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Mohd. Hoshan, A.P And Another v. State Of A.P .
Factual and Procedural Background
The deceased, Razwana Parveen, was married to the first appellant on 26-4-1987 and lived in the matrimonial home shared with the second appellant (her mother-in-law). On 9-3-1988, within eleven months of marriage, she allegedly poured kerosene on herself and suffered burn injuries in the presence of the appellants. She was admitted to Osmania General Hospital, where she died on 12-3-1988.
A dying declaration (Ex. P-2) was recorded by a Magistrate (PW-1) in the presence of a doctor (PW-11). The prosecution also relied on statements of family members (PWs 3–7) describing continuous taunting and dowry-related harassment.
The Sessions Court acquitted the appellants of charges under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498-A IPC, finding the evidence unreliable. On the State’s appeal, the High Court upheld the acquittal under Section 304-B but reversed the acquittal on Sections 306 and 498-A, convicting and sentencing each appellant to two years’ rigorous imprisonment, sentences to run concurrently. The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court; the State did not appeal against the continued acquittal under Section 304-B.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s acquittal and convicting the appellants under Sections 306 (abetment of suicide) and 498-A (cruelty) IPC.
- Whether the dying declaration (Ex. P-2) and supporting witness testimony were reliable and sufficient to establish continuous mental cruelty amounting to abetment of suicide.
- Whether, in the circumstances, the sentence imposed required modification.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The High Court impermissibly interfered with a reasoned acquittal merely because it could take a different view of the evidence.
- The Sessions Court’s doubts about the authenticity and admissibility of the dying declaration and witnesses’ credibility were proper and should have been respected.
State’s Arguments
- The High Court correctly appreciated the evidence, particularly the duly attested dying declaration, and rightly found continuous cruelty leading to suicide.
- The trial court’s reasons for rejecting key evidence were manifestly erroneous, warranting appellate reversal.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasised that cruelty is a question of fact varying with individual sensitivity, social background and endurance. It endorsed the High Court’s finding that sustained taunts and harassment over appearance, cooking and dowry constituted mental cruelty severe enough to provoke suicide.
Key analytical steps included:
- Assessment of dying declaration (Ex. P-2): Unlike the trial court, the Supreme Court accepted the High Court's reliance on the declaration. It noted that the Magistrate recorded it in question-and-answer form, obtained the doctor’s contemporaneous certification of the victim’s fitness, and explained the contents to her before taking a thumb impression.
- Credibility of witnesses (PWs 3–7): The Court considered their testimony trustworthy; minor contradictions did not detract from the core narrative of cruelty and demands for dowry.
- Error of the Sessions Court: The acquitting court’s view was deemed unreasonable because it overstated minor discrepancies and undervalued material evidence.
- Standard for appellate interference with acquittal: When the initial view is demonstrably unreasonable, the appellate court is entitled to reverse it.
- Sentence: Given the lapse of time (incident in 1988), the appellants’ two months already spent in custody, the second appellant’s age (around 60), and the fact that both were on bail, the Court found further incarceration unwarranted.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC but reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. The appeal was otherwise dismissed and bail bonds were cancelled.
Implications: The decision maintains the High Court’s finding that persistent mental cruelty can constitute abetment of suicide, reinforcing judicial readiness to rely on properly recorded dying declarations. However, no new legal precedent was expressly formulated; the primary impact is confined to the parties, sparing them additional imprisonment while leaving the convictions intact.
Shivaraj V. Patil, J.— It is yet another unfortunate case of a young girl of 18 years whose all hopes and aspirations to live a happy married life were burnt and destroyed by the burn injuries caused by herself to end her life when the appellants subjected her to cruelty and abetted the commission of suicide by her within 11 months after marriage.
2. The appellants were tried for offences under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge, after trial acquitted them of all the charges giving benefit of doubt. On appeal, the High Court while confirming the order of acquittal under Section 304-B IPC, set aside the order of acquittal recorded under Sections 306 and 498-A and convicted and sentenced them to two years' rigorous imprisonment each for the said offences making the sentences to run concurrently. Thus, aggrieved by this judgment and order of the High Court, the appellants have filed this appeal before this Court. The State has not filed any appeal against the order of the High Court confirming the order acquitting the appellants for the offence under Section 304-B IPC.
3. The prosecution case as projected during the trial is that Appellant 1 is the son of Appellant 2. The deceased Razwana Parveen was married to Appellant 1 on 26-4-1987. Mohammed Allauddin Asir Mansoori (PW 3), Allauddin Mansoori (PW 4) and Rahman Bee (PW 5) are the brother, father and the mother of the deceased respectively. On 9-3-1988 at about 9.30 p.m, the deceased sustained burn injuries in the house of the appellants where she was living. She was shifted to Osmania General Hospital at Hyderabad. She died at 11.00 a.m on 12-3-1988 due to burn injuries. It was alleged by the prosecution that the deceased committed suicide because of cruel treatment of the appellants after her marriage and that the appellants were demanding dowry from her.
4. There is no direct evidence to establish the case of the prosecution. The prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of PWs 3 to 7, dying declaration (Ext. P-2) recorded by the Magistrate V. Surender Rao (PW 1) and Ext. P-12, report made to the Head Constable.
5. The learned Sessions Judge, finding some minor contradictions in Exts. P-2 and P-12, and that Ext. P-2 was not recorded in the language in which the dying declaration was made, rejected it stating that much weight could not be given to it. He also doubted whether the deceased was in a fit condition to make such a dying declaration. The learned trial Judge did not accept the case of the prosecution that scolding and taunting of the deceased by the appellants for not preparing proper food or that she was not good-looking was not (sic) such a cruelty so as to push her to commit suicide. For no good reasons, the trial court did not accept the evidence of PWs 3 to 7. The High Court, on reappreciation of the evidence objectively and on dislodging the reasons given by the trial court for acquittal, convicted and sentenced the appellants. The High Court held that the trial court was wrong in rejecting Ext. P-2, the dying declaration recorded by PW 1, the Magistrate, particularly when it was attested by the doctor on duty, PW 11. The High Court has noticed that Surender Rao, PW 1, the Magistrate has testified that on 10-3-1988 he recorded the dying declaration between 2.46 a.m to 3.15 a.m He has certified that he had signed it and had taken the endorsement of the doctor on duty that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make a statement; the deceased had made the dying declaration in question-answer form in Urdu and he had translated the version and recorded the declaration in English. After recording her statement, he explained the statement in Hindi to the deceased who admitted its correctness. Thereafter, he took the thumb impression of the deceased on her declaration (Ext. P-2). In cross-examination, he has stated that he could read and speak in Hindi; the deceased had made statement in Urdu which he could understand as Urdu and Hindi languages are almost similar and in Hyderabad, Urdu and Hindi languages are spoken in the same way, there being not much difference. PW 11 Dr Vidya Sagar corroborated the statement of PW 1 to the effect that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make statement and that he was present when the statement was recorded by the Magistrate. The High Court also did not agree with the reasoning of the trial court that the comment or taunting for not preparing good food was not a serious thing so as to say that the appellants treated the deceased with cruelty which made her to commit suicide. The High Court observed based on evidence that continuous taunting and teasing led the deceased to such a situation where she had been disgusted and went to the extent of pouring kerosene on herself and burning. The High Court observed that continuous mental cruelty practised on the deceased was a grave and serious provocation for an ordinary Indian woman to do what the deceased had done in burning herself.
6. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact. The impact of complaints, accusations or taunts on a person amounting to cruelty depends on various factors like the sensitivity of the individual victim concerned, the social background, the environment, education etc. Further, mental cruelty varies from person to person depending on the intensity of sensitivity and the degree of courage or endurance to withstand such mental cruelty. In other words, each case has to be decided on its own facts to decide whether the mental cruelty was established or not. The High Court in the present case, having regard to the facts found and circumstances stated, rightly concluded that the continuous taunting or teasing the deceased by the appellants on one ground or the other amounted to mental cruelty drawing her to end her life. As found by the learned Sessions Judge, out of 11 months of married life, the deceased was forced to live in her parents' house and could live with her husband for a period of two months in different spells. The High Court also took note of the fact that the appellants did not try to save the deceased although they were present when the burn injuries were caused to her.
7. We are not impressed by the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court committed an error in reversing the order of acquittal made by the trial court merely because the High Court could take a different view and that the reasons given by the Sessions Court for recording acquittal of the appellants were proper. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State made submissions supporting the impugned judgment and order.
8. Having regard to the evidence brought on record and looking to the reasons recorded by the High Court as indicated in the foregoing paragraphs, we are of the view that the trial court committed manifest error in disbelieving the dying declaration (Ext. P-2) and the evidence of PWs 3 to 7. We have no hesitation in holding that the view taken by the trial court in acquitting the appellants was not a reasonable and justifiable view which could have been taken looking to the evidence keeping in view the well-settled principles. The High Court, in our opinion, was right and justified in reversing the order of acquittal and convicting and sentencing the appellants for the offences under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC. We find no good reason to interfere with the same. However, we think it just and appropriate to modify the sentence of imprisonment for the period already undergone and order accordingly having regard to the fact that both the appellants were in imprisonment for about two months; the incident took place on 9-3-1988; Appellant 2 is the mother of Appellant 1 and she is aged 60 years; both the appellants are on bail and it may not be appropriate to send them to jail again. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. The bail bonds stand cancelled.
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