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Bankat And Another v. State Of Maharashtra .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants (referred to as Accused-1 and Accused-2) were tried along with two co-accused for causing injuries to Ratnabai (PW-2) and Manik (PW-1) on 1 March 1993. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Osmanabad convicted all four accused for offences punishable under Sections 325 and 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Each accused, except Accused-4 who received a lesser term because of his age, was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and fined Rs 500 for the Section 326 offence; no separate sentence was imposed for the Section 325 offence.
On revision, a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) upheld all convictions but:
- reduced the custodial sentence of Accused-3 and Accused-4 to “period already undergone”,
- enhanced their fines to Rs 2000, and
- declined to alter the sentences of the present appellants.
The High Court also refused to extend the benefits of the Bombay Probation of Offenders Act. After the revision was disposed of on 11 December 2003, the accused filed an application stating that the dispute had been compromised and sought modification of the order. The High Court rejected the application, holding that no modification was permissible after disposal of the revision.
The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging both conviction and sentence and reiterating the post-judgment compromise.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether offences punishable under Section 326 IPC, which are statutorily non-compoundable, can nevertheless be compounded or treated as compounded on the basis of a private compromise between the parties.
- Whether the High Court erred in refusing to modify its judgment after disposal of the revision in light of the subsequent compromise.
- Whether, irrespective of non-compoundability, the compromise and lapse of more than ten years warranted reduction of the custodial sentence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The incident occurred over a decade ago; parties have now “sorted out differences” and executed a compromise.
- Although Section 326 IPC is non-compoundable under Section 320(9) CrPC, the Supreme Court can exercise powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to permit compounding or to mould relief.
- Precedents such as Ram Pujan v. State of U.P. and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan support compounding or sentence reduction in compromised matters.
- The benefit of sentence reduction already granted to co-accused by the High Court should equally extend to the appellants.
Respondent's Arguments
- Section 326 IPC is categorically non-compoundable; Section 320(9) CrPC bars compounding except as expressly provided.
- The High Court correctly refused the application for compounding; reliance placed on Ram Lal v. State of J&K, which held that Mahesh Chand was decided per incuriam.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Pujan v. State of U.P. (1973) 2 SCC 456 | Compromise may be considered while determining sentence even for non-compoundable offences. | Distinguished: Court noted it permits sentence reduction but not compounding for Section 326 IPC. |
| Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1990 Supp SCC 681 | Trial court may permit compounding in certain circumstances. | Held per incuriam; not a binding precedent because Section 320(9) CrPC was not considered. |
| Ram Lal v. State of J&K (1999) 2 SCC 213 | Only offences listed in Section 320 CrPC tables are compoundable; others are not. | Followed: Supreme Court accepted this interpretation to refuse compounding. |
| Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P. (JT 1987) 2 SC 361 / (2005) 1 SCC 347 (citation as in judgment) | Earlier instance where compromise was permitted. | Declared not to be treated as precedent; contrary to Section 320(9) CrPC. |
| Surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa (1999) 5 SCC 238 | Clarified limits on compounding offences under CrPC. | Reaffirmed the statutory bar on compounding non-listed offences. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Statutory Scheme: The Court analysed Section 320 CrPC, emphasising that sub-section (9) explicitly prohibits compounding of any offences not enumerated in the two statutory tables. Section 326 IPC does not appear in either table; accordingly, the offence is non-compoundable.
2. Precedential Clarification: Decisions that had previously allowed compounding of Section 326 offences (Mahesh Chand, Y. Suresh Babu) were declared either per incuriam or non-precedential because they ignored Section 320(9). The Court followed Ram Lal, which had directly addressed the statutory bar.
3. Application to Present Case: Given the legislative mandate, the High Court correctly refused to permit compounding. Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged the reality of the private compromise, the passage of more than ten years since the incident, and the partial incarceration already undergone.
4. Sentencing Discretion: Relying on the principle from Ram Pujan that a compromise can be a mitigating factor in sentencing (even if not ground for compounding), the Court exercised its appellate discretion to reduce the custodial sentence to “period already undergone” while enhancing the fine.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Convictions under Sections 325 and 326 read with Section 34 IPC are affirmed. Custodial sentences for the appellants are reduced to the period already undergone, each appellant to pay a fine of Rs 5000; in default, six months’ further imprisonment. Out of each fine, Rs 4000 is to be paid to each injured victim as compensation. Appeals disposed of accordingly.
Implications: The judgment re-affirms that offences not listed in Section 320 CrPC—such as Section 326 IPC—cannot be compounded, and past decisions permitting such compounding lack precedential value. While upholding the statutory bar, the Court illustrates that private compromise may still influence sentencing discretion, thereby balancing statutory mandates with equitable considerations.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench. The appellants who are described as A-1 and A-2 (hereinafter referred to as “the accused”) had questioned correctness of their conviction as recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Osmanabad for offences punishable under Sections 325 and 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”).
3. For offence relatable to Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC each of A-1 to A-3 was sentenced by the learned trial Judge to undergo imprisonment for one year and pay a fine of Rs 500 with default stipulation. But looking to the age of A-4, he was sentenced to imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs 500 with default stipulation. No separate sentence was passed for the offence punishable under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC.
4. By the impugned judgment, the High Court held that A-3 was not responsible for the injury on the leg of the victim Ratnabai (PW 2) and on the head of the victim Manik (PW 1) and taking note of the long passage of time the custodial sentence was reduced to the period already undergone. However, the fine was enhanced to Rs 2000. For Pandurang Mohan Aade (A-4) also, looking to his age fine was enhanced to Rs 2000 but custodial sentence was reduced to the period already undergone. So far as the present appellants are concerned it was held that there is no scope for interference with the sentence awarded. In other words, the conviction was maintained for all the four accused persons but different sentences were imposed.
5. The benefit of the Bombay Probation of Offenders Act (in short “the Probation Act”) was not extended to the appellants looking to the nature of the offence committed.
6. After disposal of the revision application on 11-12-2003, an application was filed stating that the matter has been compromised between the victims and the accused persons and, therefore, the order should be modified. The said application was rejected by the learned Single Judge holding that there is no scope for modification of the order after disposal of the revision application.
7. Though in support of the appeals, many points were urged on the factual aspects, we find that the courts below have concurrently found that the accused persons were responsible for injuries on the victims Ratnabai and Manik and, therefore, in view of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, more particularly, the injured witnesses, there is no scope for interference with the conclusions arrived at.
8. It was next submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the occurrence took place on 1-3-1993 and more than a decade has elapsed and in the meantime the parties have sorted out their differences, entered into compromise and, therefore, the High Court should have accepted the prayer for modification of the order.
9. It was further submitted that though the offence under Section 326 is not compoundable in terms of Section 320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) this Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution and pass necessary orders. It was submitted that the benefit extended to the other co-accused persons should be made available to the appellants and the custodial sentence should have been reduced to the period already undergone.
10. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that as the dispute was amicably settled and the matter was compromised, the High Court ought to have granted permission to compound the offences and ought not to have convicted the appellants and imposed the sentence. For this purpose, reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in Ram Pujan v. State of U.P (1973) 2 SCC 456 and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1990 Supp SCC 681. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the offence under Section 326 IPC is not compoundable and the High Court has rightly rejected the application for compounding the same. He, for this purpose, relied upon the judgment of this Court in Ram Lal v. State of J&K (1999) 2 SCC 213 wherein after referring to Section 320(9) of the Code the Court observed that the decision in Mahesh Chand case 1990 Supp SCC 681 was rendered per incuriam.
11. In our view, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent requires to be accepted. For compounding of the offences punishable under IPC, a complete scheme is provided under Section 320 of the Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 320 provides that the offences mentioned in the table provided thereunder can be compounded by the persons mentioned in column 3 of the said table. Further, sub-section (2) provides that the offences mentioned in the table could be compounded by the victim with the permission of the court. As against this, sub-section (9) specifically provides that “no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section”. In view of the aforesaid legislative mandate, only the offences which are covered by Table 1 or Table 2 as stated above can be compounded and the rest of the offences punishable under IPC could not be compounded.
12. Further, the decision in Ram Pujan case (1973) 2 SCC 456 does not advance the contention raised by the appellants. In the said case, the Court held that the major offences for which the accused have been convicted were no doubt non-compoundable, but the fact of compromise can be taken into account in determining the quantum of sentence. In Ram Lal case (1999) 2 SCC 213 the Court referred to the decision of this Court in Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P (2005) 1 SCC 347, JT (1987) 2 SC 361 and to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand case 1990 Supp SCC 681:
“3. We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission to compound the offence. After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the trial court shall permit them to compound the offence.”
and held as under:
“We are unable to follow the said decision as a binding precedent. Section 320 which deals with ‘compounding of offences’ provides two Tables therein, one containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded by the person mentioned in it, and the other containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded with the permission of the court by the persons indicated therein. Only such offences as are included in the said two Tables can be compounded and none else.”
13. In the case of Y. Suresh Babu (2005) 1 SCC 347, JT (1987) 2 SC 361 the Court has specifically observed that the said case “shall not be treated as a precedent”. The aforesaid two decisions are based on facts and in any set of circumstances, they can be treated as per incuriam as pointed attention of the Court to sub-section (9) of Section 320 was not drawn. Hence, the High Court rightly refused to grant permission to compound the offence punishable under Section 326.
14. We reiterate that the course adopted in Y. Suresh Babu (2005) 1 SCC 347, JT (1987) 2 SC 361 and Mahesh Chand case 1990 Supp SCC 681 was not in accordance with law.
15. The above position was elaborately indicated by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa (1999) 5 SCC 238.
16. However, considering the fact that the parties have settled their dispute outside the court, the fact that 10 years have elapsed from the date of the incident, and the further fact that the appellants have already undergone several months' imprisonment, ends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone besides imposing a fine of Rs 5000 on each of the accused under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC. In default of payment of fine, the appellants concerned shall undergo imprisonment for a further period of six months. We also refrain from imposing any separate sentence on the other counts of offences. Out of the fine amount, if realised, a sum of Rs 4000 also be paid to each of the injured as compensation.
17. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
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