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State Of Gujarat And Others v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent was appointed on 8 September 1982 as a temporary Clerk in the Gujarat Forest Department because no regularly selected candidates were then available under the Gujarat Non-Secretariat Clerks, Clerks-cum-Typists and Typists (Direct Recruitment Procedure) Rules, 1970. When a duly selected candidate joined on 23 March 1984, the respondent was relieved on 28 March 1984. He challenged the termination in Special Civil Application No. 1777 of 1984 before the Gujarat High Court, asserting that the dismissal was invalid for non-compliance with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The learned Single Judge, relying chiefly on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, set aside the termination. The Division Bench affirmed that decision, additionally referring to Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare. The State of Gujarat appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Forest Department of the State of Gujarat constitutes “an industry” within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- If not an industry, whether the respondent’s termination is nonetheless void for want of compliance with Section 25-F of the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
State of Gujarat (Appellant)
- The Forest Department performs sovereign functions and cannot be characterised as an “industry”.
- The judgments relied upon by the High Court examine specific schemes, not the department as a whole; hence those precedents are inapplicable.
- Because the establishment is not an industry, the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F do not apply to the respondent’s termination.
Respondent
- The writ petition contained positive assertions that the Forest Department is an industry; the State did not effectively deny these assertions.
- On the authority of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, the Forest Department’s functions fall outside the realm of sovereign activity, attracting the Industrial Disputes Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) 2 SCC 213 |
Laid down the broad and inclusive test for what constitutes an “industry” under the Industrial Disputes Act. | Relied upon by the Single Judge; the Supreme Court noted that the High Court applied it without examining factual details of the Forest Department’s functions. |
| Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (1996) 2 SCC 293 |
Held that a particular forestry scheme was not part of the State’s sovereign functions. | Division Bench relied on this case; the Supreme Court clarified the decision was scheme-specific and did not declare the entire Forest Department to be an industry. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasised that the burden of proving that an establishment is an industry rests on the claimant. Government departments are ordinarily part of the sovereign functions of the State and are not presumed to be industries.
In the present matter, the respondent failed to plead or prove facts describing either the nature of his duties or the operational activities of the Forest Department to demonstrate industrial character. Conversely, the State specifically denied that the department is an industry. Despite this, both the Single Judge and the Division Bench treated the Forest Department as an industry solely on the authority of earlier Supreme Court decisions without undertaking the necessary factual inquiry.
The Court distinguished Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, noting that the decision was confined to a particular forestry scheme supported by detailed affidavits, and did not lay down a blanket rule applicable to the entire Forest Department. Because the respondent furnished no factual foundation, the High Court had erroneously invoked that precedent.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the Industrial Disputes Act, including Section 25-F, was inapplicable, rendering the High Court’s interference with the termination order legally unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench set aside; the respondent’s writ petition stands dismissed.
The immediate consequence is that the respondent’s termination remains valid, and no relief under the Industrial Disputes Act is available. The Court’s ruling underscores that a governmental department is not automatically an “industry”; specific factual pleadings and proof are essential before statutory labour protections can be invoked. No broader precedent was created beyond reinforcing the evidentiary burden on employees in similar disputes.
Order
1. This appeal by the State of Gujarat is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court which upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the said High Court. The question for consideration in this appeal is, whether the Forest Department in the State of Gujarat wherein the respondent was appointed as a Clerk can be held to be “an industry” within the meaning of the said expression under the Industrial Disputes Act (for short “the Act”) so that an order of termination, without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act would get vitiated.
2. Be it stated that the appointment to the posts of Clerks, Clerks-cum-Typists and Typists in the State of Gujarat is governed by a set of rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India called the Gujarat Non-Secretariat Clerks, Clerks-Typists and Typists (Direct Recruitment Procedure) Rules, 1970 (for short “the Recruitment Rules”). In 1982, the Conservator of Forests wanted two Clerks to be appointed but, as in accordance with the prescribed procedure no candidate could be made available, the respondent was appointed on a purely temporary basis on 8-9-1982 and continued as such till 28-3-1984 on which date he was relieved since another candidate duly selected in accordance with the Recruitment Rules was appointed on 23-3-1984. The respondent approached the High Court by filing a writ petition which was registered as SCA No. 1777 of 1984. It was averred in the writ petition that since the respondent had been duly selected by a process of selection and had been continuing ever since his date of appointment, the termination without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act vitiated the order of termination. The State in its counter-affidavit took the stand that the selection of the respondent was not on regular basis and the Forest Department to which the respondent had been recruited, cannot be held to be “an industry” within the meaning of Section 2(2)(j) of the Act and as such the question of compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act does not arise.
3. The learned Single Judge, without examining the nature of duty discharged by the respondent as well as the nature of job of the organisation to which the respondent was recruited, following the judgment of this Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) 2 SCC 213 came to the conclusion that the impugned order of termination was vitiated for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, the order of termination was set aside against which judgment the State had moved in appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench also took into consideration yet another judgment of this Court in the case of Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (1996) 2 SCC 293 and came to the conclusion that this Court has taken the view that the work undertaken by the Forest Department cannot be regarded as part and parcel of the sovereign function of the State and as such the Single Judge did not commit any error in setting aside the order of termination for non-compliance with Section 25-F of the Act.
4. Mr Dholakia, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Gujarat contended before us that both the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench committed serious error in holding that the Forest Department of the State of Gujarat is “an industry” and thereby applying the provisions of the Act to the order of termination of an employee under the said Department. He further contended that in the case upon which reliance has been placed, this Court on consideration of the affidavits of the Chief Conservator of Forests examined the nature of the job that was being discharged by the employee concerned and the scheme that had been undertaken by the Department wherein the employee had been recruited and then came to hold that the said scheme cannot be regarded as a part of the sovereign function of the State. It has nowhere been stated that the Forest Department itself would be “an industry”. Mr Anand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that in view of the positive assertions made in the writ petition, there has been no denial by the State in its counter-affidavit and, therefore, the Court was fully justified in relying upon the judgment of this Court in coming to the conclusion that the establishment to which the respondent was appointed is “an industry”.
5. If a dispute arises as to whether a particular establishment or part of it wherein an appointment has been made is an industry or not, it would be for the person concerned who claims the same to be an industry, to give positive facts for coming to the conclusion that it constitutes “an industry”. Ordinarily, a department of the Government cannot be held to be an industry and rather it is a part of the sovereign function. To find out whether the respondent in the writ petition had made any assertion that with regard to the duty which he was discharging and with regard to the activities of the organisation where he had been recruited, we find that there has not been an iota of assertion to that effect though, no doubt, it has been contended that the order of dismissal is vitiated for non-compliance with Section 25-F of the Act. The State in its counter-affidavit, on the other hand, refuted the assertion of the respondent in the writ petition and took the positive stand that the Forest Department cannot be held to be an industry so that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act cannot have any application. In the absence of any assertion by the petitioner in the writ petition indicating the nature of duty discharged by the petitioner as well as the job of the establishment where he had been recruited, the High Court wholly erred in law in applying the principles enunciated in the judgment of this Court in Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (1996) 2 SCC 293 to hold that the Forest Department could be held to be “an industry”.
6. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court have failed to carefully examine the ratio of this Court's judgment in Jagannath Maruti Kondhare case (1996) 2 SCC 293 inasmuch as in para 15 of the said judgment, the Court has quoted the assertions made in the affidavit of the Chief Conservator of Forests and then in para 17, the Court held that the scheme undertaken cannot be regarded as a part of the sovereign function of the State. We are afraid that the aforesaid decision cannot have any application to the facts of the present case where there has not been any assertion of fact by the petitioner in establishing that the establishment to which he had been appointed is “an industry”. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench committed serious error of law in holding that to the appointment in question, the provisions of the Act apply. We would accordingly set aside the judgment of the Division Bench as well as that of the learned Single Judge and hold that the writ petition would stand dismissed.
7. Mr Anand then submitted that by virtue of an interim order, this Court had observed that the pendency of the appeal in this Court does not stand in the way of the State Government to consider the case of regularisation of the respondent since he has continued for a pretty long time. We do not think it appropriate to make any observation on that score since the impugned judgment proceeded on the basis of applicability of the Act and we have already held that the judgment is erroneous in law. This appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
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