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R. Kapilnath (Dead) Through Lr. v. Krishna .
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns a residential house (CTS Nos. 936 and 939, Ward II, Hubli) owned by a temple that is not under State management. Late Shankarbhat, the temple’s pujari and manager, inducted the appellant as a tenant. By a registered deed of adoption, Shankarbhat adopted the present respondent, who now serves as pujari, manager, and rent collector. In 1986 the respondent filed an eviction suit under Section 21(1)(h) & (p) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. The Munsiff’s Court rejected the ground under clause (h) but granted eviction under clause (p) on the finding that the appellant had built or acquired a suitable alternative residence. The appellant’s revisions before the Ist Additional District Judge (1995) and the High Court under Section 115 CPC were dismissed. The tenant then approached the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1994—by deleting the words “under the management of the State Government” in Section 2(7)—ousted the jurisdiction of the Munsiff’s Court in pending eviction proceedings concerning premises belonging to a religious institution.
- Whether an eviction petition filed by a person who claims to be both owner and landlord is maintainable under Section 21(1)(p) when his proven status is only that of landlord/rent collector.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The 1994 Amendment exempted all premises belonging to religious institutions from the Act, thereby divesting the Munsiff’s Court of jurisdiction; consequently, all proceedings before that court were a nullity.
- The respondent claimed ownership of the premises, which is inconsistent with being merely a landlord; therefore, his eviction action should fail.
The opinion does not set out the respondent’s arguments in detail.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
On the 1994 Amendment and Jurisdiction: The Court treated the amendment as prospective because the statute fixed 18 May 1994 as its commencement date and contained no language indicating retrospectivity. By that date, the trial proceedings had concluded and the matter was in revision; hence the forum question did not affect the concluded trial. Citing the general principle that a change of forum does not disturb pending actions absent express legislative direction, the Court held the Munsiff’s decree valid. Additionally, the appellant had not timely raised a jurisdictional objection before the District Judge, High Court, or in the original special-leave petition; raising it belatedly was impermissible.
On the Status of the Respondent as Landlord: Section 3(h) defines “landlord” to include any person entitled to receive rent on behalf of another. The respondent, acknowledged as rent collector, squarely fell within that definition. Even if his ownership claim failed, his established landlord status sufficed to maintain an eviction action under Section 21(1)(p). The Court emphasized that a plaintiff who proves a lesser right than claimed is still entitled to relief if that lesser right supports the remedy.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
The eviction decree stands affirmed. Execution is stayed for four months on the conditions that the appellant (i) clears all rent arrears and (ii) files an undertaking within three weeks to deliver vacant possession after the grace period, while paying rent punctually in the interim. The judgment clarifies that the 1994 Amendment to the Karnataka Rent Control Act operates prospectively and that rent collectors of religious institutions remain “landlords” entitled to seek eviction under Section 21(1)(p). No new precedent is set beyond these clarifications.
R.C Lahoti, J.— The suit premises are a residential house comprised in CTSs Nos. 936 and 939 of Ward II of Hubli city. The premises are owned by a temple — a religious institution but not under the management of the State Government. The adoptive father of the respondent, late Shankarbhat, was the pujari and manager of the temple. The appellant was inducted as a tenant in the suit premises by late Shankarbhat. Shankarbhat has, through a registered deed of adoption, adopted the respondent as his son who is presently the pujari and manager of the temple. The appellant has been paying rent to the respondent. It is not in doubt, nor in dispute, that whatever be the ownership of the suit premises the respondent is certainly the rent collector.
2. The respondent claiming himself to be the owner of the premises filed a suit for eviction of the appellant tenant on the grounds available under clauses (h) and (p) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter “the Act” for short). Availability of ground under clause (h) has been negated while the Court of Munsiff upheld the entitlement of the respondent to a decree under clause (p). The appellant preferred a revision before the Ist Additional District Judge, Dharwad under Section 50(2) of the Act and subsequently a revision petition to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Both have been dismissed confirming the decree for eviction under clause (p) abovesaid. The finding arrived at by all the courts is that the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession of a suitable building. The tenant has preferred the present appeal by special leave.
3. The principal submission of Ms Kiran Suri, the learned counsel for the appellant, centres around an amendment made in the Act by Karnataka Act 32 of 1994. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit premises belong to a temple which is a religious institution. The Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 was enacted inter alia to control evictions of tenants. The Act has a wide application. However, sub-section (7) of Section 2 provides that nothing in this Act shall apply to certain premises specified in the several clauses therein. One of the categories of the premises, excepted from the application of the Act, was “any premises belonging to a religious or charitable institution under the management of the State Government”. By the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act 32 of 1994) which came into force with effect from 18-5-1994, the words “under the management of the State Government” were deleted. The effect of the amendment is that while earlier only the premises belonging to a religious or charitable institution under the management of the State Government were exempted from the operation of the Act, now subsequent to the amendment, the scope of excepted category has been enlarged so as to cover all premises belonging to a religious or charitable institution without regard to the fact whether they are under the management of the State Government or not. The proceedings for eviction of a tenant under Section 21 of the Act are maintainable in a court which, as defined in clause (d) of Section 3, is the Court of Munsiff. So far as the suit premises are concerned, the proceedings were initiated in the year 1986 in the Court of Munsiff. Revision petition before the Additional District Judge was filed in the year 1990 and came to be decided on 14-9-1995. During the pendency of the revision, the 1994 Amendment came into force. The effect of the amendment is that the suit premises were taken out of the operation of the Act and therefore the Munsiff lost jurisdiction to try a case for eviction over such premises. The learned Additional District Judge ought to have taken note of this change in law and directed the proceedings held before the Munsiff to be a nullity for want of jurisdiction in view of the change in law.
4. The above submission of the learned counsel has been stated only to be rejected. It is pertinent to note that the proceedings in the Court of Munsiff had already stood concluded by the time the amendment came into force. It is not disputed that Amendment Act 32 of 1994 has not been given a retrospective operation and there is nothing in the Act to infer retrospectivity by necessary implication. The Act has been specifically brought into force w.e.f the 18th day of May, 1994. The learned counsel for the appellant cited a number of decisions laying down the law as to how an amendment in legislation brought into force during the pendency of legal proceedings has to be given effect to. Without stating the decisions so cited, suffice it to observe that all those decisions deal with substantive rights having been created or abolished during the pendency of legal proceedings and depending on the legislative intent and the language employed by the legislature in the relevant enactment, this Court has determined the impact of the legislation on pending proceedings and the power of the court to take note of change in law and suitably mould the relief consistently with the legislative changes. So far as the present case is concerned, the only submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the effect of the amendment is to deprive the Court of Munsiff of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the proceedings for eviction over such premises as the suit premises are. In other words, it is a change in forum brought during the pendency of the proceedings. The correct approach to be adopted in such cases is that a new law bringing about a change in forum does not affect pending actions, unless a provision is made in it for changeover of proceedings or there is some other clear indication that pending actions are affected. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P Singh, 8th Edn., 2001, p. 442.) We have already indicated that the Act does not bring about a change in forum so far as the pending actions are concerned. Moreover, by the time the amendment came into force, the proceedings before the Munsiff had already stood concluded and the case was pending at the stage of revision before the Additional District Judge. Further, we find that an objection laying challenge to the forum's competence was not raised before the learned Additional District Judge nor was the objection taken before the High Court in the civil revision preferred by the appellant. It was not taken as a ground in the special leave petition. It has been taken only by way of a separate petition filed subsequently and seeking leave to urge additional grounds. Such an objection cannot be allowed to be urged so belatedly. However, we have already held the argument based on the 1994 Amendment as of no merit.
5. It was next submitted that though a petition for eviction under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act can be filed by a landlord and it is not necessary that he must also be the owner of the premises, yet it is necessary that the petitioner must claim himself to be only a landlord and not an owner. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent has claimed himself to be the owner of the premises which claim is inconsistent with his being a mere rent collector on behalf of the temple and so the claim for eviction at his instance should have been refused. This submission too is wholly devoid of any merit. A petition for recovery of possession of any premises can be filed by the landlord against the tenant within the meaning of Section 21(1). Clause (h) of Section 3 includes in the meaning of “landlord” any person who is for the time being receiving or entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person etc. It cannot be doubted nor has it been disputed that the respondent is “landlord” within the meaning of Section 3(h) abovesaid. Though the respondent claimed himself to be an owner also so long as he has been found to be a landlord he is entitled to maintain the action for eviction under Section 21(1)(p). The plaintiff or the petitioner may claim a higher right and may succeed in proving only a smaller right or entitlement to relief but that would not result in disentitling the plaintiff or the petitioner from succeeding so long as the smaller right successfully substantiated by him is enough in law to entitle him to a relief against the defendant.
6. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is held to be devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed with costs throughout. The decree for execution shall not be available for execution for a period of four months from today subject to the appellant clearing all the arrears of rent and filing the usual undertaking — both within a period of three weeks from today — for delivering vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent landlord on the expiry of the said period of four months and continuing to clear the arrears falling due month by month till then.
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