its wisdom and in furtherance of a valid policy decision may or may not accept its recommendations. The State in exercise of its jurisdiction conferred upon it by the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India can unilaterally make or amend the conditions of service of its employees by framing appropriate rules. The State in terms of the said provision is also entitled to give a retrospective effect thereto. A policy decision had been adopted by the State that the post of Extension Officers shall be filled up only by graduates. Such a policy decision ex facie cannot be termed to be arbitrary or irrational attracting the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A dying scale was provided by the State for the non-graduates. Fresh recruitments were to be made only from amongst the persons who held the requisite educational qualification. With a view to avoid any discrimination between the new recruits and the serving employees who possessed the same qualification, the State cannot be said to have acted illegally in granting a higher scale of pay also for the existing degree-holders.

14. Article 14, it is trite, does not forbid a reasonable classification.

15. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification subject to the conditions that it is based on an intelligible differentia and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. (See Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146, (2003) 9 Scale 272.)

16. Constitutional interpretation is a difficult task. Its concept varies from statute to statute, fact to fact, situation to situation and subject-matter to subject-matter. A classification based on educational qualification has been applied by a Constitution Bench of this Court as far back as in 1968 in P. Narasinga Rao AIR 1968 SC 349, (1968) 1 SCR 407 wherein it was observed: (AIR p. 351, para 4)

“It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group, and the second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated, Articles 14 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words, Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the general rule of equality laid down in Article 14 and it should be construed as such. Hence, there is no denial of equality of opportunity unless the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with the person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured; Article 16(1) does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for their selection.”

17. The said dicta was applied by this Court in Mewa Ram Kanojia (1989) 2 SCC 235, (1989) 10 ATC 51 stating:

“5. While considering the question of application of principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ it has to be borne in mind that it is open to the State to classify employees on the basis of qualifications, duties and responsibilities of the posts concerned. If the classification has reasonable nexus with the objective sought to be achieved, efficiency in the administration, the State would be justified in prescribing different pay scales but if the classification does not stand the test of reasonable nexus and the classification is founded on unreal, and unreasonable basis it would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Equality must be among the equals. Unequal cannot claim equality.”

18. The principle was reiterated in V. Markendeya (1989) 3 SCC 191, (1989) 11 ATC 3 observing:

“13. In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that where two classes of employees perform identical or similar duties and carrying out the same functions with the same measure of responsibility having same academic qualifications, they would be entitled to equal pay. If the State denies them equality in pay, its action would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and the court will strike down the discrimination and grant relief to the aggrieved employees. But before such relief is granted the court must consider and analyse the rationale behind the State action in prescribing two different scales of pay. If on an analysis of the relevant rules, orders, nature of duties, functions, measure of responsibility, and educational qualifications required for the relevant posts, the court finds that the classification made by the State in giving different treatment to the two classes of employees is founded on rational basis having nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, the classification must be upheld. Principle of equal pay for equal work is applicable among equals, it cannot be applied to unequals. Relief to an aggrieved person seeking to enforce the principles of equal pay for equal work can be granted only after it is demonstrated before the court that invidious discrimination is practised by the State in prescribing two different scales for the two classes of employees without there being any reasonable classification for the same. If the aggrieved employees fail to demonstrate discrimination, the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be enforced by court in abstract. The question what scale should be provided to a particular class of service must be left to the executive and only when discrimination is practised amongst the equals, the court should intervene to undo the wrong, and to ensure equality among the similarly placed employees. The court however cannot prescribe equal scales of pay for different classes of employees.”

19. A Bench of three Judges in which two of us were parties reiterated the same principle in Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347, JT (2003) 9 SC 130.

20. The aforementioned decisions are authorities for the proposition that despite the fact that the employees have been performing similar duties and functions and their posts are interchangeable, a valid classification can be made on the basis of their educational qualification. The observation of Krishna Iyer, J. in V. Balasubramanyam (1980) 1 SCC 634 although is interesting but it appears that the fact of the matter involved therein did not warrant application of the said principle.

21. The view of Subba Rao, J. in Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 222 was a minority view. Venkatarama Aiyar, J. therein speaking for the majority held: (AIR pp. 232-33, para 22)

“The law is now well settled that while Article 14 prohibits discriminatory legislation directed against one individual or class of individuals, it does not forbid reasonable classification, and that for this purpose even one person or group of persons can be a class. Professor Willis says in his Constitutional Law, p. 580 ‘a law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it’. This statement of the law was approved by this Court in Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41, 1950 SCR 869. There the question was whether a law providing for the management and control by the Government, of a named company, the Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Company Ltd. was bad as offending Article 14. It was held that even a single company might, having regard to its features, be a category in itself and that unless it was shown that there were other companies similarly circumstanced, the legislation must be presumed to be constitutional and the attack under Article 14 must fail. In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538, 1959 SCR 279 (SCR at p. 297 : AIR at p. 547) this Court again examined in great detail the scope of Article 14, and in enunciating the principles applicable in deciding whether a law is in contravention of that article observed
‘that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others that single individual may be treated as a class by himself’.”

22. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, a valid classification based on educational qualification for the purpose of grant of pay has been upheld by the Constitution Bench of this Court in P. Narasinga Rao AIR 1968 SC 349, (1968) 1 SCR 407.

23. In B. Basavalingappa 1986 Supp SCC 661, (1987) 2 ATC 915 a two-Judge Bench of this Court did not notice the earlier binding precedents of this Court. In fact one of them, K.N Singh, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, was a party to the subsequent decision in Mewa Ram Kanojia (1989) 2 SCC 235, (1989) 10 ATC 51. In that case no material was brought on record on the basis of which it could be contended that there was any substantial difference at that time between the two classifications although they were described differently. It was in that situation observed:

“It was argued that a diploma is a higher qualification than a certificate. But neither there is any curriculum on record nor any other material to draw that inference. On the contrary this circumstance that at the time when respondent was recruited a diploma-holder or a certificate-holder both were entitled to be recruited as Instructors on the same pay scale indicates that in those days the two were considered to be alike.”

24. In Pramod Bhartiya (1993) 1 SCC 539, (1993) 23 ATC 657 Jeevan Reddy, J. categorically held that burden to prove that a discrimination has been committed is upon the petitioners. In that case the petitioners failed to discharge their burden.

25. Yet again in Shyam Babu Verma (1994) 2 SCC 521, (1994) 27 ATC 121 N.P Singh, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench observed:

“The nature of work may be more or less the same but scale of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies classification. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ should not be applied in a mechanical or casual manner. Classification made by a body of experts after full study and analysis of the work should not be disturbed except for strong reasons which indicate the classification made to be unreasonable. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them.”

26. True it may be that when recommendations are made by a Pay Commission, evaluation of job must be held to have been made but the same by itself may not be a ground to enforce the recommendations by issuing a writ of or in the nature of mandamus although the State did not accept the same in toto and made rules to the contrary by evolving a policy decision which cannot be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory.

27. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for our interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.