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Bihari Manjhi And Others v. State Of Bihar .
Expert Legal Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
A carnage in 1992 resulted in the death of 35 persons, the burning of several houses/huts, and injuries to many others. A charge-sheet was filed against 119 persons. Thirteen of them were tried in G.R. Case No. 430 of 1992 (Tekari P.S. Case No. 19 of 1992) under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and Sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
On 8 June 2001 the Designated Court, Gaya:
- Acquitted four accused (A-1, A-10, A-11, A-12);
- Sentenced four accused (A-5, A-8, A-9, A-13) to death;
- Sentenced four accused (A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7) to life imprisonment; and
- Sentenced one accused (A-3) to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment.
The present Supreme Court judgment concerns Criminal Appeal No. 752 of 2001 (filed by A-2 Bihari Manjhi, A-4 Ramautar Dusadh @ Lakhan Dusadh, and A-7 Wakil Yadav) and Criminal Appeal No. 765 of 2001 (filed by A-6 Rajendra Paswan). The appeals challenge the Designated Court’s conviction based primarily on a single confessional statement.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the confessional statement of A-2 Bihari Manjhi, allegedly recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act, was admissible and sufficient to convict the appellants.
- Whether non-compliance with Rule 15 of the TADA Rules (failing to forward the confession to the Chief Judicial Magistrate) vitiated the evidentiary value of the confession.
- Whether, in the absence of corroborative evidence, the appellants’ convictions could be sustained solely on the impugned confession.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The confession was recorded by a Police Inspector who had arrived to apprehend the accused, not by a competent officer as envisaged under Section 15 of TADA.
- The statement was recorded at night (around 2:30 a.m.) in a police jeep’s headlights, raising doubts about voluntariness and authenticity.
- The confession was never forwarded to the Chief Judicial Magistrate as mandated by Rule 15; it surfaced for the first time before the Designated Court after a five-year delay.
- Neither the Superintendent of Police (PW 2) nor the recording officer (PW 17) identified A-2 in court, casting further doubt on the document.
- No eyewitness or physical evidence linked the appellants to the carnage.
State’s Arguments (as accepted by the Designated Court)
- The confession was admissible because Section 15 of TADA allows confessions made to police officers to be evidence.
- Procedural requirements under Rule 15 are directory, not mandatory; therefore, non-submission to the CJM did not invalidate the confession.
- Signatures of A-2 appeared on every page of the confession, supporting its authenticity.
- Some witness statements under Section 161 CrPC mentioned the appellants, providing corroboration.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court scrutinised the manner in which the confession was procured and relied upon. Its key analytical steps were:
- Improper Recording Authority: The confession was recorded by a Police Inspector who was part of the arresting team. Although the Superintendent of Police was present, the Court held that such circumstances undermined the safeguards envisioned by Section 15 of TADA.
- Timing and Conditions: Recording at 2:30 a.m. in a jeep’s headlights raised serious doubts about voluntariness and authenticity.
- Non-Compliance with Rule 15: Admittedly, the statement was never forwarded to the Chief Judicial Magistrate and surfaced only after five years. Even if Rule 15 is directory, investigators must still comply; non-compliance diminishes evidentiary weight.
- Lack of Identification: Both PW 2 (Superintendent of Police) and PW 17 (recording officer) failed to identify A-2 in court, undermining the prosecution’s narrative that A-2 had made the confession.
- Absence of Corroboration: No eyewitness identified the appellants; no recovery of weapons or incriminating objects was made from them. Hence, the confession lacked independent corroboration.
- Constitutional Concerns: The Court stressed the constitutional principle of separation of judiciary and executive. Permitting convictions based on procedurally tainted confessions would imperil individual liberty.
- Conclusion: Given these infirmities, the confession could not be relied upon, and the convictions were unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: Criminal Appeal No. 752 of 2001 and Criminal Appeal No. 765 of 2001 are allowed. The convictions and sentences of A-2 Bihari Manjhi, A-4 Ramautar Dusadh @ Lakhan Dusadh, A-7 Wakil Yadav, and A-6 Rajendra Paswan are set aside, and they are acquitted of all charges. They are to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.
Implications: The decision underscores that procedural safeguards governing confessions under TADA are essential. Even where rules are deemed directory, substantial non-compliance can erode the evidentiary value of a confession. The judgment reaffirms the judiciary’s vigilance in protecting individual liberty and signals to investigating agencies that shortcuts in recording and preserving confessions will not withstand appellate scrutiny.
M.B Shah, J.— In a gruesome carnage, 35 persons lost their lives, some houses/huts were burnt, a number of persons were injured and in that case charge-sheet was submitted against 119 persons. Out of them, 13 were tried by the Designated Court of Sessions Judge, Gaya in GR Case No. 430 of 1992, Tekari Police Station Case No. 19 of 1992 under the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as “the TADA Act”) and under Sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”). After recording the evidence, by judgment and order dated 8-6-2001, the Designated Court:
(a) acquitted A-1 Nanhe Yadav @ Dina Yadav, A-10 Nanhak Teli, A-11 Naresh Chamar and A-12 Ramashish Mahto;
(b) convicted A-5 Veer Kuer Paswan, A-8 Krishna Mochi, A-9 Dharmendra Singh @ Dharu Singh and A-13 Nanhe Lal Mochi and sentenced to death;
(c) convicted A-2 Bihari Manjhi, A-4 Ramautar Dusadh @ Lakhan Dusadh, A-6 Rajendra Paswan and A-7 Wakil Yadav and imposed life imprisonment;
(d) convicted A-3 Ravindra Singh and imposed RI for ten years. He has not filed any appeal.
2. A-2 Bihari Manjhi, A-4 Ramautar Dusadh @ Lakhan Dusadh and A-7 Wakil Yadav have filed Criminal Appeal No. 752 of 2001; A-6 Rajendra Paswan has filed Criminal Appeal No. 765 of 2001; A-5 Veer Kuer Paswan, A-8 Krishna Mochi, A-9 Dharmendra Singh @ Dharu Singh and A-13 Nanhe Lal Mochi have preferred Criminal Appeal No. 761 of 2001 and also there is a Death Reference Case No. 1 of 2001 against A-5 Veer Kuer Paswan, A-8 Krishna Mochi, A-9 Dharmendra Singh @ Dharu Singh and A-13 Nanhe Lal Mochi.
3. By this judgment and order, we are disposing of Criminal Appeal No. 752 of 2001 and Criminal Appeal No. 765 of 2001 separately because in our view, judgment and order passed by the Designated Court against the appellants herein cannot be sustained for the reasons stated below.
4. The Designated Court convicted the aforesaid four accused only on the basis of the confessional statement Ext. 2 dated 27-2-1992 of A-2 Bihari Manjhi. The said statement admittedly was recorded by PI Suresh Chandra Sharma in the presence of Shri Sunil Kumar, SP, Gaya, and Birendra Kumar Singh, OIC, Bodh Gaya Police Station. The Designated Court held that the confessional statement of Bihari Manjhi was recorded by the Superintendent of Police and in his inculpatory statement he has named A-4, A-6 and A-7 as participants and since confessional statement is admissible, there is no reason to disbelieve the same and, therefore, the participation of all the accused in the carnage is well proved. Thereafter, the court observed that A-6 was named as participant by PW 6 and PW 7 and this gets corroboration from their statement under Section 161 CrPC recorded by the police. No doubt, the learned Judge hastened to add that as the witnesses were terrorised, they have evaded either naming or identifying them in the court but on the basis of the confessional statement he held them guilty and convicted them under Section 3(1) of the TADA Act and also for the offence punishable under Sections 302/149 IPC and sentenced them to suffer life imprisonment. The court also negatived the submission made by the learned counsel for the accused that in the statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, accused Bihari Manjhi, A-2 has denied to have made any such statement before the Superintendent of Police, by holding that on each page of the confessional statement there is signature of A-2 Bihari Manjhi and, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the Superintendent of Police.
5. In our view, in the facts of the present case, it would be difficult to hold that the confessional statement recorded by the Police Inspector, who went there for apprehending the accused, can be considered to be confessional statement recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act, even though it was recorded in the presence of the Superintendent of Police. The so-called statement was recorded by the police officers in the presence of the police party at night-time at about 2.30 a.m between 26-2-1992 and 27-2-1992 in the light of the jeep as there was no other light available.
6. Further, admittedly, the statement was not sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate as required under Rule 15 of the TADA Rules. The statement was produced for the first time before the Designated Court on 21-3-1997 which was allegedly kept in the police diary. Dealing with this contention, the Designated Court held that the procedure prescribed under the Rules was directory. In our view, even though this Court has held the procedure prescribed under Rule 15 as directory, that would not mean that the investigating officer is not required to follow the said procedure. He has to follow the said procedure. If there is delay in sending the statement, the court would consider its evidentiary value by weighing other evidence brought on record by the prosecution. It is to be stated that in our country under the Constitution, there is separation of the judiciary from the executive and if lapses on the part of the investigating officer are condoned and such statements are used for convicting the accused then the liberty of the citizens would not be safe. It appears that instead of collecting any material or evidence for connecting these accused with the crime, the investigating agency has adopted unjustified methods.
7. Further, PW 2 Sunil Kumar, Superintendent of Police, in whose presence the statement was recorded, as well as PW 17 Suresh Chandra Sharma who recorded the said statement have not identified A-2 Bihari Manjhi before the court. This would throw a serious doubt with regard to the said confessional statement being recorded by PW 17 and putting of signatures by A-2 Bihari Manjhi on the same. There is no other evidence so far as the co-accused appellants are concerned, despite the fact that the accused are residents of the same village where the occurrence took place and no other prosecution witnesses have identified them as the persons present at the scene of offence nor is there any recovery alleged to have been made from them or at their instance. In the aforesaid circumstances and for the infirmities, we are in agreement with the submission of learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellants that the said confessional statement ought not to have been relied upon by the court for convicting the accused-appellants.
8. In the result, Criminal Appeal No. 752 of 2001 filed by A-2 Bihari Manjhi, A-4 Ramautar Dusadh @ Lakhan Dusadh and A-7 Wakil Yadav and Criminal Appeal No. 765 of 2001 filed by A-6 Rajendra Paswan are allowed and the judgment and order convicting the appellants is set aside and they are acquitted of the offences for which they were charged and it is ordered that they be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
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