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Kanhaiyalal And Others v. Anupkumar And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The litigation originates from suits filed in 1972. The trial court and, on first appeal, the District Court arrived at concurrent findings of fact in favour of one party. The losing side then filed second appeals before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
On 21-11-1990 the High Court heard arguments and reserved judgment. Nearly two and a half years later, on 07-05-1993, it delivered judgments allowing the second appeals and reversing the concurrent findings below. The High Court’s written judgments, however, did not record or formulate any “substantial question of law,” which is a statutory prerequisite for deciding a second appeal under Section 100 CPC.
The aggrieved parties sought relief before the Supreme Court of India, challenging both the absence of a formulated substantial question of law and the delay between hearing and pronouncement of the High Court’s judgments.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a High Court may reverse concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal without explicitly formulating and addressing a substantial question of law as mandated by Section 100 CPC.
- Whether an inordinate delay (over two years) between the hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment renders the High Court’s decision unsustainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents’ Arguments
- Although the impugned judgments did not expressly set out a substantial question of law, such a question could be inferred because the trial and first-appellate findings were allegedly “perverse,” and perversity itself constitutes a substantial question of law.
- The Madhya Pradesh High Court allegedly follows a practice of framing substantial questions of law in a separate order-sheet at the time of admission, even if the final judgment omits to reproduce them.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 | Under Section 100 CPC, the High Court must formulate a substantial question of law before disturbing findings of fact. | Relied upon to hold that the High Court’s omission to frame such a question invalidates its judgment. |
| Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 | High Court’s jurisdiction in second appeal is confined to substantial questions of law; it cannot interfere with pure findings of fact without such a question. | Cited to reinforce that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating facts without a formulated legal question. |
| Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591 | Mere long possession does not convert permissive possession into adverse possession without clear evidence of hostile animus. | Referenced within the quotation from Roop Singh to illustrate proper fact-finding that the High Court should not have disturbed. |
| Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani v. HPA International (2000) 2 SCC 13 | Long delay in delivery of judgment may justify setting it aside and remitting the matter. | Used as an additional ground for setting aside the High Court judgments due to the 2½-year delay between hearing and pronouncement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court began by reiterating the statutory scheme of Section 100 CPC: a second appeal must (i) identify a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal, (ii) have that question formulated by the High Court, and (iii) be decided only on the question so framed. Examining the impugned judgments, the Court found no indication that any such question had been formulated or addressed.
The Court rejected the respondents’ contention that a substantial question could be gleaned implicitly from allegations of “perversity.” Citing Ishwar Dass Jain and Roop Singh, it held that express formulation is mandatory and that a High Court cannot bypass this step even if it suspects factual findings are perverse.
Separately, the Court noted the significant lapse—arguments concluded in November 1990 but judgment was pronounced only in May 1993. Relying on Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani, it observed that such a delay undermines confidence in the adjudicatory process and, by itself, constitutes a ground to set aside the judgment.
Because both defects—the lack of a formulated substantial question of law and the inordinate delay—went to the root of the High Court’s jurisdiction and the fairness of the proceeding, the Supreme Court concluded that the impugned judgments were unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Judgment: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgments, allowed the civil appeals, and remitted the second appeals to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
Implications: The High Court must now rehear the second appeals, first formulating the specific substantial questions of law and then deciding the matter expeditiously. No new substantive legal precedent was created; rather, the Court reinforced existing principles governing second-appeal jurisdiction and timely delivery of judgments. The High Court has been requested to conclude the remanded appeals within six months of receiving the Supreme Court’s order.
Order
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. The impugned judgments were passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in second appeals reversing the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Though the High Court elaborately considered the contentions and the evidence placed on record, the impugned judgments do not reflect or indicate as to what was the substantial question of law that arose for consideration between the parties, as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, in support of the impugned judgment, contended that though substantial question of law was not specifically stated in the impugned judgment, it can be made out from the very judgment that the findings recorded by the trial court and the first appellate court were perverse and perversity itself was a substantial question of law for disturbing the findings of fact recorded by the courts below. He also added that in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, there is a practice that substantial question of law is separately framed at the time of admission in the order sheet. We may notice one more fact that the arguments were heard by the High Court and the appeals were reserved for judgment on 21-11-1990. The High Court pronounced the impugned judgments as late as on 7-5-1993 allowing the appeals, interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the courts below.
4. In a second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal as required under sub-section (3). Where the High Court is satisfied that in any case a substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that question under sub-section (4). The second appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5).
5. The impugned judgments do not indicate any substantial question of law formulated and that the second appeals were heard on any substantial question of law.
6. This Court has taken the view in cases more than one that in second appeals, substantial question or questions of law must arise for consideration and the appeals are to be heard on the substantial questions of law so formulated.
7. In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 this Court, in para 10, has stated thus:
“10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so.”
Yet again, in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
“7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact-finding courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession. (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591.) Hence, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. In the light of what is stated above, in our view, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained. Further, as stated above, the arguments were heard in November 1990 and the High Court pronounced the judgments on 7-5-1993. This Court in Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani v. HPA International (2000) 2 SCC 13 dealing with the contention that the long delay in delivery of judgment is sufficient to set aside the judgment under appeal without going into this broad question, set aside the judgment under appeal on the ground of delay in delivery of judgment without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and remitted the case to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits. While doing so this Court observed:
“However, it is correct to this extent that a long delay in delivery of judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculations in the minds of parties to a case. Moreover, the appellants whose appeals have been dismissed by the High Court may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at the Bar have not been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgment — nearly after five years. … We, therefore, on this short question, set aside the judgment under appeal….”
In this view also the judgments of the High Court under challenge cannot be sustained.
9. In the circumstances, the impugned judgments are set aside. The appeals are allowed. We remit these matters to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations made above.
10. Taking note of the fact that the suits are of the year 1972, we request the High Court to dispose of the second appeals within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.
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