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State Of M.P v. S.P Sales Agencies And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
On 2 May 1988, Madhya Pradesh police intercepted Truck No. USR 1147 carrying 281 cases of kattha manufactured by M/s Harsh Wood Products (Respondent 2) and purchased by M/s K.S. Finance Corporation (Respondent 3) without the transit pass mandated by Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Transit (Forest Produce) Rules, 1961. The Sub-Divisional Forest Officer, Gwalior, initiated confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, resulting in an order of confiscation that was affirmed on appeal. A revision (Criminal Revision No. 1147 of 1988) was then admitted by the Sessions Judge, during which the seized kattha was released as an interim measure.
On 15 August 1991, Truck No. MP 07 A 8740 with 160 bags of cutch bought by M/s S.P. Sales Agencies (Respondent 1) from the same manufacturer was similarly seized for lack of a transit pass. Applications for release before the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the Sessions Court failed, but the High Court ordered interim release on 17 December 1991.
Respondents 1 and 3 then invoked Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashing of both seizures. On 7 September 1995 the High Court allowed the petitions, holding that kattha and cutch were not “forest produce” and that confiscation could not proceed without a criminal prosecution. Consequently, Criminal Revision No. 1147 of 1988 was withdrawn as infructuous. The State obtained special leave to appeal; those appeals are the subject of the present judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether kattha and cutch fall within the term “forest produce” under Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927.
- Whether confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of the Act may be initiated independently of, and without first launching, a criminal prosecution for the underlying forest offence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments (State/Forest Authorities)
- Invoked dictionary definitions to show that “catechu” is an astringent extract from various acacia species and that kattha and cutch are forms of “catechu,” expressly listed as forest produce in Section 2(4)(a).
- Relied on H.P. Marketing Board v. Shankar Trading Co. (P) Ltd. (1997) 2 SCC 496, where the Supreme Court recognised the manufacturing process demonstrating that kattha and cutch are end-products of khair (acacia) wood.
- Contended that Section 52 allows confiscation upon seizure when a forest offence is believed to have been committed, and that prior criminal prosecution is not a pre-condition, citing Divisional Forest Officer v. G.V. Sudhakar Rao (1985) 4 SCC 573.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| H.P. Marketing Board v. Shankar Trading Co. (P) Ltd., (1997) 2 SCC 496 | Established that kattha is derived from khair wood and detailed the manufacturing process showing it is an extract of acacia. | Used to support the conclusion that kattha and cutch are varieties of “catechu,” hence “forest produce” under Section 2(4). |
| Divisional Forest Officer v. G.V. Sudhakar Rao, (1985) 4 SCC 573 | Held that confiscation under Section 52 is independent of criminal prosecution. | Applied to reject the High Court’s view that confiscation could not proceed without first filing a criminal case. |
| State of W.B. v. Gopal Sarkar, (2002) 1 SCC 495 | Reaffirmed the independence of confiscation proceedings from criminal prosecution. | Further buttressed the conclusion that the High Court erred on the procedural point. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first examined Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, which explicitly lists “catechu” as forest produce. Through multiple English and Hindi dictionary definitions and by describing the accepted industrial process, the Court found that kattha and cutch are both extracts obtained from khair (Acacia catechu) wood and are commonly referred to as forms of “catechu.” Accordingly, they fall within the statutory definition of forest produce.
Turning to procedure, the Court analysed Section 52 and related provisions. It confirmed that a “forest offence” includes violations of the Transit Rules. Contravention of Rule 3 (movement without a transit pass) therefore allows two separate statutory responses: criminal prosecution under Rule 29 and confiscation under Section 52. Citing Sudhakar Rao and Gopal Sarkar, the Court emphasised that confiscation is a distinct remedial action and is not contingent on criminal prosecution being initiated first. Hence, the High Court’s finding that the absence of prosecution invalidated confiscation proceedings was incorrect.
Despite these conclusions, the Supreme Court considered the lapse of time: the cutch seizure dated to 1991, confiscation proceedings had never begun for it, and the revision regarding kattha was withdrawn in 1995. In light of the prolonged delay and absence of ongoing proceedings, the Court declined to set aside the High Court’s order.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISMISSED.
The Court categorically held that kattha and cutch are “forest produce” and that confiscation under Section 52 can proceed independently of criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, given the 8–12-year delay and the absence of any active confiscation or criminal proceedings, it allowed the High Court’s quashing order to stand. The decision reaffirms existing jurisprudence on confiscation powers but sets no new precedent on remedy, as relief was denied solely on equitable considerations of delay.
B.N Agrawal, J.— These appeals by special leave have been filed against judgment rendered by Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court whereby two petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) by Respondents 1 and 3 have been allowed and seizure of stock of kattha and cutch under the provisions of Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (“the Act” for short) for violation of provisions of Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Transit (Forest Produce) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Transit Rules”) and the consequent proceedings have been quashed.
2. The short facts are that on 2-5-1988 a truck bearing No. USR 1147 was intercepted by the police near Shinde Police Outpost under Indraganj Police Station in the district of Gwalior within the State of Madhya Pradesh and it transpired that 281 cases of kattha manufactured by M/s Harsh Wood Products (Respondent 2) were loaded therein at their factory premises, the same having been purchased by M/s K.S Finance Corporation (Respondent 3) without obtaining transit pass as required under Rule 3 of the Transit Rules. Thereafter, the matter was reported to the Sub-Divisional Forest Officer, Gwalior, who initiated a confiscation proceeding under Section 52 of the Act and on 23-5-1988 an order of confiscation was passed whereafter an appeal was taken to the Conservator of Forests under Section 52-A of the Act, who remitted the matter to the original authority. On remand, the original authority again passed an order of confiscation of kattha seized which was confirmed in appeal whereafter a revision bearing No. 1147 of 1988 was preferred under Section 52-B of the Act before the Sessions Judge, Gwalior, challenging order passed in appeal and the same was admitted. During the pendency of the revision application, the seized stock of kattha was released by way of interim measure.
3. On 15-8-1991 another truck bearing No. MP 07 A 8740 was found loaded with 160 bags of cutch which were purchased by M/s S.P Sales Agencies (Respondent 1) from its manufacturer M/s Harsh Wood Products (Respondent 2) and as no transit pass, as required under the Rules, was obtained for its movement, it was seized and made over to the Sub-Divisional Forest Officer, Gwalior. Respondent 1 thereafter filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior, for release of the seized articles, but the prayer was refused and the same was upheld by the Sessions Court whereafter Respondent 1 preferred an application before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Section 482 of the Code which was allowed on 17-12-1991 and the seized cutch was ordered to be released by way of interim measure. Respondents 1 and 3 thereupon filed two separate applications under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court which were registered as Misc. Criminal Cases Nos. 2475 and 2466 of 1995 respectively for quashing the seizure of the aforesaid stock of kattha and cutch and consequent proceedings. The High Court by its order dated 7-9-1995 allowed both the applications and quashed the seizure and consequent proceedings on grounds, inter alia, that kattha and cutch were not forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act and confiscation proceedings could not have been initiated as no criminal prosecution was launched pursuant to the seizure. In view of the aforesaid order, Criminal Revision No. 1147 of 1988 which was filed before the Sessions Court against the appellate order in relation to seized stock of kattha became infructuous and accordingly, the same was withdrawn on 1-11-1995. Challenging the aforesaid order dated 7-9-1995 passed by the High Court, two petitions were filed before this Court for grant of special leave in which leave to appeal having been granted, the present appeals are before us.
4. The main question that falls for our consideration is as to whether “kattha” and “cutch” are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act. For deciding this question, it would be necessary to refer to Section 2(4) of the Act which reads thus:
“2. Interpretation clause.—In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—
(4) ‘forest produce’ includes—
(a) the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not, that is to say—
timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood oil, resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, shellac gum, mahua flowers, mahua seeds, tendu leaves, kuth and myrobalans, and
(b) the following when found in, or brought from a forest, that is to say—
(i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees,
(ii) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss), and all parts or produce of such plants,
(iii) wild animals and skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey and wax, and all other parts or produce of animals, and
(iv) peat, surface soil, rock, and minerals (including limestone, laterite, mineral oils, and all products of mines or quarries),
(v) standing agricultural crops.”
5. Learned counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted that according to the definition of “forest produce” referred to above, catechu is a forest produce and kattha and cutch both form part of catechu. In support of this, reference was made to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Vol. I, p. 352, wherein “catechu” has been defined to mean:
“1. any of various dry, earthy, or resinous astringent substances obtained by extraction and evaporation from the wood, leaves, or fruits of various tropical Asiatic plants: as a: an extract of the heartwood of an East-Indian acacia that is used for dyeing, tanning, preserving fish nets and sails, and formerly in medicine — called also black catechu b: gambier … 2. an East-Indian spiny tree (acacia catechu) that has twice-pinnate leaves, yellow flowers, and flat pods and is the source of catechu.”
Similarly, in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, at p. 276 “catechu” has been defined to mean “a name given to several astringent substances, containing from 40 to 55 per cent of tannin, which are obtained from acacia … and other Eastern trees and shrubs”. In Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary compiled by Rev. Thomas Davidson and revised and expanded by J. Liddell Geddie, at p. 148 “catechu” has been defined to mean “a substance used in tanning and dyeing, and medicinally as an astringent, obtained from the heartwood of several East-Indian trees, as the betelnut”. In New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 2, 15th Edn., at p. 949, “catechu” has been defined to mean “extract used in dyeing and tanning obtained from several plants, its chief sources are the wood of two species of acacia”.
6. “Kattha” has been defined in Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary, edited by R.S McGregor, at p. 162 to mean “an astringent and narcotic vegetable extract from the plant or tree acacia … (eaten in betel leaf with lime, which it turns red)”. “Acacia” has been botanically defined in Comprehensive English-Hindi Dictionary of Governmental and Educational Words & Phrases, 4th Edn., at p. 14, to mean, inter alia, khair. “Khair” has been defined in Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary edited by R.S McGregor, at p. 244, to mean “the plant or tree of acacia which is a source of gum, timber and the astringent extract used with pan leaves”.
7. At this juncture, it may be useful to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of H.P Marketing Board v. Shankar Trading Co. (P) Ltd. (1997) 2 SCC 496 wherein question had arisen as to whether kattha is a forest produce within the meaning of the Himachal Pradesh Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1969 wherein agricultural produce is defined under Section 2(a) to mean all produce as specified in the schedule of the Act and as kattha is specifically enumerated in the schedule of the said Act, this Court came to the conclusion that kattha is an agricultural produce within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the said Act. In that case, stand was taken before this Court on behalf of the parties that kattha is extracted from wood of tree known as khair and khair wood becomes the essential and basic raw material for the manufacture of kattha inasmuch as the said wood is not used in manufacturing of kattha alone but is also used and utilized for the manufacturing of forest medicines, etc. and in order to obtain kattha, khair wood is processed through various physical and chemical processes to obtain its end product. Further, in that case, method for the manufacture of kattha and cutch was placed before this Court to show that kattha and cutch both are end products of khair wood, which method has not been denied by the parties in the present case, and the same runs thus:
“(a) Long logs of khair wood are converted into small logs in sawmills.
(b) In order to remove the bark and sapwood either manual process is adopted or khair logs are peeled through peeling machine.
(c) The khair wood so peeled/debarked is known as heartwood.
(d) Heartwood is again converted into small pieces in sawmill.
(e) Small pieces of wood are converted into small chips in chipping machine.
(f) Standard-size chips are removed/separated from odd-size chips.
(g) Odd-size chips are converted into standard chips in disintegrator machine.
(h) Standard-size chips are boiled in closed vats.
(i) Mother liquor so obtained is concentrated in pan with steam.
(j) Thick liquor obtained is allowed to ferment with treatment with chemicals.
(k) The fermented material is allowed to cool in cold storage. Cold storage is operated with the help of compressor and other allied machinery. This process is known as crystallization.
(l) The crystallized material is allowed to filter through hydraulic press and/or vacuum filter press to obtain paste and also remove the cutch (tannin).
(m) Filtered product is converted into small blocks with the help of machine or manually.
(n) Small blocks are converted into tablets of different sizes. These tablets so obtained are allowed to dry in drying chamber. Drying chamber is operated with humidifier and other machinery.
(o) Dry product is known as kattha.”
8. In view of the foregoing discussion and definitions extracted above from various dictionaries, catechu means any of the various dry, earthy, or resinous astringent substances extracted from wood, leaves or fruits of various tropical Asiatic plants viz. acacia and other trees and shrubs. Khair tree is one of the types of acacia tree and log of wood of the said tree is basic raw material for the manufacture of kattha and cutch. After employing a series of activities to the log of khair wood, various substances, namely, cutch and kattha, etc. are extracted which are known as one of the types of catechu. This being the position, we hold that cutch and kattha come within the sweep of the expression “catechu” which has been enumerated in the definition of forest produce, as such kattha and cutch are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act and the High Court was not justified in holding otherwise.
9. The next question that arises in the present case is as to whether confiscation proceeding can be initiated under Section 52 of the Act only after launching of criminal prosecution or it is open to the Forest Authorities upon seizure of forest produce to initiate both or either. Under Section 52 of the Act when a forest officer or a police officer has reasons to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any forest produce, he may seize the same whereupon confiscation proceeding can be initiated. “Forest offence” has been defined under Section 2(3) of the Act to mean an offence punishable under this Act or any rule framed thereunder. Section 41 empowers the State Government to frame rules for regulating transit of forest produce. Section 42 further empowers the State Government to frame rules prescribing thereunder penalties for breach of the Rules framed under Section 41 of the Act. Section 76 confers additional powers upon the State Government to make rules, inter alia, for carrying out provisions of the Act. Purporting to act under Sections 41, 42 and 76 of the Act, the Government of Madhya Pradesh framed the Transit Rules referred to above, Rule 3 whereof lays down that no forest produce shall be moved either within the State of Madhya Pradesh or beyond its territory without obtaining a transit pass. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 29 lays down that whosoever contravenes any of the provisions of these Rules shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both.
10. In the present case, the allegations are that by committing breach of Rule 3 a forest offence within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act has been committed for which a criminal prosecution under Rule 29 of the Transit Rules as well as a confiscation proceeding under Section 52 of the Act could be initiated. From the scheme of the Act, it would appear that for contravention of Rule 3, two independent actions are postulated — one, criminal prosecution and the other, confiscation proceeding. The power of confiscation, exercisable under Section 52 of the Act, cannot be said to be in any manner dependent upon launching of criminal prosecution as it has nowhere been provided therein that the forest produce seized can be confiscated only after criminal prosecution is launched, but the condition precedent for initiating a confiscation proceeding is commission of forest offence, which, in the case on hand, is alleged to have been committed. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Divisional Forest Officer v. G.V Sudhakar Rao (1985) 4 SCC 573 wherein it has been clearly laid down that the two proceedings are quite separate and distinct and initiation of confiscation proceeding is not dependent upon launching of criminal prosecution. In the said case, the Court observed thus:
“The conferral of power of confiscation of seized timber or forest produce and the implements etc. on the authorized officer under sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Act on his being satisfied that a forest offence had been committed in respect thereof, is not dependent upon whether a criminal prosecution for commission of a forest offence has been launched against the offender or not. It is a separate and distinct proceeding from that of a trial before the court for commission of an offence. Under sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Act, where a Forest Officer makes a report of seizure of any timber or forest produce and produces the seized timber before the authorized officer along with a report under Section 44(2), the authorized officer can direct confiscation to Government of such timber or forest produce and the implements etc. if he is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed, irrespective of the fact whether the accused is facing a trial before a Magistrate for the commission of a forest offence under Section 20 or 29 of the Act.”
11. In the case of State of W.B v. Gopal Sarkar (2002) 1 SCC 495 while noticing the view taken in the case of G.V Sudhakar Rao (1985) 4 SCC 573 this Court has reiterated that the power of confiscation is independent of any criminal prosecution for the forest offence committed. This being the position, in our view, the High Court has committed an error in holding that initiation of confiscation proceeding relating to kattha was unwarranted as no criminal prosecution was launched.
12. Ordinarily, we would have set aside the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court, directed the revision arising out of confiscation proceeding relating to kattha to be restored and disposed of on merit and granted liberty to the Forest Authorities to consider desirability of launching prosecution against Respondents 1, 2 and 3 and initiating confiscation proceeding in relation to the stock of “cutch” seized in the year 1991. But, in the present case, we do not propose to adopt that procedure in view of the fact that the stock of cutch was seized in the year 1991, but no confiscation proceeding has been initiated as yet, the revision application arising out of the confiscation proceeding relating to the kattha seized was withdrawn more than eight years ago on 1-11-1995, the same having become infructuous in view of the impugned judgment and criminal prosecution has not been launched so far pursuant to seizure of the stock of kattha and cutch. Accordingly, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment.
13. In the result, the appeals fail and the same are dismissed.
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