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Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court Of India And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
A Senior Advocate practising before the Supreme Court invoked Article 32 in public interest seeking two reliefs: (i) publication of a confidential in-house inquiry report prepared by a committee of two Chief Justices and one Judge of different High Courts concerning alleged misconduct of sitting Judges of the Karnataka High Court, and (ii) a direction to an independent professional investigating agency to conduct a fresh probe into those allegations and to report back to the Court.
The petition arose against the backdrop of the 1999 Chief Justices’ Conference, which had framed a Code of Conduct and an informal in-house procedure for dealing with complaints against Judges. The Chief Justice of India (CJI) had ordered a discreet fact-finding inquiry under that procedure; the resulting report was treated by the CJI as confidential and preliminary, with no statutory sanction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Supreme Court can direct the Chief Justice of India to publish the confidential in-house inquiry report on allegations against certain High Court Judges.
- Whether the Court should mandate an independent professional agency to investigate those allegations and submit its report to the Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The public has a fundamental right to know; disclosure of the inquiry report is essential for transparency and accountability.
- Relied on decisions such as S.P. Gupta, Raj Narain, Association for Democratic Rights, and Cricket Association of Bengal to emphasise the constitutional value of free flow of information.
- Cited the instance where former CJI Sabyasachi Mukharji made public a report regarding Justice V. Ramaswami, asserting that a precedent for disclosure exists.
- Contended that the in-house mechanism lacks statutory backing; therefore an independent external investigation is necessary to maintain public confidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 | Recognised citizens’ right to know about public affairs. | Distinguished; right to information is not absolute and does not override confidentiality of in-house judicial inquiries. |
| State of U.P. v. Raj Narain, (1975) 4 SCC 428 | Freedom of information and government transparency. | Distinguished on the same ground; disclosure could harm the judiciary’s functioning. |
| Union of India v. Association for Democratic Rights, (2002) 5 SCC 294 | Right of voters to information about electoral candidates. | Contextually different; does not mandate disclosure of internal judicial documents. |
| Secy., Ministry of I&B v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 | Broadcasting freedom and right to receive information. | Held inapplicable; the in-house report is not meant for public domain. |
| PUCL v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399 | Reviewed scope of right to information. | Cited to show that even expanded notions of the right accept reasonable limitations such as confidentiality. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court traced the constitutional and statutory framework governing judicial tenure. Under Articles 124 and 217 and the Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968, a Judge can be removed only through parliamentary impeachment; no other disciplinary process is envisaged. Consequently, the Supreme Court—and even the CJI—lacks formal disciplinary control over High Court Judges.
The in-house procedure, agreed upon by the judiciary for self-regulation, rests solely on the CJI’s moral authority. Any report prepared under that mechanism is preliminary, ad hoc, confidential, and intended solely for the CJI’s personal satisfaction. Publicising such a report could undermine judicial independence and would encourage Judges to insist on impeachment proceedings rather than informal fact-finding.
Addressing the petitioner’s reliance on right-to-information jurisprudence, the Bench clarified that none of the cited cases declare the right absolute; statutory and constitutional limitations exist, and the Freedom of Information Act 2002 itself recognises exemptions. Therefore, confidentiality of the present report is a permissible limitation.
Regarding the request for an external investigation, the Court held that if the allegations constitute criminal offences, the petitioner is free to lodge a complaint with competent authorities. If the conduct amounts to “misbehaviour” warranting removal, the proper course is a motion under Article 217. An Article 32 petition is not the forum for bypassing these established mechanisms.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The writ petition was dismissed in limine. The Court refused to order disclosure of the confidential in-house report or to direct an independent investigation. The ruling underscores that internal judicial disciplinary inquiries are confidential and that any substantive action against a Judge must proceed through constitutional mechanisms such as impeachment. No new precedent was created, but the judgment reinforces limits on the right to information in the context of the judiciary’s internal affairs and delineates the Supreme Court’s lack of disciplinary jurisdiction over High Court Judges.
S. Rajendra Babu, J.— A Senior Advocate practising in this Court has filed this petition purporting to be one under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in public interest primarily for the publication of the inquiry report made by a Committee consisting of two Chief Justices and a Judge of different High Courts in respect of certain allegations of alleged involvement of sitting Judges of the High Court of Karnataka in certain incidents and also for a direction to any professional and independent investigating agency having expertise to conduct a thorough investigation into the said incident and to submit a report on the same to this Court.
2. In the Chief Justices' Conference held in December 1999, sixteen clauses formed part of the Code of Conduct in addition to the declaration of assets by the Judges and in-house procedure was suggested in the event of any complaint against any Judge. However, sanction for these guidelines is absent. In our constitutional scheme it is not possible to vest the Chief Justice of India with any control over the puisne Judges with regard to conduct, either personal or judicial. In case of breach of any rule of the Code of Conduct, the Chief Justice can choose not to post cases before a particular Judge against whom there are acceptable allegations. It is possible to criticise that decision on the ground that no enquiry was held and the Judge concerned had no opportunity to offer his explanation particularly when the Chief Justice is not vested with any power to decide about the conduct of a Judge. There is no adequate method or machinery to enforce the Code of Conduct. Article 124 provides for appointment of Judges of this Court and also their removal. Similarly, Article 217 deals with the appointment and removal of the Judges of the High Court. In the Judges (Inquiry) Act of 1968 provisions are made for investigation into misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge. It may be noted that since Judges of the superior courts occupy very high positions, disciplinary proceedings which exist in the case of all other employees cannot be thought of.
3. The Committee referred to by the petitioner is stated to have been constituted as a part of in-house procedure. A Judge cannot be removed from his office except by impeachment by a majority of the House and a majority of not less than 2/3rds present and voting as provided by Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution of India. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 has been enacted providing for the manner of conducting inquiry into the allegation of judicial conduct upon a motion of impeachment sponsored by at least hundred Lok Sabha Members or fifty Rajya Sabha Members. The Presiding Officer of the House concerned has the power to constitute a committee consisting of three persons as enumerated therein. No other disciplinary inquiry is envisaged or contemplated either under the Constitution or under the Act. On account of this lacuna in-house procedure has been adopted for inquiry to be made by the peers of Judges for report to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India in case of a complaint against the Chief Justices or Judges of the High Court in order to find out the truth of the imputation made in the complaint and that in-house inquiry is for the purpose of his own information and satisfaction. A report made on such inquiry if given publicity will only lead to more harm than good to the institution as Judges would prefer to face inquiry leading to impeachment. In such a case the only course open to the parties concerned if they have material is to invoke the provisions of Article 124 or Article 217 of the Constitution, as the case may be. It is not appropriate for the petitioner to approach this Court for the relief or direction for release of the report, for what the Chief Justice of India has done is only to get information from peer Judges of those who are accused and the report made to the Chief Justice of India is wholly confidential. The said report is only for the purpose of satisfaction of the Chief Justice of India that such a report has been made. It is purely preliminary in nature, ad hoc and not final. If the Chief Justice of India is satisfied that no further action is called for in the matter, the proceeding is closed. If any further action is to be taken as indicated in the in-house procedure itself, the Chief Justice of India may take such further steps as he deems fit. Therefore, in the hierarchy of the courts, the Supreme Court does not have any disciplinary control over the High Court Judges, much less the Chief Justice of India has any disciplinary control over any of the Judges. That position in law is very clear. Thus, the only source or authority by which the Chief Justice of India can exercise this power of inquiry is moral or ethical and not in exercise of powers under any law. Exercise of such power of the Chief Justice of India based on moral authority cannot be made the subject-matter of a writ petition to disclose a report made to him.
4. Heavy reliance has been placed upon the decisions of this Court in S.P Gupta v. Union of India 1981 Supp SCC 87, State of U.P v. Raj Narain (1975) 4 SCC 428, Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Rights (2002) 5 SCC 294 and Secy., Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal (1995) 2 SCC 161. The principles stated in these decisions have been reconsidered by this Court in People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399, JT (2003) 2 SC 528. It is no doubt true that in a democratic framework free flow of information to the citizens is necessary for proper functioning particularly in matters which form part of a public record. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel of the petitioner do not also say that right to information is absolute. There are several areas where such information need not be furnished. Even the Freedom of Information Act, 2002, to which also reference has been made by the learned counsel of the petitioner, does not say in absolute terms that information gathered at any level in any manner for any purpose shall be disclosed to the public. The inquiry ordered and the report made to the Chief Justice of India being confidential and discreet is only for the purpose of his information and not for the purpose of disclosure to any other person. The principles stated in the above decisions are in different context and those principles cannot be invoked in a case of this nature, which is of an exceptional category. Therefore, the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner by Shri Shanti Bhushan for a direction to release the said report has got to be rejected in limine.
5. Reference has also been made by Shri Shanti Bhushan to a statement made by Hon'ble Shri Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji, former Chief Justice of India, while withdrawing work from Justice V. Ramaswami. Thereafter, he constituted a Committee consisting of three Judges as to what further course of action he should take. It is stated that the report of the said Committee was also made public. We are afraid that no parallel or analogy can be drawn from this incident. In the first place, the learned Chief Justice in that case unilaterally withdrew work from Justice V. Ramaswami. That was his own decision and perhaps to tell the public as to what he was doing he made the said statement to which reference has been made by Shri Shanti Bhushan. Again, having withdrawn the work but when it became necessary to reassign the work pursuant to the report of three Judges, he felt appropriate that the said report should be made public. One thing should be borne in mind that in either of these incidents Justice V. Ramaswami had not participated on the ground that the only manner in which he could be proceeded against is as provided under Article 124 of the Constitution.
6. Further, the claim for a direction to any professional and independent investigating agency to conduct an inquiry into the said alleged incident cannot be accepted because appropriate course for the petitioner would be to approach the authorities concerned as enumerated in Article 217 of the Constitution.
7. If the petitioner can substantiate that any criminal offence has been committed by any of the Judges mentioned in the course of the petition, appropriate complaint can be lodged before a competent authority for taking action by complying with requirements of law. There is hardly any need for this Court to give any such direction in the matter. Therefore, we decline to entertain this petition.
8. This petition stands dismissed.
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