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Dr. Prabha Atri v. State Of U.P And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, an Anaesthetist at Kamla Nehru Memorial Hospital, Allahabad, was served with a memo on 5-1-1999 alleging that she left the hospital without notice when urgently required for an emergency surgery. She was asked to explain the lapse by 6-1-1999. Upon her failure to respond in writing, she was suspended on 8-1-1999 pending a domestic enquiry.
On receiving the suspension memo on 9-1-1999, the appellant sent a letter stating that she had verbally explained her illness and added that the memo was “uncalled for and should be withdrawn,” concluding: “If the foregoing is not acceptable to you then I have no option left but to tender my resignation with immediate effect.”
The hospital treated this as a resignation, accepted it the same day, and directed that the domestic enquiry be dropped. The appellant wrote on 14-1-1999 that she had never resigned and only indicated an intention to do so if her explanation were rejected. The hospital refused to reconsider (letter dated 16-1-1999).
The appellant filed Civil Misc. W.P. No. 13186 of 1999 before the Allahabad High Court, which was dismissed on 18-12-2001. She appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant’s letter dated 9-1-1999 constituted a valid and operative resignation or was merely an expression of intent contingent on how the hospital addressed her explanation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The 9-1-1999 letter did not amount to an unconditional resignation; it only expressed a possible resignation if her stand was not accepted.
- Under Rule 9 of the Hospital Service Rules a permanent employee must give three months’ notice or salary in lieu thereof—requirements absent in the instant case.
- The hospital misread the letter and seized an opportunity to terminate her services without due process.
Respondent Hospital's Arguments
- The language “I have no option left but to tender my resignation with immediate effect” is a clear, outright resignation intended to avoid disciplinary proceedings.
- The competent authority was within its rights to accept the resignation forthwith and discontinue the domestic enquiry.
- If the Supreme Court interferes, the hospital should retain liberty to resume the disciplinary proceedings from the stage they were at on 9-1-1999.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141 | A letter expressing resignation out of frustration, without clear intent to relinquish, does not amount to an operative resignation. | The Court likened the appellant’s letter to the threatened resignation in this case, concluding it lacked the spontaneity and unconditional intent necessary for a valid resignation. |
| Moti Ram v. Param Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725 | Defines “resignation” as spontaneous relinquishment and explains when it becomes effective (unilateral vs. bilateral acts). | Used to underscore that a resignation must be unconditional and accompanied by an act of relinquishment; the appellant’s letter did not meet this test. |
| Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301 | Distinguishes unilateral and bilateral resignations and when acceptance is necessary. | Cited to show that where the governing conditions render relinquishment bilateral, acceptance is essential; however, the Court found no genuine offer requiring acceptance in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court focused on whether the 9-1-1999 letter demonstrated an unconditional intent to relinquish office. Drawing from dictionary meanings and prior judgments, the Court held that:
- A valid resignation must be spontaneous, unconditional, and intended to operate immediately as a relinquishment of office.
- The appellant’s letter was written under duress of suspension and impending enquiry, using language that expressed frustration rather than a definite decision to resign.
- The phrase “with immediate effect” could not override the conditional nature of the statement, which was contingent on the hospital’s stance regarding her explanation.
- The hospital’s prompt acceptance did not transform the conditional statement into a completed act of resignation; instead, it evidenced an attempt to remove the appellant without fully considering her intent.
- The High Court erred by overlooking these contextual and legal nuances.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside. The hospital’s communication dated 9-1-1999 purporting to accept the appellant’s “resignation” is quashed.
Implications: The appellant’s employment relationship is restored to the status quo ante as of 9-1-1999. The hospital is, however, granted liberty to continue the disciplinary proceedings from the stage they had reached prior to the mistaken acceptance. The decision turns on factual interpretation of intent and does not establish new legal doctrine beyond reaffirming existing principles on resignation.
Raju, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellant, who was working as an Anaesthetist in Kamla Nehru Memorial Hospital, Allahabad, was issued with a memo dated 5-1-1999, bringing to her notice a lapse in that she left without informing even Dr Banerjee, when he requested her around 1300 hrs to give anaesthesia to one patient admitted in emergency with shock due to ruptured uterus, which needed urgent operation, and such conduct not only amounted to negligence as per Hospital Service Rule 10(i) but was also against medical ethics. She was also asked to submit her explanation by 5.00 p.m on 6-1-1999, failing which it would be taken that she accepted the lapse and the hospital would be at liberty to proceed against her as per the Service Rules. Since the appellant did not respond, on 8-1-1999 the appellant was placed under suspension with immediate effect, pending institution of a domestic enquiry pertaining to the above incident. On receipt of the said memo on 9-1-1999, the appellant replied to the Secretary of the hospital that she had already clarified her position verbally in his presence that on that day she was sick and very tired, that Dr Navneeta Banerjee also denied having made any complaint as such except writing for purposes of record about the incident and that formal reply in writing was not sent since she had already explained the position and nothing more was required. She further added in her letter as hereunder:
“Your letter is uncalled for and should be withdrawn. I have been working in this hospital since 10-5-1978 and have always worked in the best interest of the patients. It is tragic, instead of taking a lenient view of my sickness you have opted to punish me.
If the foregoing is not acceptable to you then I have no option left but to tender my resignation with immediate effect.”
3. Thereupon, by an order dated 9-1-1999, the appellant was informed that the suspension order could not be withdrawn since her explanation was not found to be satisfactory. A separate order dated 9-1-1999 was also said to have been passed as hereunder:
“Reference is invited to the letter dated 9-1-1999 of Dr Prabha Atri, Anaesthetist, vide which she has submitted her resignation … is accepted with immediate effect as requested. Dr P. Atri is advised to submit no-dues certificate as per the Hospital Service Rules so that her terminal benefits may be processed for payment.”
4. Yet another order was also said to have been passed on the same day wherein after adverting to the acceptance of the resignation, it has been stated that the domestic enquiry ordered on 8-1-1999 to enquire into the incident pertaining to Dr Atri should not be proceeded with. In response to the same in her letter dated 14-1-1999, the appellant stated that she never resigned and not only she nowhere stated that she is resigning but unnecessarily something has been read between the lines. Reiterating her stand that she had not resigned but had shown only an intention to resign, the appellant requested for rectifying the mistaken understanding of her earlier letter by taking necessary steps in the correct perspective. The Secretary of the hospital by his communication dated 16-1-1999 reiterated the correctness of the action taken and declined to reconsider the matter.
5. Thereupon, the appellant filed Civil Misc. WP No. 13186 of 1999 before the High Court of Allahabad, but without success and has come up before this Court challenging the order dated 18-12-2001 of the High Court, declining to interfere and dismissing the writ petition.
6. Heard Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, and Mr Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents.
7. The only question that mainly requires to be considered is as to whether the letter dated 9-1-1999 could be construed to mean or amounted to a letter of resignation or merely an expression of her intention to resign, if her claims in respect of the alleged lapse are not viewed favourably. Rule 9 of the Hospital Service Rules provided for resignation or abandonment of service by an employee. It is stated therein that a permanent employee is required to give three months' notice of resignation in writing to the appointing authority or three months' salary in lieu of notice and that he/she may be required to serve the period for such notice. In case of non-compliance with the above, the employee concerned is not only liable to pay an amount equal to three months' salary but such amount shall be realizable from the dues, if any, of the employee lying with the hospital. In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edn.) Vol. 37, at p. 476, it is found stated that:
“To constitute a ‘resignation’, it must be unconditional and with an intent to operate as such. There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. It is to give back, to give up in a formal manner, an office.”
At p. 474 of the very same book, it is found stated: “Statements by club's President and corresponding Secretary that they would resign, if constant bickering among members did not cease, constituted merely threatened offers, not tenders, of their resignations.” It is also stated therein that “A ‘resignation’ of a public office to be effective must be made with an intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by an act of relinquishment.” In the ordinary dictionary sense, the word “resignation” was considered to mean the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right, as conveyed by the maxim: Resignatio est juris proprii spontanea refutatio (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn.). In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 77, p. 311, it is found stated:
“It has been said that ‘resignation’ is a term of legal art, having legal connotations which describe certain legal results. It is characteristically, the voluntary surrender of a position by the one resigning, made freely and not under duress and the word is defined generally as meaning the act of resigning or giving up, as a claim, possession or position.”
8. In P.K Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India (1984) 2 SCC 141 this Court had an occasion to consider the nature and character of a letter written by one of the petitioners in that case who after stating in the letter that he has been all along patiently waiting for the redressal of his grievance, yet justice has not been done to him and
“as such, after showing so much patience in the matter, I am sorry to decide that I should resign from the membership of the Faculty in protest against such a treatment and against the discrimination and victimization shown to me by the Head of the Division in the allotment of students of 1968 and 1969 batches and departmental candidates”.
In that context, this Court observed that the callous and heartless attitude of the Academic Council in seizing an opportunity to get rid of him by treating the said letter to be a letter of resignation when really he was all along making representations seeking justice to him and
out of exasperation the said person wrote that letter stating that the only honourable course left open to him was to resign rather than suffer.
In Moti Ram v. Param Dev (1993) 2 SCC 725 this Court observed as hereunder:
“16. As pointed out by this Court, ‘resignation’ means the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right and in relation to an office, it connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. It has been held that in the general juristic sense, in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation there must be the intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment. It has also been observed that the act of relinquishment may take different forms or assume a unilateral or bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office and the conditions governing it. (See: Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra (1978) 2 SCC 301.) If the act of relinquishment is of unilateral character, it comes into effect when such act indicating the intention to relinquish the office is communicated to the competent authority. The authority to whom the act of relinquishment is communicated is not required to take any action and the relinquishment takes effect from the date of such communication where the resignation is intended to operate in praesenti. A resignation may also be prospective to be operative from a future date and in that event it would take effect from the date indicated therein and not from the date of communication. In cases where the act of relinquishment is of a bilateral character, the communication of the intention to relinquish, by itself, would not be sufficient to result in relinquishment of the office and some action is required to be taken on such communication of the intention to relinquish, e.g, acceptance of the said request to relinquish the office, and in such a case the relinquishment does not become effective or operative till such action is taken. As to whether the act of relinquishment of an office is unilateral or bilateral in character would depend upon the nature of the office and the conditions governing it.”
9. In traversing the contention on behalf of the appellant that the letter in question dated 9-1-1999 could not be construed as a letter of resignation, on behalf of the respondent hospital authorities it is strenuously contended that such a letter coming from the appellant in the teeth of suspension order and proposed domestic enquiry expressing a desire to tender resignation and that too with immediate effect, cannot but be a resignation outright and simpliciter to avoid facing disciplinary proceedings and that, therefore, the competent authority acted well within its rights in treating it to be a resignation and accepting the same forthwith and as a consequence thereof, directing further not to proceed with the domestic enquiry already ordered. Finally, it has been submitted that if this Court is pleased to interfere in the matter the right of the hospital authorities to pursue the disciplinary action already initiated from the stage at which it stood on the date of acceptance of the resignation should not be jeopardized and liberty may be granted in this regard.
10. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side, in the light of the materials and principles, noticed supra. This is not a case where it is required to consider as to whether the relinquishment envisaged under the rules and conditions of service is unilateral or bilateral in character but whether the letter dated 9-1-1999 could be treated or held to be a letter of resignation or relinquishment of the office, so as to sever her services once and for all. The letter cannot be construed, in our view, to convey any spontaneous intention to give up or relinquish her office accompanied by any act of relinquishment. To constitute a “resignation”, it must be unconditional and with an intention to operate as such. At best, as observed by this Court in the decision in P.K Ramachandra Iyer (1984) 2 SCC 141 it may amount to a threatened offer more on account of exasperation, to resign on account of a feeling of frustration born out of an idea that she was being harassed unnecessarily but not, at any rate, amounting to a resignation, actual and simple. The appellant had put in about two decades of service in the hospital, that she was placed under suspension and exposed to disciplinary proceedings and proposed domestic enquiry and she had certain benefits flowing to her benefit, if she resigns but yet the letter dated 9-1-1999 does not seek for any of those things to be settled or the disciplinary proceedings being scrapped as a sequel to her so-called resignation. The words “with immediate effect” in the said letter could not be given undue importance dehors the context, tenor of language used and the purport as well as the remaining portion of the letter indicating the circumstances in which it was written. That the management of the hospital took up such action forthwith, as a result of acceptance of the resignation is not of much significance in ascertaining the true or real intention of the letter written by the appellant on 9-1-1999. Consequently, it appears to be reasonable to view that as in the case reported in P.K Ramachandra Iyer (1984) 2 SCC 141 the respondents have seized an opportunity to get rid of the appellant the moment they got the letter dated 9-1-1999, without due or proper consideration of the matter in a right perspective or understanding of the contents thereof. The High Court also seems to have completely lost sight of these vital aspects in rejecting the writ petition.
11. For all the reasons stated above, the order of the High Court under challenge in this appeal is set aside and the appeals are allowed. The communication dated 9-1-1999 purporting to accept a non-existent resignation is set aside. But, the respondent hospital authorities shall be at liberty to pursue the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her in accordance with law. No costs.
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