- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
State Of U.P v. Allied Constructions .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent contractor undertook construction of a bridge-cum-fall at Munda Khera Scape for the appellant State at an estimated cost of ₹37.2 lakhs. During the night of 25-26 August 1991 the work site was flooded, causing alleged loss to the contractor. The respondent filed claims for the loss, which were referred to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded ₹12,55,365 with interest at 18 % from 1-11-1991 until the award date and 6 % thereafter. The respondent sought to make the award a rule of court. The appellant objected, contending that clause 47 (force majeure) barred the claim, but the trial court rejected the objection and made the award rule of court. A first appeal from order was dismissed by the High Court. The present civil appeal before the Supreme Court challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether clause 47 of the construction contract, which exempts the State from liability for loss caused by “unprecedented flood” or other acts of God, barred the contractor’s claim for damages resulting from the flooding.
- Whether the arbitral award could be set aside under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 on the ground that the arbitrator had misconducted the proceedings or committed an error apparent on the face of the award.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The flooding constituted an “unprecedented flood” within the meaning of clause 47; hence, the State could not be held liable for the contractor’s losses.
- The arbitrator misapplied clause 47 and thereby misconducted the proceedings, warranting setting aside of the award.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala (1989) 2 SCC 38 | Interpretation of a contract is primarily for the arbitrator. | Invoked to affirm that the arbitrator acted within jurisdiction in construing clause 47. |
| U.P. SEB v. Searsole Chemicals Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 397 | Court should not interfere if the arbitrator’s view is plausible. | Relied on to reject re-appraisal of evidence and uphold the arbitral findings. |
| Ispat Engg. & Foundry Works v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2001) 6 SCC 347 | Scope of interference with a reasoned award is very limited. | Cited to reinforce that no ground under Section 30 was met to set aside the award. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined clause 47 and observed that it protects the State only when the loss is caused by an “unprecedented flood” that could not have been foreseen or avoided by a prudent person. The appellant had led no evidence before the arbitrator to show that the rainfall was unprecedented or that the flooding qualified as an act of God. Consequently, both the arbitrator and the High Court held, as a matter of fact, that clause 47 was inapplicable.
Turning to the challenge under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the Court reiterated the restrictive grounds for setting aside an award. Citing Sudarsan Trading and subsequent authorities, it held that interpretation of contractual terms and assessment of evidence fall within the arbitrator’s domain. Errors, even if present, do not justify judicial interference unless the award is perverse or based on an erroneous proposition of law apparent on the face of the record. The award in question was reasoned and its conclusions were at least plausible; therefore, no misconduct or error under Section 30 was established.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH MODIFICATION.
The Supreme Court upheld the arbitral award and the concurrent findings of the courts below, but modified the interest rate by consent of the parties: interest from the date of claim to the date of award is reduced from 18 % to 12 %. There is no order as to costs. The decision reaffirms the limited scope of judicial interference with arbitral awards under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and underscores the burden on a party invoking a force-majeure clause to prove the requisite conditions.
Order
1. Under a contract entered into by and between the appellant and the respondent, the respondent undertook construction of bridge-cum-fall at Munda Khera Scape at an estimated cost of Rs 37.2 lakhs. While the work was in progress, the work area was flooded in the night of 25-8-1991 and 26-8-1991.
2. The respondent contractor herein filed a claim on account of loss sustained by him due to flooding of the work area. Ultimately, the matter was referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator gave an award for payment of a sum of Rs 12,55,365 together with interest at the rate of 18 per cent from 1-11-1991 till the date of the award and 6 per cent thereafter. The respondent filed the award for being made rule of the court. The appellant herein filed a petition, inter alia, on the ground that the arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings, inasmuch as the force majeure contained in clause 47 disentitled the respondent from making any claim which was on account of unprecedented rain. The said objection was rejected and the award was made rule of the court. The appellant thereafter filed a first appeal from order before the High Court and the same was dismissed. It is against the said judgment, the appellant is in appeal before us.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant reiterated his argument raised before the High Court. In fact, his argument based on force majeure is that because of unprecedented rain the liability of loss cannot be thrust upon the appellant. We do not find any merit in this contention. Clause 47 of the agreement runs as under:
“Neither party shall be liable to the other for any loss or damage occasioned by or arising out of an act of God, such as unprecedented flood, volcanic eruption, earthquake or other convulsions of nature and other acts such as but not restricted to general strikes, invasion, the act of foreign countries, hostilities or war-like operations before or after declaration of war, rebellion, military or usurped power which prevent performance of the contract and which could not have been foreseen or avoided by a prudent person.”
A perusal of clause 47 reproduced above shows that it protected the State from liability and damage occasioned by unprecedented flood which could not have been foreseen or avoided as a prudent person. The appellant herein did not lead any evidence before the arbitrator that the rain as a result of which the loss was sustained by the respondent was unprecedented and in fact, it was an act of God. In absence of such an evidence, the arbitrator as well as the High Court has recorded a finding of fact that the flood which has caused loss to the respondent was not due to the unprecedented rain and, therefore, clause 47 of the agreement was not attracted.
4. Any award made by an arbitrator can be set aside only if one or the other term specified in Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is attracted. It is not a case where it can be said that the arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings. It was within his jurisdiction to interpret clause 47 of the agreement having regard to the fact-situation obtaining therein. It is submitted that an award made by an arbitrator may be wrong either on law or on fact and error of law on the face of it could not nullify an award. The award is a speaking one. The arbitrator has assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof. Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for the arbitrator to determine (see Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala (1989) 2 SCC 38, AIR 1989 SC 890). Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 providing for setting aside an award is restrictive in its operation. Unless one or the other condition contained in Section 30 is satisfied, an award cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a Judge chosen by the parties and his decision is final. The court is precluded from reappraising the evidence. Even in a case where the award contains reasons, the interference therewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. An error apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one, the court will refrain itself from interfering (see U.P SEB v. Searsole Chemicals Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 397 and Ispat Engg. & Foundry Works v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2001) 6 SCC 347).
5. For that reason, we are of the view that the appeal has no merit and must fail. However, the parties are agreed that from the date of filing of the claim till the date of award the interest chargeable would be at the rate of 12 per cent in place of 18 per cent. For that reason, the award and judgment under challenge stand modified to that extent.
6. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
7. There shall be no order as to costs.
Alert