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Khatoon Nisa v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion consolidates several matters decided together by the Supreme Court of India. The principal set of appeals arose from proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Landholdings Act, 1960. After the Act came into force, the prescribed authority treated the agricultural holdings of Rahmatullah and the land recorded in the name of his alleged divorced wife, Smt. Khatoon Nisa, as a single “family” unit under Section 3(7) for ceiling purposes. Both spouses claimed they had been divorced since 1969 and that their lands could not be clubbed. The prescribed authority rejected the alleged divorce as a subterfuge and was upheld by the appellate authority. A writ petition under Article 226 to the Allahabad High Court followed, where the learned Single Judge not only affirmed the ceiling orders but also declared that a divorce pronounced by uttering “talaq” three times in one sitting was unconstitutional. Certificates were granted, resulting in the present civil appeals.
Additional criminal appeals dealt with maintenance awarded to a divorced Muslim woman under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) after the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Magistrate, having found no valid divorce “in the eye of law,” awarded maintenance; that finding and the maintenance order were affirmed by the High Court and then challenged before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Rahmatullah and Smt. Khatoon Nisa were legally divorced in 1969, so that their respective landholdings could not be clubbed under Section 3(7) of the U.P. Ceiling Act.
- Whether, in writ jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court was justified in examining and declaring unconstitutional the practice of dissolving a Muslim marriage by pronouncing “talaq” three times in one sitting.
- Whether a Magistrate retains jurisdiction under Section 125 CrPC to grant maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman after the 1986 Muslim Women Act, particularly when Section 5 of that Act has not been invoked.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The High Court exceeded the permissible limits of certiorari jurisdiction by adjudicating on the constitutional validity of triple talaq instead of confining itself to errors apparent on the record of the ceiling authorities.
- The findings of the prescribed and appellate authorities under the Ceiling Act were allegedly unsupported by admissible evidence, warranting interference.
- In the criminal appeals, counsel for the appellants accepted liability to pay maintenance but disputed the Magistrate’s finding that no valid divorce had occurred.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740 | Upheld validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 by reading down its provisions; recognised that Magistrates (or courts under the Act) continue to have power to grant maintenance to divorced Muslim women, with parameters akin to Section 125 CrPC. | The Court relied on Danial Latifi to affirm that, even without invoking Section 5 of the 1986 Act, a Magistrate’s power to award maintenance survives; hence the maintenance orders challenged in the criminal appeals required no interference. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Civil Ceiling Appeals: The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not have ventured into the constitutional question of triple talaq because such an inquiry was unnecessary for reviewing the orders of the ceiling authorities. Nevertheless, on the merits, the prescribed authority’s conclusion—that no genuine divorce had taken place and that the spouses formed a single family unit under Section 3(7)—was based on relevant evidence, including entries in the officially maintained family register. Finding no legal error apparent on the record, the Court declined to issue a writ of certiorari.
Criminal Maintenance Appeals: Referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Danial Latifi, the Court noted that a Magistrate retains power to grant maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman, with considerations mirroring those under Section 125 CrPC. Because the appellants did not contest the quantum of maintenance and the Magistrate possessed jurisdiction irrespective of Section 5 of the 1986 Act, the Court found no cause to disturb the maintenance order. The factual finding about the parties’ marital status was deemed unnecessary to re-examine, as it served only to establish jurisdiction under Section 125 CrPC.
Holding and Implications
DISPOSED OF – All civil and criminal appeals, as well as the connected writ petition and applications, were disposed of. In the ceiling matters, the Supreme Court upheld the determination that the lands of Rahmatullah and Smt. Khatoon Nisa are to be clubbed for ceiling purposes. In the criminal matters, the maintenance awarded to the divorced Muslim woman under Section 125 CrPC remains undisturbed.
Implications: The decision leaves intact the ceiling authorities’ methodology for computing surplus land and confirms that Magistrates retain jurisdiction to grant maintenance to divorced Muslim women despite the 1986 Act. The Court expressly declined to pronounce on the constitutional validity of triple talaq in these proceedings, signalling that the question remains open for adjudication in an appropriate case.
Order
1. These two appeals are directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, by grant of certificate from the said judgment. The two appeals are filed by the ceiling surplus tenure-holder and his wife and one of the disputes was whether there has been a divorce between them as early as in the year 1969.
2. After coming into force of the U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Landholdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), before the prescribed authority, the tenure-holder took a stand that the land recorded in the name of his wife who has already been divorced since 1969 cannot be clubbed. The wife also took a similar stand. Section 3(7) of the Act defines the expression “family” in relation to a tenure-holder to mean himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as the case may be, (other than a judicially separated wife or husband), minor sons and minor daughters (other than married daughters). Since the prescribed authority was required to determine the ceiling surplus in the hands of the tenure-holder, one of the questions for consideration was whether in fact there has been a divorce between the tenure-holder and his wife as claimed by them or was it merely a subterfuge to get over the rigours of the provisions of the Ceiling Act. On the basis of materials produced before it, the prescribed authority came to the conclusion that in fact there had been no divorce and the parties adopted divorce attempts for escaping the ceiling law. The said prescribed authority also came to the conclusion that there was no other document excepting the family register kept with the Pradhan, where the wife and the husband have been entered separately. In fact the prescribed authority gave due weight to the family register which had been kept with the Rural Development Officer who was the competent authority to issue the family register. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, the prescribed authority concluded that the land standing in the name of Khatoon Nisa, wife of Rahmatullah, the tenure-holder, has to be clubbed with the holding of the tenure-holder, inasmuch as they come within the definition of the “family” under Section 3(7) of the Act.
3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the prescribed authority, both Shri Rahmatullah and his wife, Smt Khatoon Nisa, preferred appeals under Section 13 of the Act and the Appellate Authority affirmed the conclusion arrived at by the prescribed authority and came to the conclusion that there has been no error committed by the prescribed authority in treating the appellant being members of the same family for the purpose of the provisions of the Act. The two appeals thus having been dismissed, the matter was carried to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Judge of the High Court, without being guided by the parameters for exercise of power under Article 226 against an order of an inferior Tribunal, went on to examine the issue as to whether there can be a divorce under the Muslim law by uttering three times the word “talak” in one sitting and having elaborately delved into the same came to the conclusion that such “talak” is unconstitutional and cannot be sustained. Having thus come to the aforesaid conclusion, the Court affirmed the conclusion of the prescribed authority under the Ceiling Act in the matter of determination of the surplus land in the hands of the tenure-holder. The Court having granted certificate against the judgment, the appeals came to be filed.
4. Dr Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the High Court while exercising its power of supervisory jurisdiction of a writ of certiorari is called upon to examine the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the inferior Tribunal and will be justified in interfering with those conclusions if the inferior Tribunal either has admitted inadmissible evidence under consideration or has rejected any admissible piece of material or that the conclusion is such which cannot be said to be a reasonable one on the materials on record or that the finding is based on no evidence. These being the parameters for exercise of the power, the High Court should have limited its consideration only to the materials on which the prescribed authority and the Appellate Authority under the Act came to the conclusion and the High Court was not called upon to examine the larger issue about the constitutionality and legality of a divorce made by a Muslim male by uttering “talak” three times in one sitting. Dr Dhavan also urged that the conclusion of the prescribed authority as well as that of the Appellate Authority cannot be sustained in law since the judgment is not based on the relevant materials. So far as the first submission of Dr Dhavan is concerned, we find force in the same as in our opinion in the writ petition filed by the tenure-holder and his wife, it was not necessary for the Court to examine a larger issue on the question of the constitutionality and validity of a divorce by a Muslim man by uttering “talak” thrice in one sitting. We, therefore, do not intend to delve into that question and in our opinion the aforesaid conclusion of the High Court was not required to be gone into in the case in hand and the said conclusion would not operate as law of the land until and unless the same arises in an appropriate case and decided accordingly. So far as the second contention of Dr Dhavan is concerned, we, however, do not agree with the same and after perusing the order of the prescribed authority as well as that of the Appellate Authority, we do not find any error of law much less any error apparent on the face of the order which required to be corrected by issuance of a writ of certiorari. The materials on the basis of which the conclusion of the prescribed authority as well as that of the Appellate Authority was based cannot be said to be on irrelevant materials nor can the ultimate conclusion be said to be one without any evidence for the same. In that view of the matter, the ultimate determination of the ceiling land in the hand of the surplus holder does not require any interference by the Court. These appeals are, therefore, disposed of accordingly.
5. All applications filed in these matters also stand disposed of.
In Crl. A. No. 699 of 1993
6. This appeal stands disposed of in terms of our judgment delivered today in Criminal Appeals Nos. 213-16 of 1996.
In WP (C) No. 792 of 1994
7. This writ petition was filed as a counterblast to Criminal Appeals Nos. 213-16 of 1996 which have already been disposed of by us today.
8. After going through the prayer of the writ petition and on examining the averments made in the writ petition, we find that there is no material on the basis of which the Court is in a position to grant any appropriate relief. This writ petition accordingly stands dismissed.
In Crl. As. Nos. 213-16 of 1996 and 569 of 1993
9. These appeals raise the question as to whether a Magistrate is entitled to invoke his jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to grant maintenance in favour of divorced Muslim women.
10. Subsequent to the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short “the Act”) as it was considered that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC can be invoked only when the conditions precedent mentioned in Section 5 of the Act are complied with, in the case in hand, the Magistrate came to a finding that there has been no divorce in the eye of law and as such, the Magistrate has the jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. This finding of the Magistrate has been upheld by the High Court. The validity of the provisions of the Act was for consideration before the Constitution Bench in the case of Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740. In the said case by reading down the provisions of the Act, the validity of the Act has been upheld and it has been observed that under the Act itself when parties agree, the provisions of Section 125 CrPC could be invoked as contained in Section 5 of the Act and even otherwise, the Magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced woman, and the parameters and considerations are the same as those in Section 125 CrPC. It is undoubtedly true that in the case in hand, Section 5 of the Act has not been invoked. Necessarily, therefore, the Magistrate has exercised his jurisdiction under Section 125 CrPC. But, since the Magistrate retains the power of granting maintenance in view of the Constitution Bench decision in Danial Latifi case (2001) 7 SCC 740 under the Act and since the parameters for exercise of that power are the same as those contained in Section 125 CrPC, we see no ground to interfere with the orders of the Magistrate granting maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman. In fact, Mr Qamaruddin, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, never objected to pay maintenance as ordered by the Magistrate. But, he seriously disputes the findings of the Magistrate on the status of the parties and contends that the Magistrate was wholly in error in coming to the conclusion that there has been no divorce between the parties in the eye of law.
11. In view of our aforesaid conclusion, it is not necessary for us to examine the correctness of the finding on the status of the parties, inasmuch as that finding was merely for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under Section 125 CrPC and has no bearing at all in deciding the status of the parties.
12. These appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
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