- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Management Of The Goodwill Girls High School And Another v. J. Mary Susheela (Smt) And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Smt. J. Mary Susheela (plaintiff) asserted that she had been selected for appointment as a teacher in Goodwill Girls' High School, Bengaluru, but no formal order was initially issued. After the trial court in an earlier suit expressed hope that an appointment order would follow, the School’s management issued such an order directing her to join by 15-6-1985. The plaintiff alleged that when she reported for duty the Principal refused to permit her to work, prompting Suit No. 10456 of 1985 seeking a mandatory injunction to assign her teaching duties. The XIX Additional City Civil Judge framed six issues but disposed of the suit on a single issue—whether she was entitled to a mandatory injunction—answering it in the negative and dismissing the suit on 27-9-1988.
The plaintiff appealed to the High Court of Karnataka. A learned Single Judge decreed the suit with costs and directed payment of salary from 10-6-1985. The School management and the Principal challenged that judgment before the present Court, contending that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding issues not determined by the trial court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court, while hearing an appeal, could adjudicate all issues framed by the trial court when the trial court had decided the suit solely on Issue 1 under Order 14 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
- Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a mandatory injunction directing the School to assign her teaching duties and to receive salary from 10-6-1985 despite working elsewhere.
- What legal effect, if any, flowed from alleged admissions or concessions by the School’s management in favour of the plaintiff.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments (School Management and Principal)
- The High Court impermissibly expanded the scope of appeal by deciding all six issues when only one had been tried by the trial court.
- The plaintiff had been employed elsewhere; therefore, the High Court’s direction to pay salary from 10-6-1985 lacked justification.
- The appeal was not confined to back wages; the principal challenge concerned the legality of the High Court’s approach.
Respondent’s Arguments (Plaintiff)
- The appeal before this Court should be limited to the question of back wages because the School’s management had conceded her entitlement to appointment and salary.
- Under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, a partial decree could be passed on admissions made by the management, rendering further adjudication unnecessary.
- The Principal’s contrary stand was irrelevant, as he could not contradict the management that employed him.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court observed that the litigation had persisted for nearly two decades and noted with concern the High Court’s decision to adjudicate issues not decided by the trial court. It emphasized:
- The trial court had invoked—or was treated as having invoked—Order 14 Rule 2 CPC by deciding only the preliminary Issue 1.
- In her memorandum of appeal, the plaintiff herself criticised the trial court for not deciding all issues; however, she did not request the High Court to undertake that exercise, nor did she rely on any purported admission by the School as a ground for decreeing the suit.
- No evidence had been led in the trial court; even the plaintiff had not been examined. In such circumstances, the High Court should not have rendered findings on all issues or decreed the suit on alleged admissions without proper evaluation.
- Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was “indefensible” because it exceeded the permissible appellate scope and addressed matters unconnected with the issues.
The Court therefore set aside the High Court’s decree and ordered a fresh consideration by the trial court. It directed that both the plaintiff and Ms. Nancy (a subsequently appointed teacher) continue in service during the pendency of the suit. Ms. Nancy and the State of Karnataka, already impleaded in the present appeal, were to be added as parties in the trial court, with liberty to file written statements by 15-6-2003. Given that the suit had been pending since 1985, the Court urged its disposal before the year 2004.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; matter remanded to the trial court for fresh disposal.
Immediate consequences: the plaintiff and Ms. Nancy remain engaged as teachers pending the fresh trial; the State of Karnataka and Ms. Nancy are to be impleaded and may file written statements; the trial court must expedite the suit. The decision establishes no new legal precedent but reiterates limits on an appellate court’s power to widen the scope of issues without evidence on record.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— A controversy which could have been solved long back has been blown out of proportion, making the parties travel through the corridors of various courts and has finally landed in this Court. Whenever there is prolongation of litigation, ultimate sufferers are the litigating parties, and inevitably the justice delivery system. Resultant is miscarriage of justice.
2. It is painful to notice that the arduous journey of litigating parties started about two decades back in an educational institution, named Goodwill Girls' High School. Ironically, the controversy started because of alleged “ill will” amongst the parties. Helen Keller, the great humanist had once said: “The highest result of education is tolerance.” But the foundation of the dispute was alleged intolerance by those who matter, in the educational institution concerned.
3. Steering clear of the red herrings, the factual scenario is as follows: Smt J. Mary Susheela, Respondent 1 in this appeal filed Suit No. 10050 of 1985 in the Court of City Civil Judge, Bangalore seeking a mandatory injunction directing the defendants (the appellants in this appeal) to assign teaching work to her pursuant to the order of the appointment. Her claim essentially was that she was selected for appointment as a teacher in Appellant 1 institution, but no order of appointment was issued by the then Principal who was also in the Selection Committee, primarily because she had not agreed to her appointment during the course of selection. The suit was dismissed. However, the trial court observed that in the interest of the students community, which is of utmost importance, it was hoped that the Selection Committee will issue formal order of appointment without further delay. In view of this observation the management of the School issued a letter of appointment directing the plaintiff to report for duties on or before 15-6-1985. The plaintiff claimed that though she reported for duty, the Principal (Defendant 2) did not allow her to function. That led to filing of the second suit; to which this appeal relates, bearing OS No. 10456 of 1985. By order dated 27-9-1988 the XIXth Additional City Civil Judge passed an order purportedly under Order 14 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”). It is to be noted that though six issues were framed, the only issue which was taken up was as follows:
“(1) Whether the plaintiff proves that she is entitled to mandatory injunction directing the defendant to assign the work as claimed in the suit?”
The trial court dismissed the suit, inter alia, observing as follows:
“In the result, in view of my foregoing discussions my finding on Issue 1 is that the plaintiff has failed to establish that she is entitled to mandatory injunction directing the defendant to assign the work as claimed in the suit. Consequently, the suit fails and the same is hereby dismissed.”
4. The plaintiff filed an appeal before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. By the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge decreed the suit with costs and additionally directed that payment was to be made to the plaintiff by the 1st defendant w.e.f 10-6-1985. The said judgment is assailed in this appeal by the two defendants i.e management of the School and the Principal.
5. The basic ground for challenge is that the learned Single Judge expanded the scope of the appeal and when one issue was taken up by the trial court, it was not open to the High Court to take all the issues that were framed initially by the trial court and render findings on those issues. The plaintiff was working in another institution and, therefore, the direction for paying salary right from 10-6-1985 is without any justification.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent in response, submitted that the present appeal was limited to the question of back wages and Appellant 1 in this appeal having conceded to the position that the plaintiff-respondent was entitled to the benefits claimed, the suit has been rightly decreed on the concessions and admissions made by Defendant 1. Though Defendant 2 (Appellant 2 herein) resisted the claim, the same was of no consequence because the appointment was made by Appellant 1 management and being an employee of appellant-Defendant 1, Appellant 2 could not have taken any stand at variance with the management.
7. With reference to Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, it is pointed out that on the basis of concessions made, part decree could have been passed. It is pointed out that pursuant to the various interim orders passed by this Court, the plaintiff-Respondent 1 is rendering services and while passing the interim orders this Court has taken serious note of the conduct of the management in appointing another person on regular basis. She was directed to be impleaded in the present appeal.
8. At this juncture, it is to be noted that interim orders have been passed in this appeal earlier. With a view to ascertain the stand of the State of Karnataka as to whether the appointment of the plaintiff was approved by the State Government notice was issued to the State. In an affidavit filed, the State has taken the stand that no approval was accorded to the appointment of the plaintiff and her post was an unaided one. It is to be noted that this Court had directed that the person who was appointed subsequently was to be treated against the unaided post, while the plaintiff-respondent was to be adjusted against the aided post.
9. Learned counsel for the said employee submitted that she was not a party to the suit, and no direction has been given by the trial court and the High Court so far as she is concerned, and there is nothing on record to show that she was appointed in respect of the post claimed by the plaintiff-Respondent 1. In this view, the orders so far as she is concerned, should be recalled.
10. As the factual scenario goes to show, the controversy has remained unabated for nearly two decades. The trial court decided only one issue in terms of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC though there is no specific reference to the provision made in the order. It has been only stated “Order on Issue 1.” The High Court, however, treated it to be in terms of Order 14 Rule 2. It is significant to note that in the memorandum of appeal before the High Court, the plaintiff took exceptions to disposal of the suit on one issue alone. It was specifically pleaded that the trial court should have adjudicated all the issues and it having not done so she was prejudiced. Ground 16 spells out the specific grievance of the plaintiff and reads as follows:
“(16) That the learned Judge ought to have given his own findings on all the issues however without considering the other issues the learned Judge has dismissed the suit basing his findings only on Issue 1. The absence of finding on other issues has resulted in gross injustice.”
11. The points of law formulated in paras (3) and (4) were as follows:
“(3) Whether the trial court was required in law to try all the issues and pronounce on all the issues arising in the suit?
(4) Whether the trial court was justified in trying Issue 1 as a preliminary issue and dismiss the suit as not maintainable without giving a finding on all the other issues?”
12. No evidence was led by the parties. Even the plaintiff was not examined. What is the effect of the alleged admission/concession by the management, if any, was required to be considered in the light of the stand taken by the other defendant. That aspect seems to have been completely lost sight of by the High Court. As no evidence was led, the High Court ought not to have considered all the issues; particularly when the plaintiff herself had not prayed for adjudication of other issues by the High Court. On the contrary, her stand was that the trial court should have decided all the issues. It is of considerable importance that in the memorandum of appeal before the High Court there was no plea or ground taken that the suit ought to have been decreed on the basis of alleged admission/concession by Defendant 1.
13. One aspect needs to be clarified. The present appeal is not confined to the question of back wages as contended by the plaintiff-Respondent 1. The plea in that regard was an alternative one. The primary stand related to legality of the judgment in dealing with several issues when the trial court had dealt with only one issue.
14. It pains us to note that the High Court has made certain observations which have absolutely no bearing on the subject-matter of the issues and were not even remotely connected with the subject-matter of controversy. That being the position, the judgment of the High Court is indefensible and needs to be set aside, and we direct so. The matter shall be considered by the trial court afresh.
15. The engagement of the plaintiff-Respondent 1 and Ms Nancy shall continue till disposal of the suit. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the respective stands. Ms Nancy is not a party to the suit and so is the State. For effective adjudication they shall be impleaded as parties in the suit, in view of their impletion in the present appeal. They shall be permitted to file written statements by 15-6-2003. If they fail to do so, the effect thereof shall be considered by the trial court. Since the suit was filed in 1985, it would be appropriate if the same is disposed of before 2004 sets in.
16. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above with no order as to costs.
Alert