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Shyama Charan Dash And Others v. State Of Orissa And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants, who were Industrial Supervisors in the Industries Department of the State of Orissa, challenged amendments notified on 24 May 1991 to the Orissa Industries Service Rules, 1985. The amendments expanded eligibility for promotion to Class II posts by including all Industries Promotion Officers (IPOs), regardless of whether they were in the higher pay scale of Rs 500-930 or the lower scale of Rs 400-750. The appellants contended that only officers in the higher scale should remain eligible. The Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, dismissed their application (OA No. 777 of 1991) on 26 August 1996. The present appeal is the appellants’ challenge to that dismissal before the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the 1991 amendment to Rule 7 of the Orissa Industries Service Rules, 1985—deleting the pay-scale qualification and thereby enlarging the zone of consideration for promotion—violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by equating unequals.
- Whether the State Government acted irrationally or with mala fides in equating IPOs in different pay scales with Industrial Supervisors for purposes of promotion to Class II posts.
- Whether enlargement of the zone of consideration, which may diminish an individual’s chances of promotion, infringes any vested or accrued right of Industrial Supervisors.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The amendment impermissibly “equates unequals” by treating IPOs in the lower scale (Rs 400-750) on par with Industrial Supervisors, who enjoy a higher scale (Rs 500-930).
- Opening promotion to the large cadre of IPOs effectively eliminates or severely diminishes the promotion prospects of the smaller cadre of Industrial Supervisors, amounting to discrimination under Articles 14 and 16.
- Experience gained by IPOs in lower-grade posts cannot be regarded as equivalent to that of Industrial Supervisors in the higher grade; treating them alike therefore constitutes arbitrariness.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Adopted the reasoning of the Tribunal, asserting that the State’s decision was a conscious administrative policy based on similarity of functions between IPOs and Industrial Supervisors.
- Emphasised that no mala fides were shown; the amendment merely enlarged the zone of consideration and did not strip any existing eligibility.
- Relied on precedent that loss of mere promotional chances is not a violation of Articles 14 or 16.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao (1983) 3 SCC 284 | Omission to prepare promotion panel cannot defeat accrued rights when rules change. | Held distinguishable; the present amendment did not remove existing eligibility but merely enlarged consideration. |
| R.S. Ajara v. State of Gujarat (1997) 3 SCC 641 | Benefits accrued under existing rules cannot be taken away retrospectively. | Cited to show the amendment is prospective; therefore, no vested right was taken away. |
| Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah (1997) 6 SCC 623 | Prospective rules affecting future rights are valid; retrospective diminution of benefits is impermissible. | Relied upon to uphold the prospective nature of the 1991 amendment. |
| State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal (1997) 10 SCC 419 | Empanelment does not confer an indefeasible right to promotion if eligibility changes before vacancy arises. | Used to reinforce that criteria can validly change for future promotions. |
| S.B. Mathur v. Chief Justice of Delhi High Court 1989 Supp (1) SCC 34 | Distinction between eligibility criteria and zone of consideration; employer’s discretion to equate posts. | Quoted extensively to justify State discretion in equating IPOs and Industrial Supervisors. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni (1981) 4 SCC 130 | Mere reduction in chances of promotion is not a change in conditions of service. | Supported the view that diminished chances do not violate constitutional equality. |
| Union of India v. N.Y. Apte (1998) 6 SCC 741 | Equation of posts lies within rule-making authority; courts interfere only if irrational. | Invoked to underline judicial restraint in matters of post equation. |
| Mohd. Usman v. State of A.P. (1971) 2 SCC 188 | Pooling different categories for recruitment may be justified to prevent injustice. | Cited to demonstrate that combining IPOs and Industrial Supervisors for promotion is not discriminatory. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reviewed Rule 7 of the Orissa Industries Service Rules, 1985, together with subsequent governmental notifications. It noted that:
- Since 12 September 1985, Rule 7 has allowed promotion to Class II posts from among IPOs and Industrial Supervisors. A 1986 notification had already declared seventeen additional posts—including IPOs—equivalent for this purpose, and that notification was never challenged.
- The 1991 amendment simply deleted the words that limited eligibility to Industrial Supervisors in the Rs 500-930 scale, thereby placing all IPOs, irrespective of scale, in the promotion zone.
- Differences between IPOs in the two pay scales related to their feeder categories, not to any substantive distinctions in qualifications, duties, or responsibilities.
- Enlargement of the zone of consideration affects only chances of promotion; precedents establish that such chances are not protected conditions of service.
- The State’s decision was based on legitimate administrative considerations aimed at harmonising cadres that already performed similar functions. No mala fides or irrationality were demonstrated.
- The constitutional challenge based on Articles 14 and 16 therefore failed.
Holding and Implications
The appeal was DISMISSED.
Immediate effect: the Orissa Administrative Tribunal’s order stands affirmed; all Industries Promotion Officers, regardless of their former pay scale, remain eligible for consideration for promotion to Class II posts under Rule 7. The decision does not create new legal doctrine but reiterates that enlargement of a promotion zone, without removal of eligibility, does not violate equal-protection principles.
D. Raju, J.— The above appeal has been filed against the order dated 26-8-1996 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar, in OA No. 777 of 1991, whereunder the claim of the appellants before this Court and some others seeking to quash the amendments introduced in 1991, notified on 24-5-1991, which had the consequence of bringing all the Industries Promotion Officers (IPOs) within the zone of consideration for promotion to Class II service and their further claim to declare that only Rs 500-930 grade employees alone are eligible for promotion to Class II post and that those in Rs 400-750 grade are ineligible to such Class II promotions, came to be rejected.
2. Prior to coming into force of the Orissa Industries Service Rules, 1985 on 12-9-1985, officers of different categories in the Industries Department under the Directorate of Industries were performing duties and functions of the same nature at different levels in varied fields, appointed to posts with different nomenclature carrying different scales of pay. Not only there seems to have been periodical revision of scales of pay but changes in their promotional prospects, and their status and position in the hierarchical set-up also appears to have been made from time to time depending upon the exigencies of the situation and necessities of smooth administration on the basis of recommendations of the Pay Commissions or Committees specially constituted for the purpose.
3. The Tribunal below rejected the challenge holding that the impugned notification was not vitiated on account of any mala fide exercise of power and that despite the fact that the post of Sub-Assistant Registrar was a promotional post for Block Level Extension Officers, having regard to the similarity in the nature of their functions, the cadre of IPOs came to be formed by merging and redesignating them both — SAR, Industries and BLEO, Industries as Industries Promotion Officers. Reliance was placed in this regard on the decision of the Government made on 27-5-1980 — a conscious decision to merge them into one as IPOs though with a classification among them as seniors and juniors depending upon differences in the scales of their pay which was necessitated for the reason that the merged posts were carrying different scales of pay, initially. Reference also seems to have been made to the subsequent decision on 17-2-1982 to do away with the said difference and the abolition of the selection grade in respect of all cadres of posts in the State, resulting in denial of the only avenue of promotion to IPOs in the grade of Rs 400-750. Support was drawn by the Tribunal for its conclusions also from the fact that the government orders dated 11-6-1986 declaring seventeen posts equivalent to that of Industrial Supervisors remained unchallenged and that really the equities stood adjusted in providing promotional opportunities to the cadre of IPOs, irrespective of the scales of pay, on a par with Industrial Supervisors.
4. Shri A.T.M Sampath, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, sought to assail the decision of the Tribunal mainly on the ground that the Government could not have attempted to equate unequals by making eligible all grades of IPOs dehors the intrinsic differences in their scales of pay and placing them on a par with Industrial Supervisors, who were of higher grade with higher scales of pay. It was also contended that by throwing open the avenues of promotion to Class II posts to IPOs, who are in large numbers, treating them on a par with Industrial Supervisors with comparatively small numerical strength, the prospects of promotion of the Industrial Supervisors have been completely denied with slender or even no chances during their tenure of office. In order to highlight the grievance of the appellants, the learned counsel vehemently contended that the experience gained by IPOs in the lower grade of posts cannot be treated on a par with service of those Industrial Supervisors in higher grades for purposes of further promotion to Class II posts and this anomaly brought about by the amendment with effect from 24-5-1991 works great hardship and constitutes gross violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Shri R.K Mehta appearing for the non-official respondent and Shri R.S Jena for the State, adopted the reasons assigned by the Tribunal in their support and contended that they are quite in accordance with law and do not call for any interference. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side and, in our view, the challenge to the order of the Tribunal rejecting the challenge made by the appellants, does not merit our acceptance.
5. It is appropriate at this stage to make reference to some of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel on either side. Y.V Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao (1983) 3 SCC 284 being a case where not only there was omission to prepare the promotion panel in time as per rules then in force but the amended rules dispensed with the original provision for considering LDCs along with UDCs for promotion, adversely affecting their promotional prospects, has no application to the case on hand. The decision in R.S Ajara v. State of Gujarat (1997) 3 SCC 641 lays down that the benefit that has accrued or crystallized under the existing rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect. In Chairman, Rly. Board v. C.R Rangadhamaiah (1997) 6 SCC 623 a Constitution Bench of this Court held that a rule which operates in futuro so as to govern future rights of those already in service cannot be assailed on the ground of retrospectivity as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, but a rule which seeks to reverse from an anterior date, a benefit which has been granted or availed e.g promotion or pay scale, can be assailed as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 to the extent it operates retrospectively. This observation came to be made in the context of a challenge to the notification, which, by the language employed therein, applied to the detriment of the pensionary rights of those who had already retired and were no longer in service and deprived the retired persons of their entitlement to be reckoned as on the date of retirement, when they acquired a right to a particular pension, as per rules in force on the date of their retirement. State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal (1997) 10 SCC 419 is a case wherein this Court held that the mere fact that a person was empanelled for promotion does not entitle him to valid appointment if by the time the vacancies for his appointment actually arose, the eligibility criteria were altered by the amendment to the rules, emphasizing the position that the preparation of the panel alone does not freeze the criteria to be satisfied in respect of the subsequent vacancies arising thereafter, so as to dispense with the need to satisfy the requirements of rules, which came into force thereafter by way of amendment. Those observations cannot be drawn out of their context to be extended to the case on hand which should be guided by the fact that the amendments in this case never had any effect of rendering ineligible an already eligible person. A mere enlargement of the area or zone of consideration by enabling some more category of posts also to be considered for promotion, if at all, could be claimed to have merely affected chances of promotion only and not either right to be considered for promotion or deprive any vested or accrued rights, in law. In S.B Mathur v. Chief Justice of Delhi High Court 1989 Supp (1) SCC 34, (1989) 9 ATC 286 this Court held that an eligibility criterion is distinct from the zone of consideration. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni (1981) 4 SCC 130 this Court observed that mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service, and the fact that there was reduction in the chances of promotion did not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service while reiterating the settled principle that a right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere reduction in chances of promotion is not.
6. The grievance sought to be made as to the equation of posts for purposes of further avenues of promotion or the right and powers of the State to do so also, does not merit our acceptance, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as well, besides the relevant principles of law governing the same. This Court in S.B Mathur case 1989 Supp (1) SCC 34, (1989) 9 ATC 286 observed as follows:
“11. The first submission of Mr Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners is that there is a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution in treating the posts of Superintendents, Court Masters or Readers and Private Secretaries to the Judges as equal status posts. It was urged by him that the sources of recruitment to these posts were not identical and so also the qualifications required for appointments to these posts. He also pointed out that the duties of the incumbents of these posts were different. It was submitted by him that in treating these posts as equal status posts unequals were treated equally and hence the rule of equality was violated. In appreciating this submission, it must be borne in mind that it is an accepted principle that where there is an employer who has a large number of employees in his service performing diverse duties, he must enjoy a certain measure of discretion in treating different categories of his employees as holding equal status posts or equated posts, as questions of promotion or transfer of employees inter se will necessarily arise for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of the organization. There is, therefore, nothing inherently wrong in an employer treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts provided that, in doing so, he exercises his discretion reasonably and does not violate the principles of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also clear that for treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts, it is not necessary that the holders of these posts must perform completely the same functions or that the sources of recruitment to the posts must be the same nor is it essential that qualifications for appointments to the posts must be identical. All that is reasonably required is that there must not be such difference in the pay scales or qualifications of the incumbents of the posts concerned or in their duties or responsibilities or regarding any other relevant factor that it would be unjust to treat the posts alike or, in other words, that posts having substantially higher pay scales or status in service or carrying substantially heavier responsibilities and duties or otherwise distinctly superior are not equated with posts carrying much lower pay scales or substantially lower responsibilities and duties or enjoying much lower status in service.”
7. In Union of India v. N.Y Apte (1998) 6 SCC 741 this Court observed that the matter of equation of posts is entirely within the domain of the rule-making authority and unless the rule is shown to be wholly unreasonable and irrational, the court will not interfere with the same. In Mohd. Usman v. State of A.P (1971) 2 SCC 188 this Court, while repelling a challenge based on equality clause, observed as hereunder:
“5. On the other hand it was argued on behalf of the contesting respondents that before considering the vires of Rule 5, we must first ascertain the reason behind the rule to find out whether in fact there is discrimination. The contesting respondents do not deny that the position of a UDC is superior to that of a LDC. But according to them it became necessary for the State to pool together UDCs as well as the LDCs for the purpose of recruitment in question for the following reasons.
7. On the facts before us we are unable to agree that for the purpose of recruitment with which we are concerned herein the State should have classified the UDCs and LDCs separately. If the State had treated the UDCs as being superior to the LDCs for the purpose of that recruitment it would have resulted in a great deal of injustice to a large section of the clerks. The fortuitous circumstance of an officer in a particular district becoming a UDC would have given him an undue advantage over his seniors who might have been as efficient or even more efficient than himself, merely because they chanced to serve in some other district. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not think that in the present case the State can be said to have treated unequals as equals. The rule of equality is intended to advance justice by avoiding discrimination. In our opinion the High Court by overlooking the reason behind Rule 5 came to the erroneous conclusion that the said Rule violated Article 14 of the Constitution.”
8. So far as the case on hand is concerned, Rule 7 of the Orissa Industries Service Rules, 1985, which came into force with effect from 12-9-1985 dealing with promotion to Class II posts enumerated in Schedule B thereto, and relevant for the purpose, reads as follows:
“7. Promotion to Class II.—(1) Not more than 25% of total vacancies in Class II of the service in any year may be filled up by promotion from among non-gazetted non-Ministerial Class III field executive, staff, namely:
Industries Promotion Officers, Industrial Supervisors in grade pay of Rs 500-930 or as revised from time to time and such other posts as may be created in the equivalent grade or declared equivalent in status by Government from time to time having completed seven years of service in the post or posts. The promotion quota of Industries Promotion Officers, Industrial Supervisors shall be in a ratio according to the strength of qualified officers in each group as may be decided by Government.”
9. It is stated by all the learned counsel on either side that the percentage of 25% mentioned in sub-rule (1) stood altered subsequently as 50% from August 1995. By a notification dated 11-6-1986, the State Government, in exercise of its powers under Rule 7(1) of the Rules, declared about seventeen categories of posts to be equivalent in status with that of the Industries Promotion Officers/Industrial Supervisors for the purpose of sub-rule (1) of Rule 7. This notification has not been challenged at any point of time and even in the course of the present proceedings. By the impugned amendment which came into force from 24-5-1991, the words, abbreviation and figures, “in grade pay of Rs 500-930 or as revised from time to time” were ordered to be deleted. Even dehors the reasoning of the Tribunal that those words from the inception qualified only the class of Industrial Supervisors, we are of the view that no genuine or serious objection could be either reasonably or lawfully taken to the move to enable all the Industries Promotion Officers also becoming or rendered eligible for promotion to Class II posts. So far as Industries Promotion Officers among themselves are concerned, the difference in pay scale among them is due to the differences based on the initial feeder category pay and not due to any intrinsic or basis differences of essential qualifications or the nature of duties and obligations. As long as the IPOs, as a class or category, are rendered eligible even from 1986 and that is not challenged, the differences, if any, existing and based on the scales of pay among them, when resolved to be done away with in the undoubted exercise of its power by the State, as a matter of policy, cannot be legitimately challenged by the appellants merely because due to the enlargement of the horizon of consideration resulting therefrom, the chances of consideration for promotion of Industrial Supervisors become diminished. The reasons, which weighed with the State Government in doing so, are found to be genuine, real and substantive and meant to do substantial justice to all categories or grades of posts equated for purposes of Rule 7 of the Rules. The fact that in different proceedings where claim for identical scales of pay came to be contested by the Government or rejected by the Tribunal, is no justification to countenance the claim of the appellants in these proceedings inasmuch as the criteria to be applied in dealing with such claims are totally different or, at any rate, may be one only among several requirements to be satisfied. Consequently, the challenge on behalf of the appellants has no merit whatsoever and shall stand rejected.
10. For all the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs.
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