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State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others v. Raj Pal Singh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal challenges a judgment of the High Court of Allahabad which interfered with the punishment imposed on the respondent in disciplinary proceedings. The respondent, an Assistant Warder, was accused (along with four other Assistant Warders) of beating one Shivdan Singh and of not heeding senior officers who tried to dissuade them. The allegations were proved in departmental proceedings. The disciplinary authority dismissed the respondent, while imposing a lesser penalty (stoppage of five increments) on some of the other Assistant Warders.
The respondent first challenged the dismissal before the Public Services Tribunal, which refused to interfere. He then approached the High Court. The High Court held that because the charges and delinquency were the same for all employees arising out of the same incident, there was no justification for imposing different punishments. It set aside the dismissal, substituted the punishment with stoppage of five increments (as imposed on some co-delinquents), and directed payment of 50% back wages. The High Court’s order was challenged in this appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment after the disciplinary charges were held proved.
- Whether imposing different punishments on multiple employees charged for the same incident on identical allegations amounts to impermissible discrimination.
- Whether, and to what extent, the respondent was entitled to back wages for the period between dismissal and reinstatement.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Once the charges were held established, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the quantum of punishment.
- The High Court’s substitution of punishment could not be sustained, and reliance was placed on decisions of the Supreme Court in support of limited judicial interference with punishment in disciplinary matters.
Respondent's Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| B.C Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749, (1996) 32 ATC 44 | Relied upon by the appellants to contend that, after charges are proved, courts should not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment. | The Court noted that the ratio would ordinarily apply, but held that in the present case the High Court’s interference was justified because identical charges arising out of the same incident led to different punishments without any shown distinction in delinquency. |
| Secy. to Govt., Home Deptt. v. Srivaikundathan (1998) 9 SCC 553 | Relied upon by the appellants on the same proposition regarding limited judicial interference with punishment once misconduct is proved. | The Court treated the principle as generally applicable, yet declined interference under Article 136 because differential punishment for identical misconduct was found discriminatory in the absence of any demonstrated difference among delinquents. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court acknowledged that, as a matter of principle, the decisions cited by the appellants would ordinarily support the proposition that courts should not interfere with the quantum of punishment once charges are established. However, it examined the basis of the High Court’s reasoning: the High Court had compared the charges against all five employees arising from the same incident and concluded that the gravity of charges was the same.
The Court held that the High Court’s conclusion could not be faulted because the State was unable to point out any difference in the respondent’s delinquency as compared with the others. While reaffirming that disciplinary authorities have the power to impose appropriate punishment once charges are proved, the Court emphasized that when charges are “same and identical” in relation to the same incident, imposing different punishments on different delinquents would be discriminatory.
On the question of back wages, the Court departed from the High Court’s direction of paying 50% back wages. Considering the nature of the charges, it declined to grant any back wages for the period between dismissal and the date of reinstatement. The Court recorded that the respondent had been reinstated on 5-11-1997.
Holding and Implications
DISPOSED OF: The Court declined to interfere with the High Court’s substitution of the punishment (treating differential punishment for identical misconduct as discriminatory and finding no infirmity warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution). However, it modified the relief on back wages by directing that the respondent would not be entitled to any back wages from the date of dismissal until reinstatement on 5-11-1997.
The direct effect was that the respondent’s dismissal remained set aside and the substituted penalty (stoppage of five increments) stood, but the monetary relief was curtailed by denial of back wages for the dismissal-to-reinstatement period. The opinion does not indicate that any new precedent was laid down beyond applying the non-discrimination principle to differential punishment on identical charges.
Order
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad interfering with an order of punishment inflicted upon the respondent in disciplinary proceedings.
2. Admittedly, the respondent was an Assistant Warder and the allegation against him was that he along with four other Assistant Warders had beaten one Shivdan Singh, and even though the senior officers dissuaded them, they never listened to them. These allegations were proved in departmental proceedings and the disciplinary authority passed the order of dismissal so far as the present respondent is concerned, though in respect of some others, he passed the order of stoppage of five increments.
3. The respondent assailed the legality of the order by approaching the Public Services Tribunal. The Tribunal having refused to interfere, he approached the High Court. The High Court came to the conclusion that the charges and the delinquency being same and identical, and all the employees having been served with a set of charges out of the same incident, there was no justifiable reason to pass different orders of punishment, and therefore, the order of dismissal cannot be sustained. The High Court consequently set aside the order of dismissal and directed stoppage of five increments in case of the respondent as was the order in case of some other Assistant Warders. The High Court further directed that the delinquent respondent would be paid only 50% of back wages. It is this order of the High Court which is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal.
4. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that once the charges have been held to be established, it was not appropriate for the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment and judged from this standpoint, the order of the High Court cannot be sustained. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in B.C Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749, (1996) 32 ATC 44 and Secy. to Govt., Home Deptt. v. Srivaikundathan (1998) 9 SCC 553.
5. Though, on principle the ratio in aforesaid cases would ordinarily apply, but in the case in hand, the High Court appears to have considered the nature of charges levelled against the five employees who stood charged on account of the incident that happened on the same day and then the High Court came to the conclusion that since the gravity of charges was the same, it was not open for the disciplinary authority to impose different punishments for different delinquents. The reasoning given by the High Court cannot be faulted with since the State is not able to indicate as to any difference in the delinquency of these employees.
6. It is undoubtedly open for the disciplinary authority to deal with the delinquency and once charges are established to award appropriate punishment. But when the charges are same and identical in relation to one and the same incident, then to deal with the delinquents differently in the award of punishment, would be discriminatory. In this view of the matter, we see no infirmity with the impugned order requiring our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.
7. Though the High Court by the impugned judgment has directed that the delinquent would be paid 50% of the back wages, but having regard to the nature of charges against the respondent, we are not inclined to allow any back wages from the period of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. We are told that he has been reinstated on 5-11-1997. We make it clear that the respondent will not be entitled to any back wages from the date of dismissal till 5-11-1997.
8. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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