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Lakshman Prasad Agarwal v. Syed Mohd. Karim And Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Chairman of the Municipal Board, Moradabad, received a notice from the District Magistrate to convene a Board meeting on 4 June 1990 to consider a no-confidence motion. He filed Writ Petition No. 15963/1990 in the Allahabad High Court seeking to quash that notice and restrain the meeting. Although arguments on interim relief were heard on 1 June 1990, no order was pronounced before the scheduled meeting.
The meeting proceeded on 4 June 1990 and the no-confidence motion passed, removing the appellant from office. The appellant then filed Writ Petition No. 15962/1990 challenging that resolution; on 6 June 1990 the High Court suspended the resolution unconditionally.
In the first writ petition, the High Court passed a separate interim order on 8 June 1990 allowing the appellant to continue as Chairman but expressly prohibiting him from sanctioning or passing orders on financial matters exceeding ₹1,000 “until further orders.” This restriction remained in force until 18 July 1990, when the stay was vacated as infructuous.
Between 9 June 1990 and 17 July 1990, the appellant signed or countersigned multiple cheques exceeding ₹1,000 each, amounting to approximately ₹34 lakh. An application for civil contempt was therefore filed, alleging wilful violation of the 8 June 1990 order.
The High Court found the appellant guilty of contempt and imposed a fine of ₹1,000. The present appeal was filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to challenge that finding.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant’s conduct in signing cheques over ₹1,000 constituted wilful and deliberate disobedience of the High Court’s interim order dated 8 June 1990.
- Whether any bona fide belief or legal advice could absolve the appellant of contempt liability.
- Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court’s conviction and sentence under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- He acted on legal advice that the unconditional stay granted on 6 June 1990 in W.P. No. 15962/1990 permitted him to function without monetary restriction, making any breach unintentional.
- The first writ petition, in which the conditional order was passed, had become infructuous after the no-confidence motion; therefore, violation of that order could not amount to contempt.
- An unconditional apology was tendered, requesting the court to accept it and set aside the contempt finding.
No arguments by the respondents are recorded, as they did not appear despite service of notice.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had carefully examined the appellant’s explanations and rejected them. Key points in the Court’s analysis include:
- Literal and purposive reading of the order: Both the letter and the spirit of the 8 June 1990 order clearly prohibited financial transactions above ₹1,000. The appellant’s actions directly contravened this directive.
- Rejection of bona fide defence: The appellant neither moved to withdraw W.P. No. 15963/1990 nor sought modification of the restrictive order until 18 July 1990, undermining his claim of misunderstanding. Moreover, the plea of bona fide belief was not raised in his initial reply to the contempt notice.
- Role of legal advice: Acting on erroneous legal advice does not excuse deliberate non-compliance when the order’s terms are unequivocal.
- Nature of the acts: Signing and countersigning cheques above the prescribed limit constituted direct “sanction” of amounts, defeating the appellant’s argument that he merely approved executive orders.
- Apology not accepted: Given the scale and duration of disobedience, the High Court found the apology neither unconditional nor genuine; the Supreme Court endorsed that view.
Finding no error in the High Court’s assessment, the Supreme Court held that interference was unwarranted.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The conviction for civil contempt and the fine of ₹1,000 imposed by the Allahabad High Court are affirmed.
Implications: The decision maintains the punitive order solely against the appellant and reinforces that reliance on mistaken legal advice does not negate wilful disobedience of a court order. No new legal precedent was articulated beyond affirming established contempt principles.
1. Heard Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. None appeared for the respondents despite service of notice.
2. In this appeal filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 the contemnor has assailed the judgment/order of the Allahabad High Court holding him guilty of contempt and sentencing him to pay Rs. 1,000/- as fine.
3. The factual backdrop of the case, necessary for appreciating the contentions raised, may be stated thus:
The appellant, who was the chairman of the Municipal Board of Moradabad during the relevant period, received the notice issued by the district magistrate for convening a meeting of the municipal board on 4.6.1990 to discuss the no-confidence motion against the appellant. He filed writ petition No. 15963 of 1990 seeking quashing of the said notice. Therein, he prayed for a direction to the respondents not to hold the meeting on the scheduled date. The matter relating to the prayer for interim order was heard on 1st June, 1990 and order was reserved. The meeting of the board was held on 4.6.1990 as schedule and the no-confidence motion was carried by majority and a resolution was passed removing the appellant from the office of the chairmanship of the board. Thereafter, he filed another case, civil miscellaneous writ petition No. 15962/90, challenging no-confidence motion passed in the meeting held on 4.6.1990. By an interim order passed on 6.6.1990 in that case, the resolution in which the no-confidence motion was passed was ordered to be suspended. Thereafter, on 8.6.1990 an interim order was passed in the writ petition No. 15963/90 filed earlier, which reads as follows:
"After having considered the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that until further orders of the court, in case the motion of no-confidence has been passed against the petitioner, the same shall not be given effect to. However, it is ordered that the petitioner may continue to function as chairman, in case the motion of no-confidence has been passed but he snail not sanction or pass orders regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1,000/-."
It was clearly provided in the order that the appellant may continue to function as chairman in case the motion of no-confidence has been passed but he shall not sanction or pass order regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1,000/-. This order remained operative till 18.7.1990 when on the application filed by the appellant stating that the stay order has been rendered infructuous and the same may be vacated, the court passed the order dismissing the stay petition as infructuous and vacated the stay order. Between 9.6.1990 and 17.7.1990 when the aforementioned order directing the appellant not to sanction or pass orders regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1,000/- remained operative, the appellant signed/counter-signed several cheques each for a sum of more than rupees one thousand; the total amount of such cheques was about thirty four lacs of rupees. Stating the facts as above, an application was filed in the High Court for initiating a proceeding for civil contempt against the appellant alleging that he had wilfully and deliberately violated the order passed by the court on 8.6.1990 in C.M.W.P No. 15963/ 90.
4. The appellant in his reply took the stand, inter alia, that he was misguided by the legal advice given to him that in view of the unconditional order of stay passed in another case, writ petition No. 15962/90, it was open to him not only to function as the chairman of the municipal board but also to sign cheques without any restriction regarding amount. It was the plea of the appellant that being guided by such legal advice, he had signed/counter-signed cheques for sums in excess of Rs. 1,000/-. He also raised the contention that since the first writ petition in which the conditional order of stay was passed had become infructuous in view of the fresh cause of action, which arose after the no-confidence motion was passed in the meeting, he could not be held guilty of contempt for alleged non-compliance of the order.
5. The High Court, on a discussion of the facts and circumstances placed on record and the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, held that the plea taken by the appellant that under a bona fide impression that the interim order dated 6.6.1990 had become infructuous, he had signed the cheques, was not acceptable, for the reason that even after coming to know of the order he had not taken steps for withdrawal of the writ petition or even for vacating the interim order till 18th July, 1990. The High Court further observed that the plea of bona fide impression on the part of the contemnor was not even stated in his reply to the show cause notice. The High Court also dealt with the further contention raised on behalf of the appellant that by signing/ counter-signing the cheques, he had not sanctioned the amount stated therein but had only approved the sanction order passed by the executive officer of the board The High Court rejected and in our view, rightly, the said contention.
It is relevant to state here that while considering the question of disobedience or otherwise of an order passed in a pending case not only the letter of the order but also the spirit, is to be understood and the plea of bona fide / genuine belief taken by the contemnor is to be considered on that basis. The High Court after rejecting the contentions raised on behalf of the contemnor did not feel persuaded to accept the unconditional apology tendered by him.
6. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the appellant, we are not satisfied that on the fact situation of the case, the judgment/order passed by the High Court calls for interference by this Court. We have no hesitation to hold that the High Court was right in recording the finding that the appellant was guilty of wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order passed on 8.6.1990.
7. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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