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Tej Kaur And Others v. State Of Punjab And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants are landowners whose properties were notified for acquisition by the State of Punjab on 7 May 1991 for establishing an “industrial focal point.” They filed objections on 13 June 1991 pursuant to the Section 4(1) notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. A declaration under Section 6 was issued on 18 March 1992, and the Land Acquisition Collector passed the award on 15 March 1994. The appellants challenged the entire acquisition process in writ petitions before the Punjab and Haryana High Court; the Division Bench dismissed those petitions. The present civil appeals were filed before the Supreme Court of India against that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the acquisition is vitiated because the objectors were allegedly denied a mandatory personal hearing during the Section 5-A inquiry.
- Whether the appellants’ lands, being agricultural in nature, ought to have been exempted from acquisition.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- No valid inquiry under Section 5-A was held, and they were not afforded the mandatory personal hearing, rendering the subsequent Section 6 declaration and award illegal.
- Their lands should have been excluded from acquisition because they are agricultural lands.
Respondent's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, (1976) 3 SCC 719 | Personal hearing under Section 5-A is mandatory and does not depend on a specific demand by the objector. | The Court acknowledged the principle but found, on facts, that the Collector had indeed considered the objections and partly allowed them, so non-service of a personal hearing did not vitiate the proceedings. |
| Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 298 | The duty to afford an opportunity of being heard under Section 5-A lies with the Collector; failure to do so invalidates the Government’s subsequent decision. | Relied on for the general proposition, but distinguished because the Collector in the present case conducted the inquiry and partially accepted the objections. |
| Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1993) 4 SCC 255 | Affording an opportunity of being heard during Section 5-A inquiry is indispensable. | Cited by appellants; the Court reiterated the importance of the hearing but held that the appellants’ conduct—delayed challenge and partial exclusion of their land—showed no real prejudice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a Section 5-A inquiry is a vital safeguard for landowners. It observed, however, that:
- The Collector had in fact conducted a Section 5-A inquiry; six of the eight acres originally notified were excluded, indicating that the objections were considered and partly accepted.
- The appellants in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998 waited until after the award (15 March 1994) to file their writ petition (12 April 1994), suggesting the absence of genuine prejudice.
- In Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1998, the appellants raised no timely objections, possession had already been given to third parties, and their plots were surrounded by other industrial plots, leaving no practical ground for exclusion.
- Given these circumstances, the alleged procedural lapse, even if assumed, did not warrant quashing the acquisition.
Holding and Implications
The appeals were dismissed.
The acquisition stands confirmed, and no costs were awarded. The decision emphasizes that while a Section 5-A hearing is mandatory, failure to raise timely objections and evidence that objections were substantively considered can lead the Court to uphold the acquisition. No new legal precedent was set beyond applying settled principles to the facts.
K.G Balakrishnan, J.— The appellants in these two appeals are landowners whose land was acquired for the purpose of starting an “industrial focal point” by the State of Punjab. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on 7-5-1991. The appellants in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998 filed objections on 13-6-1991. Section 6 declaration was made on 18-3-1992 and the award was passed on 15-3-1994. The appellants filed writ petitions before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, challenging the acquisition proceedings. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petitions and aggrieved by the same, the present appeals are filed.
2. Though the appellants had raised several grounds in the writ petitions, those grounds were not urged before us. The appellants urged only two grounds, namely: there was no Section 5-A inquiry and the appellants were not given personal hearing regarding the objections filed by them; and secondly, the lands owned by them were liable to be exempted as the acquired lands were agricultural lands.
3. In Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998, the counsel for the appellants contended that though Section 5-A inquiry was mandatory, no such inquiry was conducted in the instant case and that after the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made, the award was passed within a short period and, therefore, the subsequent proceedings are illegal. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on the decision in Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad (1976) 3 SCC 719 wherein this Court held that personal hearing under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act is mandatory and does not rest on a person's demand for personal hearing.
4. Another decision relied on is Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 298. In that case, this Court held that the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to afford opportunity of being heard under Section 5-A of the Act is mandatory and that a decision by the Government on the objection, when the Collector afforded no opportunity of being heard to the objector, would not be proper. The power to hear the objection under Section 5-A is that of the Collector and not of the appropriate Government. Merely because the Government may not choose to accept the recommendation of the Land Acquisition Collector, even when he makes one, it cannot be said that he need not make the recommendation at all but leave it to the Government to decide the matter.
5. Similarly, in the decision in Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255 this Court observed that affording of opportunity of being heard to the objector during inquiry under Section 5-A is a must and that this provision embodies a just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being, or is intended to be, acquired, should have occasion to persuade the authorities concerned that his property be not touched for acquisition.
6. It is true that Section 5-A inquiry is an important stage in the acquisition proceedings and a person who is aware of Section 4(1) notification can raise objection to the effect that his property is not required for acquisition and he is also at liberty to raise the contention that the property is not required for any public purpose. It is also true, that the objector must also be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and any violation of the procedure prescribed under Section 5-A would seriously prejudice the rights of the owner of the property whose land is sought to be acquired. In the instant case, however, it is pertinent to note that the Collector had, in fact, conducted the Section 5-A inquiry, though there is no material on record to show that the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998 were heard in person. The facts and circumstances of Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998 clearly show that the objection raised by the appellants was considered and partly allowed by the Collector. About eight acres of land was sought to be acquired from the appellants as per the notification, but out of that, an extent of six acres was excluded from acquisition and only one-and-a-half acres of land was actually acquired by the authorities. This would clearly show that the objection filed by the appellants was considered by the Collector. Moreover, Section 6 declaration was made on 18-3-1992 and the award was passed on 15-3-1994. The appellants filed the writ petition only on 12-4-1994. In spite of the Section 6 declaration having been made on 18-3-1992, the appellants allowed the acquisition proceedings to go on until the award was passed. This fact clearly indicates that the appellants did not have a genuine grievance against Section 5-A inquiry held by the Collector. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment on the grounds now advanced by the appellants.
7. As regards Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1998, the appellants did not raise any objection within a reasonable time after Section 6 declaration was made. The possession of the land itself was given to the third parties for the purpose of starting the industry. Moreover, the land of the appellants is surrounded completely by other plots which are acquired and sought to be used for industrial purposes. We do not find any justifiable ground to exclude the appellants' lands from acquisition. The Division Bench has correctly held that the appellants were not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition.
8. In view of the above, we see no merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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