- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Lingala Kondala Rao v. Vootukuri Narayana Rao .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent’s late father owned a non-residential premises (a shop) that was his self-acquired property. On 24 June 1988 he executed and registered a deed of settlement, gifting the suit shop exclusively to the respondent. The father died in 1991, leaving other shops to the joint Hindu family comprising the widow and three sons, including the respondent. The appellant is a tenant of the suit shop.
The respondent instituted eviction proceedings under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (“the Act”). The Rent Controller decreed eviction; the appellate authority and the High Court both affirmed the decree. The appellant (tenant) sought relief from the Supreme Court by special-leave petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, a landlord who owns and seeks possession of premises exclusively gifted to him is disqualified from doing so because he also has an undivided share and juridical possession in joint Hindu family shops occupied by the family business.
- Whether the respondent-landlord’s requirement for the premises is bona fide in light of the timing of the 1988 deed of settlement and the Full Bench decision in Vidya Bai v. Shankerlal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant-Tenant’s Arguments
- The respondent is in constructive occupation of the joint family shops where the family business is run; these shops are “his own” or premises “to the possession of which he is entitled,” thus barring eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii).
- The 1988 settlement deed was executed shortly after the Full Bench ruling in Vidya Bai, allegedly to manipulate title and manufacture a ground for eviction, demonstrating lack of bona fides.
Respondent-Landlord’s Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M. Padmanabha Setty v. K.P. Papiah Setty, AIR 1966 SC 1824; (1966) 3 SCR 868 | Meaning of “entitled to possession” in pari materia rent-control legislation. | Used to show that “entitlement” must be an immediate, enforceable right, not a remote or contingent one. |
| Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co., (1998) 5 SCC 572 | Quality, size and suitability of alternative premises are relevant; narrow literal interpretation of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) rejected. | Supported the Court’s broader interpretation that joint-family premises do not automatically bar eviction. |
| G. Kaushalya Devi v. Ghanshyamdas, (2000) 2 SCC 1 | “Entitled to possession” refers to possession in the capacity of owner, not mere tenancy or indirect claim. | Cited to reinforce that indirect or derivative possession does not defeat the landlord’s claim. |
| Vidya Bai v. Shankerlal, AIR 1988 AP 184 (FB) | Held that availability of joint-family premises could defeat landlord’s claim under Section 10(3)(a)(iii). | Its authority was considered doubtful after later Supreme Court rulings; used to rebut the appellant’s reliance on it. |
| D. Devaji v. K. Sudarashana Rao, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 729 | Earlier narrow view that any entitlement to alternative premises bars eviction. | Described as having been limited by subsequent three-Judge Bench decision in Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah (1998) 5 SCC 572. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court framed the statutory condition negatively: the landlord must not be in occupation of a non-residential building “which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled.” The Court reasoned as follows:
- The share of a coparcener in joint Hindu family property is fluctuating; the coparcener cannot claim immediate, exclusive possession without first seeking partition.
- Consequently, joint-family shops cannot be regarded as premises “which are his own” or “to the possession of which he is entitled” within the meaning of Section 10(3)(a)(iii).
- The phrase “entitled to possession” implies an immediate and enforceable right of exclusive possession, not a speculative or remote right contingent upon future partition proceedings.
- Reinforcing this construction, the Court relied on the Constitution Bench in M. Padmanabha Setty and other subsequent judgments that stressed practical availability, size, suitability, and immediacy of possession.
- On the allegation of mala fides, the Court found no material to suggest that the 1988 deed of settlement was executed with the sole object of evicting the appellant. The validity of the registered settlement deed was unchallenged by any family member, and its genuineness could not be impeached in eviction proceedings.
- The Full Bench ruling in Vidya Bai, relied upon by the tenant, had been weakened by later Supreme Court authority; the High Court correctly declined to follow it.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The eviction decree stands affirmed. The appellant-tenant is granted three months to vacate the premises, conditional upon filing the usual undertaking within four weeks in the executing court.
Implications: The judgment clarifies that a landlord’s mere coparcenary interest and constructive occupation in joint Hindu family property do not amount to occupation of premises “his own” under Section 10(3)(a)(iii). The decision thus limits tenants’ ability to resist eviction by pointing to joint-family assets and aligns the interpretation with earlier Supreme Court precedents, without creating new law beyond the statutory and case-law framework.
Order
1. A suit for eviction of a tenant from non-residential premises based on the ground available under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter “the Act” for short), has been decreed by the Controller, which decree has been upheld in appeal, as also in revision by the High Court. The appellant tenant has filed this appeal by special leave.
2. The facts relevant and admitted or beyond the pale of controversy at this stage are jejune. The father of the respondent was the owner of the suit property. He had let out the suit accommodation — non-residential in nature, being a shop. The property was self-acquired property of the late father of the respondent. The family consisted of the father of the respondent, the mother of the respondent and three sons including the respondent. On 24-6-1988, the father executed a registered deed of settlement whereby the suit shop was gifted to the respondent. The execution and registration of the deed of settlement is not in dispute. Consequent thereupon exclusive title in the suit shop has come to vest in the respondent. In the year 1991, the father of the respondent died. His other property which also has a few other shops devolved upon the family consisting of three sons and their widow mother. The shops other than the suit premises are in occupation of the joint family and also owned by it. So far as the suit shop is concerned, it is owned exclusively by the respondent and is in occupation of the appellant tenant.
3. The bona fide requirement of the respondent for the suit shop for commencing his own business has been found proved by all the three courts concurrently. The sole question arising for decision in this appeal centres around interpretation of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) as to whether a landlord who is entitled to a share in joint Hindu family property in the shops which are in occupation of a joint Hindu family wherein joint family business is being carried on is denied the right of seeking eviction from an accommodation exclusively owned by him under the said provision.
4. Section 10, insofar as relevant for the purpose of this appeal, reads as under:
“10. Eviction of tenants.—(1) A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or Sections 12 and 13:
(2)***
(3)(a) A landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building—
(i)-(ii)***
(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise—”
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the shops in the occupation of the joint Hindu family are as much owned by the respondent as any other member of the family. The respondent shall also be deemed to be in occupation of the shops inasmuch as the joint family business which is being carried on in those shops is as much the business of the respondent as of any other member of the family. In any case, submitted the learned counsel, the respondent is entitled to a share in the property and in view of his judicial occupation of other shops he would be disentitled from seeking eviction of the tenant on the said ground.
6. To disentitle the landlord from claiming eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act it must be shown that the landlord is in occupation of a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned and that such building is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled under the Act or otherwise. In case of occupation of property by members of joint Hindu family wherein the interest of a member remains fluctuating depending on the increase or decrease in number of members of the family, it cannot be said that the landlord is in occupation of a non-residential building which expression, in the setting in which it has been used, would mean his own occupation in his own right. On the same reasoning, the non-residential building owned by the joint Hindu family cannot be called a non-residential building “which is his own”. The expression “to the possession of which he is entitled” has to be construed as an immediate entitlement to possession so as to satisfy his requirement as stated in (a) and (b) parts of sub-clause (iii). A landlord cannot be expected to dislodge the members of the joint family from their possession over the joint family premises simply because the landlord requires the premises for his own exclusive use. He is not “entitled” to possession over joint family premises unless he claims partition whereat the suit premises are also allotted to him. In a partition he may or may not be held entitled to possession over the non-residential building pointed out by the tenant as an alternate accommodation and relied on by him for defeating the claim of the landlord. Therefore, a non-residential building owned by the joint Hindu family and in its occupation would not be included within the meaning of the expression “which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled”. A non-residential building said to be owned or being under entitlement to possession by the landlord under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be just any non-residential building without regard to other relevant factors including the extent of the ownership of the landlord and the remoteness between his entitlement and the occurrence of event when he would actually get possession. In taking this view, we find support from a few decisions of this Court.
7. In M. Padmanabha Setty v. K.P Papiah Setty AIR 1966 SC 1824, (1966) 3 SCR 868 the Constitution Bench, interpreting the expression “entitled to possession” in a pari materia provision contained in a Mysore Act held that the expression would not include another tenanted accommodation wherefrom the landlord could evict the tenant by making out a ground for eviction nor would the expression include a building where the landlord has a right to stay till he is evicted. The Constitution Bench held that the object of the Act is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. It cannot be said that the legislature considered it unreasonable for a landlord to shift to his own premises while he is in occupation of the tenanted premises over which he has not an absolute right of possession but only a right to remain in possession.
8. In Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co. (1998) 5 SCC 572 this Court held that the aspect of quality, size and suitability of the building cannot be totally put out of consideration else the purpose of the Act would be frustrated.
9. In G. Kaushalya Devi v. Ghanshyamdas (2000) 2 SCC 1 it was held that the expression “to the possession of which he is entitled” would not mean possession otherwise than as an owner or in that capacity. Tenanted premises in which the landlord was already having his business and hence of which he was in possession and another shop purchased by the mother of the landlord with the amount loaned by him were held not to be buildings which could disentitle the landlord from seeking an order to be put in possession of the tenanted building.
10. We hold that joint Hindu family premises in which joint family business is being run and wherein the landlord too has a share and interest and juridical possession on account of being a member of the family would not disentitle the landlord from seeking recovery of possession from the tenant of a non-residential building exclusively owned by him subject to his satisfying other requirements of Section 10(3)(a)(iii).
11. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent's requirement cannot be said to be bona fide. It was submitted that a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered its decision in Vidya Bai v. Shankerlal AIR 1988 AP 184, (1987) 2 An LT 550 (FB) on 24-9-1987 wherein the Court took the view that availability of a non-residential building belonging to a joint family was a relevant factor for denying recovery of possession by the landlord under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and shortly thereafter on 24-6-1988 the late father of the respondent executed and registered the deed of settlement conferring title on the respondent. In the year 1991, the father of the respondent died and then the present proceedings were initiated by the landlord. This shows that exclusive ownership over the suit premises vesting in the respondent landlord is a manipulation pointing out to the mala fides. Suffice it to observe that it is too far-fetched an inference to draw that the object behind execution of the registered deed of settlement was the eviction of the appellant tenant, more so, when there is no material available on record to base such an inference. The execution and registration of the deed of settlement is not disputed. In an eviction suit between the landlord and the tenant the motive behind execution of the document conferring title on the landlord cannot be allowed to be gone into so long as the document has been executed and registered in accordance with law and the transaction is otherwise legal. It is pertinent to note that no member of the family adversely affected by the deed of settlement has chosen to lay any challenge to it. Incidentally, it may be noted that the Full Bench decision in Vidya Bai case AIR 1988 AP 184, (1987) 2 An LT 550 (FB) was cited with approval before a two-Judge Bench of this Court in D. Devaji v. K. Sudarashana Rao 1994 Supp (1) SCC 729. However, the correctness of the decision of this Court in D. Devaji case 1994 Supp (1) SCC 729 was doubted by another two-Judge Bench (see Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah and Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co. (1997) 8 SCC 108) whereafter the matter came to be considered by a three-Judge Bench in Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co. (1998) 5 SCC 572 In D. Devaji case 1994 Supp (1) SCC 729 the view taken by this Court was that the landlord should not be in possession of another non-residential building or of which he is entitled to be in possession in the city, town or village concerned. The intendment of the legislature was that the landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential building which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled to under the Act or any other law should not be permitted to recover a possession of another non-residential building belonging to him by evicting the tenant therefrom. In Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah case (1998) 5 SCC 572 the three-Judge Bench held that the view so taken in D. Devaji case 1994 Supp (1) SCC 729 was an extremely narrow and literal construction placed on the provision which had the effect of scuttling the intention of the legislature. The view of the law taken by the High Court of A.P in Vidya Bai case AIR 1988 AP 184, (1987) 2 An LT 550 (FB) becomes, therefore, of doubtful authority.
12. No fault can be found with the view taken by the High Court. The appeal is held devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly. However, the appellant tenant is allowed three months' time for vacating the suit premises subject to his filing the usual undertaking within a period of four weeks from today in the executing court.
Alert