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Dhananjay v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Jalna .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was appointed by the Zilla Parishad, Jalna on 13 May 1985 as a temporary employee for one year. After a one-day break, he received another one-year temporary appointment starting 14 May 1986. On 1 July 1987 he was suspended for allegedly authorising a payment of Rs 18,000 to a contractor when the actual repair cost was Rs 8,000. The suspension order simultaneously directed an inquiry into this allegation, and a criminal complaint was also filed. The appellant was ultimately acquitted in the criminal proceedings. Meanwhile, the respondent terminated his services under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules.
Challenging the termination, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court, which a Division Bench dismissed. The present appeal was then filed before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the order terminating the appellant’s temporary service was a simpliciter termination permissible under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, or a punitive order carrying stigma that required compliance with principles of natural justice.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- Although framed as a simple termination, the order is in reality punitive and stigmatic because it is rooted in alleged misconduct.
- The suspension order expressly contemplated a disciplinary inquiry and a criminal case was also launched, showing the respondent’s intent to penalise.
- The High Court erred in relying on Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana; whether an order is stigmatic depends on the specific facts, which purportedly distinguish the present case.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The appellant was a purely temporary employee whose services could be terminated within one year without notice or reasons under Rule 5(1).
- No departmental inquiry was ever held after a government order dated 24 November 1987 permitted discharge of temporary staff without inquiry; hence the termination was simpliciter.
- The High Court correctly applied the precedent in Bihari Lal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana, (1997) 4 SCC 385 | A temporary employee’s services may be terminated under Rule 5(1) even after suspension and acquittal; mention of suspension in the order does not per se create stigma. | The Court found the facts “almost similar” and relied on this case to hold that the present termination was non-stigmatic and permissible. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court noted that the appellant’s engagement was purely temporary and that Rule 5(1) expressly allowed termination within one year without notice or reasons. Although the suspension order had contemplated an inquiry, no inquiry was ultimately held because a subsequent government order dated 24 November 1987 authorised discharge of temporary employees without inquiry.
The mere reference to the appellant’s suspension in the termination order did not convert it into a punitive action. Citing and closely following Bihari Lal, the Court emphasised that an employee’s prior suspension or criminal prosecution, and even an acquittal, do not preclude the competent authority from invoking Rule 5(1) to terminate a temporary employee without stigma.
Finding no evidence that the alleged misconduct was the foundation of the dismissal, the Court concluded that the order was a bona fide exercise of contractual power rather than a disguised punishment. Consequently, the High Court’s dismissal of the writ petition was affirmed.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view that the appellant’s termination was simpliciter under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules. The decision maintains the principle that temporary employees can be discharged without inquiry when the statutory rule so permits, even after suspension or criminal acquittal. No new legal doctrine was created; the ruling reinforces existing precedent.
Order
1. The appellant was appointed in Zilla Parishad, Jalna on 13-5-1985 on temporary basis for a period of one year. After expiry of that period, he was again given a fresh appointment for one more year with effect from 14-5-1986, after giving a break for one day. He was placed under suspension on 1-7-1987 on the ground that he had paid an amount of Rs 18,000 to a contractor when the actual cost of repairs was only Rs 8000. In the very suspension order, an enquiry also was directed in regard to the allegation of payment of Rs 18,000 as against the actual cost of Rs 8000 spent towards repairs. A complaint also was made against him on criminal side in respect of the same allegation. Ultimately, after trial, he was acquitted. The respondent passed an order terminating the services of the appellant. Aggrieved by this order of termination of services, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court, after considering the respective contentions of the parties, finding no merit in the writ petition, dismissed the same. Hence, the appellant is before us in this appeal.
2. Shri S.K Dholakia, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, urged that the order of termination of services of the appellant though in terms is stated to be simpliciter, but, in fact, it is a result of the alleged misconduct against the appellant and, in other words, is stigmatic. In support of this submission, the learned counsel stated that the very order of suspension shows that an enquiry was directed against the alleged misconduct with a view to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant to remove him from services; even a criminal complaint was filed to proceed against him and, in fact, he was prosecuted also pursuant to the complaint. Learned counsel submitted that the High Court committed an error in placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana (1997) 4 SCC 385. He added that whether the order of termination of services in a given case is simpliciter or stigmatic depends on the facts of each case and, according to him, on the facts of the present case, the order of termination of services was not simpliciter but it was punitive attaching stigma to the appellant.
3. In opposition, the learned counsel for the respondent made submissions supporting the impugned order and reiterated the very submissions that were made before the High Court.
4. It is not in dispute that the appellant was appointed on a temporary basis; his services could be terminated without notice and without assigning any reason within a period of one year. In fact, his services were terminated within a period of one year under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules. The only question that is required to be answered is: whether the order of termination of services is simpliciter or is punitive attaching stigma to the appellant. No doubt, in the order of suspension passed on 1-7-1987 keeping the appellant under suspension, an enquiry was directed against the appellant in regard to the alleged misconduct. But, no enquiry was held pursuant to the said order, having regard to the government order dated 24-11-1987 that service of a temporary servant could be discharged within a period of one year without keeping him under suspension and without holding an enquiry. Although initially the enquiry was ordered, in view of this government order, the respondent did not proceed to hold any enquiry. In the criminal case filed against the appellant, he was acquitted.
5. Para 2 of the impugned order of termination of services makes a mention of the fact that the appellant was suspended. The learned counsel for the appellant, pointing out this paragraph, submitted that it would cast stigma on the appellant and it would adversely affect his prospects. The High Court, in dismissing the writ petition, relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Bihari Lal (1997) 4 SCC 385 aforementioned. Para 5 of the said judgment reads thus:
“5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules. Admittedly, the respondent had been working as a temporary government servant before he was kept under suspension. The termination order indicated the factum that he, by then, was under suspension. It is only a way of describing him as being under suspension when the order came to be passed but that does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal of government employee does not automatically entitle the government servant to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent is only a temporary government servant, the power being available under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent authority to invoke the said power and terminate the services of the employee instead of conducting the enquiry or to continue in service a government servant accused of defalcation of public money. Reinstatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of public money.”
6. If we look to the paragraph extracted above, it becomes clear that the facts of that case are almost similar to the facts of the present case. Although a distinction was sought to be made to contend that that judgment has no application to the facts of the present case, we are unable to agree with the submission. Merely because the appellant was kept under suspension, that, by itself, is not indicative that the respondent had intended from the beginning to get rid of the services of the appellant by holding an enquiry. It is not the case of the appellant that in spite of the fact that his services were needed, the order of termination of services was passed. Even though the appellant was acquitted in the criminal case launched against him on the basis of the complaint made by the respondent, is also not a factor to indicate that the respondent wanted to take action against the appellant on his misconduct to remove him from service.
7. In our view, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not possible to hold that the order of termination of services was not simpliciter or the misconduct was the foundation for passing such order. Even if an enquiry was ordered to find out or verify the truth or otherwise, the allegation by itself does not establish that the respondent had any such design to somehow remove the appellant from service. In our view, the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition in the light of the facts of the present case and the judgment of this Court, referred to above.
8. We find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
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