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State Bank Of India v. Ram Das And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
State Bank of India (“SBI”) engaged the respondent contractor in 1978 to construct its Local Head Office building at Hyderabad. Clause 36 of the contract mandated arbitration for disputes. Construction was completed in 1982, but disagreements led to arbitration in which Mr. M.U. Hattikuddur served as umpire. On 8-8-1984 the umpire issued an unreasoned award granting the contractor ₹15.85 lakhs and rejecting SBI’s counter-claim.
The umpire himself filed the award in the City Civil Court, Hyderabad (OS No. 191/1985) and appointed counsel to pursue its confirmation. SBI objected under §§30, 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, but did not allege bias. In 1990 the Andhra Pradesh Legislature amended §§14(1) and 17 of the Act, retroactively requiring all awards to contain reasons and mandating remittal of unreasoned awards. SBI then sought to set aside the award for want of reasons; the City Civil Court accordingly remitted the matter to the umpire, who produced a “reasoned” award (1993).
On 7-10-1994 the 1st Additional Judge, City Civil Court made the award a rule of court and granted 18% interest. SBI’s objections were dismissed. SBI appealed (CRPs 5383, 5367 of 1994; CMA 1805 of 1994). On 12-3-1998 the High Court held that the umpire’s reasons were inadequate and, relying on the state amendment, again remitted the award to the same umpire, while criticising his earlier conduct in filing the award himself and engaging counsel.
SBI and the contractor filed the present cross-appeals (CAs 4542-44 & 4545-47 of 1998) to the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeals had become infructuous because the parties had acted upon the High Court’s remittal order.
- Whether SBI could, at this stage, raise a plea of bias or misconduct against the umpire for filing the award and appointing counsel, and thereby seek reference to a different arbitrator.
- Whether the High Court erred in remitting the matter to the same umpire on the ground that his 1993 award lacked adequate reasons.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State Bank of India)
- The umpire’s conduct in filing the award and engaging counsel demonstrated bias and went to the root of the matter; therefore the award should be set aside and the dispute referred to a retired High Court Judge.
- The bias plea, though not raised earlier, should be entertained because failure to address it now would preclude SBI from challenging any fresh award on that ground.
Respondent (Contractor)
- The appeals are infructuous since the High Court’s order has already been complied with and the umpire has delivered a fresh award (1998).
- The umpire’s acts do not constitute bias or mala fides; in any event SBI never raised bias at any prior stage and is barred from asserting it now.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bihar State Mineral Development Corpn. v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 418 | Categories in which bias vitiates arbitral proceedings. | Court held the present case does not fall within any of those categories. |
| International Airports Authority of India v. K.D. Bali, (1988) 2 SCC 360 | Arbitrator must avoid any act suggestive of partiality; even the appearance of bias can invalidate an award. | Distinguished on facts; the Supreme Court found the situation here “absolutely different.” |
| S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72; (1964) 4 SCR 733 | General principles regarding malice in administrative actions. | Held inapplicable; no allegation or pleading of malice was made out in the present matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first rejected the preliminary objection of infructuousness, agreeing to consider the merits because SBI alleged bias—a contention that could affect future challenges to any award.
On the bias allegation, the Court noted:
- The High Court had not set aside the award for umpire misconduct; its remarks were merely advisory.
- SBI never alleged bias during four distinct opportunities: initial objections (1985), the 1990 application post-amendment, proceedings after first remittal, and appeals before the High Court.
- The ground in SBI’s earlier memorandum merely questioned the umpire’s competence to file the award, not bias.
- An arbitrator’s filing of an award through counsel, even if irregular, does not by itself evidence personal bias or constitute “misconduct” under §30 of the Act.
The Court emphasised established jurisprudence that a party aware of a potential objection (bias or jurisdiction) but participating without protest is later estopped from raising it. The umpire’s error, if any, was a procedural misstep, not mala fides.
Regarding the High Court’s remittal for insufficient reasons, the Supreme Court declined to examine whether the 1993 award was adequately reasoned or the precise standard of sufficiency, observing that the remittal order had already been acted upon and a fresh (1998) award rendered.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s remittal order and refused to entertain SBI’s late-raised bias allegation. SBI remains free to challenge the 1998 award “before the appropriate forum,” but cannot rely on the alleged bias of the umpire. No new legal precedent was set; the decision principally applies existing principles of waiver and estoppel in arbitral challenges.
Order
1. Before us there are two sets of appeals, one, CAs Nos. 4542-44 of 1998 at the instance of State Bank of India and the other, CAs Nos. 4545-47 of 1998 at the instance of the respondent Contractor.
2. On 6-10-1978, State Bank of India entered into an agreement with the respondent herein (Contractor) for constructing the local head office building at Hyderabad. Clause 36 of the agreement provided for resolution of disputes by arbitration. It is not disputed that in the year 1982 the Contractor completed the constructions in terms of the contract. However, certain disputes arose between the parties as a result whereof the matter was referred to arbitration. Mr M.U Hattikuddur was chosen by the arbitrators as an umpire. On 8-8-1984 the umpire gave an award wherein four claims of the Contractor were allowed in full, seven claims were allowed in part and fifteen claims were rejected. A total sum of Rs 15.85 lakhs was found to be payable by the appellant to the Contractor under the said award. The umpire, however, also rejected the counterclaim of the appellant.
3. It is not disputed that the umpire in the year 1985 himself filed the award in the City Civil Court, Hyderabad for making the award the rule of court. It is also not disputed that the umpire appointed a lawyer for prosecuting the proceedings. The said suit was numbered as Original Suit No. 191 of 1985. The appellant herein filed an objection before the City Civil Court for setting aside the award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. The respondent filed his counter-affidavit to the objections of the appellant herein. The umpire also filed an affidavit to the objection filed by the appellant. It is furthermore not disputed that the appellant did not raise any plea in its objection as regards bias against the umpire.
4. The State Legislature of Andhra Pradesh, however, by amending Act 1 of 1990 inserted provisos to both Sections 14(1) and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) which are in the following terms:
Section 14(1)
“Provided that the arbitrators or umpire shall give reasons for any award made under this section and no award shall be valid unless reasons therefor are given as aforesaid.”
Section 17
“Provided that where an award pending in the court at the commencement of the Arbitration (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990 or an award filed in the court, thereafter does not contain reasons therefor as required by the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 the court shall not proceed to pronounce the judgment according to the award, but shall remit the award to the arbitrators….”
The aforesaid provisos were inserted with retrospective effect providing for giving of the reasons by the arbitrators or the umpire in the award. By reason of the said amending Act, thus, assignment of reasons by the arbitrators or umpire while making an award, not only was made imperative but by reason thereof provisions were made for remitting the unreasoned awards back to the arbitrators. In terms of the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the question as to whether the arbitrators or the umpires are required to pass a reasoned award depends upon the nature of the arbitration agreement. In terms of the said amending Act, therefore, the arbitrators became liable to assign reasons in support of their awards irrespective of any agreement to the contrary by the parties to the arbitration agreement.
5. It appears that in pursuance of the said legislative development the appellant herein moved an IA in the year 1990 for setting aside the award on the ground that it did not contain the reasons. In this IA also the appellant did not raise any objection as regards the bias of the umpire. The City Civil Court, in view of the said amendment in Sections 14 and 17 of the Act, set aside the award and remitted the matter back to the umpire for giving reasons in the award. The umpire, thereafter, passed a purported reasoned award. Thereafter, the Contractor filed the award for being made the rule of the court under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act in the year 1993.
6. On 7-10-1994, by a common judgment, the 1st Additional Judge, City Civil Court made the award the rule of the court and further, awarded 18% interest on the awarded amount. The objection filed by the appellant herein was dismissed. It is further relevant to mention that even before the learned District Judge the appellant did not raise any contention as regards the bias on the part of the umpire.
7. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of the City Civil Court, the appellant filed CRPs Nos. 5383 and 5367 of 1994 and CMA No. 1805 of 1994 before the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. On 26-9-1995, the High Court granted interim stay subject to the condition that the appellant deposits 50% of the amount awarded and costs within six weeks. It is stated that in pursuance of that order the appellant deposited the said amount and it is also not disputed that the said money was withdrawn by the respondent herein. Subsequently, the matter came up before the High Court and it by its impuged judgment dated 12-3-1998, found that the umpire did not assign sufficient reasons for giving his award and in view of the said amendment in Section 17 of the Act, it was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the umpire for giving reasons. The High Court also in the impugned judgment, adversely commented on the conduct of the umpire so far as he himself filed the award in the court and appointed a lawyer for conducting the proceedings before the City Civil Court. It is against the said judgment, the aforesaid two sets of appeals have been filed.
8. When this matter was taken up, Mr R.F Nariman, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Contractor in CAs Nos. 4542-44 of 1998 and Mr M.L Varma, learned Senior Counsel for the said appellant Contractor in CAs Nos. 4545-47 of 1998 raised a preliminary objection that since the impugned order under challenge has been acted upon, therefore, this appeal has rendered infructuous and this Court need not go into the merits of the matter.
9. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant urged that since the plea taken by the appellant that the umpire was biased goes to the root of the matter and this plea will not be available to the appellant in case if it challenges the award given by the umpire in pursuance of the judgment, and, therefore, the appeal has not been rendered infructuous and is required to be decided on merits.
10. In view of the submissions made by Dr. Dhavan, we proceeded to hear the appeal on merits. Dr. Dhavan urges that the conduct of the umpire to the effect that he himself filed the award in the City Civil Court for being made rule of the court and appointed a lawyer to prosecute the proceeding and in view of the fact that the said conduct of the umpire was adversely commented upon by the High Court, it ought not to have remitted the matter back to the same umpire and ought to have referred the same to some retired High Court Judge.
11. Shri R.F Nariman, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent would, on the other hand, contend that the purported act on the part of the umpire which has adversely been commented upon by the High Court would not amount to bias nor can the same be construed to be a mala fide act on his part. In any event, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that such a question having not been raised by the appellant at any stage whatsoever, should it be allowed to be raised before this Court?
12. The High Court while passing the impugned judgment did not set aside the award on the ground of any misconduct on the part of the umpire. Before the High Court, an appeal in terms of Section 39 of the Act as also a revision were filed. The appeal of the appellant related to that part of the order of the learned Additional Judge, City Civil Court, whereby and whereunder it rejected the objections filed by the appellant under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. The other part of the order which was the subject-matter of the civil revision application was refusal to remit the matter back to the umpire, inter alia, on the ground that the award was a reasoned one. The jurisdiction of a civil court under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act is a limited one. In terms of the said provisions, an award can be set aside, inter alia, on the ground that the arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings or there exists an error apparent on the face of the records. In the event the award is a reasoned one, non-application of the correct principles of law may also be a ground for setting aside the same.
13. The Additional Judge, City Civil Court and consequently, the High Court while determining the objections filed by the respondent herein under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act were, therefore, entitled to arrive at a conclusion that the umpire had misconducted himself or the proceedings as a result whereof the award was liable to be set aside.
14. Once the High Court did not choose to do so, in our opinion, the said observations must be held to have been made only for future guidance of the arbitrators and by reason thereof, the High Court did not intend to set aside the award.
15. Furthermore, concededly, the appellant had never questioned the conduct of the umpire during pendency of the arbitration proceedings. No case of personal bias had been made out as against the umpire either during the arbitration proceedings or otherwise.
16. Dr. Dhavan, however, would submit that the aforementioned objection had been taken in the memo of appeal filed before the High Court which is in the following terms:
“The court below should have rejected OS No. 191 of 1985 filed by the umpire to pass a decree in terms of his award. An umpire is not competent to present such a petition. The same is not maintainable….”
A bare perusal of the aforementioned ground would clearly go to show that what was contended by the appellant was that the umpire was not competent to present such a petition and, therefore, it was not maintainable. No plea as regards bias or malice on the part of the umpire had specifically been taken. The learned counsel would then contend that the appellant is entitled to raise the aforementioned question having regard to the disclosures made by the respondent in its counter-affidavit in para 5 of the counter-affidavit filed in this Court which reads as under:
“On 15-8-1984 the respondent herein addressed a letter to the umpire requesting him to file the award in the court. The umpire, thereafter, had taken assistance of a counsel Mr Y. Raja Reddy, Advocate, sending him the original award with all other documents and requested him to file the award in the court. The said counsel has thereafter filed OS No. 191 of 1985 before the Court of the 1st Additional Judge. The petitioner Bank filed a written statement in the said suit, copy of which is also annexed herewith. It is noteworthy that the petitioner Bank had not raised any issue of bias against the umpire as is sought to be done in the present special leave petition.”
According to Dr. Dhavan, from the aforementioned statements it is clear that the umpire was acting at the behest of the respondent herein. Our attention has further been drawn to para 4 of the award dated 7-8-1998 for raising a contention that despite the aforementioned adverse remarks, the umpire acted through his lawyer. The said para is as follows:
“As per the order dated 12-3-1998 of the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, the award was remitted back to me for giving reasons in the light of the observations made in the said judgment. The award along with all records has been returned to me through K. Hanumantha Rao, Advocate, who is appearing on my behalf in the matter, in a sealed packet on 24-7-1998 with a request to file the award after giving the reasons in the light of the observations made in the said judgment.”
17. We do not agree with the said submission.
18. It is one thing to say that the umpire has misconducted himself but it is another thing to say that under certain misconception of law he filed a suit through a lawyer at the first instance or filed the award in the court at the behest of the respondent. So long the award is not vitiated by reason of any act of misconduct on the part of the umpire, the same cannot be set aside. As would appear from the discussions made a little later, it would appear that the said fact was known to the appellant. The respondent was entitled to request the umpire to file the award in court. In what manner he would do it, was a matter which was left to the umpire. If he was advised to file such an award by filing a suit by appointing a lawyer, he did commit a mistake wherefor the adverse comments were made by the High Court, but the same cannot be said to be an act of bias. No such act would amount to a misconduct under the meaning of Section 30 of the Act.
19. So far as the statements made in para 4 of the award dated 7-8-1998 are concerned, suffice it to point out that thereby he merely stated the fact that the records were handed over to his lawyer by the High Court. We cannot read between the lines to arrive at a conclusion that the umpire was biased. If the High Court was of the opinion that the umpire should not have filed the suit, it ought not to have delivered the records to his lawyer. The very fact that the High Court handed over the records to the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the umpire, is itself suggestive of the fact that even the High Court did not consider the same to be an act of misconduct on the part of the umpire. It may further be noticed that the same procedure was followed on an earlier occasion by the District Judge of the City Civil Court.
20. The submission of Dr. Dhavan to the effect that the conduct of the umpire was unbecoming of an arbitrator is stated to be rejected. Only because an arbitrator committed a mistake in presenting an application himself under a misconception, the same by itself cannot be said to be a biased attitude on his part nor can his action be attributed as mala fide.
21. The doctrines of bias and malice stand on different footing. How far a bias on the part of a party would vitiate a proceeding has been considered by this Court recently in Bihar State Mineral Development Corpn. v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 418 This case does not fall within any of the categories enumerated therein.
22. Strong reliance has been placed by Dr. Dhavan on International Airports Authority of India v. K.D Bali (1988) 2 SCC 360. The fact situation obtaining therein was absolutely different. It was sought to be urged in that case that the petitioner had lost confidence in the sole arbitrator and was apprehensive that the arbitrator was biased against the petitioner. In the facts and circumstances of the said case, this Court held as under in para 5:
“It is well settled that there must be purity in the administration of justice as well as in administration of quasi-justice as are involved in the adjudicatory process before the arbitrators. It is well said that once the arbitrator enters in an arbitration, the arbitrator must not be guilty of any act which can possibly be construed as indicative of partiality or unfairness. It is not a question of the effect which misconduct on his part had in fact upon the result of the proceeding, but of what effect it might possibly have produced. It is not enough to show that, even if there was misconduct on his part, the award was unaffected by it, and was in reality just; arbitrator must not do anything which is not in itself fair and impartial.”
The said decision has no application in the instant case.
23. Reliance placed on S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 72, (1964) 4 SCR 733 by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan is also misplaced.
24. We, in this case, are not concerned with any act of malice on the part of the umpire. Malice has to be specifically pleaded and proved. Neither there exists any pleading in that behalf nor would it appear from the discussions made hereinafter that at any stage such a contention had been raised.
25. The appellant had four opportunities to raise the question of bias. The first opportunity was when the umpire filed the award in the court for being made rule of the court and appointed a lawyer to prosecute the matter. It is not disputed, the appellant was aware of the fact that the umpire did file the appeal himself in the City Civil Court and appointed a lawyer to prosecute the proceedings. Despite knowledge of the fact of filing objections under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act it did not raise the question of bias against the umpire. The second stage made available to the appellant when it filed an IA for setting aside the award on the ground that it did not contain reasons in view of the said amendment in the Act in Section 17 of the Act. Not only this, the appellant had third opportunity when the matter was remitted back to the umpire. It is relevant to mention here that the appellant was cross-examined before the Additional Judge, City Civil Court but no question as regards bias was put to him. The fourth opportunity arose when the proceedings were remitted back to the umpire and thereto also the appellant did not raise any question as regards bias.
26. Again, when the aforesaid award was given by the umpire and the same was filed in the City Civil Court, again the appellant did not raise any objection as regards bias and the appellant happily participated in the proceedings. Yet again when the award was made rule of the court, the appellant filed an appeal before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad but no ground of bias was taken in the memo of appeal or in the civil revision petition.
27. It was only after the High Court adversely commented upon the conduct of the arbitrator in the manner as noticed hereinbefore, that the appellant became wiser and for the first time this objection has been taken before us. It is an established view of law that where a party despite knowledge of the defect in the jurisdiction or bias or malice of an arbitrator participated in the proceedings without any kind of objection, by his conduct it disentitles itself from raising such a question in the subsequent proceedings. What we find is that the appellant despite numerous opportunities made available to it, although it was aware of the defect in the award of the umpire, at no stage made out any case of bias against the umpire. We, therefore, find that the appellant cannot be permitted to raise the question of bias for the first time before this Court.
28. Mr M.L Varma, the learned Senior Counsel appearing in the second set of appeals would urge that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the award and remitting the matter back to the umpire for assigning fresh reasons despite the fact that the award dated 1993 contained sufficient reasons. Having regard to the subsequent events that the order of the High Court has been acted upon and the umpire has made an award on or about 1998, we do not intend to go into the aforesaid question. For the selfsame reasons, we also refrain from going into the question as to the parameters and extent of the reasons required to be assigned by an umpire in a situation of this nature.
29. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeals. Therefore, they are dismissed. However, it will be open to the appellant to challenge the award, if it is so advised, before the appropriate forum.
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