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Narain v. State Of M.P .
Factual and Procedural Background
The case stems from an incident on 24 February 1986 in Village Murachh. According to the First Information Report lodged the same morning, the appellant Narain Singh and seven others allegedly attacked Laxman Singh (PW-14), several relatives, and ultimately the deceased Makhan with weapons such as farsa, axe and sticks. All eight accused were tried for offences under Sections 148, 302/149, 307/149, 324/149, 323/149 and 450 of the Indian Penal Code.
The trial court acquitted seven co-accused but convicted the appellant under Section 304 Part I IPC, sentencing him to eight years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 5,000. The appellant appealed; the State and the deceased’s father filed cross-appeals/revision challenging the acquittals. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court affirmed the appellant’s conviction and sentence and dismissed the State appeal and the revision. The present judgment is the Supreme Court’s determination of the appellant’s further appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant’s conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC can be sustained when the same body of evidence was found unreliable with respect to his seven co-accused.
- Whether a court may rely on portions of prosecution evidence after discarding substantial parts of it, or whether the evidence was so unreliable that truth and falsehood were “inextricably mixed,” rendering any conviction unsafe.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The core of the prosecution’s narrative had been discredited; therefore, the conviction cannot stand on evidence already rejected for the co-accused.
- Applying different standards to different accused on the same set of facts was unjustified.
State's Arguments
- Even after discarding parts of the testimony, the remaining evidence was adequate to prove the appellant’s guilt.
- The discrepancies regarding the exact locations were minor because the alleged places of occurrence were close to one another.
- The appellant’s own plea of right of private defence corroborated the prosecution to the extent necessary for conviction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 | A conviction may rest on reliable portions of evidence even if other parts are discarded; the doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a mandatory rule. | Cited to justify that an accused can be convicted on partially accepted evidence if the remaining testimony is trustworthy. |
| Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643 | Court must separate “grain from the chaff” and decide whether truthful elements remain after falsehood is excised. | Relied upon to frame the test: if truth and falsehood are inseparable, conviction is impermissible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court scrutinised the findings of the trial court and the High Court, noting:
- The prosecution alleged three distinct places of occurrence, but the trial court found the actual incident occurred elsewhere, throwing doubt on location and sequence.
- The informant (PW-14) was deemed unreliable: he denied making a statement proved by the Executive Magistrate (DW-1), and his versions in the FIR and purported dying declaration were inconsistent.
- Injured eyewitnesses (PW-4, PW-6, PW-10, PW-13) provided mutually contradictory accounts regarding where and how the deceased was assaulted.
- PW-13 admitted in cross-examination that the deceased first struck the appellant, suggesting provocation or private defence.
- The trial court itself recognised that the appellant may have retaliated, yet dismissed the plea of private defence without adequate basis. The High Court merely endorsed those conclusions.
- Applying the principles from Gurcharan Singh and Sucha Singh, the Court held that the evidence was so unreliable and internally inconsistent that it was impossible to isolate credible material without reconstructing an entirely new version of events. Therefore the prosecution had failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt against any accused, including the appellant.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed; the conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside, and his bail bonds are cancelled.
Immediate consequence: the appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 304 Part I IPC. The Court did not lay down a new legal principle but reinforced the existing rule that when prosecution evidence is hopelessly unreliable and inseparable from falsehood, a conviction cannot stand, even if some parts appear supportive when viewed in isolation.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Appellant Narain (hereinafter referred to as “the accused”) questions legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which held his conviction for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) to be in order. Consequentially, sentence of eight years' rigorous imprisonment and fine proposed were affirmed.
2. Eight persons faced trial including the appellant for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 148, 302/149, 307/149, 324/149, 323/149 and 450 IPC. The trial court held that the accusations were not established against rest of the seven, while it was established only in respect of the appellant relating to the offence for which he has been found guilty. The accused-appellant was made to undergo imprisonment for eight years and to pay a fine of Rs 5000 with default stipulation. The order of conviction was questioned by the appellant before the High Court. The State also questioned the legality of the acquittal as directed for rest of the accused. A revision application was filed by the father of Makhan (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) with similar prayers as that of the State.
3. The prosecution story in brief is as follows:
On 24-2-1986 at about 6.30 a.m at Village Murachh, the informant Halke alias Laxman (PW 14) had gone to call his labourers who were under a pipal tree. The accused persons armed with farsa, ballam etc. came there and surrounded him. Accused-appellant Narain Singh incited the others to assault him and exhorted that he should not be permitted to escape and should be done to death. Thereafter Narain Singh assaulted Laxman (PW 14) with a farsa on his head. Tijji Bai (PW 6) came on the spot to save Halke, but she was also assaulted. Thereafter, the accused persons chased the deceased Makhan and assaulted him with farsa, axe and sticks near the house of Sukka Baniya (DW 2). Parvati Bai (PW 10), Siya Bai (PW 13), Kanchhi Bai, Lalla Bai and Khilan Singh (PW 4) came to the spot in order to save Halke, but they were also assaulted. Siya Bai (PW 13) and others took deceased Makhan inside the house of Sukka (DW 2) in order to save him, but the accused persons entered the house and assaulted Makhan there also. The report of the incident was lodged on the same day at 11.00 a.m by Laxman Singh (PW 14), which was recorded as dehati nalsi (first information report). On the basis of the said report, investigation was undertaken and the accused persons were arrested.
4. The accused persons pleaded innocence and also took definite stand that on account of enmity and rivalry prosecution witnesses who claimed to be the eyewitnesses and said to have sustained injuries, assaulted the accused persons, and in any event they have acted in exercise of right of private defence. They also stated that true genesis of the occurrence has been suppressed and the occurrence did not take place at the places indicated by the prosecution.
5. The trial court found that the prosecution has not really come out with the actual scenario. According to the prosecution the occurrence took place at three different places. But the evidence was to the contrary. The occurrence took place at a place different from where it was claimed by the prosecution. It also found unexplained discrepancies in the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses and, therefore, held that seven out of the eight accused persons were not guilty. So far as the appellant is concerned, it was held that though the evidence on record indicates that assaults were made by the deceased and some of the prosecution witnesses, on whom, yet the deceased had exceeded his right of private defence, even though the same may have been available to him at some point of time. The High Court confirmed the conclusions and affirmed the conviction and sentence. It dismissed, by a common judgment, appeal of the State and revision filed by the father of the deceased.
6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that substratum of the prosecution version has been corroded. The trial court and the High Court were not justified in convicting the appellant, on the selfsame evidence which was found to be totally unreliable for seven co-accused persons.
7. In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that though part of the evidence has been discarded, the residue was sufficient to convict the accused. It was pointed out that the places of occurrence as claimed by the prosecution were really not at a great distance from the place where the occurrence took place according to the trial court and the High Court. When the accused-appellant himself took the plea of right of private defence, the courts below were justified in convicting him.
8. As a rule of universal application, it cannot be said that when a portion of the prosecution evidence is discarded as unworthy of credence, there cannot be any conviction. It is always open to the court to differentiate between an accused who has been convicted and those who have been acquitted. (See Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 460, 1956 Cri LJ 827 and Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) 7 SCC 643, (2003) 5 Supreme 445.) The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is merely a rule of caution. As has been indicated by this Court in Sucha Singh case (2003) 7 SCC 643, (2003) 5 Supreme 445 in terms of felicitous metaphor, an attempt has to be made to separate the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. When the prosecution is able to establish its case by acceptable evidence, though in part, the accused can be convicted even if the co-accused have been acquitted on the ground that the evidence led was not sufficient to fasten guilt on them. But where the position is such that the evidence is totally unreliable, and it will be impossible to separate the truth from falsehood to an extent that they are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and background against which they are made, conviction cannot be made.
9. In the case at hand it is noticed that the trial court analysed the factual position in great detail. According to the prosecution the incident took place at three different places i.e first under the pipal tree where the informant PW 14 Laxman Singh @ Halka had gone to call his labourers, then on the road in front of the house of Sukka Baniya (DW 2), and thereafter inside the house of DW 2 where the deceased was taken in order to save him from the assaults. Apart from the alleged first information report, the statement purported to be a dying declaration of PW 14 was recorded by the Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate (DW 1). In this statement (Ext. P/18) he had stated that while he was sitting along with family members, the incident took place. But in the first information report, he had stated that he had gone to call the labourers whereupon the accused persons came there and assaulted him and others. The trial court found that the informant was not a reliable witness, because he even denied to have given the dying declaration, when it was established by the statement of DW 1 that the statement was recorded by him. Injured witnesses Tijji Bai (PW 6), Parvati Bai (PW 10), Siya Bai (PW 13) and Khilan Singh (PW 4) who claimed to be eyewitnesses had given varying versions and their evidence about the actual occurrence was found unacceptable. Their statements in court were at great variance from what they had stated during investigation. It was also noticed by the trial court that from the evidence of the informant (PW 14) it was clear that he had seen the actual assault on the deceased. The evidence of the so-called eyewitnesses as to where the assaults were made on the body of the deceased was also found to be discrepant and not consistent. One of the prosecution witnesses who claimed to be an eyewitness i.e PW 13 admitted in cross-examination that the deceased had first assaulted the appellant with lathi on his head. The trial court found this to be of significance, but said that though it was probable that the appellant had acted in retaliation, the plea of right of private defence was not acceptable. These findings were confirmed by the High Court.
10. In view of the findings, the inevitable conclusion is that the prosecution has not established its accusations against any of the accused persons including the appellant. It is significant to note that the trial court itself observed that the deceased and others assaulted the appellant and he may have acted in retaliation.
11. The genesis of the incident, the place of incident and the manner in which the incident took place was found not to have been established by cogent and credible prosecution evidence. Therefore, on the peculiar facts of the case and the nature of evidence tendered by the prosecution there is no scope for taking a different view so far as the appellant is concerned and treat the case against him alone to have been substantiated beyond reasonable doubt. The conclusion arrived at in respect of other accused persons was equally applicable so far as the appellant is concerned.
12. That being the position, we set aside the conviction as recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. The appeal is allowed. The bail bonds of the appellant be cancelled.
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