- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
K. Pandurangan v. S.S.R Velusamy And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants were prosecuted for offences under Sections 420, 477-A, 468, 409 read with 109 and other related provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The VIth Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Thiruchirapalli convicted them and imposed a maximum sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment.
On appeal, the first appellate court (Court of the Sessions Judge) affirmed the convictions but reduced the sentence to two-and-a-half years and, relying on various Government Orders, purported to remit even that reduced sentence.
The complainant invoked the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction. The High Court of Judicature at Madras held that the lower appellate court had no authority to grant remission, allowed the revision, and restored the trial court’s judgment, thereby requiring the appellants to serve the original five-year term.
The present appeals before the Supreme Court challenge the High Court’s order and the manner in which the first appeal was handled.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court could entertain and act on a criminal revision petition filed by the complainant to set aside the remission granted by the lower appellate court.
- Whether a criminal court, as opposed to the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has jurisdiction to grant remission of sentence on the basis of Government Orders.
- Whether the appellants were denied their statutory right to a full appellate review on facts, thereby violating Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The revision at the instance of the complainant was not maintainable; the High Court erred in entertaining it.
- The High Court wrongly set aside the lower appellate court’s order granting remission.
- Neither the first appellate court nor the High Court examined the merits of the convictions, depriving the appellants of the substantive right of appeal guaranteed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.
State’s Arguments
- The High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction; the source of the invocation (complainant) is immaterial.
- The lower appellate court’s remission order was without jurisdiction because Section 432 CrPC reserves that power to the appropriate Government.
- The suggestion that the appellants received no hearing on facts is unfounded; any lack of submissions was attributable to defence counsel, not the court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Administration) | The High Court’s revisional powers are plenary and can be exercised suo motu; the identity of the moving party is irrelevant. | Relied upon to reject the objection that a complainant could not invoke the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction. |
| A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 | Denial of a statutory right of appeal infringes Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. | Used to emphasise that failure to consider the appeal on facts amounted to a constitutional violation, warranting remand. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Maintainability of Revision: The Supreme Court held that the High Court possesses independent, statutory revisional power under the CrPC. Therefore, whether the power is triggered by its own motion or by a complainant does not affect jurisdiction, following Nadir Khan.
Jurisdiction to Grant Remission: Under Section 432 CrPC, only the “appropriate Government” may remit sentences, and even then, the prisoner must be in custody when remission is considered. The lower appellate court therefore acted without authority in granting remission; the High Court was correct on this point.
Right of Appeal on Facts: The Supreme Court scrutinised the first appellate judgment and found no discussion of the evidence or factual findings; the court dealt only with sentence and remission. Citing the Constitution Bench decision in A.R. Antulay, the Court held that deprivation of a statutory right of appeal offends Articles 14 and 21.
Because the appellants were denied a meaningful appellate review, the Supreme Court concluded that the proper course was to restore that opportunity rather than reinstate the trial court’s sentence outright.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS ALLOWED; HIGH COURT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE; MATTER REMANDED.
The appeals were allowed, the Madras High Court’s decision was quashed, and the case was remanded to the Sessions Judge, Thiruchirapalli, to hear the appeals on merits within three months.
Implications are confined to the parties: the appellants regain their right to a complete first appeal on facts. The judgment reiterates that courts lack power to remit sentences under Section 432 CrPC and underscores the constitutional dimension of the right to appeal, but it does not establish new substantive criminal law.
N. Santosh Hegde, J.— In these appeals, the appellants were charged for offences punishable under Sections 420, 477-A, 468, 420 read with Section 109, Section 409 read with Section 109 and Section 468 read with Section 109 IPC. The trial court, namely, the VIth Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Thiruchirapalli, convicted the appellants under various sections, among them, for offences punishable under Section 420 and Section 420 read with Section 109 IPC. It awarded a maximum sentence of 5 years' RI.
2. On an appeal filed by the convicted accused, the appellate court confirmed the conviction recorded by the trial court but reduced the sentence to 2½ years each and further acting purportedly under various GOs of the Government, it granted remission of the said sentence of 2½ years also.
3. In a revision filed by the complainant, the High Court of Judicature at Madras considering the question of jurisdiction of the court to remit the sentence under the various GOs came to the conclusion that such a remission could not have been granted by the court, hence, allowed the revision. It also came to the conclusion that there is no need to remit the matter back to the lower appellate court, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment of the lower appellate court and restored the judgment of the trial court both in regard to conviction and sentence. The effect of the said judgment was that the appellants have to undergo the sentence of 5 years awarded by the trial court.
4. In these appeals, Shri M.N Krishnamani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the High Court was in error in entertaining the revision at the instance of the complainant. He also submitted that the High Court was in error in setting aside the judgment of the lower appellate court which granted the appellants benefit of remission. Alternatively, he contended that neither the lower appellate court nor the High Court have gone into the merits of the case on facts, hence, they have been denied the benefit of appeal which is otherwise provided under the Criminal Procedure Code.
5. While Shri A.T.M Ranga Ramanujam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State strongly supported the judgment of the High Court and contended that from the purport of the order of the lower appellate court, it is clear that the court had applied its mind in regard to the facts of the case before confirming the conviction. He also submitted that it is possible that the counsel appearing for the appellants before the lower appellate court did not address any argument on merits, therefore, the complaint of the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants did not get the benefit of the appeal on facts is not correct. He supported the finding of the High Court on the question of grant of remission, which he submitted, was without jurisdiction.
6. So far as the first question as to the maintainability of the revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned, we think the said argument has only to be noted to be rejected. Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court has suo motu power of revision, if that be so, the question of the same being invoked at the instance of an outsider would not make any difference because ultimately it is the power of revision which is already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being exercised by the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is done by itself or at the instance of a third party will not affect such power of the High Court. In this regard, we may note the following judgment of this Court in the case of Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Admn.1).
7. The second question that has come up for our consideration in this case pertains to the right of the lower appellate court to grant various remissions under various notifications issued by the State, reference to which has been made by the lower appellate court in its judgment. The right to grant remission is governed by the provisions of Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which vests the said power with the appropriate Government and not in any court. Even that power is subject to conditions enumerated in that section and one such condition is that an accused person who is being granted remission of sentence will have to be in custody, when the decision to grant remission is made by the Government concerned. (See the proviso to Section 432(5) of the Code which was not the factual position in this case apart from the fact that the court has no jurisdiction of remission of sentence under Section 432 of the Code.) Therefore, in our opinion, the first appellate court was not justified in granting the remission.
8. This leaves us to consider the last question argued before us by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants had a right of appeal on facts conferred statutorily by the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein they could have convinced the appellate court that the findings of the court below are erroneous and not based on facts. He pointed out from the judgment of the lower appellate court that there has been no such consideration by the said court. He submitted that if we are not inclined to accept his argument in regard to the right of the appellate court to grant remission, then he is entitled to the benefit of hearing before the appellate court on merits of the case. On facts, he submitted that the contention of the learned counsel for the State that there was no argument addressed by his counterpart on merits of the case before the lower appellate court is not correct and the same is also not so reflected in the judgment of the said court. We have also perused the said judgment and we do not think there is any application of mind in regard to the factual aspect of the case by the lower appellate court which has merely proceeded to consider the quantum of sentence and grant of remission. Apart from the fact that right of appeal is statutorily provided by the Code, a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 has held that deprivation of one's statutory right of appeal would amount to denial of procedure established by law under Article 21, and further, such denial violates the guarantee of equal protection of law under Article 14 of the Constitution. Placing reliance on the said judgment of this Court, we are of the opinion that since the lower appellate court, which was the first court of appeal, has not considered the factual aspect of the case while considering the appeal, we think the appellants have been denied an opportunity of agitating their case on facts against the judgment of the trial court. In such circumstances, we think the prayer of the learned counsel is justified. Therefore, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remand the matter back to the Court of the Sessions Judge at Thiruchirapalli who will hear all appeals which were filed against the judgment and conviction made by the VIth Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Thiruchirapalli in Calendar Case No. 2 of 1988 and other connected matters. Since the matter is very old, we think it appropriate to direct the said appellate court to dispose of the same on merits within three months from the receipt of the records.
9. Ordered accordingly.
Alert