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Simanchal Panda v. State Of Orissa And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Anchalika Mahavidyalaya, Jagannath Prasad, District Ganjam employed three clerical staff members. The appellant joined the college on 8 September 1990 and, although internally designated “Upper Division Clerk/Head Clerk,” he actually performed the duties of a Junior Clerk-cum-Typist. The fourth respondent (writ petitioner before the High Court) held the formal designation of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist, while another employee worked as Lower Division Clerk-cum-Typist.
For the purpose of obtaining government grant-in-aid, the college could secure approval for only one post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist. Relying on the appellant’s seniority, qualifications, and the duties he was already performing, the college recommended him for approval. The competent authority (second respondent) accepted the recommendation on 23 March 1996.
The fourth respondent challenged that approval in OJC No. 3652 of 1996 before the Orissa High Court, contending that she—being the formally designated Junior Clerk-cum-Typist—should have been approved instead. A Division Bench of the High Court agreed, quashed the approval granted to the appellant, and directed approval of the fourth respondent. The appellant then filed the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the competent authority’s approval of the appellant as the sole Junior Clerk-cum-Typist for grant-in-aid purposes was valid under the applicable staff-pattern guidelines.
- Whether the Orissa High Court erred in substituting the fourth respondent in place of the appellant for that approval.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- He was senior to the fourth respondent and had been working as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist since 8 September 1990.
- His internal designation as Upper Division Clerk was solely for administrative convenience and did not alter the fact that he performed the sanctioned duties.
- The college, recognising his seniority and qualifications, properly recommended him for approval, which the Education Department lawfully granted.
- Substituting a junior employee for grant-in-aid approval would create an anomalous and unjust situation.
Fourth Respondent’s Arguments
- She held the formal appointment order designating her as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist.
- Because only one such post could be approved, the competent authority should have ratified her appointment, not that of the appellant.
State Authorities’ Position
- No separate position was articulated; counsel appeared to support the validity of the approval already granted.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court found the High Court’s interference “superficial” and legally unsound. Key elements of its analysis included:
- Seniority and Actual Duties: The appellant had served in the college since 1990 and continuously performed the functions of a Junior Clerk-cum-Typist, making him senior in both tenure and role.
- Administrative Designation vs. Functional Reality: Internal nomenclature (Upper Division Clerk/Head Clerk) did not alter the substantive duties the appellant performed, which matched the sanctioned post.
- Compliance with Grant-in-Aid Norms: Guidelines allowed approval of only one Junior Clerk-cum-Typist. The college, acting within those norms, recommended the appellant, and the Education Department lawfully accepted that recommendation.
- Equitable Considerations: Upholding the High Court’s order would unfairly privilege a junior employee over a senior and better-qualified one, creating “grave and substantial injustice.”
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court had “committed a serious error” in setting aside the competent authority’s approval.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; High Court judgment set aside; writ petition dismissed.
Immediate Effect: The appellant’s approval as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist for grant-in-aid purposes is restored, while the fourth respondent’s challenge is dismissed. The decision resolves the dispute between the parties but sets no new legal precedent beyond reinforcing that administrative designations cannot override actual duties and seniority when applying staff-pattern guidelines.
Doraiswamy Raju, J.— The appellant herein, who lost before the High Court fighting his cause as the fourth respondent in a writ petition filed in the High Court by the fourth respondent in this appeal, has challenged the judgment of the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court dated 4-9-1998 in OJC No. 3652 of 1996 wherein the order dated 23-3-1996 passed by the second respondent herein according approval insofar as it related to the appellant in the category of non-teaching staff as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist in Anchalika Mahavidyalaya Jagannath Prasad, District Ganjam, came to be set aside.
2. The relevant and necessary facts for appreciating the respective claims of the parties before us are that the appellant herein was appointed as the Upper Division Clerk in the college with effect from 8-9-1990 and joined service on 8-9-1990. Since the college, as part of its own staff pattern, had a Junior Clerk (the fourth respondent herein and the writ petitioner in the High Court) and another person as Lower Division Clerk-cum-Typist for purposes of effectively manning and smooth running of the office, the appellant was stated to have been designated as Upper Division Clerk, being senior among the others though it is said, for all purposes he was taken to be the Lower Division Clerk-cum-Typist discharging duties as such from the beginning. Before joining, when the appellant pointed out about this designation as Upper Division Clerk, the college seems to have instructed the appellant to accept appointment giving at the same time an undertaking that he had no objection if the approval of the competent authorities for purposes of grant-in-aid was obtained as Lower Division Clerk or Lower Division Clerk-cum-Typist depending upon the sanction based on the staff pattern permissible and that may be accorded by the authorities for purposes of assessment of aid to the college. It is seen from the combined statement submitted by the college authorities to the Education Department, that the case of the appellant was submitted for approval as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist since that is the category of post to which the sanction could be accorded for the college as per the eligibility criteria laid down for the purpose. When the second respondent passed the order dated 23-3-1996 according approval, as noticed above, the fourth respondent herein filed the writ petition challenging the same by contending that the present appellant in this Court was only appointed as Upper Division Clerk or Head Clerk and it was the writ petitioner in the High Court, the present fourth respondent, who was appointed as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist and, therefore, the approval ought to have been of the appointment of the writ petitioner and not of the appellant. This stand of the fourth respondent herein had the acceptance of the Division Bench of the High Court for the reason that if depending upon the students' strength, the approval can only be of one Junior Clerk-cum-Typist, the writ petitioner who was appointed as such alone could have been approved and approval by the authorities of the present appellant is unwarranted and impermissible in law. While quashing the appointment of the present appellant, directions have been issued to the competent authorities to approve the appointment of the fourth respondent herein within the stipulated time. Aggrieved, as noticed earlier, the present appeal has been filed.
3. Heard Shri P.N Misra, Senior Advocate, for the appellant and Shri Ashok Panda, Senior Advocate, for the fourth respondent and Mr Kirti Misra, Advocate, for the State and its authorities.
4. We have been taken through the relevant papers to substantiate the respective stand of the opposing parties. On a careful consideration of the same we are of the view that the High Court committed a serious error in interfering with the order of approval accorded to the appointment of the appellant as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist for purposes of assessing the quantum of aid. There can be no serious dispute or controversy that the appellant herein was senior to the fourth respondent, he having been working in the college since 8-9-1990 as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist though internally for administrative purposes of the college he was designated as Head Clerk-cum-Upper Division Clerk to enable the smooth running of the office administration, in the light of the two other Clerks employed in the services of the college immediately though subsequently after the appointment of the appellant. It is seen from the qualifications possessed by the respective candidates also that the appellant is fully and better qualified for the post and he has been used as such Junior Clerk-cum-Typist in the college. When, irrespective of the nomenclature given internally to the post held by the three persons in the services of the college, in terms of the guidelines laid down for purposes of assessment of grant-in-aid from the Government only one post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist is permissible and the college authorities taking into account not only the seniority of the appellant but also the fact that the appellant alone has been discharging duties for all effective purposes as Junior Clerk-cum-Typist have chosen to recommend for approval and assessment of grant in order to satisfy the norms pertaining to the grant and the entitlement of the college and the competent authorities in the Education Department has also chosen to accept and accord approval therefor, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the sanction accorded by the second respondent under the impugned order. The reason assigned by the High Court to justify interference appears not only to be superficial but also not in conformity with any settled or accepted principle of law or on facts. It perpetuates on the other hand an anomalous position of justifying approval to the appointment of a junior to the detriment of a senior resulting in grave and substantial injustice. Consequently, we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the reason of the High Court.
5. The appeal is hereby allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and consequently the writ petition filed in the High Court by the fourth respondent shall stand dismissed. No costs.
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