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Bijay Kumar Mahanty v. Jadu Alias Ram Chandra Sahoo .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent had earlier been granted bail by the Sessions Judge on 6-11-1990 in a criminal case arising out of an alleged assault on a police officer during Durga Puja immersion on 30-9-1990. Despite this bail order, the appellant—then Officer-in-Charge of the concerned police station—arrested the respondent at his residence at 7:30 a.m. on 13-11-1990, allegedly after the respondent produced a certified copy of the bail order. The respondent remained in police custody until he was produced before the Magistrate on 14-11-1990, where he was released upon production of the bail order.
The Sessions Judge, Cuttack, referred the matter to the High Court, which initiated contempt proceedings. After examining witnesses and the physical condition of the bail order, the High Court found that the appellant had knowingly violated the bail order and sentenced him to seven days’ civil imprisonment for contempt of court. The appellant filed the present appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court correctly concluded, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant had knowledge of and wilfully disobeyed the respondent’s bail order, thereby committing contempt of court.
- Whether the belated apology tendered by the appellant should be accepted to purge the contempt.
- Whether the sentence of seven days’ civil imprisonment should be substituted with a fine.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The finding of contempt was based merely on probabilities and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt, as no independent evidence supported the respondent’s claim that the bail order was shown at the time of arrest.
- The appellant, in forwarding papers to the Magistrate, noted that the respondent had mentioned having a bail order, demonstrating the appellant’s bona fides.
- Even if the appellant believed bail had been granted, he was legally obliged to arrest and could not release the respondent without formal verification.
- The respondent failed to produce the bail order before superior officers (SDO and SDPO) who later visited the police station.
- An apology should now be accepted, and, in any event, the punishment should be limited to a fine rather than imprisonment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries (1980) 3 SCC 311 | Courts may punish contempt to protect the public interest in the orderly administration of justice. | Relied upon to underscore the need for stern action where court orders are flouted, especially by law-enforcement officers. |
| Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman (2001) 3 SCC 739 | Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal; charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. | Cited to acknowledge the high standard of proof required, which the Court found satisfied on the evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court accepted that contempt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt but held that this threshold was met. Key reasons included:
- The respondent and his mother testified that the certified bail order was shown to the appellant at the time of arrest; discrepancies in their exact wording (“torn,” “bundled,” “rubbed”) were deemed immaterial.
- The High Court had physically examined the certified bail order and observed marks of violence, corroborating the respondent’s version that the appellant had “crushed” the document.
- The appellant’s own admission that he believed the respondent had been granted bail, yet proceeded to arrest him, demonstrated wilful disobedience; the Court characterised the arrest as an act of revenge connected to the allegation of assault on a fellow police officer.
- No evidence showed that superior officers ever met the respondent during their visit, undermining the appellant’s claim about non-production of the bail order.
- The apology, offered 12 years after the incident and long after the appeal was filed, was viewed as insincere and only a tactic to avoid punishment.
- Given the intentional violation by a police officer, substituting imprisonment with a fine would not serve the ends of justice.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED; the conviction for contempt and the sentence of seven days’ civil imprisonment are affirmed, and the belated apology is rejected.
Implications: The decision reinforces that police officers who defy court orders, particularly those affecting personal liberty, will face custodial punishment. It underscores the judiciary’s commitment to uphold the rule of law and signals that apologies tendered merely to evade sanction will not be entertained. No new legal precedent was set, but the ruling serves as a stern warning to law-enforcement personnel regarding compliance with judicial orders.
Y.K Sabharwal, J.— Police officers are supposed to be the members of a disciplined force. It is of utmost importance to curb any tendency in them to flout orders of the court. It is more so when flouting of order results in deprivation of personal liberty of an individual. If protectors of law, to take revenge, defy court orders they will have to be sternly dealt with and appropriate punishment inflicted also with a view to send a message across the board that such an act cannot be countenanced.
2. The appellant is a police officer. At the relevant time i.e on 13-11-1990, he was the officer in charge of the police station in question. A police officer of that police station had reported that the respondent had assaulted him on 30-9-1990 which was the immersion day of Goddess Durga while he was on duty and the respondent had been asked by him to give side to other image (Medha) to pass. A case was registered against the respondent.
3. Now, the admitted facts. In connection with the aforesaid case, the respondent was arrested by the appellant on 13-11-1990 from his residence at 7.30 a.m He was kept in police custody and was produced before the Magistrate on 14th November. The respondent in respect of this very case had been granted bail by the Sessions Judge on 6-11-1990. The respondent had obtained certified copy of the order of bail on 7th November. The respondent was produced before the Magistrate on 14th November when his advocate produced a certified copy of the order of the Sessions Judge and, thus, he was released by the Magistrate.
4. The only controversy is whether the respondent had produced, before the appellant, the certified copy of the order of bail at the time of his arrest. According to the respondent, it was produced. In the proceedings of contempt that were initiated by the High Court, on receipt of reference from the Sessions Judge, Cuttack, the appellant denied that the copy of the bail order was produced before him. The High Court, on appreciation of evidence, held that copy of the bail order was produced before the appellant who arrested the respondent despite it. The appellant was held guilty of contempt and was sentenced for civil imprisonment for a period of seven days. Under these circumstances, this appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short “the Act”).
5. It is of paramount public interest that the people, after obtaining an order of the court, should not feel helpless or without any remedy when such order is flouted.
6. In Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P Khair Industries (1980) 3 SCC 311 this Court said that:
“[I]t may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury as the expression ‘contempt of court’ may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with.”
7. The rule of law is the foundation of the democratic society. The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. If the orders of the court are disobeyed with impunity by those who owe an obligation to the society to preserve the rule of law, not only would individual litigants suffer, the whole administration of justice would be brought into disrepute.
8. The case against the appellant was held proved by the High Court on appreciation of evidence, perusal of the original record of the case files including the certified copy of the bail order that had been obtained and its condition.
9. Mr Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the finding of guilt was returned against the appellant by the High Court without production of any independent evidence. The finding, it is contended, is based on probabilities when the requirement of law is that the charge of contempt shall be proved beyond any reasonable doubt. It was also contended that the appellant, while forwarding the respondent to the Magistrate, had mentioned at the end in his own hand that the respondent told him about the bail order having been passed by the learned Sessions Judge which shows his bona fides. The further contention is that the belief of the appellant that the respondent had been granted bail was of no consequence since it was his duty to arrest the respondent in connection with the case registered against him and he could not release the respondent merely acting on his belief. Further, it was submitted that the respondent did not produce the bail order before the SDO and SDPO who had come to the police station on tension being created after the arrest of the respondent.
10. We have no difficulty in accepting the contention that the case against the appellant is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The contempt proceedings under the Act are quasi-criminal. The standard of proof required is that of criminal proceedings. Therefore, the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt (see Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman (2001) 3 SCC 739).
11. We are, however, unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel that the charge against the appellant has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent was arrested at 7.30 a.m from his residence. The only other person available at that time when the certified copy of the bail order was shown to the appellant was the mother of the respondent who was examined as a witness. The appellant crushed the order. Different persons have the tendency to use different language while narrating the same incident. It is of no consequence that the respondent at one stage stated that the bail order when produced was “torn”, at another stage stated that it was “bundled” and with reference to that order, his mother used the word “rubbed”. The said order, as already noticed, was examined by the High Court before arriving at the finding that it bears marks of violence. The appellant admitted that as per his belief the respondent had been granted bail. If that was so, the appellant would have given an opportunity to the respondent to produce that order instead of arresting him despite that belief. The appellant wanted to arrest the respondent any way. The case related to an alleged assault on a police officer of a police station of which the appellant was In-charge. No fault can be found with the finding of the High Court that the act was a result of revenge which prompted the appellant to act against his belief that the respondent had been granted bail and act against such a belief. There was tension as a result of the arrest of the respondent because he was arrested despite bail order. There was nothing to show that the respondent was produced before the SDO and SDPO when they visited the police station. It is nobody's case that those officers met the respondent. The High Court has rightly held the appellant guilty of contempt of court.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that apology that has now been tendered by the appellant may be accepted. The incident relates to the year 1990. The respondent was deprived of his personal liberty despite grant of bail by the Sessions Judge. The appellant has tendered the apology only now after a lapse of nearly 12 years. This appeal was admitted in the year 1993. The case has been on board for quite some time. The apology has been tendered only on 30-11-2002. The apology has to be sincere and not merely to escape the punishment. In our view, it is not a fit case where the apology tendered at this belated stage ought to be accepted.
13. Lastly, it was contended that instead of imprisonment, fine be imposed on the appellant. In a matter of this nature, where a police officer, disregarding the bail order, arrests a person because case against him is of alleged assault on one of the police officials, we do not think that mere sentence of fine would meet the ends of justice. No interference is called for in the judgment and order of the High Court.
14. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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