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Sunil Kumar Rana v. State Of Haryana And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant filed his nomination on 7-3-2000 to contest the election to the Municipal Council, Karnal (Ward No. 31). Although the Returning Officer accepted the nomination after overruling objections from the 5th respondent, the Deputy Commissioner, in a revision petition dated 11-3-2000, reversed that decision and rejected the appellant’s nomination on the ground of disqualification under Section 13-A of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973. The appellant challenged the order in CWP No. 3141 of 2000 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 14-3-2000. While the writ petition was pending, elections were held on 2-4-2000 and the 5th respondent was elected; results were notified on 7-4-2000. On 31-10-2001 the High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the rejection of the nomination was valid. The present appeal reached the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the disqualification for having “more than two living children” under Section 13-A(1)(c) of the Haryana Municipal Act attaches after one year from 5-4-1994 (the commencement of Haryana Amendment Act 3 of 1994) or after one year from 4-10-1994 (the commencement of Haryana Amendment Act 15 of 1994).
- Consequently, whether the appellant’s nomination was rightly rejected on the ground that his twin children, born on 11-5-1995, triggered the statutory disqualification.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The relevant date for computing the one-year grace period in the proviso to Section 13-A(1)(c) should be 4-10-1994, the date on which Haryana Amendment Act 15 of 1994 was published and came into force.
- Accordingly, children born on 11-5-1995 would fall within the grace period, and the appellant would not be disqualified.
Respondents' Arguments
- The phrase “commencement of this Act” refers to Haryana Amendment Act 3 of 1994, which came into force on 5-4-1994; therefore, the grace period expired on 5-4-1995.
- The substitution of the word “after” by “upto” in Amendment Act 15 of 1994 did not alter the commencement date or extend the grace period.
- Because the appellant had more than two living children after 5-4-1995, he stood disqualified and his nomination was rightly rejected.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court closely examined Section 13-A(1)(c) introduced by Haryana Amendment Act 3 of 1994 and the proviso that shields candidates for one year from the “commencement of this Act.” It held that:
- The legislative intent is explicit: the one-year period must be calculated from 5-4-1994, the date on which Amendment Act 3 of 1994 came into force.
- Amendment Act 15 of 1994 only substituted the word “after” with “upto” in the proviso; it did not create a new commencement date. The substitution was meant to remove anomalies and ensure that the main provision and the proviso operate harmoniously.
- A purposive construction is necessary to prevent social mischief and effectuate legislative intent. Accepting the appellant’s construction would generate uncertainty and defeat the statute’s purpose.
- Contest for municipal office is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional or fundamental right; therefore, strict compliance with statutory qualifications is mandatory.
- Consequently, the High Court’s interpretation was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and the appellant’s nomination was correctly rejected.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision that the appellant was disqualified because his twins, born on 11-5-1995, were born after the one-year grace period measured from 5-4-1994.
Implications: The judgment clarifies that the relevant “commencement” date for the disqualification proviso in Section 13-A(1)(c) is the enforcement date of Haryana Amendment Act 3 of 1994, not any subsequent amending act. It reinforces a purposive approach to statutory interpretation but does not create new precedent beyond statutory construction in analogous contexts.
D. Raju, J.— Special leave granted.
2. The appellant filed his nomination on 7-3-2000 for contesting the election to Municipal Council, Karnal, as a member from Ward No. 31. After overruling the objections of another candidate (5th respondent) the Returning Officer accepted the same. The 5th respondent filed a revision challenging the acceptance of the nomination before the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal, and by an order dated 11-3-2000, the revision was allowed and the nomination paper of the appellant was ordered to be rejected. The appellant filed CWP No. 3141 of 2000 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on 14-3-2000. While the said writ petition was pending, the elections were held on 2-4-2000 and the 5th respondent was elected as a member of the Municipal Council from Ward No. 31. As a result of the same, on 7-4-2000 the Haryana State Election Commission notified the results. In view of the said subsequent development, the relief prayed for in the writ petition was also sought to be modified. Finally, by an order dated 31-10-2001, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the nomination paper of the appellant was rightly ordered to be rejected.
3. The factual basis, which provided the ground for his disqualification and consequent rejection of the nomination, is that at the time of filing his nomination, the appellant had four children and that of the said four children, two were born after the coming into force of the Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Haryana Act 15 of 1994), the actual date of birth of them, twins, being 11-5-1995, as per the municipal records. The stand of the appellant was and even now before us is that the relevant date for determining the disqualification is the coming into force of the Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Haryana Act 15 of 1994) viz. 4-10-1994, the date of publication of the Amendment Act in the Government Gazette and not 5-4-1994, the date of coming into force of the Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Haryana Act 3 of 1994). The High Court was of the view that the disqualification will operate after 5-4-1995 — on the expiry of the period of one year from 5-4-1994, the date of coming into force of Amendment Act 3 of 1994. Per contra, the claim of the appellant was that the disqualification will be attracted only after 4-10-1995, the expiry of one year from the date of coming into force of Amendment Act 15 of 1994.
4. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. To have a proper appreciation of the respective contentions of the parties on either side, it becomes necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. The Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (Haryana Act 24 of 1973), as it originally stood prior to the amendments in question did not provide for any such disqualification. It is only for the first time by Haryana Act 3 of 1994, Section 13-A came to be inserted, which so far as is relevant for this case, reads as follows:
“13-A. Disqualification for membership.—(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of a municipality—
(a)-(b)***
(c) if he has more than two living children:
Provided that a person having more than two children on or after the expiry of one year of the commencement of this Act, shall not be deemed to be disqualified.”
5. Thereafter, by Haryana Act 15 of 1994 clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13-A was amended, as mentioned below:
“2. Amendment of Section 13-A of Haryana Act 24 of 1973.—In the proviso to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13-A of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the principal Act), for the word ‘after’, the word ‘upto’ shall be substituted.”
6. It is the effect of this amendment that really calls for consideration, in this appeal.
7. On a careful consideration of the relevant statutory provisions and the submissions of the learned counsel on either side, we are of the view that the High Court could not be said to have erred in the construction adopted, which not only accords with the intention of the legislature but avoids uncertainty and friction as well repugnance, which otherwise would result in accepting the stand of the appellant. The main part of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13-A in unmistakable terms introduced a disqualification for being chosen as and for being a member of the municipality of a person who has more than two living children. The mandate of the legislature is clear and specific and purports to be in public interest. At the same time, in order to protect, apparently cases where a child could have by then been conceived, a reasonable period to relax from the rigour of the disqualification seems to have been thought of and keeping in view perhaps the normal gestation period, a proviso in the form of a deeming clause also appears to have been enacted enjoining at the same time that “a person having more than two children on or after the expiry of one year of the commencement of this Act, shall not be deemed to be disqualified”.
(emphasis supplied)
8. The legislative intent thus to compute the period of one year from the “commencement of this Act”, meaning thereby Haryana Act 3 of 1994 is equally explicit and clear. There is, therefore, no rhyme or reason or justification in the claim on behalf of the appellant that the one-year period has to be calculated from the date of coming into force of Haryana Act 15 of 1994, which merely substituted the word “after” by the word “upto”. The result of substitution, as we could see, was to read the provision as amended by the word, ordered to be substituted. The legislature seems to have realized the need for substitution on becoming aware of the anomalies and absurdities to which the provision without such substitution may lead to, even resulting, at times, in repugnancy with the main provision and virtually defeating the intention of the legislature. The modification of the provision, as carried out by the substitution ordered, when found to be needed and necessitated to implement effectively the legislative intention and to prevent a social mischief against which the provision is directed, a purposive construction is a must and the only inevitable solution. The right to contest to an office of a member of a municipal body is the creature of statute and not a constitutional or fundamental right. Viewed, thus also, we are convinced that the interpretation placed by the High Court on the provisions concerned is neither arbitrary, nor unreasonable nor unjust to call for our interference.
9. The appeal consequently fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs.
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