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H. Seshadri v. K.R Natarajan And Another

Supreme Court Of India

Apr 10, 2003

Judgment

Subsequent
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant claimed to be a tenant of one shop situated in a residential building at No. 297, 11th Cross, Wilson Garden, Bangalore, where he had run “Rajalakshmi Tailoring Hall” for more than 25 years. He asserted that the shop had been leased to him by the father of Respondent 1 and that he had continuously paid rent.

Respondent 1 had previously obtained an eviction decree against Respondent 2 with respect to the residential portion of the same building (HRC No. 2463 of 1990). During execution of that decree, the appellant was also dispossessed from the tailoring shop.

The appellant filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 257 of 1996 under Order 21 Rules 99 & 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking restoration of possession, asserting an independent tenancy. After recording oral and documentary evidence (Exhibits P-1 to P-16), the Small Causes Judge, Bangalore, allowed the petition on 10-6-1999 and ordered Respondent 1 to restore possession.

Respondent 1 filed HRRP No. 783 of 1999 before the High Court of Karnataka under Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act read with Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act. On 28-9-2001, the High Court set aside the trial court’s order, holding that the appellant’s possession did not amount to lawful tenancy.

The present appeal was filed challenging the High Court’s decision. The Supreme Court granted leave and rendered the instant order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, in proceedings under Order 21 Rules 99 & 100 CPC, the appellant established an independent right of tenancy distinct from the judgment-debtor (Respondent 2) so as to resist dispossession.
Whether the High Court, in revision under Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, exceeded its limited jurisdiction in reversing the factual findings of the Small Causes Judge.
Whether the absence of conclusive proof of title under Section 30 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act could justify the appellant’s eviction when such a plea had not been raised before the courts below.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

He was a lawful tenant of the tailoring shop under a lease granted by the father of Respondent 1.
He had paid rent regularly and produced documentary evidence, including the lease deed, telephone bills, labour department notices, and income-tax correspondence, to prove continuous occupation and business operation.
His eviction during execution of the decree against Respondent 2 was illegal because the tailoring shop was not part of the premises covered by that decree.
The Small Causes Judge’s factual findings in his favour, based on oral and documentary evidence as well as admissions by Respondent 1, should not have been disturbed by the High Court in revision.

Respondent 1's Arguments

The lease agreement (Exhibit P-3) and related documents were doubtful in authenticity and did not prove any tenancy in favour of the appellant.
Even if the appellant was in actual possession, such possession was that of a trespasser or sub-lessee without legal basis.
Before the Supreme Court, counsel invoked Section 30 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, contending that absence of proven independent title mandated eviction; however, this plea had not been urged before the lower courts.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found the High Court’s judgment “wholly unsatisfactory” for several reasons:

The High Court failed to make a definite finding that the appellant was either a trespasser or a person claiming through the judgment-debtor, yet concluded—without overturning trial-court findings—that his possession was unlawful.
Under Order 21 Rules 99 & 100 CPC, the decisive question is whether the applicant possesses an independent right. The Small Causes Judge had explicitly held, on evidence, that the appellant was a tenant and had been illegally dispossessed. Those factual findings were not properly dismantled by the High Court.
No plan or material was produced to demonstrate that the tailoring shop formed part of the premises leased to Respondent 2; nor was there evidence that the appellant derived possession from Respondent 2 as a sub-tenant.
The High Court overlooked admissions by Respondent 1, including acknowledgement of a rolling shutter on the disputed premises and an earlier offer to re-accommodate the appellant—facts lending credence to the appellant’s tenancy claim.
Given the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, the High Court should not have re-appreciated evidence or disturbed concurrent findings of fact unless manifestly perverse, which was not shown.
The new reliance on Section 30 of the Rent Control Act could not be entertained for the first time before the Supreme Court.

Holding and Implications

Held: The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s judgment dated 28-9-2001 is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration.

Implications: The Small Causes Judge’s order restoring possession to the appellant is effectively revived pending fresh adjudication. The Supreme Court emphasized the restraint required of revisional courts when reviewing factual findings and underscored that independent occupants cannot be dispossessed in execution proceedings without determination of their rights. No broader precedent was expressly set, but the decision signals the Supreme Court’s insistence on adherence to the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction.

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Order

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 28-9-2001 of the High Court of Karnataka in HRRP No. 783 of 1999 whereby and whereunder a revision petition filed by Respondent 1 herein purported to be under Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act read with Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act questioning an order dated 10-6-1999 passed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 257 of 1996 by the Small Causes Judge, Bangalore allowing the petition filed by the appellant herein under Order 21 Rules 99 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure was set aside.

3. The fact of the matter is as under:

The appellant is said to have entered into a lease agreement with the father of the first respondent in respect of the premises described in the schedule of the original application which comprises of one shop in a portion of the residential building bearing No. 297, 11th Cross, Wilson Garden, Bangalore. The appellant is said to have been running a tailoring shop in the said premises under the name and style “Rajalakshmi Tailoring Hall”. According to the appellant, the residential portion of the said building was in occupation of the second respondent. An eviction petition marked as HRC No. 2463 of 1990 was filed by the first respondent against the second respondent in respect of the residential portion of the premises pursuant whereto and in furtherance whereof a decree for eviction was passed on the consent of Respondent 2.

4. While purporting to evict Respondent 2 in execution of the said decree, allegedly the appellant was also evicted.

5. The appellant thereafter filed an application purported to be under Order 21 Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure inter alia claiming independent right to the said tailoring shop wherein he not only alleged execution of a lease agreement in his favour by the father of the first respondent but also alleged that he had all along been paying rent to the landlord.

6. In the proceedings arising out of the miscellaneous petition filed by the appellant marked as No. 257 of 1996, both parties adduced oral as also documentary evidence. According to the appellant, he had been running a tailoring shop under the name and style of “Rajalakshmi Tailoring Hall” for more than 25 years. With a view to substantiate his claim of tenancy he proved sixteen documents which were marked as Exhibits P-1 to P-16 being the deed of lease, a diary showing payment of rent agreement, telephone bills, notice from the Labour Department, income tax letters etc.

7. The learned Small Causes Judge, Bangalore, by his judgment dated 10-6-1999, inter alia, noticed an admission made by the first respondent in his cross-examination to the effect that there existed a rolling shutter in the disputed premises which he had removed, closed by a wall and converted the shop into a bedroom. The learned Small Causes Judge further took into consideration the fact that the first respondent after closure of the evidence adduced by the appellant consented to accommodate him on the ground floor, provided he constructs a shop at his own cost with asbestos sheet to which he agreed. The first respondent, however, later on resiled from his said stand. The trial Judge held:

“The contention of Respondent 1 that the petitioner was not a tenant in that shop is not at all believable. The present petitioner has produced the various documents and also telephone bills to show that he was running a tailoring shop in Building No. 297. The petitioner has clearly shown that he was illegally dispossessed by Respondent 1. The son of the petitioner has also stated in his evidence as PW 2 that in his presence, the articles in the shop were thrown out. He has also stated that himself and his father have now become unemployed. Looking to the entire evidence of the petitioner and that of Respondent 1 and also looking to the various documents produced by the petitioner tenant, it is clear that the petitioner was a tenant in the shop premises. It is also clear that the petitioner was illegally dispossessed by Respondent 1 while executing the eviction order in HRC No. 2463 of 1990. The notices issued by the Labour Department and the copy of lease agreement and also telephone bills are the documents which clearly show that the petitioner was running a tailoring shop and he had got the business in the said shop in Building No. 297, which is converted by Respondent 1 into his bedroom. The said shop is clearly shown in the schedule of the petition. The petitioner has proved that he was illegally dispossessed by Respondent 1 and, therefore, I answer Point 1 in the affirmative.”

8. The application filed by the appellant was, therefore, allowed and the first respondent was directed to restore possession in favour of the appellant with costs.

9. Aggrieved the first respondent filed a revision petition before the High Court. The learned Judge noticed that the delivery proceedings in the execution case indisputably establish that at the time of delivery, the appellant was in occupation of the premises in question and there were tailoring machines belonging to him. The learned Judge, however, doubted the correctness or otherwise of the lease agreement marked as Exhibit P-3 dated 5-7-1977. It was although noticed that the premises in occupation of the second respondent was admeasuring 25 × 36 feet and thus the entire area of the premises was not the subject-matter in HRC case, but the plea of the appellant was negatived by the learned Judge stating that on close perusal of the boundaries and the dimensions it is evident that the disputed premises is situated in the south-eastern portion of the same building.

10. The High Court opined:

“After going through the documentary and oral evidence, it becomes highly doubtful to believe the version of the first respondent that he is occupying the premises as a tenant. Maybe, the material suggests that he has been in occupation of the premises and carrying on a tailoring shop. But by the said material, it cannot be inferred or concluded that his occupation is by virtue of a tenancy. The plea of tenancy is based upon the documentary evidence reflected in Exts. P-3, P-4 and P-15 and the oral evidence. As discussed above, the said documentary material is discrepant and does not inspire the confidence of the Court to believe that they are genuine documents to support the theory of tenancy. Mere unexplained occupation of the premises does not give any right to the first respondent to resist the proceedings or to seek redelivery. Even though the factum of actual possession is established in the absence of any legal basis, it would only mean an occupation as a trespasser or as a sub-lessee. In other words, only on the basis of actual possession, the first respondent is not entitled to redelivery.”

11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the materials on record we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

12. The judgment under appeal demonstrates that the High Court did not come to a definite finding to the effect that the appellant was a rank trespasser or claimed his title in or over the disputed premises under Respondent 2. Although the High Court did not disbelieve the actual possession of the appellant in respect of the suit premises but without any basis whatsoever and without setting aside the findings of the trial Judge it came to the conclusion that such possession was unlawful.

13. For the purpose of considering an application under Order 21 Rules 99 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure what was required to be considered was as to whether the applicant herein claimed a right independent of the judgment-debtor or not. A person claiming through or under the judgment-debtor may be dispossessed in execution of a decree passed against the judgment-debtor but not when he is in possession of the premises in question in his own independent right or otherwise.

14. It does not appear from the records that any plan was produced or there existed any other material to show that the tailoring shop was a part of the premises tenanted in favour of the second respondent. It also does not appear that there existed any material to show that the appellant was inducted by the second respondent as a sub-tenant or was put in possession by him.

15. The first respondent, from the judgment of the trial Judge as also the High Court, does not appear to have raised a specific plea as to how the appellant came in possession of the tenanted premises. The High Court further failed and/or neglected to consider the other materials on record and in particular the admission of the first respondent in the proceedings before the trial Judge as also the effect of his offer to the appellant to be accommodated in a part of the said building.

16. Furthermore, a question arose for consideration as to whether the disputed premises was within the tenanted premises of Respondent 2 or not. A clear finding on the said question was imperative. In any event, the High Court should have taken note of its limited jurisdiction in terms of Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act. We may observe that a finding of fact based on oral evidence is not ordinarily set aside even by an appellate court save and except on strong and cogent reasons.

17. Mr Sampath Anand Shetty, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent, however, would submit that in terms of Section 30 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 as an independent title was not proved by the appellant in respect of the premises in question, he was bound to be evicted in terms thereof. Such a plea does not appear to have been taken either before the trial Judge or before the High Court. It is not for this Court to examine the said question for the first time. In view of our findings aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment is wholly unsatisfactory and deserves to be set aside.

18. This appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment and order are set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the matter afresh.

19. We, however, hasten to add that the learned Judge hearing the revision petition may consider the matter on its own merits without in any way being influenced by the discussions made herein. However, keeping in view the fact that the appellant herein was dispossessed on or about 20-4-1996, we would request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the revision petition as expeditiously as possible. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.